The Heuristic Function of Mathematics in Physics and Astronomy

This paper considers the role of mathematics in the process of acquiring new knowledge in physics and astronomy. The defining of the notions of continuum and discreteness in mathematics and the natural sciences is examined. The basic forms of representing the heuristic function of mathematics at theoretical and empirical levels of knowledge are studied: deducing consequences from the axiomatic system of theory, the method of generating mathematical hypotheses, “pure” proofs for the existence of objects and processes, mathematical modelling, the formation of mathematics on the basis of internal mathematical principles and the mathematical theory of experiment.     

Mathematical,Philosophical and Semantic Considerations on Infinity (I): General Concepts

In the Reality we know, we cannot say if something is infinite whether we are doing Physics, Biology, Sociology or Economics. This means we have to be careful using this concept. Infinite structures do not exist in the physical world as far as we know. So what do mathematicians mean when they assert the existence of ω (the mathematical symbol for the set of all integers)? There is no universally accepted philosophy of mathematics but the most common belief is that mathematics touches on another worldly absolute truth. Many mathematicians believe that mathematics involves a special perception of an idealized world of absolute truth. This comes in part from the recognition that our knowledge of the physical world is imperfect and falls short of what we can apprehend with mathematical thinking. The objective of this paper is to present an epistemological rather than an historical vision of the mathematical concept of infinity that examines the dialectic between the actual and potential infinity.     

A Rational Belief: The Method of Discovery in the Complex Variable

The importance of mathematics in the context of the scientific and technological development of humanity is determined by the possibility of creating mathematical models of the objects studied under the different branches of Science and Technology. The arithmetisation process that took place during the nineteenth century consisted of the quest to discover a new mathematical reality in which the validity of logic would stand as something essential and central. Nevertheless, in contrast to this process, the development of mathematical analysis within a framework that largely involves intuition and geometry is a fact that cannot go unnoticed amongst the mathematics community, as we shall show in this paper through the research made by Bernhard Riemann on complex variables.     

On the Foundations of Constructive Mathematics – Especially in Relation to the Theory of Continuous Functions

We discuss the foundations of constructive mathematics, including recursive mathematics and intuitionism, in relation to classical mathematics. There are connections with the foundations of physics, due to the way in which the different branches of mathematics reflect reality. Many different axioms and their interrelationship are discussed. We show that there is a fundamental problem in BISH (Bishop’s school of constructive mathematics) with regard to its current definition of ‘continuous function’. This problem is closely related to the definition in BISH of ‘locally compact’. Possible approaches to this problem are discussed. Topology seems to be a key to understanding many issues. We offer several new simplifying axioms, which can form bridges between the various branches of constructive mathematics and classical mathematics (‘reuniting the antipodes’). We give a simplification of basic intuitionistic theory, especially with regard to so-called ‘bar induction’. We then plead for a limited number of axiomatic systems, which differentiate between the various branches of mathematics. Finally, in the appendix we offer BISH an elegant topological definition of ‘locally compact’, which unlike the current definition is equivalent to the usual classical and/or intuitionistic definition in classical and intuitionistic mathematics, respectively.     

Objects and Processes in Mathematical Practice

In this paper it is argued that the fundamental difference of the formal and the informal position in the philosophy of mathematics results from the collision of an object and a process centric perspective towards mathematics. This collision can be overcome by means of dialectical analysis, which shows that both perspectives essentially depend on each other. This is illustrated by the example of mathematical proof and its formal and informal nature. A short overview of the employed materialist dialectical approach is given that rationalises mathematical development as a process of model production. It aims at placing more emphasis on the application aspects of mathematical results. Moreover, it is shown how such production realises subjective capacities as well as objective conditions, where the latter are mediated by mathematical formalism. The approach is further sustained by Polanyi’s theory of problem solving and Stegmaier’s philosophy of orientation. In particular, the tool and application perspective illuminates which role computer-based proofs can play in mathematics.     

数学发现和论证的两种原型:古希腊与古中国

萨博论点认为希腊数学证明源于埃利亚学派,但没有涉及与之相关的社会文化原因.把视野扩大到社会文化背景,可以发现,古希腊重甲步兵的出现以及其社会地位的提高,创造了以对抗或竞赛为象征的民族精神,从而既摆脱了怀疑主义哲学的束缚,又使得批判思维统治社会成为可能,这才是埃利亚学派及其数学产生的社会原因.另一方面,结合中国传统社会的...     

The Surveyability of Long Proofs

The specific characteristics of mathematical argumentation all depend on the centrality that writing has in the practice of mathematics, but blindness to this fact is near universal. What follows concerns just one of those characteristics, justification by proof. There is a prevalent view that long proofs pose a problem for the thesis that mathematical knowledge is justified by proof. I argue that there is no such problem: in fact, virtually all the justifications of mathematical knowledge are ‘long proofs’, but because these real justifications are distributed in the written archive of mathematics, proofs remain surveyable, hence good.     

What is Applied Mathematics?

A number of issues connected with the nature of applied mathematics are discussed. Among the claims are these: mathematics "hooks onto" the world by providing models or representations, not by describing the world; classic platonism is to be preferred to structuralism; and several issues in the philosophy of science (reality of spacetime, the quantum state) are intimately connected to the nature of applied mathematics.     

论数学中的虚构主义

数学虚构主义是"数学实体不存在、数学中不存在真理、数学在世界的说明和科学事业中可有可无"的一种典型的当代数学反实在论的解释。通过对数学虚构主义的批判性分析,得出"数学虚构主义的反实在论规划整体上并不成功","数学在世界的说明和科学中是至关重要,而非可有可无"、"数学实体确实不存在"和"数学中存在真理,但其本质需进一步研究"的结论。     

Data Analysis: Models or Techniques?

In this commentary to Napoletani et al. (Found Sci 16:1–20, 2011), we argue that the approach the authors adopt suggests that neural nets are mathematical techniques rather than models of cognitive processing, that the general approach dates as far back as Ptolemy, and that applied mathematics is more than simply applying results from pure mathematics.     

数学中的经验:认识论上的紧张视角

就形式数学来说,它是脱离经验,在内涵上是一种社会建构。计算机技术提高了人们的计算能力,对数学的这一社会建构平添了紧张,加强了“作为计算的数学”与“作为证明的数学”之间的不平衡性。在历史上,相似的认识论上的争论表现在计算或实践的印度数学与精神或形式的西方数学之间。我们认为,认识论上的紧张,可通过以下方式得以消解:认同数学是基于经验、可错的观点,并据此引领数学课程标准的基本理念。     

清末数学教育对中国数学家的职业化影响

数学教育是决定数学研究能否持续性发展的重要因素，对数学的专业化及数学家的职业化都起着举足轻重的作用。     

中古算书中的田地面积算法与土地制度——以《五曹算经》"田曹"卷为中心的考察

关注了前人少有深入探究的一些中古实用算书的特点和相关社会制度背景.通过对有关社会经济史料和算书中的田地面积算题进行纵向和横向的比较与细密的分析,指出<五曹算经>中"田曹"的面积计算法具有求多而不求精的特点,与北朝田制特别是均田制下出现频繁测量、分划田地的急切需要有着密切的关系,<敦煌算书>、<夏侯阳算经>等书中田地面积计算法的特点,不仅与均田制的盛衰,而且与整个社会的文化和数学的发展有关,其中后者还带有编者讲求学理和精简的意图.社会因素不仅可以影响到数学讨论的对象,还可以影响到数学知识的本身.     

Top-Down and Bottom-Up Philosophy of Mathematics

The philosophy of mathematics of the last few decades is commonly distinguished into mainstream and maverick, to which a ‘third way’ has been recently added, the philosophy of mathematical practice. In this paper the limitations of these trends in the philosophy of mathematics are pointed out, and it is argued that they are due to the fact that all of them are based on a top-down approach, that is, an approach which explains the nature of mathematics in terms of some general unproven assumption. As an alternative, a bottom-up approach is proposed, which explains the nature of mathematics in terms of the activity of real individuals and interactions between them. This involves distinguishing between mathematics as a discipline and the mathematics embodied in organisms as a result of biological evolution, which however, while being distinguished, are not opposed. Moreover, it requires a view of mathematical proof, mathematical definition and mathematical objects which is alternative to the top-down approach.     

A Physical Approach to the Construction of Cognition and to Cognitive Evolution

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.(e.g., the law of energy conservation can bederived from the homogeneity of time and bythis depends on our mental time metricgenerator). So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously (for ex.: most scientistssee cognitive evolution converging towards adefinitive world picture, whereas organicevolution obviously has no specific focus (the`pride of creation').     

Models in Biology and Physics: What’s the Difference?

In Making Sense of Life, Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion.     

Systems and Beliefs

Systems thinking provides insights into how ideas interact and change, and constructivism is an example of this type of systemic approach. In the 1970s constructivism emphasised the development of mathematical and scientific ideas in children. Recently constructivist ideas are applied much more generally. Here I use this approach to consider beliefs and their role in conflicts and the conditions needed for reconciliation. If we look at Reality in terms of how we construct it as a human cognitive process, we recognise two things. First, that we cannot go beyond our senses and thoughts to what exists independently of us, and second, if we construct what we know we have to take responsibility for this. This inevitably focuses our thinking on the relation we have with the physical and social world, we are a part of the universe rather than apart from it. This paper argues that accepting and understanding these limits of human knowing together with our interconnectedness provide opportunities to understand conflicting positions. To resolve conflict, people with opposing viewpoints have to be prepared to understand each other. That is a challenge because our own reality plays a vital role in our lives, for everything from personal survival to social support.     

Towards a Darwinian Approach to Mathematics

In the past decades, recent paradigm shifts in ethology, psychology, and the social sciences have given rise to various new disciplines like cognitive ethology and evolutionary psychology. These disciplines use concepts and theories of evolutionary biology to understand and explain the design, function and origin of the brain. I shall argue that there are several good reasons why this approach could also apply to human mathematical abilities. I will review evidence from various disciplines (cognitive ethology, cognitive psychology, cognitive archaeology and neuropsychology) that suggests that the human capacity for mathematics is a category-specific domain of knowledge, hard-wired in the brain, which can be explained as the result of natural selection.