Degenerating Families of Dendrograms

Dendrograms used in data analysis are ultrametric spaces, hence objects of nonarchimedean geometry. It is known that there exist p-adic representations of dendrograms. Completed by a point at infinity, they can be viewed as subtrees of the Bruhat-Tits tree associated to the p-adic projective line. The implications are that certain moduli spaces known in algebraic geometry are in fact p-adic parameter spaces of dendrograms, and stochastic classification can also be handled within this framework. At the end, we calculate the topology of the hidden part of a dendrogram.     

A New Representation of Interval Symbolic Data and Its Application in Dynamic Clustering

In this study, we consider the type of interval data summarizing the original samples (individuals) with classical point data. This type of interval data are termed interval symbolic data in a new research domain called, symbolic data analysis. Most of the existing research, such as the (centre, radius) and [lower boundary, upper boundary] representations, represent an interval using only the boundaries of the interval. However, these representations hold true only under the assumption that the individuals contained in the interval follow a uniform distribution. In practice, such representations may result in not only inconsistency with the facts, since the individuals are usually not uniformly distributed in many application aspects, but also information loss for not considering the point data within the intervals during the calculation. In this study, we propose a new representation of the interval symbolic data considering the point data contained in the intervals. Then we apply the city-block distance metric to the new representation and propose a dynamic clustering approach for interval symbolic data. A simulation experiment is conducted to evaluate the performance of our method. The results show that, when the individuals contained in the interval do not follow a uniform distribution, the proposed method significantly outperforms the Hausdorff and city-block distance based on traditional representation in the context of dynamic clustering. Finally, we give an application example on the automobile data set.     

Additive Biclustering: A Comparison of One New and Two Existing ALS Algorithms

The additive biclustering model for two-way two-mode object by variable data implies overlapping clusterings of both the objects and the variables together with a weight for each bicluster (i.e., a pair of an object and a variable cluster). In the data analysis, an additive biclustering model is fitted to given data by means of minimizing a least squares loss function. To this end, two alternating least squares algorithms (ALS) may be used: (1) PENCLUS, and (2) Baier’s ALS approach. However, both algorithms suffer from some inherent limitations, which may hamper their performance. As a way out, based on theoretical results regarding optimally designing ALS algorithms, in this paper a new ALS algorithm will be presented. In a simulation study this algorithm will be shown to outperform the existing ALS approaches.     

Points of View Beyond Models: Towards a Formal Approach to Points of View as Access to the World

According to Vázquez and Liz (Found Sci 16(4): 383–391, 2011), Points of View (PoV) can be considered in two different ways. On the one hand, they can be explained following the model of propositional attitudes. This model assumes that the internal structure of a PoV is constituted by a subject, a set of contents, and a set of relations between the subject and those contents. On the other hand, we can analyze points of view taking as a model the notions of location and access. If we choose to follow the second approach, instead of the first one, the internal structure of a PoV is not directly addressed, and the emphasized features of PoV are related to the function that PoV are intended to have. That is, PoV are directly identified by their role and they can solely be understood as ways of accessing the world that bring some kind of perspective about it. Having this in mind, we would like to propose a notation that explains how to understand such access as a sort of models (that can allow the creation of concepts), independently of whether the precise PoV under consideration is impersonal or non-impersonal, its kind of content, and its subjective or objective character. First, we will present an account of some previous approaches to the study of points of view. Then, we will analyze what kind of structure the world is assumed to posses and how the access to it is possible. Third, we will develop a notation that explains PoV as qualitative dimensions by means of which it is possible to valuate objects and states of the world.     

The Significance of Context in Comprehension: The `WeCase'

This paper deals with some of the issues raisedabout the use of context in language, that is,the pragmatic side of the problem; morespecifically it aims to stress the significanceand complexity of context. In real life context is exploited both in production and in comprehension.I will deal here mainly with comprehension:after briefly referring to cognitive contextsand their interaction with knowledge andcomprehension, and touching on the relationbetween language and context, I will analyzethe uses of an indexical pronoun, we,which may both include and exclude speaker/sand/or interlocutor/s, and cannot beinterpreted without referring to an`integrated' view of context.     

Induction from a Single Instance: Incomplete Frames

In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.     

Matter in Z3

In this paper, I will discuss a certain conception of matter that Aristotle introduces in Metaphysics Z3. It is often assumed that Aristotle came to distinguish between matter and form only in his physical writings, and that this lead to a conflict with the doctrine of primary substances in the Categories that he tries to resolve in Z3. I will argue that there is no such conflict. In Z3, Aristotle seems to suggest that matter is what is left over when we strip a thing of all its properties. I take it that he does not want us to strip away these properties by physical means or in our imagination. Rather, we are asked to strip a referring noun phrase of all its predicative parts. We are thus not supposed to be able to refer to something that has no qualities whatsoever, but to construct a phrase that refers to something that has properties without referring to its having them, and without implying which properties it has. The idea that there might be a way of referring to something definite without mentioning any of its qualities is platonic and it still underlies modern predicate logic. In Z3, Aristotle argues against this conception and thus against the basic idea of predicate logic. According to him, matter is at best an inseparable aspect of a primary substance, which substance is best referred to as a compound τóδε τι (“this such”). Matter is what the τóδε refers to as part of this phrase. But it cannot exist in separation from form, and we cannot refer to it by a separated term, without also referring to the substantial form of the substance of which it is an aspect.     

The Abductive Loop: Tracking Irrational Sets

We argue from the Church-Turing thesis (Kleene Mathematical logic. New York: Wiley 1967) that a program can be considered as equivalent to a formal language similar to predicate calculus where predicates can be taken as functions. We can relate such a calculus to Wittgenstein’s first major work, the Tractatus, and use the Tractatus and its theses as a model of the formal classical definition of a computer program. However, Wittgenstein found flaws in his initial great work and he explored these flaws in a new thesis described in his second great work; the Philosophical Investigations. The question we address is “can computer science make the same leap?” We are proposing, because of the flaws identified by Wittgenstein, that computers will never have the possibility of natural communication with people unless they become active participants of human society. The essential difference between formal models used in computing and human communication is that formal models are based upon rational sets whereas people are not so restricted. We introduce irrational sets as a concept that requires the use of an abductive inference system. However, formal models are still considered central to our means of using hypotheses through deduction to make predictions about the world. These formal models are required to continually be updated in response to peoples’ changes in their way of seeing the world. We propose that one mechanism used to keep track of these changes is the Peircian abductive loop.     

The Argument(s) for Universal Gravitation

In this paper an analysis of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation is provided. In the past, the complexity of the argument has not been fully appreciated. Recent authors like George E. Smith and William L. Harper have done a far better job. Nevertheless, a thorough account of the argument is still lacking. Both authors seem to stress the importance of only one methodological component. Smith stresses the procedure of approximative deductions backed-up by the laws of motion. Harper stresses “systematic dependencies” between theoretical parameters and phenomena. I will argue that Newton used a variety of different inferential strategies: causal parsimony considerations, deductions, demonstrative inductions, abductions and thought-experiments. Each of these strategies is part of Newton’s famous argument.     

Agnostic Science. Towards a Philosophy of Data Analysis

In this paper we will offer a few examples to illustrate the orientation of contemporary research in data analysis and we will investigate the corresponding role of mathematics. We argue that the modus operandi of data analysis is implicitly based on the belief that if we have collected enough and sufficiently diverse data, we will be able to answer most relevant questions concerning the phenomenon itself. This is a methodological paradigm strongly related, but not limited to, biology, and we label it the microarray paradigm. In this new framework, mathematics provides powerful techniques and general ideas which generate new computational tools. But it is missing any explicit isomorphism between a mathematical structure and the phenomenon under consideration. This methodology used in data analysis suggests the possibility of forecasting and analyzing without a structured and general understanding. This is the perspective we propose to call agnostic science, and we argue that, rather than diminishing or flattening the role of mathematics in science, the lack of isomorphisms with phenomena liberates mathematics, paradoxically making more likely the practical use of some of its most sophisticated ideas.     

Recognizing Treelike k-Dissimilarities

A k-dissimilarity D on a finite set X, |X|????k, is a map from the set of size k subsets of X to the real numbers. Such maps naturally arise from edgeweighted trees T with leaf-set X: Given a subset Y of X of size k, D(Y ) is defined to be the total length of the smallest subtree of T with leaf-set Y . In case k?=?2, it is well-known that 2-dissimilarities arising in this way can be characterized by the so-called ??4-point condition??. However, in case k?>?2 Pachter and Speyer (2004) recently posed the following question: Given an arbitrary k-dissimilarity, how do we test whether this map comes from a tree? In this paper, we provide an answer to this question, showing that for k????3 a k-dissimilarity on a set X arises from a tree if and only if its restriction to every 2?k-element subset of X arises from some tree, and that 2?k is the least possible subset size to ensure that this is the case. As a corollary, we show that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to determine when a k-dissimilarity arises from a tree. We also give a 6-point condition for determining when a 3-dissimilarity arises from a tree, that is similar to the aforementioned 4-point condition.     

The Intentionality of Formal Systems

One of the most interesting and entertaining philosophical discussions of the last few decades is the discussion between Daniel Dennett and John Searle on the existence of intrinsic intentionality. Dennett denies the existence of phenomena with intrinsic intentionality. Searle, however, is convinced that some mental phenomena exhibit intrinsic intentionality. According to me, this discussion has been obscured by some serious misunderstandings with regard to the concept ‘intrinsic intentionality’. For instance, most philosophers fail to realize that it is possible that the intentionality of a phenomenon is partly intrinsic and partly observer relative. Moreover, many philosophers are mixing up the concepts ‘original intentionality’ and ‘intrinsic intentionality’. In fact, there is, in the philosophical literature, no strict and unambiguous definition of the concept ‘intrinsic intentionality’. In this article, I will try to remedy this. I will also try to give strict and unambiguous definitions of the concepts ‘observer relative intentionality’, ‘original intentionality’, and ‘derived intentionality’. These definitions will be used for an examination of the intentionality of formal mathematical systems. In conclusion, I will make a comparison between the (intrinsic) intentionality of formal mathematical systems on the one hand, and the (intrinsic) intentionality of human beings on the other hand.     

Reality,Systems and Impure Systems

Impure systems contain Objects and Subjects: Subjects are human beings. We can distinguish a person as an observer (subjectively outside the system) and that by definition is the Subject himself, and part of the system. In this case he acquires the category of object. Objects (relative beings) are significances, which are the consequence of perceptual beliefs on the part of the Subject about material or energetic objects (absolute beings) with certain characteristics.The IS (Impure System) approach is as follows: Objects are perceptual significances (relative beings) of material or energetic objects (absolute beings). The set of these objects will form an impure set of the first order. The existing relations between these relative objects will be of two classes: transactions of matter and/or energy and inferential relations. Transactions can have alethic modality: necessity, possibility, impossibility and contingency. Ontic existence of possibility entails that inferential relations have Deontic modality: obligation, permission, prohibition, faculty and analogy. We distinguished between theorems (natural laws) and norms (ethical, legislative and customary rules of conduct).     

Mathematics as a Quasi-Empirical Science

The present paper aims at showing that there are times when set theoretical knowledge increases in a non-cumulative way. In other words, what we call ‘set theory’ is not one theory which grows by simple addition of a theorem after the other, but a finite sequence of theories T ₁, ..., T _n in which T _i+1, for 1 ≤ i < n, supersedes T _i . This thesis has a great philosophical significance because it implies that there is a sense in which mathematical theories, like the theories belonging to the empirical sciences, are fallible and that, consequently, mathematical knowledge has a quasi-empirical nature. The way I have chosen to provide evidence in favour of the correctness of the main thesis of this article consists in arguing that Cantor–Zermelo set theory is a Lakatosian Mathematical Research Programme (MRP).     

Concordance between two linear orders: The Spearman and Kendall coefficients revisited

This paper discusses the two classic measures of concordance between two linear orders L and L′, the Kendall tau and the Spearman rho, equivalently, the Kendall and Spearman distances between such orders. We give an expression for ρ(L,L′)?τ(L,L′) as a function of the parameters of the partial order L∪L′, which allows the determination of extremal values for this difference and an investigation of when tau and rho are equal. This expression for ρ(L,L′)?τ(L,L′) is derived from a relation between the Kendall and Spearman distances between linear orders that is equivalent to both the Guilbaud (1980) formula linking rho, tau, and a third coefficient sigma, and Daniels’s (1950) inequality. We also prove an apparently new monotonicity property of rho. In the conclusion we point out possible extensions and add general historical comments.     

An Optimal Algorithm To Recognize Robinsonian Dissimilarities

A dissimilarity D on a finite set S is said to be Robinsonian if S can be totally ordered in such a way that, for every i < j < k, D (i, j) ≤ D (i, k) and D (j, k) ≤ D (i, k). Intuitively, D is Robinsonian if S can be represented by points on a line. Recognizing Robinsonian dissimilarities has many applications in seriation and classification. In this paper, we present an optimal O (n ²) algorithm to recognize Robinsonian dissimilarities, where n is the cardinal of S. Our result improves the already known algorithms.     

From Doing to Performing Phenomenology: Implications and Possibilities

This commentary on Kurt Vanhoutte and Nele Wynants’s of ‘Performing phenomenology: negotiating presence in intermedial theatre’ focuses on the implications of staging phenomenological research. In my opinion the authors missed an opportunity to stress more what W (Double U), a performance of CREW has to offer postphenomenology and what it actually means to ‘perform’ phenomenology. I will not only argue that W (Double U) because of its performative nature offers a reflection on postphenomenology, but also that the performance must be understood as a specific kind of research, conducted simultaneously from a theoretical and aesthetic orientation, leading to a complex interaction between perception and reflection, and offering a valuable, different perspective on postphenomenological research issues. W (Double U) in this respect functions as a ‘theoretical object’, producing a specific kind of embodied knowledge. Finally I will emphasize the possible radical potential in W (Double U), because I do believe that the performance, although it might not lead explicitly to social change, does have an important social and political relevance that the authors do not really delve into.     

Notes on the Philosophical Status of Nuclear Physics

In our paper we propose a philosophicalanalysis, based on the notion ofphenomenological model, of Nuclear Physics. Inthis way, we will show some peculiarities ofthis branch of physics.     

The Observer Effect

Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to the foundations of physics, we provide a clarification and classification of the key concept of observation. An entity can be observed with or without a scope. In the second case, the observation is a purely non-invasive discovery process; in the first case, it is a purely invasive process, which can involve either creation or destruction aspects. An entity can also be observed with or without a full control over the observational process. In the latter case, the observation can be described by a symmetry breaking mechanism, through which a specific deterministic observational process is selected among a number of potential ones, as explained in Aerts’ hidden measurement approach. This is what is called a product test, or product observation, whose consequences are that outcomes can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, as it is the case in typical quantum measurements. We also show that observations can be about intrinsic (stable) properties of the observed entity, or about relational (ephemeral) properties between the observer and observed entities; also, they can be about intermediate properties, neither purely classical, nor purely quantum. Our analysis allows us to propose a general conceptual characterization of quantum measurements, as observational processes involving three aspects: (1) product observations, (2) pure creation aspects and (3) ephemeral relational properties. We also discuss the important concept of non-spatiality and emphasize some of the differences and similarities between quantum and classical/relativistic observations.