The Future of Life and What it Means for Humanity

Vidal’s (Found Sci, 2010) and Rottiers’s (Found Sci, 2010) commentaries on my (2010) paper raised a number of important issues about the possible future trajectory of evolution and its implications for humanity. My response emphasizes that despite the inherent uncertainty involved in extrapolating the trajectory of evolution into the far future, the possibilities it reveals nonetheless have significant strategic implications for what we do with our lives here and now, individually and collectively. One important implication is the replacement of postmodern scepticism and relativism with an evolutionary grand narrative that can guide humanity to participate successfully in the future evolution of life in the universe.     

On the Nature of Initial Conditions and Fundamental Parameters in Physics and Cosmology

The cosmological theory of the author, discussed in (Greben in Found Sci 15(2):153–176, 2010), has a number of implications for the interpretation of initial conditions and the fine-tuning problem as discussed by Vidal (Found Sci 15(4):375–393, 2010a).     

Analysis of Some Speculations Concerning the Far Future of Intelligent Civilizations

I discuss some of the speculations proposed by Stewart (2010a). These include the following propositions: the cooperation at larger and larger scales, the existence of larger scale processes, the enhancement of the tuning as the universe cycle repeats, the transmission between universes and the motivations to produce a new universe.     

Must Complex Systems Theory Be Materialistic?

So far, the sciences of complexity have received less attention from philosophers than from scientists. Responding to Salthe’s (Found Sci 15, 4(6):357–367, 2010a) model of evolution, I focus on its metaphysical implications, asking whether the implications of his canonical developmental trajectory (CDT) must be materialistic as his reading proposes.     

Participating in the Meaning of Life, a Contributor’s Critique

The aim of this contribution is to critically examine the metaphysical presuppositions that prevail in (Stewart in Found Sci 15(4):395–409, 2010a) answer to the question “are we in the midst of a developmental process?” as expressed in his statement “that humanity has discovered the trajectory of past evolution and can see how it is likely to continue in the future”.     

Scale Relativity: an Extended Paradigm for Physics and Biology?

With scale relativity theory, Laurent Nottale has provided a powerful conceptual and mathematical framework with numerous validated predictions that has fundamental implications and applications for all sciences. We discuss how this extended framework reviewed in Nottale (Found Sci 152 (3):101–152, 2010a) may help facilitating integration across multiple size and time frames in systems biology, and the development of a scale relative biology with increased explanatory power.     

Friends of Wisdom?

This commentary addresses the question of the meaning of critique in relation to objectivism or dogmatism. Inspired by Kant’s critical philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology, it defines the first in terms of conditionality, the second in terms of oppositionality. It works out an application on the basis of Salthe’s (Found Sci 15 4(6):357–367, 2010a) paper on development and evolution, where competition is criticized in oppositional, more than in conditional terms.     

n-Way Metrics

We study a family of n-way metrics that generalize the usual two-way metric. The n-way metrics are totally symmetric maps from E ⁿ into \mathbbR _{\geqslant 0} {\mathbb{R}_{ \geqslant 0}} . The three-way metrics introduced by Joly and Le Calvé (1995) and Heiser and Bennani (1997) and the n-way metrics studied in Deza and Rosenberg (2000) belong to this family. It is shown how the n-way metrics and n-way distance measures are related to (n − 1)-way metrics, respectively, (n − 1)-way distance measures.     

Symmetries and Symmetry-Breakings: The Fabric of Physical Interactions and the Flow of Time

This short note develops some ideas along the lines of the stimulating paper by Heylighen (Found Sci 15 4(3):345–356, 2010a). It summarizes a theme in several writings with Francis Bailly, downloadable from this author’s web page. The “geometrization” of time and causality is the common ground of the analysis hinted here and in Heylighen’s paper. Heylighen adds a logical notion, consistency, in order to understand a possible origin of the selective process that may have originated this organization of natural phenomena. We will join our perspectives by hinting to some gnoseological complexes, common to mathematics and physics, which may shed light on the issues raised by Heylighen.     

Optimization Strategies for Two-Mode Partitioning

Two-mode partitioning is a relatively new form of clustering that clusters both rows and columns of a data matrix. In this paper, we consider deterministic two-mode partitioning methods in which a criterion similar to k-means is optimized. A variety of optimization methods have been proposed for this type of problem. However, it is still unclear which method should be used, as various methods may lead to non-global optima. This paper reviews and compares several optimization methods for two-mode partitioning. Several known methods are discussed, and a new fuzzy steps method is introduced. The fuzzy steps method is based on the fuzzy c-means algorithm of Bezdek (1981) and the fuzzy steps approach of Heiser and Groenen (1997) and Groenen and Jajuga (2001). The performances of all methods are compared in a large simulation study. In our simulations, a two-mode k-means optimization method most often gives the best results. Finally, an empirical data set is used to give a practical example of two-mode partitioning. We would like to thank two anonymous referees whose comments have improved the quality of this paper. We are also grateful to Peter Verhoef for providing the data set used in this paper.     

On the Indeterminacy of Resemblance Measures for Binary (Presence/Absence) Data

Many similarity coefficients for binary data are defined as fractions. For certain resemblance measures the denominator may become zero. If the denominator is zero the value of the coefficient is indeterminate. It is shown that the seriousness of the indeterminacy problem differs with the resemblance measures. Following Batagelj and Bren (1995) we remove the indeterminacies by defining appropriate values in critical cases. The author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and valuable suggestions on earlier versions of this article.     

Who is Afraid of the Political? A Response to Robert Scharff and Michel Puech

In their respective commentaries to my article “Postphenomenology and the Politics of Sustainable Technology” both Robert Scharff and Michel Puech take issue with my postphenomenological inroad into the politics of technology. In a first step I try to accommodate the suggestions and objections raised by Scharff by making my account of the political more explicit. Consequently, I argue how an antagonistic relational conceptualisation of the political allows me to address head on Puech’s plea to leave politics behind and move towards an ethically informed, post-political approach to sustainability. “But perhaps the question philosophy is confronted with—through the question of the political—might be whether not all reasoning, including a purely theoretical reasoning, can truly only be a political reasoning, resulting in an inevitable, indeed necessary circular structure” (Boehm 2002; author’s translation). In a footnote to my original article ‘Postphenomenology and the Politics of Sustainable Technology’, I wrote that “for the purpose of this paper, it suffices to say that I use the adjective ‘political’ to indicate all aspects of human and non-human agency that are related to ‘shaping the good life’ (Goeminne 2011a).” With hindsight, brought about by the commentaries of Scharff (2011) and Puech (2011), I now see that I could not have been more optimistic. Or should I say naïve? Indeed, although coming from different angles and resulting in very different suggestions, both commentaries precisely target my postphenomenological inroad into the ‘politics’ of technology. In challenging my grounding of the politics of technology in a postphenomenological perspective, Scharff in particular invites me to make my notion of the political more explicit. In what follows, I will therefore first elaborate my take on the political dimension of technology in dialogue with Scharff’s comments and suggestions. Armed with this deepened concept of the political, I will then address Puech’s plea to leave politics behind and move towards an ethically informed, post-political approach to sustainability. Evidently, within the limits of this piece, I can only indicate the broader direction my conceptualisation of the political takes. It suffices perhaps to say that, partly induced by the commentaries of Scharff and Puech, the question of the political has meanwhile taken a much more prominent place in my research as can be seen from a few recent publications [e.g. Goeminne (2012) and Goeminne (forthcoming)]. In saying this, I am also expressing my indebtedness to the commentators for nudging me in this political direction.     

Reframing Architecture

I would like to thank Prof. Stephen Read (2011) and Prof. Andrew Benjamin (2011) for both giving inspiring and elaborate comments on my article “Dwelling in-between walls: the architectural surround”. As I will try to demonstrate below, their two different responses not only supplement my article very nicely, but also augment each other’s. In the beginning of Read’s comment, as he sets the stage for his observations, he unknowingly also points in the direction of Benjamin’s remarks: “I propose not to de-construct therefore, or add a point of view from an orthogonal position, but to try in the spirit of multidisciplinarity to talk in languages not well practiced—to begin to build what Bowker and Star call ‘boundary objects’ between different starting positions; points we can gather around to think further together” (Read 2011). Whereas Read facilitates a multidisciplinary dialogue, Benjamin focuses on how the absence of an initial distinction might threaten the endeavour of my paper. In my reply to Read and Benjamin, I will discuss their suggestions and arguments, while at the same time hopefully clarifying the postphenomenological approach to architecture.     

Embracing the Political in Technology and Transition Studies: A Response to Philip Vergragt and Bram Bos

This article is a short reaction to the comments of Vergragt (Found Sci, 2012) and Bos (Found Sci, 2012) on my article “Sustainability transition and the nature of technology” (Paredis in Found Sci 16(2–3):195–225, Paredis 2011). I start by situating current transition research in the sustainability debate. The relation between the two is simultaneously specific and vague: specific about processes at work during transitions, vague about the content and direction of the change. I then move on to a discussion of how a better conceptualisation of technology could strengthen the transition framework. I want to thank the two reviewers for their critical remarks, that stimulated me to better explain my position.     

Quantum Nonlocality and the Challenge to Scientific Realism

In this essay I examine various aspects of the nearcentury-long debate concerning the conceptualfoundations of quantum mechanics and the problems ithas posed for physicists and philosophers fromEinstein to the present. Most crucial here is theissue of realism and the question whether quantumtheory is compatible with any kind of realist orcausal-explanatory account which goes beyond theempirical-predictive data. This was Einstein's chiefconcern in the famous series of exchanges with NielsBohr when he refused to accept the truth orcompleteness of a doctrine (orthodox QM) which ruledsuch questions to be strictly inadmissible. I discussthe later history of quantum-theoretical debate withparticular reference to the issue of nonlocality,i.e., the phenomenon of superluminal(faster-than-light) interaction betweenwidely-separated particles. Then I show how thestandard `Copenhagen' interpretation of QM hasinfluenced current anti-realist orontological-relativist approaches to philosophy ofscience. Indeed, there are clear signs that somephilosophers have retreated from a realist positionvery largely in response to just these problems. So itis important to ask exactly why – on what scientificor philosophical grounds – any preferred alternative(causal-realist) construal should have been ruled outas a matter of orthodox QM wisdom. Moreconstructively, my paper presents various arguments infavour of one such alternative, the `hidden-variables'theory developed since the early 1950s by David Bohmand consistently marginalised by proponents of theCopenhagen doctrine.     

Virtual Invaders

Since both responses interrogate different aspects of my article “The screen as an in-between” (Vanderbeeken 2011), I will address them separately. Vanhoutte rightly questions the affinities of my theses with Luddism, Orwell and Baudrillard’s theoretical terrorism. My reply discusses why these reactionary positions are currently out of joint. Hoens rightly questions my interpretation of the notion ‘passion for the real’ and whether the examples discussed delineate the specificity of new media. My reply discusses how I take this notion as a starting point for an analysis that complements rather then criticises Badiou and ?i?ek and how the apparent resemblance between old and new media in fact entails significant differences.     

Love and Realism

In this reply I try to show that, contrary to Milberry’s apparent assertion, the general intellect of the multitude does not have the explanatory robustness she accredits to it (following both Virno and the Hardt and Negri of the Empire trilogy). Digital network technologies are currently overwhelmingly effective in proletarianizing and disempowering the cognitariat and only an active technopolitics of deproletarianization could reverse this hegemonic situation. In my response to Verbeek, I attempt to correct his misinterpretation (shared by Milberry) of the Stieglerian approach as being dialectical in nature and show that, far from reinstating the humanist dichotomy between human beings and technologies, my analysis assumes their original, albeit fundamentally ambiguous and even ‘uncanny’ [unheimlich] interconnection. I conclude with pointing out some implications of this view for a ‘really realistic’ political theory of technology.     

Whose Agency Now?

I agree with my readers on the necessary alliance of personal agency and collective agency. My point is to prioritize the former. The reasons to prioritize the latter were excellent, and it was undoubtedly a sound decision to start with this scenario: political and institutional improvement of the collectives, enlightened by progressive social sciences. My argument for suggesting a different priority—toward personal microactions and their emergent effects—relies on the opinion that we are stuck in a sustainability crisis due to our current approach. In the question “whose agency now?”, my stress is on “now”.     

From Doing to Performing Phenomenology: Implications and Possibilities

This commentary on Kurt Vanhoutte and Nele Wynants’s of ‘Performing phenomenology: negotiating presence in intermedial theatre’ focuses on the implications of staging phenomenological research. In my opinion the authors missed an opportunity to stress more what W (Double U), a performance of CREW has to offer postphenomenology and what it actually means to ‘perform’ phenomenology. I will not only argue that W (Double U) because of its performative nature offers a reflection on postphenomenology, but also that the performance must be understood as a specific kind of research, conducted simultaneously from a theoretical and aesthetic orientation, leading to a complex interaction between perception and reflection, and offering a valuable, different perspective on postphenomenological research issues. W (Double U) in this respect functions as a ‘theoretical object’, producing a specific kind of embodied knowledge. Finally I will emphasize the possible radical potential in W (Double U), because I do believe that the performance, although it might not lead explicitly to social change, does have an important social and political relevance that the authors do not really delve into.