共查询到18条相似文献,搜索用时 62 毫秒
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心灵表征理论较易机制化,但在处理框架问题方面却遇到了困难。针对心灵表征理论的这个问题,德雷福斯等人提出了反表征主义的海德格尔式的具身理论。具身理论虽然可以解决框架问题,但它还处于隐喻阶段,如何使它实现机制化仍然面临诸多困境。 相似文献
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本文主张具身认知思潮的演变其实是认知观的嬗变历程。认知观本身是有关身心关系的一种理解、诉求和主张。这种理解、诉求和主张表达了认知科学对身心问题的一种解决方案、思路或尝试。遵循着从离身认知到具身认知的演变历程,可以窥见心智加工与身体之间关系的嬗变,即从分离到契合,这反映出认知科学在人类自身心智的信息处理研究的拓展,从文化层面,也折射出认知观背后文化意识的缺失、研究立场的不定、还原论风险及研究路向的变数等问题。 相似文献
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具身AI(embodiedAI)(又称行为主义AI)的很多灵感源自现象学对经典AI的批判。现象学关于人类智能的洞见——非表征性、具身性、在世界中的存在,都转化为了具身AI的设计原则。具身AI的发展和成熟,不仅是对现象学哲学的实证,也是对现象学实践的重大发展。蒙在现象学脸上的神秘面纱,通过具身AI的工作得到了一定的揭示。因此,具身AI是一种不寻常的现象学实践。尽管当前的具身AI,还不能完全体现现象学对人的理解并克服经典AI的难题,但不容质疑的是:具身AI进路使人类向着真正理解和模拟自然智能的目标更进了一步。 相似文献
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认知的本质就是计算是认知科学研究纲领的核心,却一直遭到来自不同方面的责难和攻击.本文运用科学哲学中关于理论评价的增殖力标准,论证了认知计算主义是一个很有力量和前途的研究纲领,同时指出计算与其物理实现可分离的预设是它的软肋,最后分析了为消除这一软肋认知计算主义正在发生的新变化. 相似文献
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物理主义:从方法到理论 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
从近代科学诞生以来,物理主义学说一直和实证主义思潮交织在一起,它们相互渗透、互为表里。在现代科学革命的巨大影响下,物理主义首先作为方法论体系独立开来,并且和逻辑实证主义思潮紧密相关。物理主义方法论在社会科学中的滥觞引发了广泛的科学主义争论。但是,随着当代认知科学的深入发展,物理主义正经历着从方法体系到本体理论的自我转换。而无论如何,科学逻辑是物理主义发展的重要基础和核心理念。 相似文献
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当前中国术语学建设取得较大进展,但还应加强。特别是要进行以下几个方面的工作:1.加强术语学研究与术语实践工作的联系;2.加快国外经典著作的引进;3.在术语学研究中进一步发挥语言学家的作用;4.提倡厚积薄发;5.加快术语学专业人才培养。 相似文献
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John J. Sung 《Foundations of Science》2008,13(2):177-193
Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific
theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory
change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and
the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements
(“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure of
scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson
(In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis
but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches
to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory
change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments
bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment,
1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view.
Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and
mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such
as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual
integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are
used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in
a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of
science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics
publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991),
abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990).
The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly
and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution
is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially
based.
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John J. SungEmail: |
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认知和心智的边界——当代认知系统研究概观 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
传统认知主义不自觉地以为发生在头脑中的认知过程对整个认知任务的认知实现是充分的。然而,随着认知任务的难度和复杂性的增加,人们开始意识到认知任务的实现须依赖更广泛的系统条件;这使得系统性成为20世纪50年代以来认知研究的一个基本维度,并因此引发了关于心智和认知的本性及其边界的广泛的争论。 相似文献
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Jerzy Bobryk 《Foundations of Science》2002,7(4):481-495
Cognitive activity, which essentially consistsof the use of signs, does not only depend onthe internal (mental, or brain) processes. Thefirst part of the paper presents severalversions of the idea of the external andcultural organization of individual's mentalprocesses. The second part of the paperconsiders a future development of cognitivescience as a science of the extended andsocially constructed mind. KazimierzTwardowski's theory of intentionality and histheory of actions and products provide theconceptual framework of the undertaken analysis. 相似文献
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民间心理学是普通大众解释、预测行为的心理资源,代表着一种常识心理观。本文在考察取消主义和工具主义挑战民间心理学的基本观点和主要论证的基础上,对它们各自存在的问题进行了剖析,进而提出了重构心理概念图式的基本设想。 相似文献
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如何使认识论自然主义化?这个问题近年来引起了学术界的极的两条进路:奎因发展的激进途径和可靠主义提出的温和途径的困境分析,提出了一种融贯理论的自然主义认识论. 相似文献