Earthquake prediction,biological clocks,and the cold war psy-ops: Using animals as seismic sensors in the 1970s California

A familiar story of seismology is that of a small field originally focused on local studies of earthquakes through diverse disciplinary perspectives being transformed, in the second half of the twentieth century, into a highly specialized field focused on global studies of the earth's deep interior via sophisticated instruments and transnational networks of seismological stations. Against this backdrop, this essay offers a complementing account, highlighting the significance of local circumstances and disciplinary agendas that were contingent not only on transformations in the geophysical sciences but also on the concurrently changing biological sciences during the Cold War. Using examples of the studies of unusual animal behavior prior to earthquakes conducted under the auspices of the US Geological Survey on the West Coast of the United States in the 1970s, this essay examines a variety of motivations behind the attempts to bridge geophysics and biology. These examples illustrate the ways in which earthquake prediction became entangled with concerns over the use of seismological data, pioneering research on biological rhythms, and the troubled field of Cold War-driven military brain studies.     

The American Philosophical Society and the rise of astronomy in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century

Early geological investigations in the St David's area (Pembrokeshire) are described, particularly the work of Murchison. In a reconnaissance survey in 1835, he regarded a ridge of rocks at St David's as intrusive in unfossiliferous Cambrian; and the early Survey mapping (chiefly the work of Aveline and Ramsay) was conducted on that assumption, leading to the publication of maps in 1845 and 1857. The latter represented the margins of the St David's ridge as ‘Altered Cambrian’. So the supposedly intrusive ‘syenite’ was regarded as younger, and there was no Precambrian. These views were challenged by a local doctor, Henry Hicks, who developed an idea of the ex-Survey palaeontologist John Salter that the rocks of the ridge were stratified and had formed a Precambrian island, round which Cambrian sediments (now confirmed by fossil discoveries) had been deposited. Hicks subsequently proposed subdivision of his Precambrian into ‘Dimetian’, ‘Pebidian’, and (later) ‘Arvonian’, and he attempted correlations with rocks in Shropshire, North Wales, and even North America, seeking to develop the neo-Neptunist ideas of Sterry Hunt. The challenge to the Survey's work was countered in the 1880s by the Director General, Geikie, who showed that Hicks's idea of stratification in the Dimetian was mistaken. A heated controversy developed, several amateur geologists, supported by a group of Cambridge Sedgwickians, forming a coalition of ‘Archaeans’ against the Survey. Geikie was supported by Lloyd Morgan. Attention focused particularly on Ogof Lle-sugn Cave and St Non's Arch, with theory/controversy-ladenness of observations evident on both sides. Evidence from an eyewitness student record of a Geological Society meeting reveals the ‘sanit`ized’ nature of the official summary of the debate in QJGS. Field mapping early in the twentieth century by J. F. N. Green allowed a compromise consensus to be achieved, but Green's evidence for unconformity between the Cambrian and the Dimetian, obtained by excavation, can no longer be verified, and his consensual history of the area may need revision. Unconformity between the Cambrian and the Pebidian tuffs is not in doubt, however, and Precambrian at St David's is accepted. The study exhibits features of geological controversy and the British geological community in the nineteenth century. It also furnishes a further instance of the great influence of Murchison in nineteenth-century British geology and the side-effects of his controversy with Sedgwick.     

Scrutinizing thing knowledge

In his book Thing Knowledge Davis Baird argues that our accustomed understanding of knowledge as justified true beliefs is not enough to understand progress in science and technology. To be more accurate he argues that scientific instruments are to be seen as a form of “objective knowledge” in the sense of Karl Popper.I want to examine if this idea is plausible. In a first step I want to show that this proposal implies that nearly all man-made artifacts are materialized objective knowledge. I argue that this radical change in our concept of knowledge demands strong reasons and that Baird does not give them. I take a look at the strongest strand of arguments of Baird's book—the arguments from cognitive autonomy—and conclude that they do not suffice to make Baird's view of scientific instruments tenable.     

The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication,tacit knowledge,and the dynamics of knowledge generation

This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters' regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins's point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Collins rightly highlights the epistemic uncertainty (and skepticism) surrounding much experimental research. However, I will argue that his analysis of tacit knowledge fails to elucidate the reasons why scientists often are (and should be) skeptical of other researchers' experimental results. I will present an analysis of tacit knowledge in experimental research that not only answers to this desideratum, but also shows how such skepticism can in fact be a vital enabling factor for the dynamic processes of experimental knowledge generation.     

Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: Was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit?

The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in ?e?elja and Straßer (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy.     

Science,Politics and Networks: Shibukawa Harumi and the Birth of the New Almanac in Seventeenth-century Japan

In 1684, during the Edo period (1603–1868), the imperial court of Japan passed a reform act that resulted in a new almanac called the Jôkyô almanac. This was the first reform in more than eight hundred years, and marked a departure from the past practice of adopting almanacs from China. Yet, the reform was complicated, and it was achieved after decades through the efforts of Shibukawa Harumi (1639–1715). How was the reform accomplished, and why was it significant? In this study, I will focus on Harumi's role in the reform. I propose to examine the reform as the culmination of a process deeply linked to Harumi's political connections and his intellectual growth especially in the field of calendrical sciences. I will show that this approach of looking at the reform by analyzing different aspects of Harumi's life has implications for understanding trends in society in seventeenth-century Japan. First, despite the ban on Christianity, intellectuals like Harumi assimilated European sciences in unique ways. Second, Harumi's activities exemplified how intellectual ties were increasingly embedded within political networks. Overall, I will argue that the reform of the almanac, viewed as a process surrounding the core figure of Harumi, was driven by scientific goals and personal ambitions.     

Why was M. S. Tswett’s chromatographic adsorption analysis rejected?

The present paper claims that M. S. Tswett’s chromatographic adsorption analysis, which today is a ubiquitous and instrumentally sophisticated chemical technique, was either ignored or outright rejected by chemists and botanists in the first three decades of the twentieth century because it did not make sense in terms of accepted chemical theory or practice. Evidence for this claim is culled from consideration of the botanical and chemical context of Tswett’s technique as well as an analysis of the protracted debate over Tswett’s chromatographic analysis of chlorophyll between him and Leon Marchlewski, a noted chlorophyll chemist of the period. In this way, the paper expands and amends what it calls the ‘textbook story’ of the early history of chromatography, examples of which may be found in historical notes in many textbooks of chemical instrumental analysis and numerous short articles in chemistry journals. The paper also provides an accessible introduction to the early history of chromatography for historians of science likely to know little or nothing about it.     

Science along the Railroad: Expanding Field Work in the US Central West

The building of the transcontinental railroad in the US Central West in the late 1860s greatly improved access to this region and led to the expansion of scientific field work. The relationships between science and the railroad spanned a diverse spectrum, ranging from its practical advantages to more complex interactions such as the transformation of nature along railway corridors and the reciprocal exchange of favours between scientists and railway companies. The dominance of science along the railroad in the second half of the nineteenth century continued into the early twentieth century, with a gradual shift to automobile travel beginning in the 1910s. By stimulating and shaping field research both on and off the railway corridor, the laying of iron tracks across the continent helped guide US science, just as it influenced so many other aspects of US life.     

The Munsell Color System: A scientific compromise from the world of art

Color systems make accurate color specification and matching possible in science, art, and industry by defining a coordinate system for all possible color perceptions. The Munsell Color System, developed by the artist Albert Henry Munsell in the early twentieth century, has influenced color science to this day. I trace the development of the Munsell Color System from its origins in the art world to its acceptance in the scientific community.Munsell's system was the first to accurately and quantitatively describe the psychological experience of color. By considering the problems that color posed for Munsell's art community and examining his diaries and published material, I conclude that Munsell arrived at his results by remaining agnostic as to the scientific definition of color, while retaining faith that color perceptions could be objectively quantified. I argue that Munsell was able to interest the scientific community in his work because color had become a controversial topic between physicists and psychologists. Parts of Munsell's system appealed to each field, making it a workable compromise. For contrast, I suggest that three contemporary scientists with whom Munsell had contact – Wilhelm Ostwald, Ogden Rood, and Edward Titchener – did not reach the same conclusions in their color systems because they started from scientific assumptions about the nature of color.     

Measurement in French Experimental Physics from Regnault to Lippmann. Rhetoric and Theoretical Practice

This paper explores the legacy of the great French experimental physicist Victor Regnault through the example of Gabriel Lippmann, whose engagement with electrical standardization during the early 1880s was guided by Regnault's methodological precept to measure ‘directly’. Lippmann's education reveals that the theoretical practice of ‘direct’ measurement entailed eliminating extraneous physical effects through the experimental design, rather than, like physicists in Britain and Germany, making numerical ‘corrections’ to measured values. It also provides, paradoxically, exemplars of the qualitative theoretical practices that sustained Regnault's misguided ambition to avoid theory. By considering the largely negative reactions to Lippmann's proposals for selecting suitable electrical units and methods of measuring the ohm, this paper associates these theoretical practices with the ineffectual rhetorical strategies employed by Lippmann to promote his work, and thereby indicates that the practice of direct measurement was limited to French experimental physics. Whilst this result aligns readily with the existence of divergent nineteenth century British and German cultures of precision, it emerges from a very different disciplinary context in which the practice of precision electrical measurement developed independently of submarine telegraphy. This is because, as this paper illustrates, telegraphic engineering and experimental physics remained separate professions in France.     

Science and Security before the Atomic Bomb: The Loyalty Case of Harald U. Sverdrup

In the summer of 1941, Harald Sverdrup, the Norwegian-born Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) in La Jolla, California, was denied security clearance to work on Navy-sponsored research in underwater acoustics applied to anti-submarine warfare. The clearance denial embarrassed the world renown oceanographer and Arctic explorer, who repeatedly offered his services to the U.S. government only to see scientists of far lesser reputation called upon to aid the war effort. The official story of Sverdrup's denial was the risk of blackmail over relatives in occupied Norway. Declassified documents tell a different story. Although Sverdrup's integrity was defended on the highest levels of U.S. science, doubt was cast upon him by members of his own institution, who accused him of being a Nazi sympathiser. Personal distrust, rooted in scientific and intellectual disagreement, spilled over into questions about Sverdrup's loyalty and judgement. These doubts were considered sufficient grounds for withholding clearance, until Roger Revelle, a former student of Sverdrup now working within the Navy, was able to obtain a limited clearance for Sverdrup to develop techniques to forecast surf conditions during amphibious assaults. After the war, this work was credited with saving many lives, but at the time it placed Sverdrup out of the mainstream of Navy-sponsored oceanographic research. In being denied access to major areas of scientific work, Sverdrup's position as a leader of American oceanography was undermined.The loyalty case of Harald Sverdrup illustrates the emergence of an institutional apparatus through which the U.S. military began to control and shape the organisation of American science in the twentieth century. Military sponsorship of scientific research, begun during the open conflicts of World War II and continuing into the simmering tensions of the Cold War, involved explicit control by the U.S. military of who had access to critical information. This in turn meant who could do science in conjunction with the military. As the U.S. Navy became the principal sponsor of oceanography in the post-war years, clearance to do military work became to a great extent clearance to do oceanography. Choices about who could be trusted were also choices about who would do science, and what kind of science they would do.     

Social Darwinism and constitutional law with special reference to Lochner v. New York

American historians have generally accepted Richard Hofstadter's thesis that the scientism of Social Darwinism, or more appropriately, Spencerianism, dominated American thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and nowhere more enthusiastically or more purposively than within the conservative business community, which used Herbert Spencer's scientism to justify corporate business practices and to rewrite American Constitutional law to protect property interests against governmental regulations. Following Sharlin's general exposition of Herbert Spencer's scientism, this paper examines in detail the validity of the Hofstadter thesis as applied to the notorious Lochner v. New York Supreme Court opinion of 1905. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are offered as a repudiation of the generally accepted belief that it was the conservative activists on the Court who were guilty of Spencerian scientism. On the contrary, the argument is presented that it was Justice Holmes and the liberal reformers who found the evolutionary doctrines of Spencer congenial to their efforts of identifying needed reinterpretations of the American Constitution with biological evolution.     

The many faces of unification and pluralism in economics: The case of Paul Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis

The history of modern economics abounds with pleas for more pluralism as well as pleas for more unification. These seem to be contradictory goals, suggesting that pluralism and unification are mutually exclusive, or at least that they involve trade-offs with more of one necessarily being traded off against less of the other. This paper will use the example of Paul Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) to argue that the relationship between pluralism and unification is often more complex than this simple dichotomy suggests. In particular, Samuelson's Foundations is invariably presented as a key text in the unification of modern economics during the middle of the twentieth century; and in many ways that is entirely correct. But Samuelson's unification was not at the theoretical (causal and explanatory) level, but rather at the purely mathematical derivational level. Although this fact is recognized in the literature on Samuelson, what seems to be less recognized is that for Samuelson, much of the motivation for this unification was pluralist in spirit: not to narrow scientific economics into one single theory, but rather to allow for more than one theory to co-exist under a single unified derivational technique. This hidden pluralism will be discussed in detail. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for more recent developments in economics.     

Tuning up mind's pattern to nature's own idea: Eddington's early twenties case for variational derivatives

This paper sets out to show how Eddington's early twenties case for variational derivatives significantly bears witness to a steady and consistent shift in focus from a resolute striving for objectivity towards “selective subjectivism” and structuralism. While framing his so-called “Hamiltonian derivatives” along the lines of previously available variational methods allowing to derive gravitational field equations from an action principle, Eddington assigned them a theoretical function of his own devising in The Mathematical Theory of Relativity (1923). I make clear that two stages should be marked out in Eddington's train of thought if the meaning of such variational derivatives is to be adequately assessed. As far as they were originally intended to embody the mind's collusion with nature by linking atomicity of matter with atomicity of action, variational derivatives were at first assigned a dual role requiring of them not only to express mind's craving for permanence but also to tune up mind's privileged pattern to “Nature's own idea”. Whereas at a later stage, as affine field theory would provide a framework for world-building, such “Hamiltonian differentiation” would grow out of tune through gauge-invariance and, by disregarding how mathematical theory might precisely come into contact with actual world, would be turned into a mere heuristic device for structural knowledge.     

Constructing dystopian experience: A Neurath-Cartwrightian approach to the philosophy of social technology

Social situations, the object of the social sciences, are complex and unique: they contain so many variable aspects that they cannot be reproduced, and it is even difficult to experience two situations that are alike in many respects. The social scientists' past experiences that serve as their background knowledge to intervene in an existent situation is poor compared to what a traditional epistemologist would consider ideal. A way of dealing with the variable and insufficient background of social scientists is by means of models. But, then, how should we characterize social scientific models? This paper examines Otto Neurath's scientific utopianism as an attempt to deal with this problem. Neurath proposes that social scientists work with utopias: broad imaginative plans that coordinate a multitude of features of a social situation. This notion can be used in current debates in philosophy of science because we notice that utopias, in Neurath's sense, are comparable to models and nomological machines in Nancy Cartwright's conception. A model-based view of science lays emphasis on the fact that scientists learn from the repeated operation of such abstract entities, just as they learn from the repetition of experiments in a laboratory. Hence this approach suggests an approximation between the natural and the social sciences, as well as between science and utopian literature. This is exemplified by analyzing the literary dystopia We, written by Yevgeny Zamyatin, to show that reasoning from and debating about utopian writings, even if fictional and pessimistic, creates phenomena of valuation, which are fundamental for constituting a background of experiences in the social sciences.     

Hans Reichenbach's and C.I. Lewis's Kantian philosophies of science

Recent work in the history of philosophy of science details the Kantianism of philosophers often thought opposed to one another, e.g., Hans Reichenbach, C.I. Lewis, Rudolf Carnap, and Thomas Kuhn. Historians of philosophy of science in the last two decades have been particularly interested in the Kantianism of Reichenbach, Carnap, and Kuhn, and more recently, of Lewis. While recent historical work focuses on recovering the threatened-to-be-forgotten Kantian themes of early twentieth-century philosophy of science, we should not elide the differences between the Kantian strands running throughout this work. In this paper, I disentangle a few of these strands in the work of Reichenbach and Lewis focusing especially on their theories of relativized, constitutive a priori principles in empirical knowledge. In particular, I highlight three related differences between Reichenbach and Lewis concerning their motivations in analyzing scientific knowledge and scientific practice, their differing conceptions of constitutivity, and their relativization of constitutive a priori principles. In light of these differences, I argue Lewis's Kantianism is more similar to Kuhn's Kantianism than Reichenbach's, and so might be of more contemporary relevance to social and practice-based approaches to the philosophy of science.