The detection of fraud and fakery

Summary Fraud is often found in science, especially in what is termed, fringe science. There are several reasons why scientists should be aware of the fact that they, too, can be deceived, both by subjects in experiments and by themselves. The will to believe is strong even among hard-headed academics, and is often the factor that causes them to publish results that do not stand up to subsequent examination and/or attempts to replicate. In some cases, scientists would be well advised to consult with such experts as conjurors, when skilled frauds are in a position to mislead them.     

Cognition wars

In what kinds of physical systems can cognition be realized? There are currently competing answers among scientists and theorists of cognition. There are many plant scientists who maintain that cognition can be realized in plants. There are biological scientists who maintain that cognition is materially realized in bacteria. In this paper, I will present the basis for such claims and evaluate them and discuss the future for theories of the metaphysical basis of cognition in the cognitive sciences.     

Evaluating community science

Community science—scientific investigation conducted partly or entirely by non-professional scientists—has many advantages. For example, community science mobilizes large numbers of volunteers who can, at low cost, collect more data than traditional teams of professional scientists. Participation in research can also increase volunteers’ knowledge about and appreciation of science. At the same time, there are worries about the quality of data that community science projects produce. Can the work of non-professionals really deliver trustworthy results? Attempts to answer this question generally compare data collected by volunteers to data collected by professional scientists. When volunteer data is more variable or less accurate than professionally collected data, then the community science project is judged to be inferior to traditional science. I argue that this is not the right standard to use when evaluating community science, because it relies on a false assumption about the aims of science. I show that if we adopt the view that science has diverse aims which are often in tension with one another, then we cannot justify holding community science data to an expert accuracy standard. Instead, we should evaluate the quality of community science data based on its adequacy-for-purpose.     

The methodological defense of realism scrutinized

I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As a consequence, they are less likely to get at the truth.My aim is to show that the methodological defense is flawed. I argue that a commitment to realism does not always benefit science, and that there is reason to believe that a research community with both realists and anti-realists in it may be better suited to advancing science. A case study of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy supports this claim.     

Overlapping ontologies and Indigenous knowledge. From integration to ontological self-determination

Current controversies about knowledge integration reflect conflicting ideas of what it means to “take Indigenous knowledge seriously”. While there is increased interest in integrating Indigenous and Western scientific knowledge in various disciplines such as anthropology and ethnobiology, integration projects are often accused of recognizing Indigenous knowledge only insofar as it is useful for Western scientists. The aim of this article is to use tools from philosophy of science to develop a model of both successful integration and integration failures. On the one hand, I argue that cross-cultural recognition of property clusters leads to an ontological overlap that makes knowledge integration often epistemically productive and socially useful. On the other hand, I argue that knowledge integration is limited by ontological divergence. Adequate models of Indigenous knowledge will therefore have to take integration failures seriously and I argue that integration efforts need to be complemented by a political notion of ontological self-determination.     

‘Holding’ and ‘endorsing’ claims in the course of scientific activities

My principal aims are to show that holding, adopting and endorsing (definitions of which I provide) are distinct cognitive attitudes that may be taken towards claims at different moments of scientific activities, and that none of them are reducible to acceptance (as defined by Jonathan Cohen); to explore in detail the differences between holding and accepting, using the controversies about GMOs to provide illustrations; and to draw some implications pertinent to democratic decision-making concerning public policies about science and technology, and to the responsibilities that scientists thereby incur.     

On the narrative form of simulations

Understanding complex physical systems through the use of simulations often takes on a narrative character. That is, scientists using simulations seek an understanding of processes occurring in time by generating them from a dynamic model, thereby producing something like a historical narrative. This paper focuses on simulations of the Diels-Alder reaction, which is widely used in organic chemistry. It calls on several well-known works on historical narrative to draw out the ways in which use of these simulations mirrors aspects of narrative understanding: Gallie for “followability” and “contingency”; Mink for “synoptic judgment”; Ricoeur for “temporal dialectic”; and Hawthorn for a related dialectic of the “actual and the possible”. Through these reflections on narrative, the paper aims for a better grasp of the role that temporal development sometimes plays in understanding physical processes and of how considerations of possibility enhance that understanding.     

Modelling and representing: An artefactual approach to model-based representation

The recent discussion on scientific representation has focused on models and their relationship to the real world. It has been assumed that models give us knowledge because they represent their supposed real target systems. However, here agreement among philosophers of science has tended to end as they have presented widely different views on how representation should be understood. I will argue that the traditional representational approach is too limiting as regards the epistemic value of modelling given the focus on the relationship between a single model and its supposed target system, and the neglect of the actual representational means with which scientists construct models. I therefore suggest an alternative account of models as epistemic tools. This amounts to regarding them as concrete artefacts that are built by specific representational means and are constrained by their design in such a way that they facilitate the study of certain scientific questions, and learning from them by means of construction and manipulation.     

Reflections on the preservation of recent scientific heritage in dispersed university collections

The bulk of the significant recent scientific heritage of universities is not to be found in accredited science museums or collections employed in research. Rather it is located in a wide variety of more informal collections, assemblages and accumulations. The selection and documentation of such materials is very often unsystematic and many of them are vulnerable to changes of staff, relocation and, above all, shortage of space. Following a survey of views on the values of the recent material heritage of the sciences, I consider the many advantages—for teaching, engagement with wider communities, enhancement of institutional identity and work experience, celebration of scientific achievements, study of the recent history of the practices and fruits of the sciences, etc.—of “multi-site museums” formed through the coordination of such varied and scattered collections. I go on to reflect on ways in which the preservation and display of scientific heritage in dispersed collections may be enhanced and protected through institutional recognition and through provision of guidance and assistance in selection, documentation and digitisation, preservation and conservation, and display. The importance of adequate documentation of the contexts of production and use of objects is stressed, as are the benefits that can result from involvement of student “taskforces” and heritage-concerned scientists.     

To envision a new particle or change an existing law? Hypothesis formation and anomaly resolution for the curious case of the β decay spectrum

This paper addresses the question of how scientists determine which type of hypothesis is most suitable for tackling a particular problem by examining the historical case of the anomalous β spectrum in early nuclear physics (1927–1934), a puzzle that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown that such determinations are most often implicitly informed by scientists' individual perspectives on the structural relations between the various elements of the theory and the problem at hand. In addition to this main result, it is suggested that Wolfgang Pauli's neutrino idea may well have been an adaptation of Ernst Rutherford's original and older neutron idea, which would provide evidence that the adaptation of older ideas is a more common practice than is often thought.     

Food for thought?: the relations between the Royal Society Food Committee and government, 1915-19

This paper traces the relationship between the food committees of the Royal Society and government during the First World War, concentrating on the period up to the resignation of Lord Devonport as first Food Controller. It argues that, in the context of a radical public science discourse emanating from some sections of the scientific community and greatly increased contacts between scientists and the government, the food scientists of the committees were moved to press for a formalization of the committees' role in food policy. The members constantly manoeuvered to achieve this aim, but also used a network of alternative channels into the heart of the policy process to get their findings translated into hard policy. In doing so, they explicitly rehearsed characteristic 'public science' arguments. In the institutional blur of wartime state-science relations, scientists often got close to the policy-making process. Post-War, the state swiftly moved to clarify the position: science was to be given more money, but was to be specifically blocked by new administrative arrangements embodied in the Haldane Report on the Machinery of Government from having any say in the core areas of general policy, the expert domain of the generalist policy-maker.     

Models and the dynamics of theory-building in physics. Part I—Modeling strategies

A deeper understanding of models is sought in considering what models do, rather what they are. This distinction emphasizes how two different modeling strategies, as they pursue different purposes, do invest in different options, in particular in regard to rigor and immediate empirical relevance. The analysis focuses therefore on the services expected from models by the scientists who construct them: models are sought for how they contribute to exploring and testing the context in which they operate. In a forthcoming Part II these general considerations will be anchored in the presentation of specific case studies.     

Subjectivity and emotion in scientific research

A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion with subjectivity. The proposed method is a naturalistic and externalist one, calling for empirical investigation into the intersubjective processes by which scientists’ emotional dispositions become refined and attuned to specific objects of attention. The proposal is developed through a critical discussion of Michael Polanyi’s theory of scientific passions, as well as plant geneticist Barbara McClintock’s celebrated “feeling for the organism.”     

Book reviews

This paper traces the relationship between the food committees of the Royal Society and government during the First World War, concentrating on the period up to the resignation of Lord Devonport as first Food Controller. It argues that, in the context of a radical public science discourse emanating from some sections of the scientific community and greatly increased contacts between scientists and government, the food scientists of the committees were moved to press for a formalization of the committees' role in food policy. The members constantly manoeuvred to achieve this aim, but also used a network of alternative channels into the heart of the policy process to get their findings translated into hard policy. In doing so, they explicitly rehearsed characteristic 'public science' arguments. In the institutional blur of wartime state-science relations, scientists often got close to the policy-making process. Post-War, the state swiftly moved to clarify the position: science was to be given more money, but was to be specifically blocked by new administrative arrangements embodied in the Haldane Report on the Machinery of Government from having any say in the core areas of general policy, the expert domain of the generalist policy-maker.     

Philosophy in the trenches: from naturalized to experimental philosophy (of science)

Recent years have seen the development of an approach both to general philosophy and philosophy of science often referred to as ‘experimental philosophy’ or just ‘X-Phi’. Philosophers often make or presuppose empirical claims about how people would react to hypothetical cases, but their evidence for claims about what ‘we’ would say is usually very limited indeed. Philosophers of science have largely relied on their more or less intimate knowledge of their field of study to draw hypothetical conclusions about the state of scientific concepts and the nature of conceptual change in science. What they are lacking is some more objective quantitative data supporting their hypotheses. A growing number of philosophers (of science), along with a few psychologists and anthropologists, have tried to remedy this situation by designing experiments aimed at systematically exploring people’s reactions to philosophically important thought experiments or scientists’ use of their scientific concepts. Many of the results have been surprising and some of the conclusions drawn from them have been more than a bit provocative. This symposium attempts to provide a window into this new field of philosophical inquiry and to show how experimental philosophy provides crucial tools for the philosopher and encourages two-way interactions between scientists and philosophers.     

The role of psychology in behavioral economics: The case of social preferences

Behavioral economics is a field of study that is often thought of as interdisciplinary, insofar as it uses psychological insights to inform economic models. Yet the level of conceptual and methodological exchange between the two disciplines is disputed in the literature. On the one hand, behavioral economic models are often presented as psychologically informed models of individual decision-making (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2003). On the other hand, these models have often been criticized for being merely more elaborated “as if” economic models (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010). The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by looking at a central topic in behavioral economics: the case of social preferences. Have findings or research methods been exchanged between psychology and economics in this research area? Have scientists with different backgrounds “travelled” across domains, thus transferring their expertise from one discipline to another? By addressing these and related questions, this paper will assess the level of knowledge transfer between psychology and economics in the study of social preferences.     

Splenic enzyme systems as affected by hypothyroidism during pregnancy

Summary Influence of thyroid hormones on splenic activities and the role of the spleen during pregnancy were not known. The present study revealed that increased enzyme activities of spleen are associated with pregnancy, and hypothyroidism during gestation led to decreased activities, indicating that the thyroid gland influences them.The authors gladly acknowledge the encouragement given by Dr M. M. Razanasir and all other scientists of the division of physiology and climatology, IVRI, Izatnagar to complete this work.     

Scientists as experts: A distinct role?

The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts – that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation.     

Constructing dystopian experience: A Neurath-Cartwrightian approach to the philosophy of social technology

Social situations, the object of the social sciences, are complex and unique: they contain so many variable aspects that they cannot be reproduced, and it is even difficult to experience two situations that are alike in many respects. The social scientists' past experiences that serve as their background knowledge to intervene in an existent situation is poor compared to what a traditional epistemologist would consider ideal. A way of dealing with the variable and insufficient background of social scientists is by means of models. But, then, how should we characterize social scientific models? This paper examines Otto Neurath's scientific utopianism as an attempt to deal with this problem. Neurath proposes that social scientists work with utopias: broad imaginative plans that coordinate a multitude of features of a social situation. This notion can be used in current debates in philosophy of science because we notice that utopias, in Neurath's sense, are comparable to models and nomological machines in Nancy Cartwright's conception. A model-based view of science lays emphasis on the fact that scientists learn from the repeated operation of such abstract entities, just as they learn from the repetition of experiments in a laboratory. Hence this approach suggests an approximation between the natural and the social sciences, as well as between science and utopian literature. This is exemplified by analyzing the literary dystopia We, written by Yevgeny Zamyatin, to show that reasoning from and debating about utopian writings, even if fictional and pessimistic, creates phenomena of valuation, which are fundamental for constituting a background of experiences in the social sciences.