具身认知的两种进路

具身认知观发展出一些新的概念和研究方法。其中有些补充和修正了传统的认知观念,而另一些则对传统的认知观念及其研究方法提出了挑战。具身认知观是否与传统的认知观相容,这取决于新概念和方法与旧概念和方法的区别程度,以及在什么情况下具身性能在新方案中获得成功。本文区分了具身认知观的两种不同进路:一种是温和的具身认知观,它与传统的表征计算基本假设相容;另一种是激进的具身认知观,它挑战表征计算的基本假设,认为心智的表征计算观是错误的。本文比较了这两种不同的进路,提出了我们的评价和观点。     

认知的具身观

在认知科学中存在一个具身认知的运动。认知的具身观认为，我们的心智和理性能力是具身的。与认知的具身观相对立的是“第一代认知科学”的认知主义（cognitivism）的观念，这是一个基于“客观主义”意义的认知观。客观主义的意义理论认为认知过程和结果独立于进行认知活动的人的身体结构和认知发生于其中的认知情境。与之相对，认知的具身观认为认知是身体一主体在实时的环境中的相互作用活动。认知科学的当代发现表明，意义在认知中处于中心地位：我们的认知活动是通过意义和世界紧密关联的。心智的本质在于它构成意义的活动。     

从“无身”到“有身”:认知观的逻辑线索与检讨

本文主张具身认知思潮的演变其实是认知观的嬗变历程。认知观本身是有关身心关系的一种理解、诉求和主张。这种理解、诉求和主张表达了认知科学对身心问题的一种解决方案、思路或尝试。遵循着从离身认知到具身认知的演变历程,可以窥见心智加工与身体之间关系的嬗变,即从分离到契合,这反映出认知科学在人类自身心智的信息处理研究的拓展,从文化层面,也折射出认知观背后文化意识的缺失、研究立场的不定、还原论风险及研究路向的变数等问题。     

生成认知:具身进路与佛学认知观的交融

认知科学家F·瓦雷拉等人提出认知的"生成"概念,主张身体和环境共同构成人的认知系统,认知来源于"活生生"的人类经验,因而对人类认知的考察应当将科学反思和观照经验相结合,借鉴佛教静心、正念的方法。佛学认知观视身体为"心"、"色"的蕴积,认为心智能动作用的发挥必须以身体为基础,蕴积身体观与具身性观念对身体在认知中的作用具有相同的诉求。进而,生成认知对认知的根基进行反思,批判了认知科学中客观主义和主观主义的立场,论证了佛学中道认识论的合理性,以"动态耦合"诠释"和合缘起",从身体观、方法论、认识论等方面体现了具身进路与佛学认知观的交融。     

安迪·克拉克的表征理论

表征被看作是心灵与世界之间关系的媒介,是认知科学的核心概念,传统认知科学因"认知的本质即表征"的理念而被称为计算表征主义,随着认知科学的发展,具身认知对计算表征主义理论进行了质疑并提出种种替代性方案。认知科学家安迪·克拉克对认知科学中的表征思想进行梳理,承认表征在认知中发挥特定的作用,将传统的计算表征改造为时间性、具身的"行动导向的表征",将认知科学中的表征思想从单纯的心智计算转向心灵、身体和世界三者的构成性维度。     

控制论对生成认知科学范式的影响

生成主义已然取代计算主义成为认知科学研究的主导范式,但是它的历史根源,特别是其控制论根源,往往在认知科学的历史分析中被忽略。然而,正是这一外在于认知科学的控制论根源最终导致了生成主义的诞生。生成主义统一了认知研究的两大科学传统,一个是外在于认知科学的控制论传统,一个是内在于认知科学的人工智能传统。认知科学的发展先后经历了认知主义、联结主义、具身动力主义和生成主义。相应地,控制论的发展也经历了一阶控制论、阿什比控制论、二阶控制论和认知生物学,人工智能领域的发展也同样经历了老式的AI(即Good Old-Fashioned AI,GOFAI)、联结主义AI、具身-嵌入AI(embodied-embedded AI,EEAI)和生成AI(enactive AI)。梳理控制论传统和AI传统的发展脉络,挖掘生成主义的控制论根源,以便更好地理解生成主义的理论基础和方法论基础。     

论情境认知的本质特征

情境认知作为第二代认知科学的一种理论,与传统认知主义相对立,其思想的主要来源是现象学、实用主义、生态心理学、人工智能以及理论生物学,且与具身认知、生成认知和嵌入认知有着紧密的联系。情境认知有境遇性、交互性、动态性和即时性四个特征,境遇性凸显了认知的环境依赖性,交互性刻画了认知的非单一性,动态性说明了认知的生成性,即时性体现了认知的当下性和灵活性。这些特征有助于加深对情境认知的理解,展现其重要的理论与现实意义。     

重新审视“延展心灵”概念

延展心灵假说在过去二十年挑战了认知科学主流的颅内主义认知观,认为心灵/认知并不仅发生在脑内,而是可以延展到环境中与一些物理设备构建起耦合系统。然而,关于延展心灵的见解,却因为我们对于心灵、认知以及脑的概念的内涵和关系理解的含混,导致语词含义摆荡在认知神经科学与哲学两端。本文试图通过概念梳理,反驳颅内主义认知标志观,厘清脑与心灵/认知的基本特征和属性,并最终认为可以通过区分"作为器官的脑"和"发生功能的脑"消解这种"语词之争",为延展认知研究的概念可能提供基础。     

认知研究中的行动概念

当代认知研究中,一种以"4E"作为标识的新认知观已经形成并正在发展,其基本主张为:行动是认知的核心。不过,这种新认知观面临的一个基本问题是行动概念的模糊性。通过选择研究认知的合适视角,我们将行动置于关于心智系统的概念框架内,确定其在认知研究中所处的地位和担当的角色,并认定它实质上是一个非认知的心智概念;在此基础上,进一步论证了新认知观与认知计算主义之间的相容性。     

从交互认知走向交互哲学——以加拉格尔关于现象学与涉身认知的探索为例

现象学是理解涉身认知交互本质以及建构相应交互哲学的重要进路。当代美国哲学家肖恩.加拉格尔通过建设性地解读和利用现象学为我们探索交互认知和建构交互哲学提供了重要启示。加拉格尔从方法上廓清了一种建设性现象学的存在,建构了一种基于现象学的整体涉身性理论框架,尝试通过整体涉身性框架对认知科学研究进行了科学解释,并且透过交互主体性互动理论展示了一种可能的交互哲学。他的探索既具价值又面临挑战。     

心智科学时代的“赫尔墨斯”：弗朗西斯科·瓦雷拉

弗朗西斯科·瓦雷拉是智利著名生物学家、神经科学家、心智科学家和哲学家,也是自创生、具身心智、生成认知以及神经现象学等观念或理论的倡导者和提出者。本文就掌握的史料从瓦雷拉的生平、学术贡献以及评价和影响等三个方面再现了其作为心智科学时代的“赫尔墨斯”形象。     

自然语言中的感官隐喻认知系统

感官隐喻认知系统在汉语自然语言中普遍存在,能够从一定程度上反映汉民族的认知规律。跨概念域的映射是其实质,体验性心智是其哲学基础,感觉统合是其神经心理学基础,中国古代心学思想是其哲学渊源。     

Points of View: A Conceptual Space Approach

Points of view are a central phenomenon in human cognition. Although the concept of point of view is ambiguous, there exist common elements in different notions. A point of view is a certain way to look at things around us. In conceptual points of view, things are looked at or interpreted through conceptual lenses. Conceptual points of view are important for epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. In this article, a new method to formalize conceptual points of view is introduced. It is based on the conceptual space approach, where concepts are regions of multi-dimensional quality spaces. Points of view, as defined in this article, consist of a selection of relevant dimensions, referred to here as determinables, and of a certain supposition, referred to here as a theory, about the subject content. After considering some early efforts to formalize points of view, the notion of conceptual space is defined and explored. One concept of point of view is defined and developed in the framework of conceptual space, and a new logic for points of view is also outlined. The problem of mind–body correlation is discussed as an example of the application of the notion of points of view. To conclude, the meaning and applications of the new concepts and tools developed in the article are discussed.     

The Epistemological Functions of Symbolization in Leibniz’s Universal Characteristic

Leibniz’s universal characteristic is a fundamental aspect of his theory of cognition. Without symbols or characters it would be difficult for the human mind to define several concepts and to achieve many demonstrations. In most disciplines, and particularly in mathematics, the mind must then focus on symbols and their combinatorial rules rather than on mental contents. For Leibniz, mental perception is most of the time too confused for attaining distinct notions and valid deductions. In this paper, I argue that the functions of symbolization differ depending upon the kind of concepts that are replaced with characters. In my view, most commentators did not sufficiently underline the distinction between two main functions of formal substitution in Leibniz’s characteristic: either increasing our knowledge or simply structuring it. In the first case, we complete our knowledge because formal substitution makes sensible and imaginary concepts more distinct. In the second case, symbolization helps to organize contents that are already conceived of by reason. Thus the process of substitution is not always identically applicable, for symbols replace different types of concepts.     

人体隐喻的英汉机械工程术语翻译策略

文章基于体验认知理论,旨在研究两个问题:(1)人体隐喻机械工程术语翻译及其认知理据;(2)根据New-mark提出的七种隐喻翻译策略,每种人体隐喻的机械工程术语翻译策略使用比率及每个策略具有什么认知理据.文章从《英汉机械工程术语》中收集语料,探讨英—汉人体隐喻的机械工程术语翻译策略.该研究有助于科技术语翻译理论与实践.     

模块性、经典计算和意向实在论——论福多思维非模块性论题的一个本体论后果

福多将计算模块的概念运用于对心灵模块性的分析，提出心灵之负责输入分析的部分（感知觉系统、语言系统等）是模块性的，而心灵之专司信念的确立和思维之职的部分（中心系统）是非模块性的。由此，福多进一步得出心的计算理论不适用于中心系统的结论。然而，福多的结论给他的计算主义的意向实在论辩护带来了问题：如果思维不是计算，那么，福多关于常识心理学所持的意向实在论主张就成了空中楼阁。     

认知计算主义的威力和软肋

认知的本质就是计算是认知科学研究纲领的核心,却一直遭到来自不同方面的责难和攻击.本文运用科学哲学中关于理论评价的增殖力标准,论证了认知计算主义是一个很有力量和前途的研究纲领,同时指出计算与其物理实现可分离的预设是它的软肋,最后分析了为消除这一软肋认知计算主义正在发生的新变化.     

体认术语学视域下的中药转喻命名研究

中药名是中药的符号表征,是外界了解中药的认知起点,是外界了解中华民族优秀传统文化以及中国人民体验认知的心智入口.文章在体认术语学视域下对中药转喻命名的体验性和认知性进行了阐释.研究发现,中药转喻命名的体验性体现在命名需要仰仗命名者的经验体系;中药转喻命名的认知性体现为命名过程是一个主观化的认知加工过程.对具有显著中国特...     

Embodied Anomaly Resolution in Molecular Genetics: A Case Study of RNAi

Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements (“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure of scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson (In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment, 1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view. Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991), abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990). The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially based.