Radical Constructivism in Biology and Cognitive Science

This article addresses the issue of “objectivism vs constructivism” in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the “objectivism vs constructivism” issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely resonant withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of “enaction” incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between “objectivist”and “constructivist” perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences.     

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent “softer” accounts of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as “the anti-philosophical stance”. I then demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific practice.     

走出形而上学的区分--论社会建构主义中的本体论问题

社会建构主义的直接批判对象是自主性的科学观，即认为科学知识构成了一个独立的王国，它以某种形而上学的存在为基础，或者是先验的理性逻辑，或者是先验的认识能力，它们使得科学世界和人类的其他领域区分开来。因此，自主性的科学观是以形而上学的本体论区分为前提的。社会建构主义通过将科学的基础还原为历史性的存在，超出了这种形而上学的区分。     

国内科学文化研究与欧美后SSK“科学的文化研究”之比较

国内的科学文化研究是在不改变科学的客观性、真理性和表象论的前提下,把科学作为一种文化现象和文化过程来研究,可划归为大众理解科学的科学传播视域。欧美后SSK的科学的文化研究是SSK从科学的社会研究扩展到科学实践的文化研究,是从科学知识的社会建构论转向科学实践的文化建构论,是对科学客观性和表象论的进一步背离和消解,强化和放大了各种异质性文化因素对制造科学的作用;背离了科学家的真实立场和科学的核心问题,成了反科学的帮凶,不会结出真正的果实。二者在研究内容、方法、理念和科学观上是根本不同的,他们都有自己亟需解决的问题。     

Constructivism,Truth and Reality

This commentary to Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech’s (Reality, systems and impure systems. Foundations of Science 2013) links ideas in their paper to radical constructivism and raises two questions. (1) Would it be helpful to substitute the constructivist notion of viability for the traditional notion of truth with its connotations of relating language and reality? (2) Is the link made to issues in ontological philosophy important since the implicit constructivist epistemology of the paper considers mathematical ideas are just as real as ideas about objects.     

Systems and Beliefs

Systems thinking provides insights into how ideas interact and change, and constructivism is an example of this type of systemic approach. In the 1970s constructivism emphasised the development of mathematical and scientific ideas in children. Recently constructivist ideas are applied much more generally. Here I use this approach to consider beliefs and their role in conflicts and the conditions needed for reconciliation. If we look at Reality in terms of how we construct it as a human cognitive process, we recognise two things. First, that we cannot go beyond our senses and thoughts to what exists independently of us, and second, if we construct what we know we have to take responsibility for this. This inevitably focuses our thinking on the relation we have with the physical and social world, we are a part of the universe rather than apart from it. This paper argues that accepting and understanding these limits of human knowing together with our interconnectedness provide opportunities to understand conflicting positions. To resolve conflict, people with opposing viewpoints have to be prepared to understand each other. That is a challenge because our own reality plays a vital role in our lives, for everything from personal survival to social support.     

Philosophy of chemistry and the image of science

The philosophical analysis of chemistry has advanced at such a pace during the last dozen years that the existence of philosophy of chemistry as an autonomous discipline cannot be doubted any more. The present paper will attempt to analyse the experience of philosophy of chemistry at the, so to say, meta-level. Philosophers of chemistry have especially stressed that all sciences need not be similar to physics. They have tried to argue for chemistry as its own type of science and for a pluralistic understanding of science in general. However, when stressing the specific character of chemistry, philosophers do not always analyse the question ‘What is science?’ theoretically. It is obvious that a ‘monistic’ understanding of science should not be based simply on physics as the epitome of science, regarding it as a historical accident that physics has obtained this status. The author’s point is that the philosophical and methodological image of science should not be chosen arbitrarily; instead, it should be theoretically elaborated as an idealization (theoretical model) substantiated on the historical practice of science. It is argued that although physics has, in a sense, justifiably obtained the status of a paradigm of science, chemistry, which is not simply a physical science, but a discipline with a dual character, is also relevant for elaborating a theoretical model of science. The theoretical model of science is a good tool for examining various issues in philosophy of chemistry as well as in philosophy of science or science studies generally.     

"哲学资本"——布迪厄社会理论的"工具箱"

布迪厄是法国当代著名社会学家,更是法国当代著名哲学家。但由于多种原因,我国学界并没有把他作为法国当代著名哲学家来对待,因此,我国学者对布迪厄的哲学思想了解的不多。布迪厄依靠自己拥有的哲学资本①(哲学博士和哲学教师资格文凭),创造性地运用系统论、普遍联系和认识论等哲学思想,使其社会理论凸现出建构的结构主义或结构的建构主义、关系主义和反思性的哲学特征,布迪厄在创立社会理论的过程中,哲学资本起到了工具箱②的作用。     

"后基础主义"时代数学哲学研究的若干趋势——从波普尔、拉卡托斯到P.欧内斯特

数学基础主义之后,批判理性主义和经验主义(包括拟经验主义)成为某些数学哲学家热衷的选择。虽然对柏拉图主义和实在论有某种解构价值,但两者却混淆了数学与其他科学的本质区别。相比较而言,关于数学的社会建构主义观点虽然有不少真知灼见,但却陷入了某种形式的单一决定论的泥潭。     

A Physical Approach to the Construction of Cognition and to Cognitive Evolution

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.(e.g., the law of energy conservation can bederived from the homogeneity of time and bythis depends on our mental time metricgenerator). So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously (for ex.: most scientistssee cognitive evolution converging towards adefinitive world picture, whereas organicevolution obviously has no specific focus (the`pride of creation').     

电气化工程的社会影响及其文化意蕴

这里针对两个问题展开讨论，一个是工程的社会影响究竟有多大？从历史发展脉络中我们看到了电气化工程促进了人类社会工业化进程；加快了人类社会城市化发展；改变了人类社会农业生产方式；改善了人类社会的生活方式和家庭生活质量；推动了人类社会全球化变迁；但也对生态环境造成相当程度的破坏。另一个问题是电气化工程的社会影响何以可能？通过实证主义、实用主义、历史主义和建构主义等哲学思想，我们看到了在工程中所蕴合的科技理论的逻辑性和经验性；工程运行的实用性和简单性；工程范式的历史性和转换性以度工程实践的建构性和境遇性等文化意蕴。     

科学知识何以成为历史产品

科学知识具有历史的维度，这是20世纪科学哲学研究的重大成果。本文通过回顾20世纪科学哲学的几个主要学派争论的焦点和内在的发展线索，尤其是历史主义科学观形成的基础和其革命之处，阐明了科学知识是一种历史产品这一科学观形成的缘由。文章最后还对后库恩时期的科学哲学的发展趋势作了简介。     

Constructivism, Cognition, and Science – An Investigation of Its Links and Possible Shortcomings

This paper addresses the questions concerningthe relationship between scientific andcognitive processes. The fact that both,science and cognition, aim at acquiring somekind of knowledge or representationabout the “world” is the key for establishing alink between these two domains. It turns outthat the constructivist frameworkrepresents an adequate epistemologicalfoundation for this undertaking, as its focusof interest is on the (constructive)relationship between the world and itsrepresentation. More specifically, it will beshown how cognitive processes and their primaryconcern to construct a representation of theenvironment and to generate functionallyfitting behavior can act as the basis forembedding the activities and dynamics of theprocess of science in them by making use ofconstructivist concepts, such as functionalfitness, structure determinedness, etc.Cognitive science and artificiallife provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interactionbetween each other and with the environmentenabling us to establish this link betweencognitive processes and thedevelopment/dynamics of scientific theories.The concepts of activation, synaptic weight,and genetic (representational) spaces arepowerful tools which can be used as“explanatory vehicles”for a cognitivefoundation of science, more specifically forthe “context of discovery” (i.e., thedevelopment, construction, and dynamics ofscientific theories and paradigms).Representational spaces do not only offer us abetter understanding of embedding science incognition, but also show, how theconstructivist framework, both, can act as anadequate epistemological foundation for theseprocesses and can be instantiated by theserepresentational concepts from cognitivescience. The final part of this paper addresses somemore fundamental questions concerning thepositivistic and constructivist understandingof science and human cognition. Among otherthings it is asked, whether a purelyfunctionalist and quantitative view of theworld aiming almost exclusively at itsprediction and control is really satisfying forour intellect (having the goal of achieving aprofound understanding of reality).     

现代物理学需要思辨——评吴孟超的《宇宙解的构思》

现代物理学研究的极限问题越来越多。极限问题离直接经验最远。极限问题既有科学解，也有哲学解。极限问题的研究需要哲学与思辩。吴孟超教授的《宇宙解的构思》一书，对一些物理学的极限问题作了有益的探讨，并表明现代物理学需要思辩，物理学应关注哲学，哲学应参与思辩。     

科技知识的地方性与全球性——走向后殖民技科学观研究

在关于科技跨文化和跨国家传播的研究中,巴萨拉模型和佩尔森的文化帝国主义,是一种全球西方化的实证主义科技观;后殖民科学观,其理论基础是社会建构主义,强调地方性科技之间的永久隔阂,走向文化相对主义;当前的后殖民技科学观从全球性与地方性之间相互冲撞的关系视角去关注着全球性与地方性之间各种异质性要素的辩证冲撞与互利发展,这种视角的理论基础实际就是拉图尔的行动者网络理论。     

科学与技术的文化主导权之争及其终结——科学、技术与技科学

20世纪80年代前,人们的共识是:科学在人类文化中占据着主导地位,从而也主导着技术,其哲学基础是科学实在论。20世纪80年代,随着社会建构论的出现,技术逐渐取代科学,占据主导地位。从认识论的角度来看,这种主导权之争实际上是基于不会有答案的实在论与建构论之争。从科学实践的角度,基于辩证的新本体论的技科学,则会消解这种无果之争。     

Understanding Scientific Inquiries of Galileo’s Formulation for the Law of Free Falling Motion

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum.     

20世纪对西方占星术的科学检验

20世纪,一些学者和科学家试图用已有的科学理论和哲学分析将西方占星术(astrology)①排除在科学之外,但真正让西方占星术目前仍没能走入主流科学里的,却是近30年来的几百个对占星术有效性的科学检验.今天从哲学上看,无论是证伪主义所表述的科学是理性的,还是历史主义所表述的科学是非理性的都一致地把占星术拒斥在科学之外.占星术之所以又会在大众中盛行起来,是缘于在20世纪初人们开始对科学万能发生质疑,同时对主要是涉及精神领域的占星术,至今仍没有能很好替代它的科学学科,正如化学、核物理学可以很好地替代炼金术那样.     

阻碍法国科学发展的学界陋习例证

法国曾是世界科学的中心,物理学也曾是法国的传统强势学科。但是19世纪后半叶尤其20世纪前50年左右,法国的物理学与英国、德国的该学科发展相比,明显滞后了。贝尔纳在其著作中,表达了他对法国科学发生这一变化的原因的看法。贝尔纳的观点扼要却没有通过具体事例予以说明。通过著名的法国科学家迪昂与居里等人的遭遇,可以看出贝尔纳的说法是准确的,即科学界的老人统治以及政府的不重视是法国科学发展滞后的关键症结。法国科学界老人统治的后果值得中国科学界引以为戒。     

从康德的科学哲学到规范场论--关于本义上的自然科学的纯粹部分

康德本人对自然科学的划分，有其深刻的哲学根据。康德所寻求的自然科学中无可置辩的确定性、普遍必然性在物理学的发展中越来越明显，而规范场论是最能体现“本义上的自然科学的纯粹部分”的。