Copernicus and Fracastoro: the dedicatory letters to Pope Paul III, the history of astronomy, and the quest for patronage

Copernicus’s De revolutionibus (1543) and Girolamo Fracastoro’s Homocentrica (1538) were both addressed to Pope Paul III (1534-1549). Their dedicatory letters represent a rhetorical exercise in advocating an astronomical reform and an attempt to obtain the papal favour. Following on from studies carried out by Westman (1990) and Barker & Goldstein (2003), this paper deals with cultural, intellectual and scientific motives of both texts, and aims at underlining possible relations between them, such as that Copernicus knew of Fracastoro’s Homocentrica, and that at least part of the rhetorical strategy laid out in De revolutionibus’s dedicatory letter can be read as a sophisticated response to Fracastoro’s arguments.     

Towards a science of the individual: the Aristotelian search for scientific knowledge of individual entities

This article seeks to take a step towards recognizing that science can deal with the concrete and individual as well as the universal. I shall concentrate on some of Aristotle’s texts, as there is a long tradition going back to Aristotle, according to which science deals only with the universal, although his work also contains texts of a very different tenor. He tries to improve the process of definition as an attempt to bring science closer to the concrete, but ends up realizing that there are some unreachable limits. There is, however, a second Aristotelian approach to the problem in Metaphysica M 10, a passage which takes scientific rapprochement to the individual further by introducing a distinction between science in potential and science in act. The former is universal, but the latter deals with individual substances and processes. Aristotle himself acknowledges here that in one sense science is universal and in another it is not, a position that raises important ontological and epistemological problems. Some suggestions are also offered concerning the kind of truth applicable to science in act, that is, practical truth.     

Science, truth and history, part II. Metaphysical bolt-holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?

Historians of science have frequently sought to exclude modern scientific knowledge from their narratives. Part I of this paper, published in the previous issue, cautioned against seeing more than a literary preference at work here. In particular, it was argued—contra advocates of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK)—that a commitment to epistemological relativism should not be seen as having straightforward historiographical consequences. Part II considers further SSK-inspired attempts to entangle the currently fashionable historiography with particular positions in the philosophy of science. None, I argue, is promising. David Bloor’s proposed alliance with scientific realism relies upon a mistaken view of contrastive explanation; Andrew Pickering’s appeal to instrumentalism is persuasive for particle physics but much less so for science as a whole; and Bruno Latour’s home-grown metaphysics is so bizarre that its compatibility with SSK is, if anything, a further blow to the latter’s plausibility.     

Symmetry, asymmetry, and the real possibility of radical change: reply to Kochan

In his critique of my book Heidegger and Marcuse, Jeff Kochan (2006) asserts that I am committed to the possibility of private knowledge, transcendent truths, and individualism. In this reply I argue that he has misinterpreted my analysis of the Challenger disaster and Marcuse’s work. Because I do not dismiss Roger Boisjoly’s doubts about the Challenger launch, Kochan believes that I have abandoned a social concept of knowledge for a reliance on the private knowledge of a single individual. In fact, I consider Boisjoly’s observations just as social, if not as scientific, as the results of rigorous scientific study. Kochan’s reliance on a principle of symmetry derived from science studies to explain such politically charged technological controversies tends to mask the role of power and ideology in social life. Kochan interprets Marcuse as a failed Heideggerian who regresses from Heidegger’s social conception of human being to traditional individualism. I am accused of sharing this view. This interpretation overlooks the importance of the Hegelian–Marxist category of ‘real possibility’ in Marcuse’s work and so mistakes his critique of conformist politics for individualist romanticism. Marcuse always attempted to ground radical opposition in a community of struggle without abandoning the heritage of a long critical tradition. This view I willingly share.     

Chance,determinism and the classical theory of probability

This paper situates the metaphysical antinomy between chance and determinism in the historical context of some of the earliest developments in the mathematical theory of probability. Since Hacking's seminal work on the subject, it has been a widely held view that the classical theorists of probability were guilty of an unwitting equivocation between a subjective, or epistemic, interpretation of probability, on the one hand, and an objective, or statistical, interpretation, on the other. While there is some truth to this account, I argue that the tension at the heart of the classical theory of probability is not best understood in terms of the duality between subjective and objective interpretations of probability. Rather, the apparent paradox of chance and determinism, when viewed through the lens of the classical theory of probability, manifests itself in a much deeper ambivalence on the part of the classical probabilists as to the rational commensurability of causal and probabilistic reasoning.     

New theories for new instruments: Fabrizio Mordente's proportional compass and the genesis of Giordano Bruno's atomist geometry

The aim of this article is to shed light on an understudied aspect of Giordano Bruno's intellectual biography, namely, his career as a mathematical practitioner. Early interpreters, especially, have criticized Bruno's mathematics for being “outdated” or too “concrete”. However, thanks to developments in the study of early modern mathematics and the rediscovery of Bruno's first mathematical writings (four dialogues on Fabrizio's Mordente proportional compass), we are in a position to better understand Bruno's mathematics. In particular, this article aims to reopen the question of whether Bruno anticipated the concept of infinitesimal quantity. It does so by providing an analysis of the dialogues on Mordente's compass and of the historical circumstances under which those dialogues were written.     

How to tell causes from effects: Kant’s causal theory of time and modern approaches

I attempt a reconstruction of Kant’s version of the causal theory of time that makes it appear coherent. Two problems are at issue. The first concerns Kant’s reference to reciprocal causal influence for characterizing simultaneity. This approach is criticized by pointing out that Kant’s procedure involves simultaneous counterdirected processes—which seems to run into circularity. The problem can be defused by drawing on instantaneous processes such as the propagation of gravitation in Newtonian mechanics. Another charge of circularity against Kant’s causal theory was leveled by Schopenhauer. His objection was that Kant’s approach is invalidated by the failure to deliver non-temporal criteria for distinguishing between causes and effects. I try to show that the modern causal account has made important progress toward a successful resolution of this difficulty. The fork asymmetry, as based on Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, provides a means for the distinction between cause and effect that is not based on temporal order (if some preconditions are realized).     

On geometric objects,the non-existence of a gravitational stress-energy tensor,and the uniqueness of the Einstein field equation

The question of the existence of gravitational stress-energy in general relativity has exercised investigators in the field since the inception of the theory. Folklore has it that no adequate definition of a localized gravitational stress-energetic quantity can be given. Most arguments to that effect invoke one version or another of the Principle of Equivalence. I argue that not only are such arguments of necessity vague and hand-waving but, worse, are beside the point and do not address the heart of the issue. Based on a novel analysis of what it may mean for one tensor to depend in the proper way on another, which, en passant, provides a precise characterization of the idea of a “geometric object”, I prove that, under certain natural conditions, there can be no tensor whose interpretation could be that it represents gravitational stress-energy in general relativity. It follows that gravitational energy, such as it is in general relativity, is necessarily non-local. Along the way, I prove a result of some interest in own right about the structure of the associated jet bundles of the bundle of Lorentz metrics over spacetime. I conclude by showing that my results also imply that, under a few natural conditions, the Einstein field equation is the unique equation relating gravitational phenomena to spatiotemporal structure, and discuss how this relates to the non-localizability of gravitational stress-energy. The main theorem proven underlying all the arguments is considerably stronger than the standard result in the literature used for the same purposes (Lovelock's theorem of 1972): it holds in all dimensions (not only in four); it does not require an assumption about the differential order of the desired concomitant of the metric; and it has a more natural physical interpretation.     

French historical epistemology: Discourse,concepts, and the norms of rationality

In recent years, analytic philosophers have begun to recognize the value of the French school of historical epistemology (as embodied by figures such as Jean Cavaillès, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Michel Foucault) for contemporary debates in the history and philosophy of science. This tradition, which some characterize as a ‘French’ approach to the philosophy of science, however, remains largely un-read by mainstream philosophers of science. This article offers an interpretation of this tradition, highlighting what the author takes to be its two central features: (i) its claim that scientific discourse is the object of epistemology and (ii) its claim that scientific concepts are the building blocks of scientific discourse.     

Making sense of Day 1 of the Two New Sciences: Galileo’s Aristotelian-inspired agenda and his Jesuit readers

This study proposes an explanation for the choice of topics Galileo addressed in Day 1 of his 1638 Two New Sciences, a section of the work which has long puzzled historians of science. I argue that Galileo’s agenda in Day 1, that is the topics he discusses and the questions he poses, was shaped by contemporary teaching commentaries on Books 3 through 8 of Aristotle’s Physics. Building on the insights and approach of theorists of reader reception, I confirm this interpretation by examining the response of professors of natural philosophy at the Jesuit Collegio Romano to Galileo’s text.     

Scepticism,relativism, and the structure of epistemic frameworks

This paper has four aims: first, to outline the role of the sceptical problem of the criterion in the principal argument for epistemic relativism; second, to establish that methodist and particularist responses to the problem of the criterion do not, by themselves, constitute successful strategies for resisting epistemic relativism; third, to argue that a more fruitful strategy is to attempt to evaluate epistemic frameworks on the basis of the epistemic resources that they have in common; and finally, to make the case that finding this common ground will necessarily involve determining how it is that a framework’s constituent epistemic methods depend on one another for not only their warrant, but for their application.     

The geometry of knowledge: Lewis, Becker, Carnap and the formalization of philosophy in the 1920s

On an ordinary view of the relation of philosophy of science to science, science serves only as a topic for philosophical reflection, reflection that proceeds by its own methods and according to its own standards. This ordinary view suggests a way of writing a global history of philosophy of science that finds substantially the same philosophical projects being pursued across widely divergent scientific eras. While not denying that this view is of some use regarding certain themes of and particular time periods, this essay argues that much of the epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century in a variety of projects (neo-Kantianism, logical empiricism, pragmatism, phenomenology) looked to the then current context of the exact sciences, especially geometry and physics, not merely for its topics but also for its conceptual resources and technical tools. This suggests a more variable project of philosophy of science, a deeper connection between early twentieth-century philosophy of science and its contemporary science, and a more interesting and richer history of philosophy of science than is ordinarily offered.     

A tale of three theories: Feyerabend and Popper on progress and the aim of science

In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: (i) the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); (ii) the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations (1963); (iii) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1965) and defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend's changing attitude towards falsificationism—which he often advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980s—must be explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend's very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also Popper's changing account of progress.     

String theory,Einstein, and the identity of physics: Theory assessment in absence of the empirical

String theorists are certain that they are practicing physicists. Yet, some of their recent critics deny this. This paper argues that this conflict is really about who holds authority in making rational judgment in theoretical physics. At bottom, the conflict centers on the question: who is a proper physicist? To illustrate and understand the differing opinions about proper practice and identity, we discuss different appreciations of epistemic virtues and explanation among string theorists and their critics, and how these have been sourced in accounts of Einstein's biography. Just as Einstein is claimed by both sides, historiography offers examples of both successful and unsuccessful non-empirical science. History of science also teaches that times of conflict are often times of innovation, in which novel scholarly identities may come into being. At the same time, since the contributions of Thomas Kuhn historians have developed a critical attitude towards formal attempts and methodological recipes for epistemic demarcation and justification of scientific practice. These are now, however, being considered in the debate on non-empirical physics.     

Packaging Radium,Selling Science: Boxes,Bottles and Other Mundane Things in the World of Science

This article discusses the intersection of science and culture in the marketplace and explores the ways in which radium quack and medicinal products were packaged and labelled in the early twentieth century US. Although there is an interesting growing body of literature by art historians on package design, historians of science and medicine have paid little to no attention to the ways scientific and medical objects that were turned into commodities were packaged and commercialized. Thinking about packages not as mere containers but as multifunctional tools adds to historical accounts of science as a sociocultural enterprise and reminds us that science has always been part of consumer culture. This paper suggests that far from being receptacles that preserve their content and facilitate their transportation, bottles and boxes that contained radium products functioned as commercial and epistemic devices. It was the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act that enforced such functions. Packages worked as commercial devices in the sense that they were used to boost sales. In addition, ‘epistemic’ points to the fact that the package is an artefact that ascribes meaning to and shapes its content while at the same time working as a device for distinguishing between patent and orthodox medicines.     

In vitro effects of methionine-enkephalin,somatostatin and insulin on cultured gonadal cells of the snailHelix aspersa

Isolated snail gonadal cells were cultured in the presence of synthetic neuropeptides in order to determine the subsequent effect of these substances on gonadal synthetic activities. Gonadal cells were incubated for 24 h in concentrations of methionine-enkephalin, somatostatin and insulin ranging from 10^–4 M to 10^–9 M, in medium 199 supplemented with 6% Ultroser G. Synthesis of DNA and protein by the cultured cells were simultaneously estimated by measuring incorporation of³H thymidine and³⁵S methionine. The rate of labelled precursor incorporation was measured using the liquid scintillation technique. All substances tested exerted a dose-dependent effect. The synthetic activity of the cultured cells was highest when the concentration of the peptides added to the medium approximated the physiological levels. Methionine-enkephalin, somatostatin and insulin at 2×10^–8 M significantly increased³H thymidine incorporation, by 62%, 69% and 69% respectively, and protein synthesis by 42%, 57% and 57%, respectively. In the case of juvenile gonadal cultured cells, a similar increase in³H and³⁵S incorporation was registered for a 10^–7 M peptide concentration. Both lower and higher peptide concentrations inhibited³H thymidine and³⁵S methionine incorporation. Pharmacological studies suggest the existence of methionine-enkephalin and somatostatin-like receptors on snail gonadal cells. These results indicate that our gonadal cell culture model provides a useful tool for the study of the neuroendocrinological control of the activity of snail gonadal cells.     

Limited proteolysis of lactate dehydrogenase from procine heart with trypsin: Characterization and reactivation of the fragments

Summary The ternary complex formed by native lactate dehydrogenase (LDH) from porcine heart, NAD⁺ and sulfite, was digested with trypsin over a period of 12–16 h³. After removal of the ligands and residual native lactate dehydrogenase by ion exchange chromatography dimers were obtained which were almost inactive. The dimers were lacking a hexapeptide at the N-terminus; however, the secondary structure was the same as that of native lactate dehydrogenase. The circular dichroism spectra showed a dependence on temperature which suggested an equilibrium of two different structural states.The reaction of antibodies against native porcine heart LDH with the dimers restored the catalytic activity, and subsequently the dimers behaved similarly to the native enzyme. Addition of 1 M phosphate or NAD-sulfite to the dimers restored 80–90% of the catalytic activity. It could be demonstrated that the behaviour of the reactivated dimers, in contrast to that of the inactive dimers, was similar to the behaviour of native lactate dehydrogenase. For instance, ultracentrifugal analysis showed that dimers reactivated with NAD–SO₃ ^– were associated to give tetramers.The reaction of antibodies against native LDH with the dimers reactivated with NAD–SO ₃ ^– demonstrated that the native LDH and the dimers have the same surface determinants.     

Visual legitimisation of astronomy in the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries: Atlas, Hercules and Tycho’s nose

Images of the virtuous hero Hercules and the crowned King Atlas offered considerable potential for legitimising the new astronomy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The accomplishments of Hercules, a seeker after virtue, with his exceptional learning, his role as disseminator of knowledge, his significance as an example of ideal manhood and, in addition to all, his achievement of immortality, invited comparison with the endeavours of astronomers. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hercules and Atlas appear as the spiritual authorities of the discipline, and each was called into use to symbolise both the old and the new astronomy. Both figures embodied qualities that were decisive in struggles for patronage: they were politicised, especially Hercules, and used to legitimise claims to power.     

Nuclear science and technology in the Malaysian context: Three phases of technoscientific knowledge transfer (ETTLG)

This essay considers the development of the nuclear science programme in Malaysia from a transnational perspective by examining the interactions between state agents and other external nuclear-knowledge/technology related actors and agents. Going beyond the model of knowledge diffusion that brings together concerns articulated in Harris’s (2011) geographies of long distance knowledge and Reinhardt's (2011) role of the expert in knowledge transfer, the proposed three-phase model of knowledge transfer theorises the pathways undertaken by a late-blooming participant of modern science and technology as the latter moves from epistemic dependency to increasing independence despite the hurdles encountered, and the underdevelopment of many areas of its technoscientific economy. The model considers tensions stemming from the pressures of expediency for meeting national developmental goals on the one side, and the call to support the objectives of basic science on the other. The three phases of the model are epistemic transition, epistemic transplantation and localisation, and epistemic generation (ETTLG). As additional support for the proposed model, three arguments are proffered as deeper explanations of the epistemic goal by using Malaysia as a case study: knowledge transfer for political legitimization, knowledge transfer for countering agnotology, and knowledge transfer for social engineering and science diplomacy.