I am knowledge. Get me out of here! On localism and the universality of science

It has become increasingly common in historiography of science to understand science and its products as inherently local. However, this orientation is faced with three problems. First, how can one explain the seeming universality of contemporary science? Second, if science is so reflective of its local conditions of production, how can it travel so effortlessly to other localities and even globally? And third, how can scientific knowledge attain validity outside its context of origin? I will argue that the notion of standardization and theories of delocalization manage to explain the ‘globality’ of science, but that localism denies ‘universality’ if it is understood non-spatially. Further, localism limits the validity of scientific knowledge unacceptably inside the laboratory walls or other boundaries of knowledge creation. This is not consistent with scientific practice. I will consider on what grounds extra-local knowledge inferences that transcend the boundaries of locality could be seen as justified.     

Overlapping ontologies and Indigenous knowledge. From integration to ontological self-determination

Current controversies about knowledge integration reflect conflicting ideas of what it means to “take Indigenous knowledge seriously”. While there is increased interest in integrating Indigenous and Western scientific knowledge in various disciplines such as anthropology and ethnobiology, integration projects are often accused of recognizing Indigenous knowledge only insofar as it is useful for Western scientists. The aim of this article is to use tools from philosophy of science to develop a model of both successful integration and integration failures. On the one hand, I argue that cross-cultural recognition of property clusters leads to an ontological overlap that makes knowledge integration often epistemically productive and socially useful. On the other hand, I argue that knowledge integration is limited by ontological divergence. Adequate models of Indigenous knowledge will therefore have to take integration failures seriously and I argue that integration efforts need to be complemented by a political notion of ontological self-determination.     

The benefits of acquiring interactional expertise: Why (some) philosophers of science should engage scientific communities

Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of ‘interactional expertise’ – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one ‘hang out’ with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several ‘socio-epistemic’ benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances.     

Ernst Cassirer's transcendental account of mathematical reasoning

Cassirer's philosophical agenda revolved around what appears to be a paradoxical goal, that is, to reconcile the Kantian explanation of the possibility of knowledge with the conceptual changes of nineteenth and early twentieth-century science. This paper offers a new discussion of one way in which this paradox manifests itself in Cassirer's philosophy of mathematics. Cassirer articulated a unitary perspective on mathematics as an investigation of structures independently of the nature of individual objects making up those structures. However, this posed the problem of how to account for the applicability of abstract mathematical concepts to empirical reality. My suggestion is that Cassirer was able to address this problem by giving a transcendental account of mathematical reasoning, according to which the very formation of mathematical concepts provides an explanation of the extensibility of mathematical knowledge. In order to spell out what this argument entails, the first part of the paper considers how Cassirer positioned himself within the Marburg neo-Kantian debate over intellectual and sensible conditions of knowledge in 1902–1910. The second part compares what Cassirer says about mathematics in 1910 with some relevant examples of how structural procedures developed in nineteenth-century mathematics.     

The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication,tacit knowledge,and the dynamics of knowledge generation

This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters' regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins's point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Collins rightly highlights the epistemic uncertainty (and skepticism) surrounding much experimental research. However, I will argue that his analysis of tacit knowledge fails to elucidate the reasons why scientists often are (and should be) skeptical of other researchers' experimental results. I will present an analysis of tacit knowledge in experimental research that not only answers to this desideratum, but also shows how such skepticism can in fact be a vital enabling factor for the dynamic processes of experimental knowledge generation.     

Scrutinizing thing knowledge

In his book Thing Knowledge Davis Baird argues that our accustomed understanding of knowledge as justified true beliefs is not enough to understand progress in science and technology. To be more accurate he argues that scientific instruments are to be seen as a form of “objective knowledge” in the sense of Karl Popper.I want to examine if this idea is plausible. In a first step I want to show that this proposal implies that nearly all man-made artifacts are materialized objective knowledge. I argue that this radical change in our concept of knowledge demands strong reasons and that Baird does not give them. I take a look at the strongest strand of arguments of Baird's book—the arguments from cognitive autonomy—and conclude that they do not suffice to make Baird's view of scientific instruments tenable.     

Knowledge transfer across scientific disciplines

Thomas Kuhn suggested that symbolic generalizations are applied to concrete systems by a process involving exemplars and analogical reasoning. Using the related concepts of theoretical and formal templates, I argue that the process of applying templates can in some cases be made explicit and that we do not need to rely on similarity relations and tacit knowledge. In so doing I show how some formal models can be transferred from one scientific field to another. Examples include scale-free networks, the Lotka-Volterra model from biology, and the Goodwin model in economics. I also argue that this explicit approach has advantages over the more psychologically oriented approach of Kuhn and explain the sense in which templates do and do not produce unification.     

Constructing dystopian experience: A Neurath-Cartwrightian approach to the philosophy of social technology

Social situations, the object of the social sciences, are complex and unique: they contain so many variable aspects that they cannot be reproduced, and it is even difficult to experience two situations that are alike in many respects. The social scientists' past experiences that serve as their background knowledge to intervene in an existent situation is poor compared to what a traditional epistemologist would consider ideal. A way of dealing with the variable and insufficient background of social scientists is by means of models. But, then, how should we characterize social scientific models? This paper examines Otto Neurath's scientific utopianism as an attempt to deal with this problem. Neurath proposes that social scientists work with utopias: broad imaginative plans that coordinate a multitude of features of a social situation. This notion can be used in current debates in philosophy of science because we notice that utopias, in Neurath's sense, are comparable to models and nomological machines in Nancy Cartwright's conception. A model-based view of science lays emphasis on the fact that scientists learn from the repeated operation of such abstract entities, just as they learn from the repetition of experiments in a laboratory. Hence this approach suggests an approximation between the natural and the social sciences, as well as between science and utopian literature. This is exemplified by analyzing the literary dystopia We, written by Yevgeny Zamyatin, to show that reasoning from and debating about utopian writings, even if fictional and pessimistic, creates phenomena of valuation, which are fundamental for constituting a background of experiences in the social sciences.     

Knowing what would happen: The epistemic strategies in Galileo's thought experiments

While philosophers have subjected Galileo's classic thought experiments to critical analysis, they have tended to largely ignored the historical and intellectual context in which they were deployed, and the specific role they played in Galileo's overall vision of science. In this paper I investigate Galileo's use of thought experiments, by focusing on the epistemic and rhetorical strategies that he employed in attempting to answer the question of how one can know what would happen in an imaginary scenario. Here I argue we can find three different answers to this question in Galileo later dialogues, which reflect the changing meanings of ‘experience’ and ‘knowledge’ (scientia) in the early modern period. Once we recognise that Galileo's thought experiments sometimes drew on the power of memory and the explicit appeal to ‘common experience’, while at other times, they took the form of demonstrative arguments intended to have the status of necessary truths; and on still other occasions, they were extrapolations, or probable guesses, drawn from a carefully planned series of controlled experiments, it becomes evident that no single account of the epistemological relationship between thought experiment, experience and experiment can adequately capture the epistemic variety we find Galileo's use of imaginary scenarios. To this extent, we cannot neatly classify Galileo's use of thought experiments as either ‘medieval’ or ‘early modern’, but we should see them as indicative of the complex epistemological transformations of the early seventeenth century.     

Dogma and dreams: experimental lessons for epilepsy mechanism chasers

Epilepsy mechanism chasers face one major difficulty. Since we don’t know how the normal brain works, we can’t start to understand how the diseased brain fails. Most of today’s hypotheses are based on what we think about ‘normal’ brain function, which may lead to misconceptions, as will be developed here. Furthermore, since there are many different types of epilepsies, some mechanisms may only be relevant to some epilepsies. Here, I shall focus on temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) the most common form of partial epilepsy in adults. TLE is often drug resistant, as are 30–40% of all forms of epilepsies. The failure of drug-treatments most likely reflects our lack of knowledge of the underlying mechanisms.Received 10 January 2005; received after revision 3 March 2005; accepted 23 March 2005     

Experiential and cosmopolitan knowledge: The transcontinental field practices of the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey

Before many of the global environmental knowledge producing networks and technologies emerged later in the twentieth century, another spatially extended form of field science was implemented at a continental scale by the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey, revealing similar tensions and dynamics. Specimens and observations from across continental spaces were integrated through railroad-based transportation and communications networks in order to map distributions of birds and mammals and delineate “life zones” stretching across the continent. At the same time that field zoologists of the Biological Survey produced this cosmopolitan scientific knowledge, they also developed an intimate, experiential knowledge of many of the places where they traveled. By following the travels of Biological Survey field parties, especially the agency's long-time chief field naturalist Vernon Bailey, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the railroad was dominant, this paper traces the interconnections between the two ways of knowing in the Biological Survey's practice. However, the integration of these different forms of knowledge was ultimately partial and incomplete, as seen through the Survey's daily practices such as food consumption, the seasonality of survey field practice, and limitations on what types of knowledge were incorporated from lay network collaborators and field assistants.     

Science at Oxford

Faraday demonstrated electromagnetic induction in 1831 using an iron ring wound with two wire coils; on interrupting battery current in one coil, momentary currents arose in the other. Between Faraday's ring and the induction coil, coiled instruments developed via meandering paths. This paper explores the opening phase of that work in the late 1830s, as the iron core, primary wire coil, and secondary wire coil were researched and differentiated. ‘Working knowledge’ (defined by Baird) gained with materials and phenomena was crucial to innovations. To understand these material-based interactions, I experimented with hand-wound coils, along with examining historical texts, drawings, and artefacts. My experience recovered the historical dead-end of two-wire coils and ensuing work with long-coiled single conductors initiated by Faraday and Henry. The shock and spark heightened in these coils provided feedback to the many instrumental configurations tested by Page, Callan, Sturgeon, Bachhoffner, and others. The continuous conductor differentiated into two segments soldered together: a thick short wire carrying battery current and a long thin wire for elevating shocks (voltage). The joined wires eventually separated, yet their transitional connection documents belief that the induced effects depend on continuity. These coiled instruments, with their intertwined histories, show experimental work and understandings in the process of developing. Seeing the nonlinear paths by which these instruments developed deepens our understanding of historical experiences, and of how people learn.     

Membrane trafficking in neuronal maintenance and degeneration

Defects in membrane trafficking and degradation are hallmarks of most, and maybe all, neurodegenerative disorders. Such defects typically result in the accumulation of undegraded proteins due to aberrant endosomal sorting, lysosomal degradation, or autophagy. The genetic or environmental cause of a specific disease may directly affect these membrane trafficking processes. Alternatively, changes in intracellular sorting and degradation can occur as cellular responses of degenerating neurons to unrelated primary defects such as insoluble protein aggregates or other neurotoxic insults. Importantly, altered membrane trafficking may contribute to the pathogenesis or indeed protect the neuron. The observation of dramatic changes to membrane trafficking thus comes with the challenging need to distinguish pathological from protective alterations. Here, we will review our current knowledge about the protective and destructive roles of membrane trafficking in neuronal maintenance and degeneration. In particular, we will first focus on the question of what type of membrane trafficking keeps healthy neurons alive in the first place. Next, we will discuss what alterations of membrane trafficking are known to occur in Alzheimer’s disease and other tauopathies, Parkinson’s disease, polyQ diseases, peripheral neuropathies, and lysosomal storage disorders. Combining the maintenance and degeneration viewpoints may yield insight into how to distinguish when membrane trafficking functions protectively or contributes to degeneration.     

Objective styles in northern field science

Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in style. A field style treats epistemic alterity as a resource rather than an obstacle for objective knowledge production. A sociological stylistics of the field should thus explain how objective science can co-exist with radical conceptual difference. I discuss examples from the Canadian North, focussing on collaborations between state wildlife biologists and managers, on the one hand, and local Aboriginal Elders and hunters, on the other. I argue that a sociological stylistics of the field can help us to better understand how radically diverse agents may collaborate across cultures in the successful production of reliable natural knowledge.     

Ten reasons to embrace scientism

A strong version of scientism, such as that of Alex Rosenberg, says, roughly, that natural science reliably delivers rational belief or knowledge, whereas common sense sources of belief, such as moral intuition, memory, and introspection, do not. In this paper I discuss ten reasons that adherents of scientism have or might put forward in defence of scientism. The aim is to show which considerations could plausibly count in favour of scientism and what this implies for the way scientism ought to be formulated. I argue that only three out of these ten reasons potentially hold water and that the evidential weight is, therefore, on their shoulders. These three reasons for embracing scientism are, respectively, particular empirical arguments to the effect that there are good debunking explanations for certain common sense beliefs, that there are incoherences and biases in the doxastic outputs of certain common sense sources of belief, and that beliefs that issue from certain common sense doxastic sources are illusory. From what I argue, it follows that only a version of scientism that is significantly weaker than many versions of scientism that we find in the literature is potentially tenable. I conclude the paper by stating what such a significantly weaker version of scientism could amount to.     

The ecological rationality of explanatory reasoning

There is growing evidence that explanatory considerations influence how people change their degrees of belief in light of new information. Recent studies indicate that this influence is systematic and may result from people’s following a probabilistic update rule. While formally very similar to Bayes’ rule, the rule or rules people appear to follow are different from, and inconsistent with, that better-known update rule. This raises the question of the normative status of those updating procedures. Is the role explanation plays in people’s updating their degrees of belief a bias? Or are people right to update on the basis of explanatory considerations, in that this offers benefits that could not be had otherwise? Various philosophers have argued that any reasoning at deviance with Bayesian principles is to be rejected, and so explanatory reasoning, insofar as it deviates from Bayes’ rule, can only be fallacious. We challenge this claim by showing how the kind of explanation-based update rules to which people seem to adhere make it easier to strike the best balance between being fast learners and being accurate learners. Borrowing from the literature on ecological rationality, we argue that what counts as the best balance is intrinsically context-sensitive, and that a main advantage of explanatory update rules is that, unlike Bayes’ rule, they have an adjustable parameter which can be fine-tuned per context. The main methodology to be used is agent-based optimization, which also allows us to take an evolutionary perspective on explanatory reasoning.     

疼痛的神经生物学--理解大脑机制及神经疾病治疗的机理

中枢神经系统的神经元和突触具有可塑性，他们能够发生贯穿整个生命过程的长时程改变。研究这种长时程变化的分子和细胞学机制，不仅可以帮助我们了解大脑如何学习和储存新的知识，而且还可以揭示机体损伤后病理变化的机制。我认为，一方面学习和记忆等生理学功能的神经机制可能与大脑在疼痛期间的反常或机体损伤相关的变化过程共用一些信号分子；另一方面，一些不参与认知学习和记忆过程的突触和神经元网络机制也可能与疼痛的病理过程相关。伤害性感受可以从脊髓传递到前脑并在不同水平受到调节。其中，前扣带脑皮质(anterior cingulate cortex，ACC)在痛觉的感受和调节中具有重要作用。我们的实验结果表明，ACC中的N-甲基-D-门冬氨酸(NMDA)受体依赖的、钙／钙调蛋白激活的腺苷酸环化酶(adenylyl cyclases，AC)(ACl和ACB)在慢性痛的表达过程中起着重要的作用。ACC还可以通过激活内源性易化系统影响脊髓背角的痛觉信号传递。这些结果为机体对损伤的生理反应如痛行为反应、情绪变化和不良记忆等提供了重要的突触和分子水平的机制。加强对疼痛机制研究，会带动中国的神经科学的基础和临床研究。     

Descartes’s changing mind

Descartes is always concerned about knowledge. However, the Galileo affair in 1633, the reactions to his Discourse on method, and later his need to reply to objections to his Meditations provoked crises in Descartes’s intellectual development the import of which has not been sufficiently recognized. These events are the major reasons why Descartes’s philosophical position concerning how we know and what we may know is radically different at the end of his life from what it was when he began. We call this later position Descartes’s epistemic stance and contrast it with his earlier methodological, metaphysical realism. Yet Descartes’s epistemic views cannot be separated from other aspects of his work, for example, his views concerning God, causality, metaphysics, and the nature of science. A further meta-implication is that serious errors await any scholar who cites early Cartesian texts in support of late Cartesian positions, or who uses later texts in conjunction with early ones to support a reading of Descartes’s philosophy.     

Playing with molecules

Recent philosophy of science has seen a number of attempts to understand scientific models by looking to theories of fiction. In previous work, I have offered an account of models that draws on Kendall Walton’s ‘make-believe’ theory of art. According to this account, models function as ‘props’ in games of make-believe, like children’s dolls or toy trucks. In this paper, I assess the make-believe view through an empirical study of molecular models. I suggest that the view gains support when we look at the way that these models are used and the attitude that users take towards them. Users’ interaction with molecular models suggests that they do imagine the models to be molecules, in much the same way that children imagine a doll to be a baby. Furthermore, I argue, users of molecular models imagine themselves viewing and manipulating molecules, just as children playing with a doll might imagine themselves looking at a baby or feeding it. Recognising this ‘participation’ in modelling, I suggest, points towards a new account of how models are used to learn about the world, and helps us to understand the value that scientists sometimes place on three-dimensional, physical models over other forms of representation.