Incredulity towards Lyotard: a critique of a postmodernist account of science and knowledge

Philosophers of science have paid little attention, positive or negative, to Lyotard’s book The postmodern condition, even though it has been popular in other fields. We set out some of the reasons for this neglect. Lyotard thought that sciences could be justified by non-scientific narratives (a position he later abandoned). We show why this is unacceptable, and why many of Lyotard’s characterisations of science are either implausible or are narrowly positivist. One of Lyotard’s themes is that the nature of knowledge has changed and thereby so has society itself. However much of what Lyotard says muddles epistemological matters about the definition of ‘knowledge’ with sociological claims about how information circulates in modern society. We distinguish two kinds of legitimation of science: epistemic and socio-political. In proclaiming ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ Lyotard has nothing to say about how epistemic and methodological principles are to be justified (legitimated). He also gives a bad argument as to why there can be no epistemic legitimation, which is based on an act/content confusion, and a confusion between making an agreement and the content of what is agreed to. As for socio-political legitimation, Lyotard’s discussion remains at the abstract level of science as a whole rather than at the level of the particular applications of sciences. Moreover his positive points can be accepted without taking on board any of his postmodernist account of science. Finally we argue that Lyotard’s account of paralogy, which is meant to provide a ‘postmodern’ style of justification, is a failure.     

The abundant world: Paul Feyerabend's metaphysics of science

The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend's metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend's late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic claims about the epistemic and cultural authority of science, claims incompatible with situating science properly in democratic societies. I show how Feyerabend's metaphysical view, which I call “the abundant world” or “abundant realism,” constitute a sophisticated and challenging form of ontological pluralism that makes interesting connections with contemporary philosophy of science and issues of the political and policy role of science in a democratic society.     

A tale of three theories: Feyerabend and Popper on progress and the aim of science

In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: (i) the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); (ii) the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations (1963); (iii) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1965) and defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend's changing attitude towards falsificationism—which he often advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980s—must be explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend's very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also Popper's changing account of progress.     

How to make a university history of science museum: Lessons from Leeds

The historic scientific collections of well-established University Museums—the Whipple at Cambridge and the Museum of the History of Science at Oxford, for example—have long served in university teaching and as objects of research for historians. But what is involved in starting such a museum from scratch? This paper offers some reflections based on recent experiences at the University of Leeds. In a relatively short period, the Leeds project has grown from a small volunteer initiative, aimed at salvaging disparate scientific collections from all over the campus, to a centrally supported and long-term scheme to provide collections care, exhibitions, and public events, as well as material for teaching and research within history and philosophy of science. Recent work undertaken on a range of Leeds objects and collections, including a camera reportedly used to take the first X-ray diffraction photographs of DNA in the 1930s and the Mark 1 prototype of the MONIAC (Monetary National Income Automatic Computer), built and designed at Leeds in 1949 to model the flow of money through the economy, highlights the national and international significance of the University’s scientific heritage as well as the project’s ambition of providing students with on-going collections care responsibilities and object-research experience. Sketching possible futures for the Leeds project, the paper considers challenges confronting the heritage sector more broadly, and how those involved with historic scientific collections can make use of new opportunities for teaching, research, and public engagement.     

Aristotle, Copernicus, Bruno: centrality, the principle of movement and the extension of the Universe

This paper¹ studies the different conceptions of both centrality and the principle or starting point of motion in the Universe held by Aristotle and later on by Copernicanism until Kepler and Bruno. According to Aristotle, the true centre of the Universe is the sphere of the fixed stars. This is also the starting point of motion. From this point of view, the diurnal motion is the fundamental one. Our analysis gives pride of place to De caelo II, 10, a chapter of Aristotle’s text which curiously allows an ‘Alpetragian’ reading of the transmission of motion.In Copernicus and the Copernicans, natural centrality is identified with the geometrical centre and, therefore, the Sun is acknowledged as the body through which the Deity acts on the world and it also plays the role of the principle and starting point of cosmic motion. This motion, however, is no longer diurnal motion, but the annual periodical motion of the planets. Within this context, we pose the question of to what extent it is possible to think that, before Kepler, there is a tacit attribution of a dynamic or motive role to the Sun by Copernicus, Rheticus, and Digges.For Bruno, since the Universe is infinite and homogeneous and the relationship of the Deity with it is one of indifferent presence everywhere, the Universe has no absolute centre, for any point is a centre. By the same token, there is no place that enjoys the prerogative of being—as being the seat of God—the motionless principle and starting point of motion.     

On the Virtues and Disadvantage of Quantification for Democratic Life

In this paper, a response to Ed Levy's discussion of medical quantification, I reflect on the ambitions of my book Trust in Numbers. I explore the idealized method of randomized clinical trials, revealed in his case study, as a social technology, one endowed with a persuasive scientific rationale but shaped also by political and social demands. The scholarly study of quantification requires not a choice between blind admiration and sweeping rejection, but a nuanced understanding. This should take into account not only the cognitive aspects of science, but also its role in relation to institutions and customs, examined with some specificity. While history is narrowed and distorted when it is written to support a position on some present issue, historical and social studies of science should at least provide tools of criticism. For this, the historian of science must look beyond narrow communities of specialists, and seek a wider perspective on science as an administrative tool and a bearer of cultural and political values.     

Nuclear science and technology in the Malaysian context: Three phases of technoscientific knowledge transfer (ETTLG)

This essay considers the development of the nuclear science programme in Malaysia from a transnational perspective by examining the interactions between state agents and other external nuclear-knowledge/technology related actors and agents. Going beyond the model of knowledge diffusion that brings together concerns articulated in Harris’s (2011) geographies of long distance knowledge and Reinhardt's (2011) role of the expert in knowledge transfer, the proposed three-phase model of knowledge transfer theorises the pathways undertaken by a late-blooming participant of modern science and technology as the latter moves from epistemic dependency to increasing independence despite the hurdles encountered, and the underdevelopment of many areas of its technoscientific economy. The model considers tensions stemming from the pressures of expediency for meeting national developmental goals on the one side, and the call to support the objectives of basic science on the other. The three phases of the model are epistemic transition, epistemic transplantation and localisation, and epistemic generation (ETTLG). As additional support for the proposed model, three arguments are proffered as deeper explanations of the epistemic goal by using Malaysia as a case study: knowledge transfer for political legitimization, knowledge transfer for countering agnotology, and knowledge transfer for social engineering and science diplomacy.     

History and scientific practice in the construction of an adequate philosophy of science: revisiting a Whewell/Mill debate

William Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science which suggested that Mill’s views were not properly informed by the history of science or by adequate reflection on scientific practices. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian criticism of Mill’s views by assessing Mill’s account of Michael Faraday’s discovery of electrical induction. The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill’s reconstruction is an inadequate reconstruction of this historical episode and the scientific practices Faraday employed. But a study of Faraday’s research also raises some questions about Whewell’s characterization of this discovery. Thus, this example provides an opportunity to reconsider the debate between Whewell and Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an adequate philosophy of scientific methodology.     

How not to integrate the history and philosophy of science: a reply to Chalmers

Alan Chalmers uses Robert Boyle’s mechanical philosophy as an example of the irrelevance of ‘philosophy’ to ‘science’ and criticizes my 2006 book Atoms and alchemy for overemphasizing Boyle’s successes. The present paper responds as follows: first, it argues that Chalmers employs an overly simplistic methodology insensitive to the distinction between historical and philosophical claims; second, it shows that the central theses of Atoms and alchemy are untouched by Chalmers’s criticisms; and third, it uses Boyle’s analysis of subordinate causes and his debate with Henry More in the 1670s to demonstrate the inadequacy of Chalmers’s construal of the mechanical philosophy.     

The history of science as the progress of the human spirit: The historiography of astronomy in the eighteenth century

In the eighteenth century, the historiography of astronomy was part of a wider discussion concerning the history of the human spirit. The concept of the human spirit was very popular among Enlightenment authors because it gave the history of human knowledge continuity, unity and meaning. Using this concept, scientists and historians of science such as Montucla, Lalande, Bailly and Laplace could present the history of astronomy in terms of a progress towards contemporary science that was slow and could be interrupted at times, but was still constant, regular, and necessary. In my paper I intend to explain how the originally philosophical concept of the human spirit was transferred to the history of astronomy. I also introduce the basic principles to which the development of the spirit is subject in astronomy, according to historians of astronomy. The third part of the paper describes how historians of astronomy took into account the effect of social and natural factors on the history of astronomy.     

Social exclusion in academia through biases in methodological quality evaluation: On the situation of women in science and philosophy

Empirical studies show that academia is socially exclusive. I argue that this social exclusion works, at least partly, through the systematic methodological disqualification of contributions from members of underrepresented social groups. As methodological quality criteria are underdetermined their interpretation and weighting can be biased with relation to gender, race, social background, etc. Such biased quality evaluation can take place on a local or global level. The current situation of women in academic philosophy illuminates this. I conclude that only mechanical solutions can effectively change the situation.     

日本学术振兴会(JSPS)科学基金资助机制与战略分析

简要概述了日本的科学基金情况,重点分析了日本学术振兴会（JSPS）及其管理的科学基金。日本学术振兴会（JSPS）相当于日本的国家科学基金会,其负责管理的科学研究费补助金是日本政府出资的科学研究基金中资助金额最大、资助范围最广、资助项目数量最多的竞争性科学基金。其对基础研究的资助政策、方向遴选、评审程序、经费分配、管理机制等对其它国家的基础研究政府资助机构具有借鉴和示范意义。介绍了科学研究费补助金资助的研究类型和申请程序,分析了近10年科学研究费补助金的预算及年增长率、近12年科学研究费补助金的项目资助率情况、近5年科学研究费补助金的领域分配与资助情况、2005年科学研究费补助金资助情况等。对科学研究费补助金的基金项目资助战略予以全面分析,对我国相关部门的管理工作有重要参考价值和借鉴意义。     

日本学术振兴会(JSPS)人才培养机制及其学科发展的平衡性

简要介绍了日本学术振兴会（JSPS）在国家科技政策中的重要作用.介绍了JSPS特别研究人员、海外研究人员和JSPS奖三种人才培养机制的人才的选拔方法及其学科分布特点.并基于经费投入比与论文产出比分析了基础研究中的学科发展平衡问题.日本已经认识到了学科发展的不平衡性,并采取措施促进学科的平衡发展.     

Analogical reflection as a source for the science of life: Kant and the possibility of the biological sciences

In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to his conception of living beings and to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.