Henri Poincaré and bruno de finetti: Conventions and scientific reasoning

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincaré used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincaré's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincaré's conventionalism as it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincaré's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received.     

Atomism, Poincaré and Planck

Planck's change in attitude to the question of whether atomic hypotheses were scientifically accessible, is discussed. It is argued contra Holton, that Planck's change in attitude to this question did not signal a methodological shift towards realism. The point of doing this is not just to investigate a significant episode in the history of quantum theory, but also to use the episode as a case study in support of a broader historical thesis. This thesis is that there was a widespread late-nineteenth century methodological tradition which motivated the change in status of certain ontological claims — e.g., that atoms exist — from ‘inaccessible to science’ to ‘scientifically acceptable’ even though those claims were not strictly ‘observable’. This methodological tradition is a hybrid of positivist and realist views. Thus, contrary to one popular view, the fin de siécle triumph of atomism is not to be seen as a triumph for a realist view of science Poincare's views are also used as an illustration.     

History of Science through Koyré's Lenses

Alexandre Koyré was one of the most prominent historians of science of the twentieth century. The standard interpretation of Koyré is that he falls squarely within the internalist camp of historians of science—that he focuses on the history of the ideas themselves, eschewing cultural and sociological interpretations regarding the influence of ideologies and institutions on the development of science. When we read what Koyré has to say about his historical studies (and most of what others have said about them), we find him embracing and championing this Platonic view of his work. Ultimately I think this interpretation of Koyré's history of science is lopsided and in need of correction. I claim, rather, that a careful reading of Koyré's work suggests that a tension exists between internal and external methodological considerations. The external considerations stem from Koyré's commitment to the unity of human thought and the influence he admits that the ‘transscientifiques’ (philosophy, metaphysics, religion) have on the development of science. I suggest in conclusion then, that if we are to put a philosophical label on his work, rather than ‘Platonist’, as has been the custom, ‘Hegelian’ makes a better fit.     

Concepts, anomalies and reality: a response to Bloor and Fehér

In this article I respond to the defences of the Strong Programme put forward by David Bloor and Márta Fehér in this issue. I dispute the claim that it is attention to only limited parts of the Strong Programme framework that allows me to argue that this approach: (i) leads to weak idealism, (ii) undermines the idea that theories have varying levels of instrumental success, and (iii) challenges the theoretical claims of scientific actors. Rather, I argue that these problematic positions are entailed by the constructionist tenets at the core of the Strong Programme.     

The development of the Neurath principle: unearthing the Romantic link

Otto Neurath’s thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism is connected to the recognition that protocol sentences are not inviolable, that is they are fallible and their choice cannot be determined: ‘Poincaré, Duhem and others have adequately shown that even if we have agreed on the protocol statements, there is a not limited number of equally applicable, possible systems of hypotheses. We have extended this tenet of the uncertainty of systems of hypotheses to all statements, including protocol statements that are alterable in principle’ (Neurath, 1983, p. 105). Later historiography has called Neurath’s extension of Duhemian holism the Neurath principle. Based on a study of Neurath’s early works on the history of optics, the paper investigates a previously unnoticed influence on the development of this principle, Neurath’s reading of Goethe’s Theory of colours. The historical and polemical parts of Goethe’s tripartite book provided Neurath with ideal examples for the vertical extension of Duhem’s thesis to observation statements. Moreover, Goethe’s critique of the language of science and his views on the theory-ladenness of observation, as well as on the history of science show strong parallels to many of Neurath’s ideas. These demonstrate the existence of surprisingly direct textual links between Romantic views on science and the development of twentieth-century philosophy of science. Neurath’s usage of Goethe’s examples also indicates that the birth of the Neurath principle is more tightly connected to actual scientific practice than to theory-testing, and that by admitting the theory-ladenness of observation reports and fallibility of protocol statements Neurath does not throw empiricism overboard.     

Bayesian pseudo-confirmation,use-novelty,and genuine confirmation

According to the comparative Bayesian concept of confirmation, rationalized versions of creationism come out as empirically confirmed. From a scientific viewpoint, however, they are pseudo-explanations because with their help all kinds of experiences are explainable in an ex-post fashion, by way of ad-hoc fitting of an empirically empty theoretical framework to the given evidence. An alternative concept of confirmation that attempts to capture this intuition is the use novelty (UN) criterion of confirmation. Serious objections have been raised against this criterion. In this paper I suggest solutions to these objections. Based on them, I develop an account of genuine confirmation that unifies the UN-criterion with a refined probabilistic confirmation concept that is explicated in terms of the confirmation of evidence-transcending content parts of the hypothesis.     

Hélène Metzger: the history of science between the study of mentalities and total history

In this article, I examine the historiographical ideas of the historian of chemistry Hélène Metzger (1886–1944) against the background of the ideas of the members of the groups and institutions in which she worked, including Alexandre Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, Abel Rey, Henri Berr and Lucien Febrve. This article is on two interdependent levels: that of particular institutions and groups in which she worked (the Centre de Synthèse, the International Committee for History of Science, the Institut d'Histoire des Sciences et Techniques (Sorbonne) and the École Pratique des Hautes Études) and that of historiographical ideas. I individuate two particular theoretical aspirations pursued by the historians in Metzger's milieu: the ideal of total history and the study of the human mind. These two objectives were seen by Metzger and many others as implicating each other. Moreover, Metzger and other historians wanted to integrate the practice of commentary of texts in the realisations of those ideals. I argue, however, that these objectives proved very difficult to realise at the same time. One tradition which stemmed out of these discussions, exemplified by Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault, focused on the mind and knowledge, and renounced commentary of texts and total history as it was understood by the historians of the Centre de Synthèse. The latter, however, did not really pursue the study of the mind. Moreover, historians like Metzger and Koyré who practised an attentive analysis of texts could not realise total history.     

Atoms, complexes, and demonstration: Posterior analytics 96b15-25

There is agreement neither concerning the point that is being made in Posterior analytics 96b15–25 nor the issue Aristotle intends to address. There are two major lines of interpretation of this passage. According to one, sketched by Themistius and developed by Philoponus and Eustratius, Aristotle is primarily concerned with determining the definitions of the infimae species that fall under a certain genus. They understand Aristotle as arguing that this requires collating definitional predictions, seeing which are common to which species. Pacius, on the other hand, takes Aristotle to be saying that a genus is studied scientifically through first determining the infimae species that fall under that genus. This interpretation attributes to Aristotle a distinction between primary and derivative subjects. I argue for Pacius’s interpretation, defending it against Barnes’s objections.     

Galileo as a ‘bad theologian’: a formative myth about Galileo’s trial

For 150 years after Galileo’s condemnation in 1633, there were many references to the trial, but no sustained, heated or polarized discussions. Then came the thesis that Galileo was condemned not for being a good astronomer but for being a bad theologian (using Scripture to support astronomical hypotheses); it began in 1784–1785 with an apology of the Inquisition by Mallet du Pan in the Mercure de France and the printing in Tiraboschi’s Storia della letteratura italiana of an apocryphal letter attributed to Galileo but forged by Onorato Gaetani. This thesis is not only untenable and false but inverts and subverts the truth; it proved to be long-lasting and widely accepted; so it may be labeled a myth. It was held by such writers as Bergier; Bergier; B; Feller; Cooper; Purcell; Marini; Reumont; Madden and Duhem. Afterwards, it was generally abandoned, its death knell being pope John Paul II’s speeches in 1979–1992. The myth seems to have acted as a catalyst insofar as its creation encouraged the proliferation of pro-clerical accounts and the articulation of pro-Galilean ones, thus making the discussion of Galileo’s trial the cause célèbre it is today.     

Poincaréan intuition revisited: what can we learn from Kant and Parsons?

This paper provides a comprehensive critique of Poincaré’s usage of the term intuition in his defence of the foundations of pure mathematics and science. Kant’s notions of sensibility and a priori form and Parsons’s theory of quasi-concrete objects are used to impute rigour into Poincaré’s interpretation of intuition. In turn, Poincaré’s portrayal of sensible intuition as a special kind of intuition that tolerates the senses and imagination is rejected. In its place, a more harmonized account of how we perceive concrete objects is offered whereby intuitive knowledge is consistently a priori whatever the domain of application.     

Vincanorin und Vincarein,zwei neue Alkaloide ausVinca minor L.

Summary The isolation of two new alkaloids fromVinca minor L. (Apocynaceae) is described. Vincarein, C₂₁H₂₄N₂O₄, and Vincanorin, C₁₉H₂₂N₂O, both probably belong to the group of indol alkaloids.     

Photochemical transformations of 6-Amino-penicillanic acid and phenoxymethylpenicillin

Zusammenfassung Bei der Bestrahlung von 6-Aminopenicillansäure mit UV-Licht entstehen Aminomethylpenicillin (Id), N-Formylpenicillamin (II) und ein Stoff der Summenformel C₅H₉NS, der vermutlich Struktur III besitzt. Phenoxymethylpenicillin wird bei der UV-Bestrahlung in ein Gemisch vonp- undo-Hydroxybenzylpenicillin umgewandelt.     

Kondensationsprodukte von Oxyketonen und Aminoketonen mit 2,4,5-Triamino-6-oxy-pyrimidin

Summary By condensing 2:4:5-triamino-6-hydroxy-pyrimidine with dihydroxyacetone (diacetate), diaminoacetone or acetone-1,3-di (p-formylaminobenzoic acid) not the expected 8- or 9-oxymethyl resp. -aminomethyl-pteridines but 8-or 9-methyl-pteridines were obtained. With p-tolyl-d-isoglucosamine not a tetrahydroxybutyl-pteridine but a trihydroxybutyl-pteridine was formed. For an explanation of these results it is supposed that from the dihydro-pteridines formed at first by intramolecular splitting off of H₂O or R·NH₂ aromatization takes place.     

CSTX-9, a toxic peptide from the spider Cupiennius salei: amino acid sequence, disulphide bridge pattern and comparison with other spider toxins containing the cystine knot structure

CSTX-9 (68 residues, 7530.9 Da) is one of the most abundant toxic polypeptides in the venom of the wandering spider Cupiennius salei. The amino acid sequence was determined by Edman degradation using reduced and alkylated CSTX-9 and peptides generated by cleavages with endoproteinase Asp-N and trypsin, respectively. Sequence comparison with CSTX-1, the most abundant and the most toxic polypeptide in the crude spider venom, revealed a high degree of similarity (53% identity). By means of limited proteolysis with immobilised trypsin and RP-HPLC, the cystine-containing peptides of CSTX-9 were isolated and the disulphide bridges were assigned by amino acid analysis, Edman degradation and nanospray tandem mass spectrometry. The four disulphide bonds present in CSTX-9 are arranged in the following pattern: 1-4, 2-5, 3-8 and 6-7 (Cys₆-Cys₂₁, Cys₁₃-Cys₃₀, Cys₂₀-Cys₄₈, Cys₃₂-Cys₄₆). Sequence comparison of CSTX-1 with CSTX-9 clearly indicates the same disulphide bridge pattern, which is also found in other spider polypeptide toxins, e.g. agatoxins (ω-AGA-IVA, ω-AGA-IVB, μ-AGA-I and μ-AGA-VI) from Agelenopsis aperta, SNX-325 from Segestria florentina and curtatoxins (CT-I, CT-II and CT-III) from Hololena curta. CSTX-1/CSTX-9 belong to the family of ion channel toxins containing the inhibitor cystine knot structural motif. CSTX-9, lacking the lysine-rich C-terminal tail of CSTX-1, exhibits a ninefold lower toxicity to Drosophila melanogaster than CSTX-1. This is in accordance with previous observations of CSTX-2a and CSTX-2b, two truncated forms of CSTX-1 which, like CSTX-9, also lack the C-terminal lysine-rich tail. Received 23 July 2001; accepted 31 July 2001     

The development of the Laplace Transform, 1737–1937 II. Poincaré to Doetsch, 1880–1937

An earlier paper, to which this is a sequel, traced the history of the Laplace Transform up to 1880. In that year Poincaré reinvented the transform, but did so in a more powerful context, that of properly conceived complex analysis. Rapid developments followed, culminating in Doetsch' work in which the transform took its modern shape.     

Histamine-induced hypotension modified by H1 and H2 antagonists in the monkey (Macaca mulatta)

Summary Blocking H₂ receptors with burimamide in the dose used (20 mg/kg) approximately doubles the amount) of histamine needed to produced the same effect as seen when H₁ antagonists (chlorpheniramine or mepyramine) are used alone. TheK ₂ ratios for chlorpheniramine-chlorpheniramine plus burimamide are 117–204 and for mepyramine-mepyramine phus burimamide are 200–478. H₁ and H₂ receptors, in the monkey, when stimulated, both cause cardiovascular responses in the same direction.     

A study of DNA synthesis in sea urchin hybrids by the incorporation of H3-thymidine

Zusammenfassung (1) Es wird die DNS-Synthese der letalen SeeigelbastardeParacentrotus ×Arbacia (PA) undParacentrotus ×Sphaerechinus (PS) mit H³-Thymidin untersucht. (2) Dem verschiedenen, der Letalität vorausgehenden Entwicklungstpus (PA ohne, PS mit Chromosomenelimination) entspricht ein verschiedener Verlauf der Hemmung der DNS-Synthese. Parallel dazu wird die Vermehrung in der Anzahl der Kerne verglichen.     

Negotiating history: Contingency,canonicity, and case studies

Objections to the use of historical case studies for philosophical ends fall into two categories. Methodological objections claim that historical accounts and their uses by philosophers are subject to various biases. We argue that these challenges are not special; they also apply to other epistemic practices. Metaphysical objections, on the other hand, claim that historical case studies are intrinsically unsuited to serve as evidence for philosophical claims, even when carefully constructed and used, and so constitute a distinct class of challenge. We show that attention to what makes for a canonical case can address these problems. A case study is canonical with respect to a particular philosophical aim when the features relevant to that aim provide a reasonably complete causal account of the results of the historical process under investigation. We show how to establish canonicity by evaluating relevant contingencies using two prominent examples from the history of science: Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory of general relativity using his data from the 1919 eclipse and Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure of DNA.     

Isomériecis-trans des ménaquinones et oxydations phosphorylantes dans les extraits deMycobacterium phlei

Summary Incubation ofM. phlei washed cells with [¹⁴C³H₃]-l-methionine led to [2-¹⁴C³H₃] dihydromena-quinone-9 with an isotope ratio identical to that of methionine. Chromatography of the doubly labelled quinone indicated, despite a pronounced isotope effect, that bothcis andtrans isomers had the same isotope ratio. This result eliminates any possibility of hydrogen exchange in the 2-methyl group of menaquinones during oxydative phosphorylation, even in thecis isomer. Furthermore, it is confirmed that this compound is certainly formed from natural or synthetic menaquinones during isolation or incubation periods by the effect of daylight irradiation.