Sufficient Reason and Reason Enough

I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relevancy for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot be, rational—only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomological hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the mechanisms that operate in Nature.     

Pro-Latour

In this comment I want to clarify five topics. The first topic concerns the importance of looking back at the very principles of the foundations of Western society. The second comment argues for the original position of Latour within the field of (social) constructivism. In the third comment, I argue that Haraway adds to the science-politics discussion by elaborating her philosophy beyond dichotomy. In the fourth comment, I argue that the terms ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ are central philosophical concepts which should be retained. Finally I will make the connection between ‘what’ is represented and ‘how’ to represent it.     

Parmenides Reloaded

I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.     

Remodeling the Past

In some of the papers in which she develops and defends the mental modelview of thought experiments in physics, Nersessian expresses the belief that her account has implications for thought experiments in other domains as well. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that counterfactual reasoning has a legitimate place in historical inquiry, and secondly, that the mental model view can account for such "alternative histories". I proceed as follows. Firstly, I review the main accounts of thought experiments in physics and point at some explanatory advantages of the mental model view. Subsequently, I argue that historians cannot dispense with counterfactual reasoning altogether and qualify a number of principled objections against the explicit use of alternative histories for theoretical purposes. Finally, I show that the mental model view can account for such thought experiments in history.     

How Can We Teach the Chemical Elements to Make the Memorization Task More Enjoyable?

In this commentary to Leal (2013), we argue that the memorization of the names and symbols of the chemical elements is necessary in the study of that topic because this task is the key for the later understanding of the Periodic Table. We can make the memorization task in an enjoyable, but effective way, using some educational games in chemistry class. Some recent puzzles, card games, mnemonics rules or games based on drawings to learn the chemical elements are addressed in this paper.     

Quantum Mechanics and Realism

Quantum mechanics is usually presented as a challenge to scientific realism, but I will argue that the details of quantum mechanics actually support realism. I will first present some basic quantum mechanical concepts and results, including the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment and Bell's theorem, and do it in a way that everyone can understand. I will then use the physics to inform the philosophy, showing that quantum mechanics provides evidence to support epistemological realism.     

Understanding Scientific Inquiries of Galileo’s Formulation for the Law of Free Falling Motion

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum.     

What if Haecceity is not a Property?

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.     

Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativity

In this paper, I argue that logic hasan important role to play in the methodological studyof creativity. I also argue, however, that onlyspecial kinds of logic enable one to understand thereasoning involved in creative processes. I show thatdeductive and ampliative adaptive logics areappropriate tools in this respect.     

A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation</Emphasis>

The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application. The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed, how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the nuclear structure.     

Understanding Pluralism in Climate Modeling

To study Earth’s climate, scientists now use a variety of computer simulation models. These models disagree in some of their assumptions about the climate system, yet they are used together as complementary resources for investigating future climatic change. This paper examines and defends this use of incompatible models. I argue that climate model pluralism results both from uncertainty concerning how to best represent the climate system and from difficulties faced in evaluating the relative merits of complex models. I describe how incompatible climate models are used together in ‘multi-model ensembles’ and explain why this practice is reasonable, given scientists’ inability to identify a ‘best’ model for predicting future climate. Finally, I characterize climate model pluralism as involving both an ontic competitive pluralism and a pragmatic integrative pluralism.     

赫伯特·马尔库塞:寻找技术社会的希望

希望是马尔库塞技术批判理论的构成要素，它具有一种在理想与现实之问的二元结构。这种二元结构决定着批判理论的逻辑，即在对技术现实所做的“极其经验主义”的分析背后，决离不开某些背景性信念的支撑。这些信念可以追溯到德国哲学传统中人的形象，它具有三个方面的基本内涵：理性自主、个性的自由发展和普遍和谐。批判既从这些信念中汲取了力量，同时其在理论上和实践中的尴尬处境也与此不无干系。     

表征还是建构? 量子场论的一种解释

在本文中,我坚持认为,量子场论所描述的具有因果关系的实体层次中那些基本的实体不是粒子而是场。然后,我从结构实在论的角度进一步讨论了在何种意义上并在何种程度上,有关场的这种理论建构可以被看作物理实在的客观表征。     

略谈术语学研究

本文对术语学的定义和体系提出了建议，推荐了需要开展的重要研究课题，如：术语命名的理论、方法和原则，术语的表示，汉语术语的精简和缩写规则，术语生存周期，术语更新原则，专有名词的命名，术语的自动提取，术语乱用与术语法。     

论理论创新的经验确定性指标

科学理论的经验确定性是科学创新的合理指标之一.追求理论的经验确定性对于理论创新具有重要意义.     

论科学哲学中的对应规则

对应规则在科学哲学中是为了解决理论术语的经验意义问题而引发出来的。在逻辑经验主义的双语言模型中，对应规则赋予理论词汇以经验内容。在理论的还原解释中，对应规则起限制性条件、双向条件语句或恒等陈述作用。在科学实践中，从不同的角度可以将对应规则分为不同的类型。     

The Third Dogma Revisited

This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of the notion of law, and can easily be adapted to account for such characteristics of mechanisms. The idea of tropes as mechanisms is worked out in some detail. According to the resulting picture, there is still an opportunity to link mechanisms and laws. But while the predominant law view conceives of mechanistic approaches as special kinds of law accounts, this study indicates that the converse may be true. Law accounts are special cases of mechanistic accounts, and they work only in those worlds where the mechanisms are of the right kind     

Tropes As Mechanisms

This paper is an attempt to further our understanding of mechanisms conceived of as ontologically separable from laws. What opportunities are there for a mechanistic perspective to be independent of, or even more fundamental than, a law perspective? Advocates of the mechanistic view often play with the possibility of internal and external reliability, or with the paralleling possibilities of enforcing, counteracting, redirecting, etc., the mechanisms’ power to produce To further this discussion I adopt a trope ontology. It is independent of the notion of law, and can easily be adapted to account for such characteristics of mechanisms. The idea of tropes as mechanisms is worked out in some detail. According to the resulting picture, there is still an opportunity to link mechanisms and laws. But while the predominant law view conceives of mechanistic approaches as special kinds of law accounts, this study indicates that the converse may be true. Law accounts are special cases of mechanistic accounts, and they work only in those worlds where the mechanisms are of the right kind     

Computational empiricism

I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue against formalist approaches in the philosophy of science and for a greater role for perceptual knowledge rather than propositional knowledge in scientific empiricism.The term computational empiricism was suggested to me in conversation at a philosophy conference in Venice, Italy in June 1991 by someone whose name I have unfortunately forgotten. It seemed to capture perfectly the set of techniques I had described in my talk there, and I have since adopted it. I thank the originator of this term, whoever he is.