Multiplicity in Everett׳s interpretation of quantum mechanics

Everett׳s interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed to avoid problems inherent in the prevailing interpretational frame. It assumes that quantum mechanics can be applied to any system and that the state vector always evolves unitarily. It then claims that whenever an observable is measured, all possible results of the measurement exist. This notion of multiplicity has been understood in different ways by proponents of Everett׳s theory. In fact the spectrum of opinions on various ontological questions raised by Everett׳s approach is rather large, as we attempt to document in this critical review. We conclude that much remains to be done to clarify and specify Everett׳s approach.     

The relative facts interpretation and Everett's note added in proof

In the published version of Hugh Everett III's doctoral dissertation, he inserted what has become a famous footnote, the “note added in proof”. This footnote is often the strongest evidence given for any of various interpretations of Everett (the many worlds, many minds, many histories and many threads interpretations). In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of the footnote. One that is supported by evidence found in letters written to and by Everett; one that is suggested by a new interpretation of Everett, an interpretation that takes seriously the central position of relative states in Everett's pure wave mechanics: the relative facts interpretation. Of central interest in this paper is how to make sense of Everett's claim in the “note added in proof” that “all elements of a superposition (all “branches”) are “actual,” none any more “real” than the rest.”     

The metaphysics of D-CTCs: On the underlying assumptions of Deutsch׳s quantum solution to the paradoxes of time travel

I argue that Deutsch׳s model for the behavior of systems traveling around closed timelike curves (CTCs) relies implicitly on a substantive metaphysical assumption. Deutsch is employing a version of quantum theory with a significantly supplemented ontology of parallel existent worlds, which differ in kind from the many worlds of the Everett interpretation. Standard Everett does not support the existence of multiple identical copies of the world, which the D-CTC model requires. This has been obscured because he often refers to the branching structure of Everett as a “multiverse”, and describes quantum interference by reference to parallel interacting definite worlds. But he admits that this is only an approximation to Everett. The D-CTC model, however, relies crucially on the existence of a multiverse of parallel interacting worlds. Since his model is supplemented by structures that go significantly beyond quantum theory, and play an ineliminable role in its predictions and explanations, it does not represent a quantum solution to the paradoxes of time travel.     

The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation

I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence.     

Worlds in the Everett interpretation

This is a discussion of how we can understand the world-view given to us by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular the rôle played by the concept of ‘world’. The view presented is that we are entitled to use ‘many-worlds’ terminology even if the theory does not specify the worlds in the formalism; this is defended by means of an extensive analogy with the concept of an ‘instant’ or moment of time in relativity, with the lack of a preferred foliation of spacetime being compared with the lack of a preferred basis in quantum theory. Implications for identity of worlds over time, and for relativistic quantum mechanics, are discussed.     

Situated observation in Bohmian mechanics

Here we investigate what it might mean for a formulation of quantum mechanics to be empirically adequate. We begin by considering the measurement problem as an empirical problem and distinguishing between stronger and weaker varieties of empirical adequacy. A strongly adequate theory is one that explains the experiences of a physically situated observer. A formulation of quantum mechanics that provides such situated empirical adequacy also provides a particularly compelling response to the measurement problem. As a concrete example we consider how Bohmian mechanics explains the experience of a physically situated observer.     

Quantum probability and many worlds

We discuss the meaning of probabilities in the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. We start by presenting very briefly the many worlds theory, how the problem of probability arises, and some unsuccessful attempts to solve it in the past. Then we criticize a recent attempt by Deutsch to derive the quantum mechanical probabilities from the non-probabilistic parts of quantum mechanics and classical decision theory. We further argue that the Born probability does not make sense even as an additional probability rule in the many worlds theory. Our conclusion is that the many worlds theory fails to account for the probabilistic statements of standard (collapse) quantum mechanics.     

Interpretation neutrality in the classical domain of quantum theory

I show explicitly how concerns about wave function collapse and ontology can be decoupled from the bulk of technical analysis necessary to recover localized, approximately Newtonian trajectories from quantum theory. In doing so, I demonstrate that the account of classical behavior provided by decoherence theory can be straightforwardly tailored to give accounts of classical behavior on multiple interpretations of quantum theory, including the Everett, de Broglie–Bohm and GRW interpretations. I further show that this interpretation-neutral, decoherence-based account conforms to a general view of inter-theoretic reduction in physics that I have elaborated elsewhere, which differs from the oversimplified picture that treats reduction as a matter of simply taking limits. This interpretation-neutral account rests on a general three-pronged strategy for reduction between quantum and classical theories that combines decoherence, an appropriate form of Ehrenfest׳s Theorem, and a decoherence-compatible mechanism for collapse. It also incorporates a novel argument as to why branch-relative trajectories should be approximately Newtonian, which is based on a little-discussed extension of Ehrenfest׳s Theorem to open systems, rather than on the more commonly cited but less germane closed-systems version. In the Conclusion, I briefly suggest how the strategy for quantum-classical reduction described here might be extended to reduction between other classical and quantum theories, including classical and quantum field theory and classical and quantum gravity.     

What could be objective about probabilities?

The basic notion of an objective probability is that of a probability determined by the physical structure of the world. On this understanding, there are subjective credences that do not correspond to objective probabilities, such as credences concerning rival physical theories. The main question for objective probabilities is how they are determined by the physical structure.In this paper, I survey three ways of understanding objective probability: stochastic dynamics, humean chances, and deterministic chances (typicality). The first is the obvious way to understand the probabilities of quantum mechanics via a collapse theory such as GRW, the last is the way to understand the probabilities in the context of a deterministic theory such as Bohmian mechanics. Humean chances provide a more abstract and general account of chances locutions that are independent of dynamical considerations.     

Experimental : The double standard in the quantum-information approach to the foundations of quantum theory

Among the alternatives of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM) there are those that give different predictions than quantum mechanics in yet-untested circumstances, while remaining compatible with current empirical findings. In order to test these predictions, one must isolate one's system from environmental induced decoherence, which, on the standard view of NRQM, is the dynamical mechanism that is responsible for the ‘apparent’ collapse in open quantum systems. But while recent advances in condensed-matter physics may lead in the near future to experimental setups that will allow one to test the two hypotheses, namely genuine collapse vs. decoherence, hence make progress toward a solution to the quantum measurement problem, those philosophers and physicists who are advocating an information-theoretic approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics are still unwilling to acknowledge the empirical character of the issue at stake. Here I argue that in doing so they are displaying an unwarranted double standard.     

Non-contextuality,finite precision measurement and the Kochen–Specker theorem

Meyer originally raised the question of whether non-contextual hidden variable models can, despite the Kochen–Specker theorem, simulate the predictions of quantum mechanics to within any fixed finite experimental precision (Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 (1999) 3751). Meyer's result was extended by Kent (Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 (1999) 3755). Clifton and Kent later presented constructions of non-contextual hidden variable theories which, they argued, indeed simulate quantum mechanics in this way (Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A 456 (2000) 2101).These arguments have evoked some controversy. Among other things, it has been suggested that the Clifton–Kent models do not in fact reproduce correctly the predictions of quantum mechanics, even when finite precision is taken into account. It has also been suggested that careful analysis of the notion of contextuality in the context of finite precision measurement motivates definitions which imply that the Clifton–Kent models are in fact contextual. Several critics have also argued that the issue can be definitively resolved by experimental tests of the Kochen–Specker theorem or experimental demonstrations of the contextuality of Nature.One aim of this paper is to respond to and rebut criticisms of the Meyer–Clifton–Kent papers. We thus elaborate in a little more detail how the Clifton–Kent models can reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics to arbitrary precision. We analyse in more detail the relationship between classicality, finite precision measurement and contextuality, and defend the claims that the Clifton–Kent models are both essentially classical and non-contextual. We also examine in more detail the senses in which a theory can be said to be contextual or non-contextual, and in which an experiment can be said to provide evidence on the point. In particular, we criticise the suggestion that a decisive experimental verification of contextuality is possible, arguing that the idea rests on a conceptual confusion.     

Uncertainty and probability for branching selves

Everettian accounts of quantum mechanics entail that people branch; every possible result of a measurement actually occurs, and I have one successor for each result. Is there room for probability in such an account? The prima facie answer is no; there are no ontic chances here, and no ignorance about what will happen. But since any adequate quantum mechanical theory must make probabilistic predictions, much recent philosophical labor has gone into trying to construct an account of probability for branching selves. One popular strategy involves arguing that branching selves introduce a new kind of subjective uncertainty. I argue here that the variants of this strategy in the literature all fail, either because the uncertainty is spurious, or because it is in the wrong place to yield probabilistic predictions. I conclude that uncertainty cannot be the ground for probability in Everettian quantum mechanics.     

Subjective probability and quantum certainty

In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent's degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that probabilities always represent degrees of belief. We then argue that a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an agent's prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that state also depend on the agent's prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore always some agent's certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict with locality. We emphasize this by giving a version of an argument of Stairs [(1983). Quantum logic, realism, and value-definiteness. Philosophy of Science, 50, 578], which applies the Kochen–Specker theorem to an entangled bipartite system.     

On classical cloning and no-cloning

It is part of information theory folklore that, while quantum theory prohibits the generic (or universal) cloning of states, such cloning is allowed by classical information theory. Indeed, many take the phenomenon of no-cloning to be one of the features that distinguishes quantum mechanics from classical mechanics. In this paper, we argue that pace conventional wisdom, in the case where one does not include a machine system, there is an analog of the no-cloning theorem for classical systems. However, upon adjoining a non-trivial machine system (or ancilla) one finds that, pace the quantum case, the obstruction to cloning disappears for pure states. We begin by discussing some conceptual points and category-theoretic generalities having to do with cloning, and proceed to discuss no-cloning in both the case of (non-statistical) classical mechanics and classical statistical mechanics.     

From canonical transformations to transformation theory, 1926–1927: The road to Jordan's Neue Begründung

We sketch the development from matrix mechanics as formulated in the Dreimännerarbeit of Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan, completed in late 1925, to transformation theory developed independently by Jordan and Dirac in late 1926. Focusing on Jordan, we distinguish three strands in this development: the implementation of canonical transformations in matrix mechanics (the main focus of our paper), the clarification of the relation between the different forms of the new quantum theory (matrix mechanics, wave mechanics, q-numbers, and operator calculus), and the generalization of Born's probability interpretation of the Schrödinger wave function. These three strands come together in a two-part paper by Jordan published in 1927, “On a new foundation [neue Begründung] of quantum mechanics.”     

The emergence of selection rules and their encounter with group theory, 1913–1927

In today's quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, the observable signature of a symmetry is often sought in the form of a selection rule: a missing radiation frequency, a particle that does not decay in another one, a scattering process which fails to take place. The connection between selection rules and symmetries is effected thanks to the mathematical discipline of group theory. In the present paper, I will offer an overview of how the productive synergy between selection rules and group theory came to be. The first half of the work will be devoted to the emergence of the idea of spectroscopic selection rules in the context of the old quantum theory, showing how this notion was linked with an interpretive scheme of theoretical nature which, once combined with group theory, would bear many fruits. In the second part of the paper, I will focus on the actual encounter between selection rules and group theory, and on the person largely responsible for it: Eugene Wigner. I will attempt to reconstruct the path which led Wigner, of all people, to be the agent effecting this connection.     

The operational framework for quantum theories is both epistemologically and ontologically neutral

Operational frameworks are very useful to study the foundations of quantum mechanics, and are sometimes used to promote antirealist attitudes towards the theory. The aim of this paper is to review three arguments aiming at defending an antirealist reading of quantum physics based on various developments of standard quantum mechanics appealing to notions such as quantum information, non-causal correlations and indefinite causal orders. Those arguments will be discussed in order to show that they are not convincing. Instead, it is argued that there is conceptually no argument that could favour realist or antirealist attitudes towards quantum mechanics based solely on some features of some formalism. In particular, both realist and antirealist views are well accomodable within operational formulations of the theory. The reason for this is that the realist/antirealist debate is located at a purely epistemic level, which is not engaged by formal aspects of theories. As such, operational formulations of quantum mechanics are epistmologically and ontologically neutral. This discussion aims at clarifying the limits of the historical and methodological affinities between scientific antirealism and operational physics while engaging with recent discoveries in quantum foundations. It also aims at presenting various realist strategies to account for those developments.     

Quantum jumps,superpositions, and the continuous evolution of quantum states

The apparent dichotomy between quantum jumps on the one hand, and continuous time evolution according to wave equations on the other hand, provided a challenge to Bohr's proposal of quantum jumps in atoms. Furthermore, Schrödinger's time-dependent equation also seemed to require a modification of the explanation for the origin of line spectra due to the apparent possibility of superpositions of energy eigenstates for different energy levels. Indeed, Schrödinger himself proposed a quantum beat mechanism for the generation of discrete line spectra from superpositions of eigenstates with different energies.However, these issues between old quantum theory and Schrödinger's wave mechanics were correctly resolved only after the development and full implementation of photon quantization. The second quantized scattering matrix formalism reconciles quantum jumps with continuous time evolution through the identification of quantum jumps with transitions between different sectors of Fock space. The continuous evolution of quantum states is then recognized as a sum over continually evolving jump amplitudes between different sectors in Fock space.In today's terminology, this suggests that linear combinations of scattering matrix elements are epistemic sums over ontic states. Insights from the resolution of the dichotomy between quantum jumps and continuous time evolution therefore hold important lessons for modern research both on interpretations of quantum mechanics and on the foundations of quantum computing. They demonstrate that discussions of interpretations of quantum theory necessarily need to take into account field quantization. They also demonstrate the limitations of the role of wave equations in quantum theory, and caution us that superpositions of quantum states for the formation of qubits may be more limited than usually expected.     

Quantum reality: A pragmaticized neo-Kantian approach

Despite remarkable efforts, it remains notoriously difficult to equip quantum theory with a coherent ontology. Hence, Healey (2017, 12) has recently suggested that “quantum theory has no physical ontology and states no facts about physical objects or events”, and Fuchs et al. (2014, 752) similarly hold that “quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world”. While intriguing, these positions either raise the question of how talk of ‘physical reality’ can even remain meaningful, or they must ultimately embrace a hidden variables-view, in tension with their original project. I here offer a neo-Kantian alternative. In particular, I will show how constitutive elements in the sense of Reichenbach (1920) and Friedman (1999, 2001) can be identified within quantum theory, through considerations of symmetries that allow the constitution of a ‘quantum reality’, without invoking any notion of a radically mind-independent reality. The resulting conception will inherit elements from pragmatist and ‘QBist’ approaches, but also differ from them in crucial respects. Furthermore, going beyond the Friedmanian program, I will show how non-fundamental and approximate symmetries can be relevant for identifying constitutive principles.