Pluralism and anarchism in quantum physics: Paul Feyerabend's writings on quantum physics in relation to his general philosophy of science

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend's philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics.In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend's perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend's arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics.However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr's work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science.     

Kant on science and normativity

The aim of this paper is to explore Kant’s account of normativity through the prism of the distinction between the natural and the human sciences. Although the pragmatic orientation of the human sciences is often defined in contrast with the theoretical orientation of the natural sciences, I show that they are in fact regulated by one and the same norm, namely reason’s demand for autonomy.     

John Hunter and his approach to pathology

Given the old conception of the relation greater than, the proposition that the whole is greater than the part is an immediate consequence. But being greater in this sense is not incompatible with being equal in the sense of one-one correspondence. Some who failed to recognize this formulated invalid arguments against the possibility of infinite quantities. Others who did realize that the relations of equal and greater when so defined are compatible, concluded that such relations are not appropriately taken as quantitative relations, at least, not in general. If suitable quantitative relations were to be defined, there was a possibility of retaining either the traditional definition of greater and finding another concept of equality, or of retaining the concept of equality as one-one correspondence and defining greater than so that it is incompatible with equality in this sense. The former alternative was implicitly taken by Bolzano, who never succeeded in defining suitable quantitative relations. The latter alternative was taken by Cantor, and is the basis of his great success in constructing a mathematical theory of the transfinite.