A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction

I began this study with Laudan's argument from the pessimistic induction and I promised to show that the caloric theory of heat cannot be used to support the premisses of the meta-induction on past scientific theories. I tried to show that the laws of experimental calorimetry, adiabatic change and Carnot's theory of the motive power of heat were (i) independent of the assumption that heat is a material substance, (ii) approximately true, (iii) deducible and accounted for within thermodynamics.I stressed that results (i) and (ii) were known to most theorists of the caloric theory and that result (iii) was put forward by the founders of the new thermodynamics. In other words, the truth-content of the caloric theory was located, selected carefully, and preserved by the founders of thermodynamics.However, the reader might think that even if I have succeeded in showing that laudan is wrong about the caloric theory, I have not shown how the strategy followed in this paper can be generalised against the pessimistic meta-induction. I think that the general strategy against Laudan's argument suggested in this paper is this: the empirical success of a mature scientific theory suggests that there are respects and degrees in which this theory is true. The difficulty for — and and real challenge to — philosophers of science is to suggest ways in which this truth-content can be located and shown to be preserved — if at all — to subsequent theories. In particular, the empirical success of a theory does not, automatically, suggest that all theoretical terms of the theory refer. On the contrary, judgments of referential success depend on which theoretical claims are well-supported by the evidence. This is a matter of specific investigation. Generally, one would expect that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence or turn out to be independent of the evidence at hand, are not compelling. For simply, if the evidence does not make it likely that our beliefs about putative theoretical entities are approximately correct, a belief in those entities would be ill-founded and unjustified. Theoretical extrapolations in science are indespensable , but they are not arbitrary. If the evidence does not warrant them I do not see why someone should commit herself to them. In a sense, the problem with empricist philisophers is not that they demand that theoretical beliefs must be warranted by evidence. Rather, it is that they claim that no evidence can warrant theorretical beliefs. A realist philosopher of science would not disagree on the first, but she has good grounds to deny the second.I argued that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence must not be taken as belief-worthy. But can one sustaon the more ambitious view that loosely supported parts of a theory tend to be just those that include non-referring terms? There is an obvious excess risk in such a generalisation. For there are well-known cases in which a theoretical claim was initially weakly supported by the evidence     

Was Newtonian cosmology really inconsistent?

This paper follows up a debate as to the consistency of Newtonian cosmology. Whereas Malament [(1995). Is Newtonian cosmology really inconsistent? Philosophy of Science 62, 489–510] has shown that Newtonian cosmology is not inconsistent, to date there has been no analysis of Norton's claim [(1995). The force of Newtonian cosmology: Acceleration is relative. Philosophy of Science 62, 511–522.] that Newtonian cosmology was inconsistent prior to certain advances in the 1930s, and in particular prior to Seeliger's seminal paper of Seeliger [(1895). Über das Newton'sche Gravitationsgesetz. Astronomische Nachrichten 137 (3273), 129–136.] In this paper I agree that there are assumptions, Newtonian and cosmological in character, and relevant to the real history of science, which are inconsistent. But there are some important corrections to make to Norton's account. Here I display for the first time the inconsistencies—four in total—in all their detail. Although this extra detail shows there to be several different inconsistencies, it also goes some way towards explaining why they went unnoticed for 200 years.     

Prianicin A and B,nor-sesterterpenoid peroxide antibiotics from red sea sponges

Summary The antibiotic properties of 2 acidic C₂₄H₄₀O₄ nor-sesterterpenoid peroxides, prianicin A (1) and B (2), against gram-positive and gram-negative bacteria, and against fungi are herein described. They are 4–10 times more effective than tetracycline againstbeta hemolytic Streptococcus, but significantly non-effective against a variety of gram-negative bacteria.Acknowledgment. The authors are grateful to Prof. A. Kjaer of the Organic Chemistry Department of the Technical University of Denmark, for his help and fruitful discussions.     

Newton's Propositions on Comets: Steps in Transition, 1681–84

Isaac Newton's closest approach to a system of the world in the critical period 1681–84 is provided in a set of untitled propositions concerning comets. They drastically revise his position maintained against Flamsteed in 1681 and may signal his adoption of a single comet solution for the appearances of 1680/1. Points of agreement and difference with the key pre-Principia texts of 1684–85 are analysed. He shows substantial control of the phenomena of tails which change very little in mechanical detail throughout his subsequent work. An emerging theory of gravitation brings planets, their satellites, and comets under the same laws of motion, yet retains a celestial vortex and includes a singular proposition in lieu of the usual formulation of Keplers area law. The analysis raises questions on a number of issues of recent Newtonian scholarship ranging from his achievement following his correspondence with Robert Hooke in 1679 to his veneration of the wisdom of the ancients. (Received September 7, 1999)     

Osservazioni preliminari,chimiche e farmacologiche,sulla murexina

Summary (1) Murexine, a new choline derivative found in the hypobranchial body ofMurex trunculus, Murex brandaris, andTritonalia erinacea, was isolated as picrate, picrolonate, styphnate, flavianate, and reineckate. Some preliminary characteristics of these salts are given.(2) The murexine content of the median zone of the hypobranchial body ofMurex trunculus is extremely high: murexine picrate equivalents of 45–70 mg per g fresh tissue are commonly observed.(3) Murexine manifests intense nicotinic and curariform actions, but is practically wanting in any muscarinic activity.The central nervous system is strongly affected by the substance: at first stimulation seems to prevail, but later on, with larger doses, a deep depression regularly develops.In decapitated cats and dogs murexine causes a significant rise in blood pressure, which is due, at least partially, to a liberation of epinephrine from the adrenal medulla and from the adrenergic nerve terminals.On the enucleated eye of frogs andOctopoda the substance acts to cause mydriasis and expansion of the iris chromatophora.

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V. Erspamer eF. Dordoni, Arch. int. Pharmacodyn.74, 263 (1947).     

Incommensurabilities in the work of Thomas Kuhn

I distinguish between two ways in which Kuhn employs the concept of incommensurability based on for whom it presents a problem. First, I argue that Kuhn’s early work focuses on the comparison and underdetermination problems scientists encounter during revolutionary periods (actors’ incommensurability) whilst his later work focuses on the translation and interpretation problems analysts face when they engage in the representation of science from earlier periods (analysts’ incommensurability). Secondly, I offer a new interpretation of actors’ incommensurability. I challenge Kuhn’s account of incommensurability which is based on the compartmentalisation of the problems of both underdetermination and non-additivity to revolutionary periods. Through employing a finitist perspective, I demonstrate that in principle these are also problems scientists face during normal science. I argue that the reason why in certain circumstances scientists have little difficulty in concurring over their judgements of scientific findings and claims while in others they disagree needs to be explained sociologically rather than by reference to underdetermination or non-additivity. Thirdly, I claim that disagreements between scientists should not be couched in terms of translation or linguistic problems (aspects of analysts’ incommensurability), but should be understood as arising out of scientists’ differing judgments about how to take scientific inquiry further.     

Newton,Gases, and Daltonian chemistry: The foundations of combination in definite proportion

This study deals with the relationship between Newton's gas model in the Principia (Book II, Proposition xxiii) and Dalton's theorizing. Dalton's first theory of mixed gases is an elegant extension of the Newtonian gas model which, in turn, led Dalton to a general model of chemical combination. The views on combination are contrasted with those of Arnold Thackray. Interestingly, the model of combination was knowingly based on a falsified theory.     

Emericid,a new polyether antibiotic fromStreptomyces hygroscopicus (DS 24 367)

Summary Emericid is a new polyether polycyclic ionophore antibiotic excreted byStreptomyces hygroscopicus (DS 24 367). Active in vitro against Gram-positive bacteria, it is ineffective in vivo. At a 0.006–0.02% level in the diet it protects chickens and rabbits against coccidiosis.From a recent paper byN. Otake (Tetrahedron Lett.1970, 4147) emericid and lonomycin would be identical.     

Atoms, complexes, and demonstration: Posterior analytics 96b15-25

There is agreement neither concerning the point that is being made in Posterior analytics 96b15–25 nor the issue Aristotle intends to address. There are two major lines of interpretation of this passage. According to one, sketched by Themistius and developed by Philoponus and Eustratius, Aristotle is primarily concerned with determining the definitions of the infimae species that fall under a certain genus. They understand Aristotle as arguing that this requires collating definitional predictions, seeing which are common to which species. Pacius, on the other hand, takes Aristotle to be saying that a genus is studied scientifically through first determining the infimae species that fall under that genus. This interpretation attributes to Aristotle a distinction between primary and derivative subjects. I argue for Pacius’s interpretation, defending it against Barnes’s objections.     

Propriétés antiacétylcholinestérasiques du diiodométhylate debis-(diméthylamino-3-phénoxy)-1-3 propane,de ses dérivés phénoliques et des esters carbamiques correspondants

Summary Thein vitro anti-acetylcholinesterase properties ofbis-(dimethylamino-3-phenoxy)-1-3 propane dimethiodide (2842 CT) of two phenolics derivatives (3443 CT and 3116 CT) and of the two corresponding carbamic esters (3152 CT et 3113 CT) have been compared using human red blood corpuscles as enzyme source; under specified conditions, the Cl-50 are respectively 8 × 10^–7 M for 2842 CT, 3.5 × 10^–9 for the two phenolic compounds, and 1.5 × 10^–9 for the carbamic esters. The potencies of these phenols are very close to those of the carbamates, being a bit higher or lower depending on the concentration of the inhibitor and on the time of the readingThe two phenolic compounds, like 2842 CT, react readily with the enzyme contrarily to the carbamic esters which combine slowly. On the other hand the inhibition by the phenolic derivatives is as stable against washing as that by the carbamates. The carbamates, but not the phenols, show the slow displacement phenomenon.Some of these characteristics are compatible with the hypothesis that carbamic compounds could act through liberated phenolic functions but others indicate that carbamic groups have a role of their own.     

Isaac Newton and the problem of the earth's shape

In this article I discuss the theory of the earth's shape presented by Isaac Newton in Book III of his Principia. I show that the theory struck even the most reputable continental mathematicians of the day as incomprehensible. I examine the many obstacles to understanding the theory which the reader faced — the gaps, the underived equations, the unproven assertions, the dependence upon corollaries to practically incomprehensible theorems in Book I of the Principia and the ambiguities of these corollaries, the conjectures without explanations of their bases, the inconsistencies, and so forth. I explain why these apparent drawbacks are, historically considered, strengths of Newton's theory of the earth's shape, not weaknesses.     

Atomism, Poincaré and Planck

Planck's change in attitude to the question of whether atomic hypotheses were scientifically accessible, is discussed. It is argued contra Holton, that Planck's change in attitude to this question did not signal a methodological shift towards realism. The point of doing this is not just to investigate a significant episode in the history of quantum theory, but also to use the episode as a case study in support of a broader historical thesis. This thesis is that there was a widespread late-nineteenth century methodological tradition which motivated the change in status of certain ontological claims — e.g., that atoms exist — from ‘inaccessible to science’ to ‘scientifically acceptable’ even though those claims were not strictly ‘observable’. This methodological tradition is a hybrid of positivist and realist views. Thus, contrary to one popular view, the fin de siécle triumph of atomism is not to be seen as a triumph for a realist view of science Poincare's views are also used as an illustration.     

Science, truth and history, part II. Metaphysical bolt-holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?

Historians of science have frequently sought to exclude modern scientific knowledge from their narratives. Part I of this paper, published in the previous issue, cautioned against seeing more than a literary preference at work here. In particular, it was argued—contra advocates of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)—that a commitment to epistemological relativism should not be seen as having straightforward historiographical consequences. Part II considers further SSK-inspired attempts to entangle the currently fashionable historiography with particular positions in the philosophy of science. None, I argue, is promising. David Bloor’s proposed alliance with scientific realism relies upon a mistaken view of contrastive explanation; Andrew Pickering’s appeal to instrumentalism is persuasive for particle physics but much less so for science as a whole; and Bruno Latour’s home-grown metaphysics is so bizarre that its compatibility with SSK is, if anything, a further blow to the latter’s plausibility.     

Mach and Hertz’s mechanics

The place of Heinrich Hertz’s The principles of mechanics in the history of the philosophy of science is disputed. Here I critically assess positivist interpretations, concluding that they are inadequate.There is a group of commentators who seek to align Hertz with positivism, or with specific positivists such as Ernst Mach, who were enormously influential at the time. Max Jammer is prominent among this group, the most recent member of which is Joseph Kockelmans. I begin by discussing what Hertz and Mach had to say about one another, and I specify certain respects in which their views are indeed similar. I then go on to detail their differences, looking at Hertz’s attitude to the atomic theory, to the mechanical world-view, to simplicity, to unobservables and metaphysics, and his objections to Newtonian forces. I conclude that the positivist interpretation of Hertz’s mechanics significantly overplays its similarities to Mach’s views.     

Descartes’s changing mind

Descartes is always concerned about knowledge. However, the Galileo affair in 1633, the reactions to his Discourse on method, and later his need to reply to objections to his Meditations provoked crises in Descartes’s intellectual development the import of which has not been sufficiently recognized. These events are the major reasons why Descartes’s philosophical position concerning how we know and what we may know is radically different at the end of his life from what it was when he began. We call this later position Descartes’s epistemic stance and contrast it with his earlier methodological, metaphysical realism. Yet Descartes’s epistemic views cannot be separated from other aspects of his work, for example, his views concerning God, causality, metaphysics, and the nature of science. A further meta-implication is that serious errors await any scholar who cites early Cartesian texts in support of late Cartesian positions, or who uses later texts in conjunction with early ones to support a reading of Descartes’s philosophy.     

On the status of the geodesic principle in Newtonian and relativistic physics

A theorem due to Geroch and Jang (1975) provides a sense in which the geodesic principle has the status of a theorem in General Relativity. I have recently shown that a similar theorem holds in the context of geometrized Newtonian gravitation (Newton–Cartan theory) (Weatherall, J.O., 2011). Here I compare the interpretations of these two theorems. I argue that despite some apparent differences between the theorems, the status of the geodesic principle in geometrized Newtonian gravitation is, mutatis mutandis, strikingly similar to the relativistic case.     

Sur l'action de l'acide 2,4-dichlorophénoxyacétique sur la croissance des racines deZea mays et dePisum cultivéesin vitro

Summary (1) A response ofZea mays andPisum roots cultured aseptically to 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid has been observed.Depending on the concentrationZea mays shows an increase of the growth rate (optimal concentration 10^–11 mol) which turns over to an inhibition (above 10^–7 mol). The curve is similar to that obtained by 3-indoleacetic acid, which proves the phytohormonal character of 2,4-D.(2) ThePisum root is more sensitive than theZea mays root. A concentration of 10^–7 molinhibitsPisum in a high degree, whileZea mays is no more inhibited, thus demonstrating the selective herbicidal action of 2,4-D against isolated roots of Dicotyledons culturedin vitro.     

Ramsey sentences, structural realism and trivial realization

Several recent authors identify structural realism about scientific theories with the claim that the content of a scientific theory is expressible using its Ramsey sentence. Many of these authors have also argued that so understood, the view collapses into empiricist anti-realism, since an argument originally proposed by Max Newman in a review of Bertrand Russell’s The analysis of matter demonstrates that Ramsey sentences are trivially satisfied, and cannot make any significant claims about unobservables. In this paper I argue against both of these claims. Structural realism and Ramsey sentence realism are, in their most defensible versions, importantly different doctrines, and neither is committed to the premises required to demonstrate that they collapse into anti-realism.     

The jump ofOrchestia cavimana Heller, 1865 (Crustacea,Amphipoda, Talitridae)

Summary The saltatory locomotion of the Talitrid (Crustacea)Orchestia cavimana Heller, 1865, was studied by high frequency cinematography (1000 fps). The jump lasts about 350–400 msec and covers a distance of 18 cm due to an average acceleration of 300 m/sec². About 4–6 somersaults are performed in the course of each jump.Thanks are due to Prof. Dr R. Altevogt for guidance, encouragement and translating the German text.     

DNA synthesis in the nuclei of differentiating muscle fibers of the silkworm,Bombyx mori L.

Summary Incorporation of³H-thymidine (³HTdr) into the nuclei of myofibril-containing myofibers of larvae of the silkworm,Bombyx mori, was shown by means of light microscope (LM) and electron-microscope (EM) autoradiography. The number of DNA-synthesizing myonuclei attains 42% 12–18 h after each molt. Thus in the developing silkworm DNA replication and myofibrillogenesis are coexisting and not mutually exclusive processes as is the rule in vertebrate somatic myogenesis.