Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery: the Importance of Strategies

There are various ``classical' argumentsagainst abduction as a logic of discovery,especially that (1) abduction is too weak amode of inference to be of any use, and (2) inbasic formulation of abduction the hypothesisis already presupposed to be known, so it isnot the way hypotheses are discovered in thefirst place. In this paper I argue, bybringing forth the idea of strategies,that these counter-arguments are weaker thanmay appear. The concept of strategiessuggests, inter alia, that many inferentialmoves are taken into account at the same time.This is especially important in abductivereasoning, which is basically a very weak modeof inference. The importance of strategicthinking can already be seen in Charles S.Peirce's early treatments of the topic, and N.R.Hanson's later writings on abductionalthough they did not use the concept of``strategies.' On the whole, I am arguing thatthe focus should be more on methodologicalprocesses, and not only on validityconsiderations, which have dominated thediscussion about abduction.     

Games as formal tools versus games as explanations in logic and science

This paper addresses the theoretical notion of a game as it arisesacross scientific inquiries, exploring its uses as a technical andformal asset in logic and science versus an explanatory mechanism. Whilegames comprise a widely used method in a broad intellectual realm(including, but not limited to, philosophy, logic, mathematics,cognitive science, artificial intelligence, computation, linguistics,physics, economics), each discipline advocates its own methodology and aunified understanding is lacking. In the first part of this paper, anumber of game theories in formal studies are critically surveyed. Inthe second part, the doctrine of games as explanations for logic isassessed, and the relevance of a conceptual analysis of games tocognition discussed. It is suggested that the notion of evolution playsa part in the game-theoretic concept of meaning.     

Scientific Discovery: Between Incommensurability of Paradigms and Historical Continuity

Discoveries in physics imply two elements. The firstone is the belief that formal tools, already foundedin the framework of existing mathematical theories,may offer the solution to a puzzling anomaly. Thesecond one is the ability to assign a physical meaningto the adopted formalism, and to consider all itstheoretical implications.Discussing an historical case where the adoption of aparticular formalism represents the real motor of thecreative intuition, we mean to delineate scientificdiscovery both as a discontinuous change with respectto previous achievements and as a linear process ofknowledge enrichment.On March 1948, during the Pocono conference thatfollowed the one held in Shelter Island, Feynmananalysed the electron-photon interaction formulatingit in terms of the Lagrangian formalism. Thedevelopment of Feynman's idea draws attention to thepoint that novel theoretical discoveries may be theresult of applying existing formal tools. They may bethe result of giving different interpretations toprevious scientific thinking (according to thehermeneutical point that not even scientific textshave a single, absolute meaning but are given amultiplicity of possible readings by different peoplein different contexts).     

论古代科学发现优先权的确立原则与判定标准——以勾股定理与毕达哥拉斯定理的发现为例

通过对勾股定理与毕达哥拉斯定理发现与证明方法比较,考证了中西方对勾股定理的发现均符合现代科学发现的定义,提出了中国与西方几乎同时独立发现勾股定理。根据时间敏感性差异原理,指出了古代科学发现优先权的确立原则和判定标准,中西方这种独立的发现开辟了中西方科学发展的不同模式。     

Rationality in the Discovery of Empirical Laws

In this paper I argue against the traditional viewthat in discovery processes there is no place forrational decisions. First I argue that some historicalprocesses in which an empirical law was developed,were rational. Second, I identify some of themethodological rules that we can follow in order to berational when constructing an empirical law. Finally,I argue that people who deny that scientific discoverycan be rational do not understand the nature ofmethodological rules.     

爱因斯坦与老子科学发现方法论的相似与区别

分析了爱因斯坦和老子对科学发现方法论的贡献,比较了其各自发现方法论的基本思想及其相似与区别,指出了老子发现方法论中所潜在的优势及其现代意义,说明了建立新的、中西互补的科学方法论体系的可能性和必要性,讨论了老子发现方法论的潜在优势转化为有效的现实意义的社会条件.     

Analogical Reasoning and Modeling in the Sciences

This paper aims at integrating the work onanalogical reasoning in Cognitive Science into thelong trend of philosophical interest, in this century,in analogical reasoning as a basis for scientificmodeling. In the first part of the paper, threesimulations of analogical reasoning, proposed incognitive science, are presented: Gentner's StructureMatching Engine, Mitchel's and Hofstadter's COPYCATand the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine, proposedby Holyoak and Thagard. The differences andcontroversial points in these simulations arehighlighted in order to make explicit theirpresuppositions concerning the nature of analogicalreasoning. In the last part, this debate in cognitivescience is applied to some traditional philosophicalaccounts of formal and material analogies as a basisfor scientific modeling, like Mary Hesse`s, and tomore recent ones, that already draw from the work inArtificial Intelligence, like that proposed byAronson, Harré and Way.     

科学发现的本质及其逻辑机制的再发现

不管对科学发现进行语义分析，还是对科学发现活动本身进行历史探究，我们都会发现，科学发现除了具有社会、历史和心理上的属性外，它在本质上乃是新假说的产生、选择、修正、接受和解释的逻辑过程，其逻辑机制正是皮尔士与汉森等所倡导的溯因推理。而且，现代认知科学的新成果促进了溯因推理形式的不断完善，人们意识到在新假说产生与选择中背景理论与背景知识的重要作用，创新了溯因推理的推理形式，令人满意地回答了溯因推理何以能够以及如何能够成为科学发现的逻辑的问题。     

关于科学前沿若干问题的哲学思考

自然科学在当代的发展日新月异，由于科学的本体论及方法论上的进步落后于科学本身的发展，所以，面对新的科学事实、新的科学问题，哲学的反思在今天显得犹为必要。本文以当代科学的最新成果为基础，对科学前沿的时间与空间的性质、宇宙的有限与无限问题，及科学方法论上的经验证实、模型方法等问题给予了一定意义上的哲学探讨。     

Pragmatism and the Practical Relevance of Truth

In this article, I argue that pragmatism has something to gain from returning once more to the question of truth, and acknowledging the truth of the existence of Being and its elements. The practical relevance of this insight is shown by my proposition for a practical hermeneutic social scientific method which logically follows from the truth of Being. The method is compatible with the inevitability of subjective judgments in any kind of scientific research, as well as with many pragmatist insights. It is my hope that pragmatists will be willing to follow their own adagium and conceive of this confrontation with difference as an opportunity to re-assess their views.     

我国水坝工程论辩的特征剖析与几点建议

合理的工程论辩既是促进工程决策科学化与民主化的重要手段,也是管窥工程活动存在问题的有效媒介。因此考察工程论辩的特征和存在的问题,采取措施保障工程论辩的科学有效开展实属必要。新中国成立以来,国内水坝工程论辩此起彼伏,挺坝派与反对派针锋相对,在各种场合、利用多种渠道针锋相对、各抒己见,已引起社会各界的广泛关注,并造成一定的社会影响。本文力求概括当前我国水坝工程论辩的一般进展,并对论辩中存在的方法论之争和价值论之争这两个典型特征进行了剖析,指出其中暴露出的我国工程论辩中的问题,最后给出了改善我国工程论辩的几点建议。     

论经济学中的实在论问题

科学实在论是当代科学哲学中的一个重要的方法论立场,其中的某些分支已经在经济学方法论文献中占有一定地位。梅基和劳森是经济学方法论中的两位主要的实在论者。科斯始终把经济现象看作独立的真实存在物,始终坚持理论的要素应该有所指,他的著作是经济学中的科学实在论的代表作。由于科学实在论是经济学方法论中的少数派观点,因而科斯的经济探究与主流经济学大异其趣。     

《缀术算经》:东亚数学归纳推理的典范

《缀术算经》是日本和算家建部贤弘最富创造性的一部和算著作,代表了当时日本数学发展的最高成就。文章在前人工作的基础上,从数学传播史和比较数学史的角度,将其置于整个汉字文化圈数学文化背景下,对其数学内容、思想实质与中国传统数学的关系予以深入分析,对其数学成就与建部贤弘的数学方法论予以客观公正的评价。     

从耗散结构理论看创新人才的培养与高教改革--兼论创造性思维的耗散结构模型

耗散结构理论作为非平衡系统的自组织理论，具有普通的方法论意义。本文以耗散结构理论的启发为依据，揭示了创造性活动的发生机制，建立了创造性思维的耗散结构模型，探讨了创造性人才的培养及高等教育改革应该努力的方向。     

企业核心刚性形成机制的多视角分析

本文从哲学、自组织理论出发,分析组织在进化过程中核心刚性的形成,指出,核心能力是拉卡托斯科学研究纲领方法论中的硬核,具有刚性特征,随着条件的成熟,它从旧的核心能力向新的核心能力转换;核心能力是企业自组织过程中的基核和超序参量,主宰和支配系统进化过程,基核和超序参量的特征决定了核心能力形成的同时也形成了核心刚性。     

科技史研究中的"双重标准"现象

科技史研究中存在着对同类问题的判定采用“双重标准”的现象。同一作者的“双重标准”是逻辑欠严密,首尾不一贯;不同作者之间存在的“双重标准”现象则是学术观点不同的结果。“双重标准”不利于科学发现优先权的评价,需要通过学术讨论统一认识,这至标准统一。     

人文社科类术语定义方法研究——以翻译学和叙事学为例

文章系统梳理了人文社会科学类术语工作的国内外研究现状,剖析了人文社科类术语的本质属性和特征,并以翻译学和叙事学为例,研究了人文社科类术语的定义方法,提出了借助语义层级分析展开术语定义的方法。     

牛顿科学的"推理规则"与科学发现的逻辑

牛顿在<自然哲学的数学原理>中提出的"哲学中的推理规则",不仅浓缩了牛顿时代有关科学方法论的许多内容,而且还蕴涵着在此之后有关"科学发现的逻辑"问题的历史变化的思想根源,甚至这一规则也可以作为今天"复活发现逻辑"的一个典型的科学史范例.     

物理学基本定律的独立性之争及其反思

理论公理化的一个重要问题是公理的独立性问题.考察公理化最为发达的物理学中关于独立性问题的争论,可以看出,自然科学的公理独立性问题不同于逻辑学和数学,有自身独特的方法论价值.