赖欣巴哈对传统知识观的批判研究

赖欣巴哈认为传统哲学在三个方面干扰着对知识的分析。一是普遍性的寻求:知识起源于概括,传统哲学寻求知识的普遍性,但当知识不足以获致正确的概括时,就用想象、朴素类比法来满足知识普遍性的寻求。二是确定性的寻求:认为知识是确定的、必然的,唯理论者把确定性表述为"具有数学的可靠性",即知识或经验科学应该具有数学那样的确定性和可靠性;经验论者用观察的可靠性来代替数学的可靠性,而要求关于未来的语句必定具有关于过去的语句所具有的那一种可靠性。三是道德指导的寻求:追寻认识方面的确定性是由于它能提供找到道德方面的确定性的手段,认识论的探索只是手段,建立道德伦理才是目的,而目的高于手段。     

表达生存焦虑的怀疑论——反思现代性科学中的后现代主义

以反思现代性科学为主题的后现代主义是怀疑论在当代的表现,它是人类对自身生存焦虑的理论表达。后现代主义产生的历史前提使这种焦虑把批判的矛头直指构成现代精神的科学、理性和主体性。在思维方式上,后现代主义集中批判的是一直以来作为西方文化基础的形而上学和本质主义的思维逻辑。在理论追求上,与近代怀疑论对确定性的追求不同,后现代主义作为怀疑论的现代形式,旨在消解人们对确定性的信仰。费耶阿本德“什么都行”的无政府主义就是后现代主义的典型。     

费耶阿本德对理论依赖观察观点的批判

1"没有经验的科学"是可以想象的 在发表于1958年的论文<对经验进行实在论解释的尝试>中,费耶阿本德通过对逻辑经验主义理论依赖观察的彻底批判,提出他作为理论核心的"没有经验的科学"观点.     

论约瑟夫.劳斯科学实践哲学的理论创新——从比较的观点看

在与唯物史观、福柯、利奥塔、科学知识社会学(SSK)的比较中,分析了约瑟夫.劳斯科学实践哲学的主要理论创新,并在科学哲学史广阔背景中对其进行了理论定位。在科学实践观、实验室研究以及科学叙事论方面,劳斯均有一定的理论创新,但总体上创新性不够。劳斯的科学哲学属于当代美国的另类科学哲学,属于从分析哲学中杀出的"叛逆"。     

萨维奇确定性原则的逻辑与认知分析

萨维奇将确定性原则作为其决策理论体系的一条重要公理,以确保决策者的偏好具有一致性。然而,确定性原则遭到了阿莱悖论等诸多难题的挑战,致使期望效用理论的合理性遭到质疑。从认知的角度看,确定性难题可以由框架错觉、不恰当的问题情境、非结果主义推理方式等非理性因素所导致。从逻辑的角度看,确定性难题源于人们错误地将确定性原则当作了一个逻辑原则。因而,在运用确定性原则时,必须注意它的应用条件和适用范围,或者引入非线性的决策权重以建构起更加具有解释力的权重效用理论,从而实现对确定性难题的消解。     

现象学还原的科学批判之维

梅洛-庞蒂主张对科学进行现象学还原,而这种还原大体上与某种艺术性取向联系在一起.受胡塞尔晚期关于生活世界理论的影响,他对科学的客观主义始终保持警惕.在他看来,科学世界建立在实际经验世界基础之上,为了评价科学的意义与影响,我们应该首先唤醒知觉经验,而科学只不过是其派生的表达形式.我们始终面临着如何与受到操作性规则支配的世界维持一种原始关系的问题,"世界的肉"为我们提供了人与自然之间的一种可逆的本体论关系.     

假说的经验支持与理论支持之间的张力——从范式理论和贝叶斯方法的角度看

一个科学假说的确立受到两方面的支持,即经验支持和理论支持。在检验假说的过程中既会出现经验和理论同时支持的情况,也会出现二者作用相反的情况。库恩范式理论和贝叶斯方法可用于说明这两种支持之间的张力关系。根据范式理论,在常规科学时期,理论支持对于假说的确立起着决定性的作用;在科学革命时期,经验支持对于假说的确立起着决定性的作用。贝叶斯方法则通过假说的验前概率和验后概率提供了一种将经验支持和理论支持综合起来的检验模式。     

中国学术和教育：存在问题与救治之方（七）：思想还原论：还学术以本真

逻辑经验主义有一个重要的哲学理论,这个理论被称为经验还原论。它强调任何理论或命题都必须最终还原为经验,并接受经验的检验。凡是能被经验证实的,就是有意义的、科学的；凡是不能被经验证实的,那就是无意义的、非科学的。这个理论不仅为实证主义定下了基调,而且也为“科学”主义定下了基调,影响极大。它不仅影响人们对科学的理解,而且也影响人们对整个学术的理解。关键是,它不仅蕴含着一     

汉斯·赖欣巴哈概率归纳逻辑思想的再解读

1.赖欣巴哈的概率归纳逻辑思想起源于20世纪科学革命的激发。爱因斯坦相对论挑战了康德的先验综合判断的基础,显示了经验证据的威力。海森伯的不确定性原理表明,基础主义的绝对确定性只是梦想。2.基于逻辑的形式结构,必须与世界的逻辑结构互相配对的理念,赖欣巴哈按客观主义采用了概率的"频率解释",并且建构了概率归纳逻辑的公理体系。3.在认知科学、心理逻辑取得新发展的背景下,按照真理实用论精神,对概率归纳逻辑思想重新进行合理性辩护。     

追求确定性知识的思维方式及其现代性后果

追求确实可靠的确定性知识，构成了哲学和自然科学得以成立和发展的传统。随着这一思维方式在人文社会知识中的贯彻，确定性及其所导致的知识霸权和控制构成了现代性的一个基本纬度；后现代的相对主义是上述现代性的极端的怀疑主义后果。确定性的思维方式使我们不能真实理解科学及其发展。不论是从知识论自身的发展，还是从追求确定性知识所导致的现代性后果来看，我们必须正视知识的不确定性。     

Empirical Evidence in the Structure of Physical Theories

The author considers the empirical component of physical theories. He studies the origin and development of the theory of physical experiment, the structure and gnoseological hypotheses of the measuring process, as well as the relativity principle concerning the measuring equipment. Examples of modern physical theories are used in order to demonstrate the influence of experimental facts on the formation and development, verification and accepting of these theories in the structure of scientific systems. The role of accidental experimental facts in this process is also the subject.     

科学真理

一方面科学理论被普遍地认为是真理的典范;另一方面科学史告诉我们,无论多么成功的理论都逃脱不了最终被推翻的命运。这种"悲观的元归纳"表明,就其本性而论科学理论并非为一般人们所认为的那种符合论真理。关于科学理论本性的争论一直在进行中。本文在深入分析、谨慎运用相关专业资料的基础上,对"科学理论是否为真理",以及"如果是真理,它是一种什么意义上的真理"等问题进行了尽可能系统而清晰细致的讨论和论证。     

Evaluating Scientific Research Projects: The Units of Science in the Making

Original research is of course what scientists are expected to do. Therefore the research project is in many ways the unit of science in the making: it is the center of the professional life of the individual scientist and his coworkers. It is also the means towards the culmination of their specific activities: the original publication they hope to contribute to the scientific literature. The scientific project should therefore be of central interest to all the students of science, particularly the philosophers and sociologists of science. We shall focus on the preliminary evaluation of research projects—the specific task of referees—and will emphasize the problem of their scientificity—the chief concern of scientific gatekeepers. In the past such an examination aimed only at protecting the taxpayer from swindlers and incompetent amateurs, such as the inventors of continuous motion artifacts. In recent times a similar issue has resurfaced with regard to some of the most prestigious and most handsomely funded projects, namely work on string theory and many-worlds cosmology. Indeed, some of their faithful have claimed that these theories are so elegant, and so full of high-grade mathematics, that they should be exempted from empirical tests. This claim provoked the spirited rebuttal of the well-known cosmologists Ellis and Silk (Nature 516:321–323, 2014), which the present paper is intended to reinforce. Indeed, we shall try to show why empirical testability is necessary though insufficient for a piece of work to qualify as scientific. Finally, the present paper may also be regarded as an indirect contribution to the current debate over the reliability of quantitative indicators of scientific worth, such as the h-index of scientific productivity (e.g., Wilsdon in Nature 523:129, 2015). But we shall touch only tangentially on the sociological, political, and economics of research teams: our focus will be the acquisition of new scientific knowledge.     

Science Is Not Always “Self-Correcting”

Some prominent scientists and philosophers have stated openly that moral and political considerations should influence whether we accept or promulgate scientific theories. This widespread view has significantly influenced the development, and public perception, of intelligence research. Theories related to group differences in intelligence are often rejected a priori on explicitly moral grounds. Thus the idea, frequently expressed by commentators on science, that science is “self-correcting”—that hypotheses are simply abandoned when they are undermined by empirical evidence—may not be correct in all contexts. In this paper, documentation spanning from the early 1970s to the present is collected, which reveals the influence of scientists’ moral and political commitments on the study of intelligence. It is suggested that misrepresenting findings in science to achieve desirable social goals will ultimately harm both science and society.     

Reduction and Understanding

Reductionism, in the sense of the doctrine that theories on different levels of reality should exhibit strict and general relations of deducibility, faces well-known difficulties. Nevertheless, the idea that deeper layers of reality are responsible for what happens at higher levels is well-entrenched in scientific practice. We argue that the intuition behind this idea is adequately captured by the notion of supervenience: the physical state of the fundamental physical layers fixes the states of the higher levels. Supervenience is weaker than traditional reductionism, but it is not a metaphysical doctrine: one can empirically support the existence of a supervenience relation by exhibiting concrete relations between the levels. Much actual scientific research is directed towards finding such inter-level relations. It seems to be quite generally held that the importance of such relations between different levels is that they are explanatory and give understanding: deeper levels provide deeper understanding, and this justifies the search for ever deeper levels. We shall argue, however, that although achieving understanding is an important aim of science, its correct analysis is not in terms of relations between higher and lower levels. Connections with deeper layers of reality do not generally provide for deeper understanding. Accordingly, the motivation for seeking deeper levels of reality does not come from the desire to find deeper understanding of phenomena, but should be seen as a consequence of the goal to formulate ever better, in the sense of more accurate and more-encompassing, empirical theories. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

复杂性研究与隐喻方法

隐喻是文学艺术中常用的表现手法,虽然科学家也经常使用,但却不太被公开认可,因此没有获得应有的方法论地位.然而,复杂性科学的研究者们却特别强调隐喻在复杂性研究中的重要作用.在复杂性的概念刻画和理论描述中,隐喻都有着出色的表现.霍兰是运用隐喻方法的高手,在其复杂适应系统理论和涌现理论中都充分运用了隐喻方法,并获得了令人瞩目的成功.     

人地关系协调系统的建立--对生态伦理学的一个重要补充

生态伦理学(生态哲学)从生态道德关系的角度,承担协调人与自然关系的任务;强调人类与自然和谐共进的伦理思想。生态伦理学只建立了生态伦理(人类与自然的协调)的思维模式,而没有从理论上建立人地关系协调系统的行为模式。本文从人地关系角度,以行为地理学与复杂性科学的基本理论建立了人地关系协调系统的基本概念与基本理论。这是对生态伦理学理论建设的一个重要补充。     

Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?

The pessimistic induction over scientific theories (Poincaré in Science and hypothesis, Dover, New York, 1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists (Stanford in Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists (Wray in Synthese 190(18):4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories (Park in Organon F 21(1):3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of the success of science (Lyons in Philos Sci 70(5):891–901, 2003) has hidden problems just as its eight predecessors did. In this paper, I (1) criticize the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, (2) introduce a pessimistic induction over antirealist theories, and then (3) construct two new pessimistic inductions. One is a pessimistic induction over antirealists according to which the author of the latest antirealist proposal cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as his antirealist predecessors could not see hidden problems with their proposals. The other is the pessimistic induction over pessimists according to which since past pessimists have been wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, future pessimists will also be wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twenty-first century to the early twenty-second century.     

艺术意象·审美意象·科学意象——创造活动心理图像异同的理论与实证构想

意象是意义与图像的有机结合体,是创造性活动不可或缺的逻辑基点、加工方法、过程与结果。中国古典和西方近现代美学与文艺理论、现代科学技术和认知心理学等的研究成果都表明:意象是艺术创作、审美创造、科学创造,甚至生活创造活动中所共同拥有的心理图像,是统摄感性、理性认知活动及情感态度价值取向的精神活动。意和像的构成因素及组合方式不同,形成了意像的不同种类。艺术意象、审美意象与科学意象的基本过程相似,但具体过程的目标、走向与结果表达式很不相同。有关意象的理论值得更深入和系统探讨;同时应当补充实证研究,例如艺术家与科学家创造过程中图像资料的统计分析;各类人群的意象调查与测验;各类意象加工模式、特点与水平实验等。意象研究是艺术认知、审美认知与科学认知,艺术教育、审美教育与科学教育的重要交结点。     

Understanding Scientific Inquiries of Galileo’s Formulation for the Law of Free Falling Motion

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum.