Chance,determinism and the classical theory of probability

This paper situates the metaphysical antinomy between chance and determinism in the historical context of some of the earliest developments in the mathematical theory of probability. Since Hacking's seminal work on the subject, it has been a widely held view that the classical theorists of probability were guilty of an unwitting equivocation between a subjective, or epistemic, interpretation of probability, on the one hand, and an objective, or statistical, interpretation, on the other. While there is some truth to this account, I argue that the tension at the heart of the classical theory of probability is not best understood in terms of the duality between subjective and objective interpretations of probability. Rather, the apparent paradox of chance and determinism, when viewed through the lens of the classical theory of probability, manifests itself in a much deeper ambivalence on the part of the classical probabilists as to the rational commensurability of causal and probabilistic reasoning.     

Aristotle on the infallibility of normal observation

Whereas it is well established that Aristotle allowed the possibility of error in some observations, it is often held that he was an infallibilist with respect to normal observational beliefs. We shall argue against this interpretation of Aristotle, and in particular show that it is not implicit in his view that observation is the ‘ultimate arbiter of truth’.     

Fine ways to fail to secure local realism

Since he proved his theorem in 1982, Fine has been challenging the traditional interpretation of the experimental violation of the Bell Inequalities (BI). A natural interpretation of Fine's theorem is that it provides us with an alternative set of assumptions on which to place blame for the failure of the BI, and opens to a new interpretation of the violation of the BI. Fine has a stronger interpretation for his theorem. He claims that his result undermines the traditional interpretation in terms of local realism. The aim of this paper is to understand and to assess Fine's claim. We distinguish three different strategies that Fine uses in order to support his view. We show that none of these strategies is successful. Fine fails to prove that local realism is not at stake in the violation of the BI by quantum phenomena.     

Helmholtz's early empiricism and the Erhaltung der Kraft

Hermann Helmholtz has often been understood to have started research under the influence of Kant, and then to have made a transition to a later mature empiricist phase. Without claiming that in 1847 Helmholtz held the same positions that he later espoused, I suggest that already in his 1847 ‘Über die Erhaltung der Kraft’ one may find important aspects of his later empiricism. I highlight the ways in which, from early on, Helmholtz turned Kant to use in developing an empirical program of inquiry into possible basic natural causes. To that end, I indicate how, throughout his arguments, Helmholtz employed, sometimes explicitly, but often tacitly, an empiricist logic, one that ran contrary to any form of transcendental deduction, and even to all a priori knowledge. Instead of deriving aspects about the ultimate constituents of nature, Helmholtz aimed to define the proper project for physical natural science. The first part of the paper describes the context of discussion in which Helmholtz entered. The bulk of the paper then analyzes Helmholtz's arguments in order to make space between (1) Kantian, and other, deductions of characteristics that must be true of nature and (2) Helmholtz's delineation of empirically determinable characteristics of presumed ultimate elements of nature, ones that he meant to be specified and delimited through future experimental research. The paper highlights that throughout his discussion Helmholtz meant to define the proper project for physical natural science, a project rife with empiricist aspects.     

Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of ‘anything goes’

The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan ‘anything goes’, was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munévar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003; Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specifically, I present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabend's radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be ‘methodological opportunists’, which Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the more influential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of ‘anything goes’ on Feyerabendian grounds.     

History of Science through Koyré's Lenses

Alexandre Koyré was one of the most prominent historians of science of the twentieth century. The standard interpretation of Koyré is that he falls squarely within the internalist camp of historians of science—that he focuses on the history of the ideas themselves, eschewing cultural and sociological interpretations regarding the influence of ideologies and institutions on the development of science. When we read what Koyré has to say about his historical studies (and most of what others have said about them), we find him embracing and championing this Platonic view of his work. Ultimately I think this interpretation of Koyré's history of science is lopsided and in need of correction. I claim, rather, that a careful reading of Koyré's work suggests that a tension exists between internal and external methodological considerations. The external considerations stem from Koyré's commitment to the unity of human thought and the influence he admits that the ‘transscientifiques’ (philosophy, metaphysics, religion) have on the development of science. I suggest in conclusion then, that if we are to put a philosophical label on his work, rather than ‘Platonist’, as has been the custom, ‘Hegelian’ makes a better fit.     

Instrumentalizing Failure: Edison's Invention of the Carbon Microphone

For Thomas Edison, experiencing a failure did not mean that he had failed. Through an examination of the process that led to his invention of the carbon microphone, I argue that his positive approach to failure contributed both to his success as an inventor and to the functional success of his inventions. Edison's laboratory notebooks and legal testimony reveal that his seemingly erratic approach and reliance on trial and error methods in fact had a consistent direction and a rational basis, well suited to the under-determined problems he faced. The outcome of this process, the carbon microphone, contributed significantly to the commercial success of the telephone and remains in use today. Thomas Hughes has observed that nineteenth century inventors made use of the unexpected behaviour of their inventions as sources of novel phenomena to exploit in new inventions. This paper identifies other ways in which Edison made use of failure and proposes that, paradoxically, the success of technological artefacts can be determined by the thoroughness with which failure is pursued in their creation. It also notes a parallel between Edison's instrumentalizing of failure and the way in which recent philosophers of science have proposed that scientists should make use of error.     

Understanding Deutsch's probability in a deterministic multiverse

Difficulties over probability have often been considered fatal to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I argue that the Everettian can have everything she needs from ‘probability’ without recourse to indeterminism, ignorance, primitive identity over time or subjective uncertainty: all she needs is a particular rationality principle.The decision-theoretic approach recently developed by Deutsch and Wallace claims to provide just such a principle. But, according to Wallace, decision theory is itself applicable only if the correct attitude to a future Everettian measurement outcome is subjective uncertainty. I argue that subjective uncertainty is not available to the Everettian, but I offer an alternative: we can justify the Everettian application of decision theory on the basis that an Everettian should care about all her future branches. The probabilities appearing in the decision-theoretic representation theorem can then be interpreted as the degrees to which the rational agent cares about each future branch. This reinterpretation, however, reduces the intuitive plausibility of one of the Deutsch–Wallace axioms (measurement neutrality).     

Kuhn reconstructed: Incommensurability without relativism

The standard reading of Kuhn's philosophy attributes to him the view that the incommensurability of rival theories and theory-ladenness of observation make rational debate about competing paradigms nearly impossible. If this reflects his real view, then he has claimed something prima facie absurd, and easily refuted with historical counter-examples. It is not the incommensurability thesis per se that is easily refutable, but Kuhn's gestelt interpretation of it. The gestalt interpretation, moreover misrepresents his more fundamental ideas on paradigms, and is in itself confused. The incommensurability thesis can be explained and defended without invoking gestalts, and this reconstructed view can be used to show that familiar criticisms, such as those of Davidson and Laudan, and unwelcome endorsements, such as that of Barnes, which are based on the assumption that Kuhn must be an extreme relativist, are all directed at views that he need not, and should not, hold.     

Minds, machines and economic agents: Cambridge receptions of Boole and Babbage

In the 1860s and 1870s the logic of Boole and the calculating machines of Babbage were key resources in W. S. Jevons’s attempt to construct a mechanical model of the mind, and both therefore played an important role in Jevons’s attempted revolution in economic theory. In this same period both Boole and Babbage were studied within the Cambridge Moral Sciences Tripos, but the Cambridge reading of Boole and Babbage was much more circumspect. Implicitly following the division of the moral sciences into material and ‘real’ as established by the Rev. Grote, John Venn treated Boole’s logic as a purely formal science, while Alfred Marshall based his psychological model of the mechanical part of the human mind upon Babbage’s two-level machine. From the different perspectives of logic and psychology, Venn and Marshall did not simply incorporate their readings of Boole and Babbage, but also attempted to establish the limits to any mechanical explanation of the mind. This comparison of the attitudes to mental science of Jevons and Marshall provides a foundation from which the differing conceptions of economic theory of the two men can be established.     

The problem of grounding natural modality in Kant's account of empirical laws of nature

One of the central problems of Kant's account of the empirical laws of nature is: What grounds their necessity? In this article I discuss the three most important lines of interpretation and suggest a novel version of one of them. While the first interpretation takes the transcendental principles as the only sources of the empirical laws' necessity, the second interpretation takes the systematicity of the laws to guarantee their necessity. It is shown that both views involve serious problems. The third interpretation, the “causal powers interpretation”, locates the source of the laws' necessity in the properties of natural objects. Although the second and third interpretations seem incompatible, I analyse why Kant held both views and I argue that they can be reconciled, because the metaphysical grounding project of the laws' necessity is accounted for by Kant's causal powers account, while his best system account explains our epistemic access to the empirical laws. If, however, causal powers are supposed to fulfil the grounding function for the laws' natural modality, then I suggest that a novel reading of the causal powers interpretation should be formulated along the lines of a genuine dispositionalist conception of the laws of nature.     

On de Movire's solutions of the problem of duration of play 1708–1718

Summary I attempt to solve the enigma of how de Moivre derived his recursion formulae and the formulae for the probability of a duration of exactly n games. I believe that he obtained the latter probability by differencing Nicholas Bernoulli's formula for the probability of ruin and that he obtained the recursion formulae by a simple algebraic method and induction.     

Pierre-Joseph Macquer an Eighteenth-Century Artisanal-Scientific Expert

Summary

Pierre-Joseph Macquer (1718–1784) is well known as one of the major chemists in the eighteenth century as a theoretician and a teacher. He is also known for his works on dyeing. This paper presents a new face of Macquer. He proposed a theory on mordants in dyeing as early as 1775. Besides his activity at the Académie des sciences, he played an important role in Government as the commissioner of dyeing from 1766 where he established close links with artisan inventors. Académicien chimiste at the royal Manufactory of Sèvres from 1757, he was also the inventor of French porcelain. His notebooks show his organization, method, courage, passion and obstinacy in the search for the paste for hard porcelain. He also proposed an interpretation of its formation. Macquer was both a theoretician and a practical expert in dyeing as well as in porcelain making. He managed to bridge the gap between science and art.     

Atomism and ‘subtlety’ in Francis Bacon's philosophy

Francis Bacon's reflections on atomism have generally been misunderstood because they have never been systematically studied in relation to the speculative chemical philosophy which he developed in the interval between about 1592 and his death in 1626. This philosophy, in many respects unknown to historians until quite recently, was the only body of positive science which Bacon ever accepted. The speculative philosophy was, on the whole, chemical and non-mechanical, and consequently not consistent with atomist doctrines. In fact, Bacon never at any time accepted the principal atomist tenets. It is therefore necessary to explain why he was interested in atomism at all. Of the several reasons for his interest one (hitherto unrecognised) is especially important—namely, his belief that the speculative and atomic philosophies had affinities. In particular, he believed that of all the ancient philosophies atomism alone approached the ideals associated with the key notion of ‘subtlety’—ideals represented in their highest form (as he imagined) in the speculative philosophy.     

Goethe's critique of Newton: A reconsideration

The masses may concede that someone has talent where he has displayed a certain industry and fortune has not been unkind to him; but if he tries to enter another field and diversify his abilities, he appears to damage the claim he once had on public opinion, and therefore his efforts in a new realm are seldom accepted with favor and good will.     

The metaphysics of D-CTCs: On the underlying assumptions of Deutsch׳s quantum solution to the paradoxes of time travel

I argue that Deutsch׳s model for the behavior of systems traveling around closed timelike curves (CTCs) relies implicitly on a substantive metaphysical assumption. Deutsch is employing a version of quantum theory with a significantly supplemented ontology of parallel existent worlds, which differ in kind from the many worlds of the Everett interpretation. Standard Everett does not support the existence of multiple identical copies of the world, which the D-CTC model requires. This has been obscured because he often refers to the branching structure of Everett as a “multiverse”, and describes quantum interference by reference to parallel interacting definite worlds. But he admits that this is only an approximation to Everett. The D-CTC model, however, relies crucially on the existence of a multiverse of parallel interacting worlds. Since his model is supplemented by structures that go significantly beyond quantum theory, and play an ineliminable role in its predictions and explanations, it does not represent a quantum solution to the paradoxes of time travel.     

Pictures and pedagogy: The role of diagrams in Feynman's early lectures

This paper aims to give a substantive account of how Feynman used diagrams in the first lectures in which he explained his new approach to quantum electrodynamics. By critically examining unpublished lecture notes, Feynman's use and interpretation of both “Feynman diagrams” and other visual representations will be illuminated. This paper will discuss how the morphology of Feynman's early diagrams were determined by both highly contextual issues, which molded his images to local needs and particular physical characterizations, and an overarching common diagrammatic style, which facilitated Feynman's movement between different diagrams despite their divergent forms and significance.     

Duhem’s theory of mixture in the light of the Stoic challenge to the Aristotelian conception

The bulk of Duhem’s writing which bears on the understanding of mixtures suggests he adopted an Aristotelian position which he opposed only to the atomic view. A third view from antiquity—that of the Stoics—seems not to be taken into account. But his lines of thought are not always as explicit as could be wished. The Stoic view is considered here from a perspective which Duhem might well have adopted. This provides a background against which his somewhat unorthodox Aristotelianism might be understood.     

Hermeneutic strategies in Gerd Buchdahl’s Kantian philosophy of science

Gerd Buchdahl’s international reputation rests on his masterly writings on Kant. In them he showed how Kant transformed the philosophical problems of his predecessors and he minutely investigated the ways in which Kant related his critical philosophy to the contents and methods of natural science. Less well known, if only because in large part unpublished, are the writings in which Buchdahl elaborated his own views on the methods and status of the sciences. In this paper I examine the roles of hermeneutics in Buchdahl’s reconstruction of Kant’s philosophical system and in his own ‘transcendental methodological’ approach to the philosophy of science. The first section looks at Buchdahl’s views on the theory and practice of historical interpretation and at the Husserlian hermeneutic scheme of reduction and realisation that he used in his later accounts of the philosophies of science of Kant and himself. The second section concentrates on Buchdahl’s treatment of the grounds of science in Kant; and the third on the hermeneutic strategies Buchdahl employed in articulating and justifying his own views. The paper closes with reflections on the impact and importance of Buchdahl’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy in relation to the sciences and of his own hermeneutically based philosophy of science.