The metaphysics of D-CTCs: On the underlying assumptions of Deutsch׳s quantum solution to the paradoxes of time travel

I argue that Deutsch׳s model for the behavior of systems traveling around closed timelike curves (CTCs) relies implicitly on a substantive metaphysical assumption. Deutsch is employing a version of quantum theory with a significantly supplemented ontology of parallel existent worlds, which differ in kind from the many worlds of the Everett interpretation. Standard Everett does not support the existence of multiple identical copies of the world, which the D-CTC model requires. This has been obscured because he often refers to the branching structure of Everett as a “multiverse”, and describes quantum interference by reference to parallel interacting definite worlds. But he admits that this is only an approximation to Everett. The D-CTC model, however, relies crucially on the existence of a multiverse of parallel interacting worlds. Since his model is supplemented by structures that go significantly beyond quantum theory, and play an ineliminable role in its predictions and explanations, it does not represent a quantum solution to the paradoxes of time travel.     

Accentuate the negative: Locating possibility in Darwin’s ‘long argument’

Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species has an unusual format. After presenting his theory of Natural Selection in its first four chapters, there follows a series of five chapters presenting a large number of problems and objections to the theory which, he admits, appear overwhelming. Not until chapter 10 does he begin to present what he takes to be the positive evidence for his theory. In this paper I trace the evolution of this structure from its first hints in his Species Notebooks , through the 1842 Sketch and 1844 Essay to the Origin, showing that it reflects a growing awareness on Darwin’s part of what I call ’In Principle Impossible’ arguments against his theory, and of a systematic strategy for disarming them.     

On “the application of science to science itself:” chemistry,instruments, and the scientific labor process

The “Instrumental Revolution” in chemistry refers to a transitional period in the mid-20th century during which sophisticated instrumentation based on physical principles was introduced to solve chemical problems. Historical and philosophical reflection on whether the revolution was a scientific one has been dominated by general models of scientific revolution, in particular, those proposed by Thomas Kuhn, I. B. Cohen and Ian Hacking. In this article I propose that the Industrial Revolution is a useful model for understanding the transformation wrought by the increasingly important role of machines in chemical research. Drawing on Marx's analysis of that event, I argue that that the Instrumental Revolution bears a striking resemblance to the industrial one. I offer grounds for thinking that the resemblance is not fortuitous, but rather reflects a general pattern of development involving the mechanization of the labor process. It is suggested that the cognitive consequences of radical changes in the means of production, as exemplified in the Instrumental Revolution, warrant the consideration of whether the latter is an instance of a kind of revolution in science rather than a singular episode.     

On the relation between the probabilistic characterization of the common cause and Bell׳s notion of local causality

In this paper the relation between the standard probabilistic characterization of the common cause (used for the derivation of the Bell inequalities) and Bell׳s notion of local causality will be investigated in the isotone net framework borrowed from algebraic quantum field theory. The logical role of two components in Bell׳s definition will be scrutinized; namely that the common cause is localized in the intersection of the past of the correlated events; and that it provides a complete specification of the ‘beables’ of this intersection.     

An “ecological” view of styles of science and of art: Alois Riegl’s explorations of the style concept

This paper compares the views of styles of science of Alistair Crombie and Ian Hacking with the notion of styles of art, as developed by Alois Riegl at the end of the 19th Century. Important similarities are noted, notably in the conceptualization of the autonomy of styles. Riegl developed in particular the notion of Kunstwollen (“will to art”), which encompasses an implied relation to the world, in both a cognitive and an ethical sense, and a relation to the public of art. The latter aspect will be examined as the “role of the spectator”. Finally, a number of Riegl’s view on art are tentatively applied to styles of science.     

The professor and the pea: Lives and afterlives of William Bateson’s campaign for the utility of Mendelism

As a defender of the fundamental importance of Mendel’s experiments for understanding heredity, the English biologist William Bateson (1861–1926) did much to publicize the usefulness of Mendelian science for practical breeders. In the course of his campaigning, he not only secured a reputation among breeders as a scientific expert worth listening to but articulated a vision of the ideal relations between pure and applied science in the modern state. Yet historical writing about Bateson has tended to underplay these utilitarian elements of his program, to the extent of portraying him, notably in still-influential work from the 1960s and 1970s, as a type specimen of the scientist who could not care less about application. This paper offers a corrective view of Bateson himself—including the first detailed account of his role as an expert witness in a courtroom dispute over the identity of a commercial pea variety—and an inquiry into the historiographic fate of his efforts in support of Mendelism’s productivity. For all that a Marxian perspective classically brings applied science to the fore, in Bateson’s case, and for a range of reasons, it did the opposite during the Cold War.     

On the history of the isomorphism problem of dynamical systems with special regard to von Neumann’s contribution

This article reviews some major episodes in the history of the spatial isomorphism problem of dynamical systems theory (ergodic theory). In particular, by analysing, both systematically and in historical context, a hitherto unpublished letter written in 1941 by John von Neumann to Stanislaw Ulam, this article clarifies von Neumann’s contribution to discovering the relationship between spatial isomorphism and spectral isomorphism. The main message of the article is that von Neumann’s argument described in his letter to Ulam is the very first proof that spatial isomorphism and spectral isomorphism are not equivalent because spectral isomorphism is weaker than spatial isomorphism: von Neumann shows that spectrally isomorphic ergodic dynamical systems with mixed spectra need not be spatially isomorphic.     

Maxwell’s contrived analogy: An early version of the methodology of modeling

The term “analogy” stands for a variety of methodological practices all related in one way or another to the idea of proportionality. We claim that in his first substantial contribution to electromagnetism James Clerk Maxwell developed a methodology of analogy which was completely new at the time or, to borrow John North’s expression, Maxwell’s methodology was a “newly contrived analogue”. In his initial response to Michael Faraday’s experimental researches in electromagnetism, Maxwell did not seek an analogy with some physical system in a domain different from electromagnetism as advocated by William Thomson; rather, he constructed an entirely artificial one to suit his needs. Following North, we claim that the modification which Maxwell introduced to the methodology of analogy has not been properly appreciated. In view of our examination of the evidence, we argue that Maxwell gave a new meaning to analogy; in fact, it comes close to modeling in current usage.     

What's nu? A re-examination of Maxwell's ‘ratio-of-units’ argument,from the mechanical theory of the electromagnetic field to ‘On the elementary relations between electrical measurements’

This re-examination of the earliest version of Maxwell's most important argument for the electromagnetic theory of light—the equality between the speed of wave propagation in the electromagnetic ether and the ratio of electrostatic to electromagnetic measures of electrical quantity—establishes unforeseen connections between Maxwell's theoretical electrical metrology and his mechanical theory of the electromagnetic field. Electrical metrology was not neutral with respect to field-theoretic versus action-at-a-distance conceptions of electro-magnetic interaction. Mutual accommodation between these conceptions was reached by Maxwell on the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) Committee on Electrical Standards by exploiting the measurement of the medium parameters—electric inductive capacity and magnetic permeability—on an arbitrary scale. While he always worked within this constraint in developing the ‘ratio-of-units’ argument mathematically, I maintain that Maxwell came to conceive of the ratio ‘as a velocity’ by treating the medium parameters as physical quantities that could be measured absolutely, which was only possible via the correspondences between electrical and mechanical quantities established in the mechanical theory. I thereby correct two closely-related misconceptions of the ratio-of-units argument—the counterintuitive but widespread notion that the ratio is naturally a speed, and the supposition that Maxwell either inferred or proved this from its dimensional formula.     

The eagle and the starlings: Galileo’s argument for the autonomy of science—how pertinent is it today?

After Galileo’s argument for the autonomy of science is analysed and adapted to take into account later developments of scientific practices, we conclude that, in the final analysis, it is not compelling. Nevertheless, Galileo’s argument still provides a useful point of reference, for aspects of it can be interpreted to anticipate central components of the often acclaimed ideal of science as value free, so that appraising it contributes to the larger purpose of exploring how well that ideal stands up today. Finally, we will argue that residue from Galileo’s struggle with the Church remains with us, making it difficult to identify the conditions that would need to be put into place today for any robust sense of the autonomy of science to be defensible.     

The case of the composite Higgs: The model as a “Rosetta stone” in contemporary high-energy physics

This paper analyses the practice of model-building “beyond the Standard Model” in contemporary high-energy physics and argues that its epistemic function can be grasped by regarding models as mediating between the phenomenology of the Standard Model and a number of “theoretical cores” of hybrid character, in which mathematical structures are combined with verbal narratives (“stories”) and analogies referring back to empirical results in other fields (“empirical references”). Borrowing a metaphor from a physics research paper, model-building is likened to the search for a Rosetta stone, whose significance does not lie in its immediate content, but rather in the chance it offers to glimpse at and manipulate the components of hybrid theoretical constructs. I shall argue that the rise of hybrid theoretical constructs was prompted by the increasing use of nonrigorous mathematical heuristics in high-energy physics. Support for my theses will be offered in form of a historical–philosophical analysis of the emergence and development of the theoretical core centring on the notion that the Higgs boson is a composite particle. I will follow the heterogeneous elements which would eventually come to form this core from their individual emergence in the 1960s and 1970s, through their collective life as a theoretical core from 1979 until the present day.     

“Exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science

This essay utilizes the concept “exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science. The essay traces the emergence of the historiographical concept “exploratory experimentation” in the late 1990s. The reconstruction of the early discussions about exploratory experimentation shows that the introduction of the concept had unintended consequences: Initially designed to debunk philosophical ideas about theory testing, the concept “exploratory experimentation” quickly exposed the poverty of our conceptual tools for the analysis of experimental practice. Looking back at a number of detailed analyses of experimental research, we can now appreciate that the concept of exploratory experimentation is too vague and too elusive to fill the desideratum whose existence it revealed.     

Into the ‘regions of physical and metaphysical chaos’: Maxwell’s scientific metaphysics and natural philosophy of action (agency,determinacy and necessity from theology,moral philosophy and history to mathematics,theory and experiment)

Maxwell’s writings exhibit an enduring preoccupation with the role of metaphysics in the advancement of science, especially the progress of physics. I examine the question of the distinction and the proper relation between physics and metaphysics and the way in which the question relies on key notions that bring together much of Maxwell’s natural philosophy, theoretical and experimental. Previous discussions of his attention to metaphysics have been confined to specific issues and polemics such as conceptions of matter and the problem of free will. I suggest a unifying pattern based on a generalized philosophical perspective and varying expressions, although never a systematic or articulated philosophical doctrine, but at least a theme of action and active powers, natural and human, intellectual and material, with sources and grounds in theology, moral philosophy and historical argument. While science was developing in the direction of professional specialization and alongside the rise of materialism, Maxwell held on to conservative intellectual outlook, but one that included a rich scientific life and held science as part of a rich intellectual, cultural and material life. His philosophical outlook integrated his science with and captured the new Victorian culture of construction and work, political, economic, artistic and engineering.     

The making of an intrinsic property: “Symmetry heuristics” in early particle physics

Mathematical invariances, usually referred to as “symmetries”, are today often regarded as providing a privileged heuristic guideline for understanding natural phenomena, especially those of micro-physics. The rise of symmetries in particle physics has often been portrayed by physicists and philosophers as the “application” of mathematical invariances to the ordering of particle phenomena, but no historical studies exist on whether and how mathematical invariances actually played a heuristic role in shaping microphysics. Moreover, speaking of an “application” of invariances conflates the formation of concepts of new intrinsic degrees of freedom of elementary particles with the formulation of models containing invariances with respect to those degrees of freedom. I shall present here a case study from early particle physics (ca. 1930–1954) focussed on the formation of one of the earliest concepts of a new degree of freedom, baryon number, and on the emergence of the invariance today associated to it. The results of the analysis show how concept formation and “application” of mathematical invariances were distinct components of a complex historical constellation in which, beside symmetries, two further elements were essential: the idea of physically conserved quantities and that of selection rules. I shall refer to the collection of different heuristic strategies involving selection rules, invariances and conserved quantities as the “SIC-triangle” and show how different authors made use of them to interpret the wealth of new experimental data. It was only a posteriori that the successes of this hybrid “symmetry heuristics” came to be attributed exclusively to mathematical invariances and group theory, forgetting the role of selection rules and of the notion of physically conserved quantity in the emergence of new degrees of freedom and new invariances. The results of the present investigation clearly indicate that opinions on the role of symmetries in fundamental physics need to be critically reviewed in the spirit of integrated history and philosophy of science.     

Burnside’s engagement with the “modern theory of statistics”

The group theorist William Burnside devoted much of the last decade of his life to probability and statistics. The work led to contact with Ronald Fisher who was on his way to becoming the leading statistician of the age and with Karl Pearson, the man Fisher supplanted. Burnside corresponded with Fisher for nearly three years until their correspondence ended abruptly. This paper examines Burnside’s interactions with the statisticians and looks more generally at his work in probability and statistics. I am grateful to June Barrow-Green and Tony Mann for showing me important letters, to Susan Woodburn, Elise Bennetto and Jeniffer Beauchamps of the University of Adelaide for help with letters to Fisher and to Jonathan Harrison of St. John’s Cambridge for help with letters to Baker and White. Peter Neumann, the editor and a referee made helpful comments on an earlier draft.