The impact of climate change on human health: Some international implications

The objective of this study is to discuss the potential impact of a global warming on various aspects of human health. Changes in heat-related mortality are estimated for four countries: the United States, Canada, the People's Republic of China and Egypt. In addition, the potential confounding impact of increased air pollution is considered. Finally, a framework to analyze two vector-borne diseases, onchocerciasis and malaria, which may spread if temperatures increase, is discussed. Our findings suggest that heat-related mortality is estimated to rise significantly in all four countries if the earth warms, with the greatest impacts in China and Egypt. The most sensitive areas are those with intense but irregular heat waves. In the United States, air pollution does not appear to impact daily mortality significantly when severe weather is present, although it seems to have a slight influence when weather conditions are not stressful.     

It starts at home? Climate policies targeting household consumption and behavioral decisions are key to low-carbon futures

Through their consumption behavior, households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, they are key actors in reaching the 1.5 °C goal under the Paris Agreement. However, the possible contribution and position of households in climate policies is neither well understood, nor do households receive sufficiently high priority in current climate policy strategies. This paper investigates how behavioral change can achieve a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in European high-income countries. It uses theoretical thinking and some core results from the HOPE research project, which investigated household preferences for reducing emissions in four European cities in France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The paper makes five major points: First, car and plane mobility, meat and dairy consumption, as well as heating are the most dominant components of household footprints. Second, household living situations (demographics, size of home) greatly influence the household potential to reduce their footprint, even more than country or city location. Third, household decisions can be sequential and temporally dynamic, shifting through different phases such as childhood, adulthood, and illness. Fourth, short term voluntary efforts will not be sufficient by themselves to reach the drastic reductions needed to achieve the 1.5 °C goal; instead, households need a regulatory framework supporting their behavioral changes. Fifth, there is a mismatch between the roles and responsibilities conveyed by current climate policies and household perceptions of responsibility. We then conclude with further recommendations for research and policy.     

It starts at home? Climate policies targeting household consumption and behavioral decisions are key to low-carbon futures

Through their consumption behavior, households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, they are key actors in reaching the 1.5 °C goal under the Paris Agreement. However, the possible contribution and position of households in climate policies is neither well understood, nor do households receive sufficiently high priority in current climate policy strategies. This paper investigates how behavioral change can achieve a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in European high-income countries. It uses theoretical thinking and some core results from the HOPE research project, which investigated household preferences for reducing emissions in four European cities in France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The paper makes five major points: First, car and plane mobility, meat and dairy consumption, as well as heating are the most dominant components of household footprints. Second, household living situations (demographics, size of home) greatly influence the household potential to reduce their footprint, even more than country or city location. Third, household decisions can be sequential and temporally dynamic, shifting through different phases such as childhood, adulthood, and illness. Fourth, short term voluntary efforts will not be sufficient by themselves to reach the drastic reductions needed to achieve the 1.5 °C goal; instead, households need a regulatory framework supporting their behavioral changes. Fifth, there is a mismatch between the roles and responsibilities conveyed by current climate policies and household perceptions of responsibility. We then conclude with further recommendations for research and policy.     

“Global warming” versus “climate change”: A replication on the association between political self-identification,question wording,and environmental beliefs

Climate change is one of the greatest threats to humanity and requires immediate action. Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) suggested that beliefs in environmental phenomena can be influenced by the terminology used to describe it: changing question wording from global warming to climate change resulted in a 6.3 percentage point increase in belief in environmental phenomena. This association was moderated by political self-identification, with Republicans being 16.2 percentage points more likely to believe in climate change than in global warming, with Democrats showing no difference. The potential for connotative meanings to shift over time and the sociopolitical changes since the original study, potential policy and environmental campaign implications, and an expansion of these findings to other countries, motivated an attempt to replicate this important finding. This pre-registered study repeated the original procedures in the United States of America and two other countries (United Kingdom and Australia; total N = 5,717). Although question wording no longer had a significant effect on beliefs in climate change/global warming, the association of political self-identification with beliefs in environmental phenomena replicated in all three countries, with Conservatives consistently believing less in climate change/global warming than Liberals. The potential impacts of temporal and methodological differences on the discrepancies between this study's and the original's findings are discussed.     

“Global warming” versus “climate change”: A replication on the association between political self-identification,question wording,and environmental beliefs

Climate change is one of the greatest threats to humanity and requires immediate action. Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) suggested that beliefs in environmental phenomena can be influenced by the terminology used to describe it: changing question wording from global warming to climate change resulted in a 6.3 percentage point increase in belief in environmental phenomena. This association was moderated by political self-identification, with Republicans being 16.2 percentage points more likely to believe in climate change than in global warming, with Democrats showing no difference. The potential for connotative meanings to shift over time and the sociopolitical changes since the original study, potential policy and environmental campaign implications, and an expansion of these findings to other countries, motivated an attempt to replicate this important finding. This pre-registered study repeated the original procedures in the United States of America and two other countries (United Kingdom and Australia; total N = 5,717). Although question wording no longer had a significant effect on beliefs in climate change/global warming, the association of political self-identification with beliefs in environmental phenomena replicated in all three countries, with Conservatives consistently believing less in climate change/global warming than Liberals. The potential impacts of temporal and methodological differences on the discrepancies between this study's and the original's findings are discussed.     

Computer models and the evidence of anthropogenic climate change: An epistemology of variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis

To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis. Recent philosophical discussions dispute the confirmatory power of robustness, raising the question of how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body of evidence supporting hypotheses about climate change. Expanding on Staley’s (2004) distinction between evidential strength and security, and Lloyd’s (2015) argument connecting variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis, I address this question with respect to recent challenges to the epistemology robustness analysis. Applying this epistemology to case studies of climate change, I argue that, despite imperfections in climate models, and epistemic constraints on variety-of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis, this framework accounts for the strength and security of evidence supporting climatological inferences, including the finding that global warming is occurring and its primary causes are anthropogenic.     

Values in early-stage climate engineering: The ethical implications of “doing the research”

Calls for research on climate engineering have increased in the last two decades, but there remains widespread agreement that many climate engineering technologies (in particular, forms involving global solar radiation management) present significant ethical risks and require careful governance. However, proponents of research argue, ethical restrictions on climate engineering research should not be imposed in early-stage work like in silico modeling studies. Such studies, it is argued, do not pose risks to the public, and the knowledge gained from them is necessary for assessing the risks and benefits of climate engineering technologies. I argue that this position, which I call the “broad research-first” stance, cannot be maintained in light of the entrance of nonepistemic values in climate modeling. I analyze the roles that can be played by nonepistemic political and ethical values in the design, tuning, and interpretation of climate models. Then, I argue that, in the context of early-stage climate engineering research, the embeddedness of values will lead to value judgments that could harm stakeholder groups or impose researcher values on non-consenting populations. I conclude by calling for more robust reflection on the ethics and governance of early-stage climate engineering research.     

The theory theory thrice over: the child as scientist, Superscientist or social institution?

Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) a rational reconstruction of a Superscientist, or (iii) the scientific community. We argue that (i) is false, (ii) is non-empirical (which is problematic since the theory theory is supposed to be a bold empirical hypothesis), and (iii) is either false or doesn't make enough sense to have a truth-value. We conclude that the theory theory is an interesting failure. Its failure points the way to a full, empirical picture of scientific development, one that marries a concern with the social dynamics of science to a psychological theory of scientific cognition.     

How to make value-driven climate science for policy more ethical

In previous works, I examine inferential methods employed in Probabilistic Weather Event Attribution studies (PEAs), and explored various ways they can be used to aid in climate policy decisions and decision-making about climate justice issues. This paper evaluates limitations of PEAs and considers how PEA researchers’ attributions of “liability” to specific countries for specific extreme weather events could be made more ethical. In sum, I show that it is routinely presupposed that PEA methods are not prone to inductive risks and presuppose that PEA researchers thus have no epistemic consequences or responsibilities for their attributions of liability. I argue that although PEAs are nevertheless crucially useful for practical decision-making, the attributions of liability made by PEA researchers are in fact prone to indicative risks and are influenced by non-epistemic values that PEA researchers should make transparent to make such studies more ethical. Finally, I outline possible normative approaches for making sciences, including PEAs, more ethical; and discuss implications of my arguments for the ongoing debate about how PEAs should guide climate policy and relevant legal decisions.