A close examination of the pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems: The homology between mechanics and poetry as technē

The pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems is the earliest known ancient Greek text on mechanics, principally concerned with the explanation of a variety of mechanical phenomena using a particular construal of the principle of the lever. In the introduction, the author—thought to be an early Peripatetic—quotes the tragic poet Antiphon to summarise a discussion of the technē-physis (art-nature) relationship and the status of mechanics as a technē. I argue that this citation of a poet is an Aristotelian cultural signature, intended to guide its readers towards a better understanding of the nature of mechanics as expounded in the Mechanical Problems. By analysing several instances where Aristotle cites Antiphon (as well as other tragic poets) in the Aristotelian corpus, I propose that both the author of the Mechanical Problems and Aristotle use poets for the purpose of persuasion. This is in turn explained by understanding the homologous relationship between mechanics-as-technē (according to the author of the Mechanical Problems) and poetics-as-technē (according to Aristotle) in terms of their shared status as poiētikē technē (productive art) and claims to universal knowledge. A final facet of the proposed relationship between mechanics and poetry is hypothesised on the grounds of their mimetic nature.     

A consideration of Babylonian astronomy within the historiography of science

This paper traces the reception of Babylonian astronomy into the history of science, beginning in early to mid twentieth century when cuneiform astronomical sources became available to the scholarly public. The dominant positivism in philosophy of science of this time influenced criteria employed in defining and demarcating science by historians, resulting in a persistently negative assessment of the nature of knowledge evidenced in cuneiform sources. Ancient Near Eastern astronomy (and astrology) was deemed pre- or non-scientific, and even taken to reflect a stage in the evolution of thought before the emergence of science (in ancient Greece). Two principal objections are examined: first, that the Near East produced merely practical as opposed to theoretical knowledge and, second, that astronomy was in the service of astrology and religion. As the notion of a universal scientific method has been dismantled by post-positivists and constructivists of the second half of the twentieth century, an interest in varieties of intellectual and cultural contexts for science has provided a new ground for the re-consideration of Babylonian astronomical texts as science developed here.     

Solar and lunar observations at Istanbul in the 1570s

From the early ninth century until about eight centuries later, the Middle East witnessed a series of both simple and systematic astronomical observations for the purpose of testing contemporary astronomical tables and deriving the fundamental solar, lunar, and planetary parameters. Of them, the extensive observations of lunar eclipses available before 1000 AD for testing the ephemeredes computed from the astronomical tables are in a relatively sharp contrast to the twelve lunar observations that are pertained to the four extant accounts of the measurements of the basic parameters of Ptolemaic lunar model. The last of them are Taqī al-Dīn Mu?ammad b. Ma‘rūf’s (1526–1585) trio of lunar eclipses observed from Istanbul, Cairo, and Thessalonica in 1576–1577 and documented in chapter 2 of book 5 of his famous work, Sidrat muntaha al-afkar fī malakūt al-falak al-dawwār (The Lotus Tree in the Seventh Heaven of Reflection). In this article, we provide a detailed analysis of the accuracy of his solar (1577–1579) and lunar observations.     

Observation and prediction in ancient astrology

What is the relationship between observations, predictions, texts, and instruments in ancient astrology? By distinguishing between two distinct kinds of observation claim in astrological texts, I show on the one hand the rhetorical and theoretical importance of each kind of observation claim to ancient astrological traditions, and on the other hand how practices of ancient astrology break from observation once astronomical phenomena become reliably predictable. We thus see a shift in practice from observationally derived predictions to a reliance on textual and instrumental authority, even though the rhetoric of ancient astrology still tries to maintain an emphasis on observation.     

Galileo and the problem of infinity

During the period before the Greek revolution of 1821, and especially during the years between 1750 and 1821, there were two ways in which European scientific thought was propagated in Greece. The first is traditional. It comes from ancient Greece and, through Byzantium, reaches the period before the Greek revolution. It makes known the thought of Aristotle, Democrititus, and others on ‘natural philosophy’. The second way comes from Europe. The Greek scholars of the period before the Greek revolution, and especially at the end of the eighteenth century, tried to bring to and propagate in Greece the spirit ofthe European Enlightenment, They tried to make known to the Greek people the scientific achievements of Newton, Descartes, Lavoisier, and Laplace. Scientific knowledge is an important weapon against superstition, and Greek students had to learn about science to become free persons in an independent Greek state.     

The politics of environments before the environment: Biopolitics in the longue durée

Our understanding of body–world relations is caught in a curious contradiction. On one side, it is well established that many concepts that describe interaction with the outer world – ‘plasticity’ or ‘metabolism’- or external influences on the body - ‘environment’ or ‘milieu’ – appeared with rise of modern science. On the other side, although premodern science lacked a unifying term for it, an anxious attentiveness to the power of ‘environmental factors’ in shaping physical and moral traits held sway in nearly all medical systems before and alongside modern Europe. In this article, I build on a new historiography on the policing of bodies and environments in medieval times and at the urban scale to problematize Foucault's claim about biopolitics as a modern phenomenon born in the European eighteenth-century. I look in particular at the collective usage of ancient medicine and manipulation of the milieu based on humoralist notions of corporeal permeability (Hippocrates, Galen, Ibn Sīnā) in the Islamicate and Latin Christendom between the 12th and the 15th century. This longer history has implications also for a richer genealogy of contemporary tropes of plasticity, permeability and environmental determinism beyond usual genealogies that take as a starting point the making of the modern body and EuroAmerican biomedicine.     

“Exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science

This essay utilizes the concept “exploratory experimentation” as a probe into the relation between historiography and philosophy of science. The essay traces the emergence of the historiographical concept “exploratory experimentation” in the late 1990s. The reconstruction of the early discussions about exploratory experimentation shows that the introduction of the concept had unintended consequences: Initially designed to debunk philosophical ideas about theory testing, the concept “exploratory experimentation” quickly exposed the poverty of our conceptual tools for the analysis of experimental practice. Looking back at a number of detailed analyses of experimental research, we can now appreciate that the concept of exploratory experimentation is too vague and too elusive to fill the desideratum whose existence it revealed.     

What We Can Learn from a Diagram: The Case of Aristarchus's On The Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon

By using the example of a single proposition and its diagrams, this paper makes explicit a number of the processes in effect in the textual transmission of works in the exact sciences of the ancient and medieval periods. By examining the diagrams of proposition 13 as they appear in the Greek, Arabic, and Latin traditions of Aristarchus's On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon, we can see a number of ways in which medieval, and early modern, scholars interpreted their sources in an effort to understand and transmit canonical ancient texts. This study highlights the need for modern scholars to take into consideration all aspects of the medieval transmission in our efforts to understand ancient practices.     

‘The long-lost truth’: Sir Isaac Newton and the Newtonian pursuit of ancient knowledge

In the 1720s the antiquary and Newtonian scholar Dr. William Stukeley (1687-1765) described his friend Isaac Newton as ‘the Great Restorer of True Philosophy’. Newton himself in his posthumously published Observations upon the prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John (1733) predicted that the imminent fulfilment of Scripture prophecy would see ‘a recovery and re-establishment of the long-lost truth’. In this paper I examine the background to Newton’s interest in ancient philosophy and theology, and how it related to modern natural philosophical discovery. I look at the way in which the idea of a ‘long-lost truth’ interested others within Newton’s immediate circle, and in particular how it was carried forward by Stukeley’s researches into ancient British antiquities. I show how an interest in and respect for ancient philosophical knowledge remained strong within the first half of the eighteenth century.     

Pre-Euclidean geometry and Aeginetan coin design: some further remarks

Some ancient Greek coins from the island state of Aegina depict peculiar geometric designs. Hitherto they have been interpreted as anticipations of some Euclidean propositions. But this paper proposes geometrical constructions which establish connections to pre-Euclidean treatments of incommensurability. The earlier Aeginetan coin design from about 500 bc onwards appears as an attempt not only to deal with incommensurability but also to conceal it. It might be related to Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The newer design from 404 bc onwards reveals incommensurability, namely in the context of ‘doubling the square’. It thereby covers the same topic but a different geometry as passages in Plato’s dialogue Meno (385 bc). This coin design incorporates important elements of ancient Greek geometrical analysis of the fifth century bc like the gnomon, Hippocrates’ squaring of the lunule (ca. 430 bc), and a geometrical version of monetary equivalence. Through this venue, the design’s conceptual lineage might be traced as far back as Heraclitus’ cosmology of about 500 bc.     

The rule of law: Natural,human, and divine

In this paper we compare two different contexts—the legal and the scientific—in which the concept of law is prominent. We argue that the acute philosophical awareness, in the early modern period, of the difficulties surrounding the law concept in the scientific context, and the various responses to these difficulties, are rooted in an earlier tradition of jurisprudential concerns over the concept of natural law in its legal sense. We seek to show, further, that each one of the various philosophical accounts of the concept of natural law (in both of its senses) is embedded in a metaphysical and theological context, so that different visions of God yield different accounts of the meaning of the natural law idiom in science as well as legal theory.     

The invention of atmosphere

The word “atmosphere” was a neologism Willebrord Snellius created for his Latin translation of Simon Stevin's cosmographical writings. Astronomers and mathematical practitioners, such as Snellius and Christoph Scheiner, applying the techniques of Ibn Mu‘ādh and Witelo, were the first to use the term in their calculations of the height of vapors that cause twilight. Their understandings of the atmosphere diverged from Aristotelian divisions of the aerial region. From the early years of the seventeenth century, the term was often associated with atomism or corpuscular matter theory. The concept of the atmosphere changed dramatically with the advent of pneumatic experiments in the middle of the seventeenth century. Pierre Gassendi, Walter Charleton, and Robert Boyle transformed the atmosphere of the mathematicians giving it the characteristics of weight, specific gravity, and fluidity, while disputes about its extent and border remained unresolved.     

The geometry of knowledge: Lewis, Becker, Carnap and the formalization of philosophy in the 1920s

On an ordinary view of the relation of philosophy of science to science, science serves only as a topic for philosophical reflection, reflection that proceeds by its own methods and according to its own standards. This ordinary view suggests a way of writing a global history of philosophy of science that finds substantially the same philosophical projects being pursued across widely divergent scientific eras. While not denying that this view is of some use regarding certain themes of and particular time periods, this essay argues that much of the epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century in a variety of projects (neo-Kantianism, logical empiricism, pragmatism, phenomenology) looked to the then current context of the exact sciences, especially geometry and physics, not merely for its topics but also for its conceptual resources and technical tools. This suggests a more variable project of philosophy of science, a deeper connection between early twentieth-century philosophy of science and its contemporary science, and a more interesting and richer history of philosophy of science than is ordinarily offered.     

How physics flew the philosophers' nest

We all know that, nowadays, physics and philosophy are housed in separate departments on university campuses. They are distinct disciplines with their own journals and conferences, and in general they are practiced by different people, using different tools and methods. We also know that this was not always the case: up until the early 17th century (at least), physics was a part of philosophy. So what happened? And what philosophical lessons should we take away? We argue that the split took place long after Newton's Principia (rather than before, as many standard accounts would have it), and offer a new account of the philosophical reasons that drove the separation. We argue that one particular problem, dating back to Descartes and persisting long into the 18th century, played a pivotal role. The failure to solve it, despite repeated efforts, precipitates a profound change in the relationship between physics and philosophy. The culprit is the problem of collisions. Innocuous though it may seem, this problem becomes the bellwether of deeper issues concerning the nature and properties of bodies in general. The failure to successfully address the problem led to a reconceptualization of the goals and subject-matter of physics, a change in the relationship between physics and mechanics, and a shift in who had authority over the most fundamental issues in physics.     

The problem of the invariance of dimension in the growth of modern topology,part II

Summary This work examines the historical origins of topological dimension theory with special reference to the problem of the invariance of dimension. Part I, comprising chapters 1–4, concerns problems and ideas about dimension from ancient times to about 1900. Chapter 1 deals with ancient Greek ideas about dimension and the origins of theories of hyperspaces and higher-dimensional geometries relating to the subsequent development of dimension theory. Chapter 2 treatsCantor's surprising discovery that continua of different dimension numbers can be put into one-one correspondence and his discussion withDedekind concerning the discovery. The problem of the invariance of dimension originates with this discovery. Chapter 3 deals with the early efforts of 1878–1879 to prove the invariance of dimension. Chapter 4 sketches the rise of point set topology with reference to the problem of proving dimensional invariance and the development of dimension theory. Part II, comprising chapters 5–8, concerns the development of dimension theory during the early part of the twentieth century. Chapter 5 deals with new approaches to the concept of dimension and the problem of dimensional invariance. Chapter 6 analyses the origins ofBrouwer's interest in topology and his breakthrough to the first general proof of the invariance of dimension. Chapter 7 treatsLebesgue's ideas about dimension and the invariance problem and the dispute that arose betweenBrouwer andLebesgue which led toBrouwer's further work on topology and dimension. Chapter 8 offers glimpses of the development of dimension theory afterBrouwer, especially the development of the dimension theory ofUrysohn andMenger during the twenties. Chapter 8 ends with some concluding remarks about the entire history covered. Dedicated to Hans Freudenthal     

Structures and strategies in ancient Greek and Roman technical writing: An Introduction

Most of our knowledge of Greek and Roman scientific practice and its place in ancient culture is derived from our study of ancient texts. In the last few decades, this written evidence—ancient technical or specialist literature—has begun to be studied using tools of literary analysis to help answer questions about, for instance, how these works were composed, their authors’ intentions and the expectations of their readers.This introduction to Structures and strategies in ancient Greek and Roman technical writing provides an overview of recent scholarship in the area, and the difficulty in pinning down what ‘technical/specialist literature’ might mean in an ancient context, since Greek and Roman authors communicated scientific knowledge using a wide variety of styles and forms of text (e.g. poetry, dialogues, letters).An outline of the three sections is provided: Form as a mirror of method, in which Sabine Föllinger and Alexander Mueller explore ways in which the structures of texts by Aristotle and Plutarch may reflect methodological concerns; Authors and their implied readers, with contributions by Oliver Stoll, David Creese, Boris Dunsch and Paula Olmos, which examines what ancient texts can tell us about the place of technical knowledge in antiquity; Science and the uses of poetry, with articles by Jochen Althoff, Michael Coxhead and Laurence Totelin, and a new English translation of the Aetna poem by Harry Hine, which explores the (to us) unexpected roles of poetry in ancient scientific culture.     

Swedenborg's Lunars

The celebrated Swedish natural philosopher and visionary theologian Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) devoted major efforts to the establishment of a reliable method for the determination of longitude at sea. He first formulated a method, based on the astronomical observation of lunar position, while in London in 1710–12. He issued various versions of the method, both in Latin and in Swedish, throughout his career. In 1766, at the age of 78, he presented his scheme for judgment by the Board of Longitude in London. The rich archive of Swedenborg's career allows an unusually detailed historical analysis of his longitude project, an analysis rather better documented than that available for the host of contemporary projectors who launched longitude schemes, submitted their proposals to the Board of Longitude, and have too often been ignored or dismissed by historians. This analysis uses the longitude work to illuminate key aspects of Swedenborg's wider enterprises, including his scheme to set up an astronomical observatory in southern Sweden to be devoted to lunar and stellar observation, his complex attitude to astronomical and magnetic cosmology, and his attempt to fit the notion of longitude into his visionary world-view. Swedenborg's programme also helps make better sense of the metropolitan and international networks of diplomatic and natural philosophical communication in which the longitude schemes were developed and judged. It emerges that his longitude method owed much to the established principles of earlier Baroque and Jesuit natural philosophy while his mature cosmology sought a rational and enlightened model of the universe.     

Heritable changeability: Epimutation and the legacy of negative definition in epigenetic concepts

Epigenetic concepts are fundamentally shaped by a legacy of negative definition, often understood by what they are not. Yet the function and implication of negative definition for scientific discourse has thus far received scant attention. Using the term epimutation as exemplar, we analyze the paradoxical like-but-unlike structure of a term that must simultaneously connect with but depart from genetic concepts. We assess the historical forces structuring the use of epimutation and like terms such as paramutation. This analysis highlights the positive characteristics defining epimutation: the regularity, oxymoronic temporality, and materiality of stable processes. Integrating historical work, ethnographic observation, and insights from philosophical practice-oriented conceptual analysis, we detail the distinctive epistemic goals the epimutation concept fulfils in medicine, plant biology and toxicology. Epimutation and allied epigenetic terms have succeeded by being mutation-like and recognizable, yet have failed to consolidate for exactly the same reason: they are tied simultaneously by likeness and opposition to nouns that describe things that are assumed to persist unchanged over space and time. Moreover, negative definition casts the genetic-epigenetic relationship as an either/or binary, overshadowing continuities and connections. This analysis is intended to assist practitioners and observers of genetics and epigenetics in recognizing and moving beyond the conceptual legacies of negative definition.     

Reasons for relativism: Feyerabend on the ‘Rise of Rationalism’ in ancient Greece

This paper argues that essential features of Feyerabend's philosophy, namely his radicalization of critical rationalism and his turn to relativism, could be understood better in the light of his engagement with early Greek thought. In contrast to his earlier, Popperian views he came to see the Homeric worldview as a genuine alternative, which was not falsified by the Presocratics. Unlike socio–psychological and externalist accounts my reading of his published and unpublished material suggests that his alternative reconstruction of the ancient beginnings of the Western scientific tradition motivate and justify his moderate Protagorean relativism.