The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws

This paper sketches a dispositionalist conception of laws and shows how the dispositionalist should respond to certain objections. The view that properties are essentially dispositional is able to provide an account of laws that avoids the problems that face the two views of laws (the regularity and the contingent nomic necessitation views) that regard properties as categorical and laws as contingent. I discuss and reject the objections that (i) this view makes laws necessary whereas they are contingent; (ii) this view cannot account for certain kinds of laws of nature and their properties.     

Quantum Superpositions and the Representation of Physical Reality Beyond Measurement Outcomes and Mathematical Structures

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical (actualist) representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the (metaphysical) presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions.     

自然种类本质的倾向性解读

关于自然种类是否有本质的问题,本质观认为自然种类都具有本质,其划分也是基于本质进行的;而其反对者主张自然种类没有本质,分类是根据不同的兴趣和目的而进行的。面对生物学中物种和进化等的挑战,自然种类的本质观应从传统的强本质形式向弱的倾向性本质形式转化。     

Variations in Variation and Selection: The Ubiquity of the Variation-and-Selective-Retention Ratchet in Emergent Organizational Complexity, Part II: Quantum Field Theory

If the general arguments concerning theinvolvement of variation and selection inexplanations of ``fit'' are valid, then variationand selection explanations should beappropriate, or at least potentiallyappropriate, outside the paradigm historisticdomains of biology and knowledge. In thisdiscussion, I wish to indicate some potentialroles for variation and selection infoundational physics – specifically inquantum field theory. I will not be attemptingany full coherent ontology for quantum fieldtheory – none currently exists, and none islikely for at least the short term future. Instead, I wish to engage in some partiallyspeculative interpretations of some interestingresults in this area with the aim ofdemonstrating that variation and selectionnotions might play a role even here. Ifvariation and selection can survive in even asinhospitable and non-paradigmatic a terrain asfoundational physics, then it can surviveanywhere.     

定律的形而上学谱系——从休谟式随附谈起

传统科学哲学中规则系统式定律观与普遍必然式定律观,分别代表了定律形而上学观点的最弱与最强的两端,而休谟式随附可以被看作处于这两端之间。这三者构成的定律形而上学谱系,都首先需要承诺对象及其属性的本体论优先性。可是,这时这一谱系的内部区间划分其实并不清楚。于是,对这三种观点尤其是休谟式随附与普遍必然式定律观的哲学分析就是必要的,并且有可能在结合对实际的科学定律案例的分析后获得一种超出了已有形而上学观念的定律观。     

Quantum Nonlocality and the Challenge to Scientific Realism

In this essay I examine various aspects of the nearcentury-long debate concerning the conceptualfoundations of quantum mechanics and the problems ithas posed for physicists and philosophers fromEinstein to the present. Most crucial here is theissue of realism and the question whether quantumtheory is compatible with any kind of realist orcausal-explanatory account which goes beyond theempirical-predictive data. This was Einstein's chiefconcern in the famous series of exchanges with NielsBohr when he refused to accept the truth orcompleteness of a doctrine (orthodox QM) which ruledsuch questions to be strictly inadmissible. I discussthe later history of quantum-theoretical debate withparticular reference to the issue of nonlocality,i.e., the phenomenon of superluminal(faster-than-light) interaction betweenwidely-separated particles. Then I show how thestandard `Copenhagen' interpretation of QM hasinfluenced current anti-realist orontological-relativist approaches to philosophy ofscience. Indeed, there are clear signs that somephilosophers have retreated from a realist positionvery largely in response to just these problems. So itis important to ask exactly why – on what scientificor philosophical grounds – any preferred alternative(causal-realist) construal should have been ruled outas a matter of orthodox QM wisdom. Moreconstructively, my paper presents various arguments infavour of one such alternative, the `hidden-variables'theory developed since the early 1950s by David Bohmand consistently marginalised by proponents of theCopenhagen doctrine.     

Leibniz and Newton on Space

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable.     

What if Haecceity is not a Property?

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.     

From Permanence to Total Availability: A Quantum Conceptual Upgrade

We consider the classical concept of time of permanence and observe that its quantum equivalent is described by a bona fide self-adjoint operator. Its interpretation, by means of the spectral theorem, reveals that we have to abandon not only the idea that quantum entities would be characterizable in terms of spatial trajectories but, more generally, that they would possess the very attribute of spatiality. Consequently, a permanence time shouldn’t be interpreted as a “time” in quantum mechanics, but as a measure of the total availability of a quantum entity in participating to a process of creation of a spatial localization.     

A Realistic Look at Putnam's Argument Against Realism

Putnam's ``model-theoretic' argument against metaphysical realism presupposes that an ideal scientific theory is expressible in a first order language. The central aim of this paper is to show that Putnam's ``first orderization' of science, although unchallenged by numerous critics, makes his argument unsound even for adequate theories, never mind an ideal one. To this end, I will argue that quantitative theories, which dominate the natural sciences, can be adequately interpreted and evaluated only with the help of so-called theories of measurement whose epistemological and methodological purpose is to justify systematic assignments of quantitative values to objects in the world. And, in order to fulfill this purpose, theories of measurement must have an essentially higher order logical structure. As a result, Putnam's argument fails because much of science turns out to rest on essentially higher order theoretical assumptions about the world.     

从逻辑哲学观点看量子逻辑

1.根据逻辑哲学,量子逻辑可以定位于一种以非分配性为特征的非经典逻辑,它以量子力学家实际使用的科学推理为现实原型或经验基础;2.普特南从量子逻辑的产生而得出根据经验的理由,逻辑是整体可修正的结论。但他同时又主张逻辑联词的意义不变,因此陷入二难困境。3.根据量子力学几种不同解释来重新审视经验理由和逻辑可修正性论证,发现形而上学考量更不可忽视。4.对应原理具有消解普特南二难的方法论功效,量子逻辑对于经典逻辑的继承性与革新性同时可以得到合理解释。     

强纲领对逻辑合理性的误批判

“强纲领”是埃丁堡科学知识社会学学派提出的研究知识社会成因的社会学形而上学理论。巴里.巴恩斯和大卫.布鲁尔是这个学派的理论家。他们把自己的纲领定位在“相对主义知识观”上,其批判的矛头直指科学哲学研究中的理性主义。他们的一个重要观点是,反对逻辑的合理性是人类理性活动的普遍合理性的标准。然而,他们的论证是有问题的。     

Applications of quantum statistics in psychological studies of decision processes

We present a new approach to the old problem of how to incorporate the role of the observer in statistics. We show classical probability theory to be inadequate for this task and take refuge in the epsilon-model, which is the only model known to us caapble of handling situations between quantum and classical statistics. An example is worked out and some problems are discussed as to the new viewpoint that emanates from our approach.Supported by the I UAP-III no. 9.     

Towards a Darwinian Approach to Mathematics

In the past decades, recent paradigm shifts in ethology, psychology, and the social sciences have given rise to various new disciplines like cognitive ethology and evolutionary psychology. These disciplines use concepts and theories of evolutionary biology to understand and explain the design, function and origin of the brain. I shall argue that there are several good reasons why this approach could also apply to human mathematical abilities. I will review evidence from various disciplines (cognitive ethology, cognitive psychology, cognitive archaeology and neuropsychology) that suggests that the human capacity for mathematics is a category-specific domain of knowledge, hard-wired in the brain, which can be explained as the result of natural selection.     

Logical Aspects of Quantum (Non-)Individuality

In this paper I consider some logical and mathematical aspects of the discussion of the identity and individuality of quantum entities. I shall point out that for some aspects of the discussion, the logical basis cannot be put aside; on the contrary, it leads us to unavoidable conclusions which may have consequences in how we articulate certain concepts related to quantum theory. Behind the discussion, there is a general argument which suggests the possibility of a metaphysics of non-individuals, based on a reasonable interpretation of quantum basic entities. I close the paper with a suggestion that consists in emphasizing that quanta should be referred to by the cardinalities of the collections to which they belong, for which an adequate mathematical framework seems to be possible.     

The Observer Effect

Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to the foundations of physics, we provide a clarification and classification of the key concept of observation. An entity can be observed with or without a scope. In the second case, the observation is a purely non-invasive discovery process; in the first case, it is a purely invasive process, which can involve either creation or destruction aspects. An entity can also be observed with or without a full control over the observational process. In the latter case, the observation can be described by a symmetry breaking mechanism, through which a specific deterministic observational process is selected among a number of potential ones, as explained in Aerts’ hidden measurement approach. This is what is called a product test, or product observation, whose consequences are that outcomes can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, as it is the case in typical quantum measurements. We also show that observations can be about intrinsic (stable) properties of the observed entity, or about relational (ephemeral) properties between the observer and observed entities; also, they can be about intermediate properties, neither purely classical, nor purely quantum. Our analysis allows us to propose a general conceptual characterization of quantum measurements, as observational processes involving three aspects: (1) product observations, (2) pure creation aspects and (3) ephemeral relational properties. We also discuss the important concept of non-spatiality and emphasize some of the differences and similarities between quantum and classical/relativistic observations.     

企业环境社会责任缺失的制度机理研究

企业之所以会去承担环境责任就在于企业受到正式制度以及非正式制度的约束,如果没有制度的制约,企业寻求自身利益最大化的结果会导致社会资源的过度使用,环境严重恶化。在目前情况下,造成中国企业环境社会责任缺失的原因很多,但根源在于制度安排的缺位,因此只有通过有效的制度安排,才能促使企业更好地承担环境社会责任,以局部和谐来实现社会的整体和谐。     

A Nonparametric Approach to Cognitive Diagnosis by Proximity to Ideal Response Patterns

A trend in educational testing is to go beyond unidimensional scoring and provide a more complete profile of skills that have been mastered and those that have not. To achieve this, cognitive diagnosis models have been developed that can be viewed as restricted latent class models. Diagnosis of class membership is the statistical objective of these models. As an alternative to latent class modeling, a nonparametric procedure is introduced that only requires specification of an item-by-attribute association matrix, and classifies according to minimizing a distance measure between observed responses, and the ideal response for a given attribute profile that would be implied by the item-by-attribute association matrix. This procedure requires no statistical parameter estimation, and can be used on a sample size as small as 1. Heuristic arguments are given for why the nonparametric procedure should be effective under various possible cognitive diagnosis models for data generation. Simulation studies compare classification rates with parametric models, and consider a variety of distance measures, data generation models, and the effects of model misspecification. A real data example is provided with an analysis of agreement between the nonparametric method and parametric approaches.