The bounded heavens: defining the limits of astrological practice in the Iberian indices

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the rules for the expurgation of texts of astrology in the Iberian Indices of forbidden books. It addresses the prohibitions put forward in Rule IX of the Index of Trent and the bull Coeli et terrae of Sixtus V, and studies its impact on the rules and their interpretation in the Spanish and Portuguese Indices, in particular, those published in the first decades of the seventeenth century: the Spanish Index librorum prohibitorum et expurgatorum of 1612 and the Portuguese Index auctorum damnatae memoriae of 1624. It shows how these indices offer a more meticulous examination of the prohibitions providing not only more detail regarding the different practices of astrology, but also explicitly accept the doctrine of inclinations of Thomas Aquinas as a central rule to deal with astrological judgments on human behaviour. It also highlights some specific details of the practice of censorship of astrological books by examining case studies of censored Portuguese and Spanish astrological publications. These provide new dimensions and highlight significant differences between the theoretical rules, practical guidelines, and actual restriction of astrological content.     

Reconstructing Thomist astrology: Robert Bellarmine and the papal bull Coeli et terrae*

ABSTRACT

Historians have portrayed the papal bull Coeli et terrae (1586) as a significant turning point in the history of the Catholic Church’s censorship of astrology. They argue that this bull was intended to prohibit the idea that the stars could naturally incline humans towards future actions, but also had the effect of preventing the discussion of other forms of natural astrology including those useful to medicine, agriculture, and navigation. The bull, therefore, threatened to overturn principles established by Thomas Aquinas, which not only justified long-standing astrological practices, but also informed the Roman Inquisition’s attitude towards this art. The promulgation of the bull has been attributed to the ‘rigour’ of the incumbent pope, Sixtus V. In this article I revise our understanding of this bull in two ways. First, I reconsider the Inquisition’s attitude towards astrology in the mid-sixteenth century, arguing that its members promoted a limited form of Thomist astrology that did not permit the doctrine of inclination. Second, using Robert Bellarmine’s unpublished lectures discussing Aquinas’s views of astrology, I suggest that this attitude was common during the sixteenth century, and may have been caused by the crisis of Renaissance astrology precipitated by the work of Giovanni Pico.     

A consideration of Babylonian astronomy within the historiography of science

This paper traces the reception of Babylonian astronomy into the history of science, beginning in early to mid twentieth century when cuneiform astronomical sources became available to the scholarly public. The dominant positivism in philosophy of science of this time influenced criteria employed in defining and demarcating science by historians, resulting in a persistently negative assessment of the nature of knowledge evidenced in cuneiform sources. Ancient Near Eastern astronomy (and astrology) was deemed pre- or non-scientific, and even taken to reflect a stage in the evolution of thought before the emergence of science (in ancient Greece). Two principal objections are examined: first, that the Near East produced merely practical as opposed to theoretical knowledge and, second, that astronomy was in the service of astrology and religion. As the notion of a universal scientific method has been dismantled by post-positivists and constructivists of the second half of the twentieth century, an interest in varieties of intellectual and cultural contexts for science has provided a new ground for the re-consideration of Babylonian astronomical texts as science developed here.     

The Newton letters (Vols. I and II)

The metaphysical commitment to the circle as the essential element in the analysis of celestial motion has long been recognized as the hallmark of classical astronomy. What has not always been clear, however, is that the circle continued to serve Kepler as a central element in his astronomy after the discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars. Moreover, the circle also functioned for Kepler in geometry to select the basic polygons, in music to select the basic harmonies, and in astrology to select the basic aspects. His basic set of polygons consisted of those figures that could be constructed using only a compass and a rule; the set of fundamental harmonies consisted of the consonances of the just intonation; and the traditional set of astrological aspects were enlarged by Kepler to include three new aspects in order to make the astrological set consistent with geometry and music. And as the circle served to unify these three areas, so also did it serve to supply the fundamental answers to astronomical problems well after the discovery of his new astronomy—a topic to be discussed in Part II of this paper.     

Astrology

As a divinatory practice, astrology is without equal in both its colorful history and modern day popularity. Astrology has grown, over thousands of years, into a huge and ornate superstructure that lacks a central design. Although astrology has been dimly veiled by its occult mystique for centuries, the light of modern day inquiry has shown its substance to be mostly illusionary and revealed its foundation to be the shakiest possible: that of self-justification and anecdotal evidence. Despite the many claims of its practitioners and followers, extensive investigation has revealed astrology to be a great teetering monument to human gullibility.     

Laws of nature and natural laws

The relationship between conceptions of law and conceptions of nature is a complex one, and proceeds on what appear to be two distinct fronts. On the one hand, we frequently talk of nature as being lawlike or as obeying laws. On the other hand there are schools of philosophy that seek to justify ethics generally, or legal theory specifically, in conceptions of nature. Questions about the historical origins and development of claims that nature is lawlike are generally treated as entirely distinct from the development of ethical natural law theories. By looking at the many intersections of law and nature in antiquity, this paper shows that such a sharp distinction is overly simplistic, and often relies crucially on the imposition of an artificial and anachronistic suppression of the role of gods or divinity in the worlds of ancient natural philosophy. Furthermore, by tightening up the terms of the debate, we see that the common claim that a conception of ‘laws of nature’ only emerges in the Scientific Revolution is built on a superficial reading of the ancient evidence.     

Structures and strategies in ancient Greek and Roman technical writing: An Introduction

Most of our knowledge of Greek and Roman scientific practice and its place in ancient culture is derived from our study of ancient texts. In the last few decades, this written evidence—ancient technical or specialist literature—has begun to be studied using tools of literary analysis to help answer questions about, for instance, how these works were composed, their authors’ intentions and the expectations of their readers.This introduction to Structures and strategies in ancient Greek and Roman technical writing provides an overview of recent scholarship in the area, and the difficulty in pinning down what ‘technical/specialist literature’ might mean in an ancient context, since Greek and Roman authors communicated scientific knowledge using a wide variety of styles and forms of text (e.g. poetry, dialogues, letters).An outline of the three sections is provided: Form as a mirror of method, in which Sabine Föllinger and Alexander Mueller explore ways in which the structures of texts by Aristotle and Plutarch may reflect methodological concerns; Authors and their implied readers, with contributions by Oliver Stoll, David Creese, Boris Dunsch and Paula Olmos, which examines what ancient texts can tell us about the place of technical knowledge in antiquity; Science and the uses of poetry, with articles by Jochen Althoff, Michael Coxhead and Laurence Totelin, and a new English translation of the Aetna poem by Harry Hine, which explores the (to us) unexpected roles of poetry in ancient scientific culture.     

Astrology

Summary As a divinatory practice, astrology is without equal in both its colorful history and modern day popularity. Astrology has grown, over thousands of years, into a huge and ornate superstructure that lacks a central design. Although astrology has been dimly veiled by its occult mystique for centuries, the light of modern day inquiry has shown its substance to be mostly illusionary and revealed its foundation to be the shakiest possible: that of self-justification and anecdotal evidence. Despite the many claims of its practitioners and followers, extensive investigation has revealed astrology to be a great teetering monument to human gullibility.     

A proto-Normal Star Almanac dating to the reign of Artaxerxes III: BM 65156

Babylonian methods for predicting planetary phenomena using the so-called goal-year periods are well known. Texts known as Goal-Year Texts contain collections of the observational data needed to make predictions for a given year. The predictions were then recorded in Normal Star Almanacs and Almanacs. Large numbers of Goal-Year Texts, Normal Star Almanacs and Almanacs are attested from the early third century BC onward. A small number of texts dating from before the third century present procedures for using the goal-year periods to predict planetary phenomena. In addition, two texts, one dating to the late sixth century BC and the other to the late fifth century BC, contain planetary data which was probably predicted using these methods. In this article, I discuss a further example of a tablet dating from before the third century BC which contains planetary data predicted using the goal-year periods. I show that the planetary phenomena contained in this tablet can be dated to the twelfth year of the reign of Artaxerxes III (347/6 BC) and that they were predicted using goal-year periods without the application of the kind of corrections which were used in the third century BC texts in order to produce more accurate predictions.

     

Subjective probability and quantum certainty

In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent's degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for the general claim that probabilities always represent degrees of belief. We then argue that a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an agent's prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that state also depend on the agent's prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore always some agent's certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict with locality. We emphasize this by giving a version of an argument of Stairs [(1983). Quantum logic, realism, and value-definiteness. Philosophy of Science, 50, 578], which applies the Kochen–Specker theorem to an entangled bipartite system.     

Studies on Babylonian goal-year astronomy II: the Babylonian calendar and goal-year methods of prediction

This paper is the second part of an investigation into Babylonian non-mathematical astronomical texts and the relationships between Babylonian observational and predicted astronomical data. Part I (Gray and Steele 2008) showed that the predictions found in the Almanacs and Normal Star Almanacs were almost certainly made by applying Goal-Year periods to observations recorded in the Goal-Year Texts. The paper showed that the differences in dates of records between the Goal-Year Texts and the Almanacs or Normal Star Almanacs were consistent with the date corrections of a few days which, according to theoretical calculations, should be added to allow for the inexactness of Goal-Year periods. The current paper follows on from our earlier study to consider the effect of the Babylonian calendar on Goal-Year methods of prediction. Due to the fact that the Babylonian calendar year can contain either 12 or 13 months, a Goal-Year period can occasionally be month longer or shorter than usual. This suggests that there should in theory be certain points in the Metonic intercalation cycle where a predicted event occurs one Babylonian month earlier or later than the corresponding event a Goal-Year period later. By comparing dates of lunar and planetary records in the Astronomical Diaries, Goal-Year Texts, Almanacs and Normal Star Almanacs, we show that these month differences between the observational records and the predictions occur in the expected years. This lends further support to the theory that the Almanacs’ and Normal Star Almanacs’ predictions originated from records in the Goal-Year Texts, and clarifies how the Goal-Year periods were used in practice.     

The roots of predictivism

In The Paradox of Predictivism (2008, Cambridge University Press) I tried to demonstrate that there is an intimate relationship between predictivism (the thesis that novel predictions sometimes carry more weight than accommodations) and epistemic pluralism (the thesis that one important form of evidence in science is the judgments of other scientists). Here I respond to various published criticisms of some of the key points from Paradox from David Harker, Jarret Leplin, and Clark Glymour. Foci include my account of predictive novelty (endorsement novelty), the claim that predictivism has two roots, the prediction per se and predictive success, and my account of why Mendeleev’s predictions carried special weight in confirming the Periodic Law of the Elements.     

What We Can Learn from a Diagram: The Case of Aristarchus's On The Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon

By using the example of a single proposition and its diagrams, this paper makes explicit a number of the processes in effect in the textual transmission of works in the exact sciences of the ancient and medieval periods. By examining the diagrams of proposition 13 as they appear in the Greek, Arabic, and Latin traditions of Aristarchus's On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon, we can see a number of ways in which medieval, and early modern, scholars interpreted their sources in an effort to understand and transmit canonical ancient texts. This study highlights the need for modern scholars to take into consideration all aspects of the medieval transmission in our efforts to understand ancient practices.     

The Whewell-Mill debate on predictions,from Mill's point of view

John Stuart Mill, in his debate with William Whewell on the nature and logic of induction, is regarded as being the first to dismiss the supposed value of successful predictions as merely psychological. I shall argue that this view of the Whewell-Mill debate on predictions misconstrues Mill’s position and argument. From Mill’s point of view, the controversial point was not the question whether predictions ‘count more’ than ex-post explanations but the alleged assertion by Whewell that the successful predictions of the wave theory of light prove the existence of the ether. Mill argued that, on the one hand, the predictions of the wave theory of light do not and cannot provide evidence for the existence of the ether; as evidence for the laws of the theory, on the other hand, the predictions are superfluous, the laws being already well-confirmed. Mill actually endorsed a requirement of independent support closely resembling Whewell’s requirements for hypotheses; the controversy on the value of predictions is a product of the 20th century.     

Testing hypotheses in macroevolution

Experimental manipulation of microevolution (changes in frequency of heritable traits in populations) has shed much light on evolutionary processes. But many evolutionary processes occur on scales that are not amenable to experimental manipulation. Indeed, one of the reasons that macroevolution (changes in biodiversity over time, space and lineages) has sometimes been a controversial topic is that processes underlying the generation of biological diversity generally operate at scales that are not open to direct observation or manipulation. Macroevolutionary hypotheses can be tested by using them to generate predictions then asking whether observations from the biological world match those predictions. Each study that identifies significant correlations between evolutionary events, processes or outcomes can generate new predictions that can be further tested with different datasets, allowing a cumulative process that may narrow down on plausible explanations, or lead to rejection of other explanations as inconsistent or unsupported. A similar approach can be taken even for unique events, for example by comparing patterns in different regions, lineages, or time periods. I will illustrate the promise and pitfalls of these approaches using a range of examples, and discuss the problems of inferring causality from significant evolutionary associations.     

‘Natures’ and ‘Laws’: The making of the concept of law of nature – Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168–1253) and Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292)

Contemporary scholars set the Greek conception of an immanent natural order in opposition to the seventeenth century mechanistic conception of extrinsic laws imposed upon nature from without. By contrast, we argue that in the process of making the concept of law of nature, forms and laws were coherently used in theories of natural causation. We submit that such a combination can be found in the thirteenth century. The heroes of our claim are Robert Grosseteste who turned the idea of corporeal form into the common feature of matter, and Roger Bacon who described the effects of that common feature. Bacon detached the explanatory principle from matter and rendered it independent and therefore external to natural substances. Our plausibility argument, anchored in close reading of the relevant texts, facilitates a coherent conception of both ‘natures’ and ‘laws’.     

Rhetorical uses of mathematical harmonics in Philo and Plutarch

The branch of harmonic science called ‘canonics’ is rarely discussed outside specialist literature in Greek antiquity. Two exceptions are discussed in this paper: one reference to the science and another to its practitioners, both in non-specialist texts (Philo of Alexandria, De opificio mundi 96; Plutarch, Quaestiones convivales iii.9). Because both texts contain erroneous claims given under the authority of canonics, the interpretation of these references is problematic. The two passages are discussed and compared in an attempt to account for the errors contained in them, and to expose the rhetorical aims of each author and the methods by which the technical terms and concepts of an ancient science could be made to serve very different ends in a non-scientific context.