The natural selection of conservative science

Social epistemologists have argued that high risk, high reward science has an important role to play in scientific communities. Recently, though, it has also been argued that various scientific fields seem to be trending towards conservatism—the increasing production of what Kuhn (1962) might have called ‘normal science’. This paper will explore a possible explanation for this sort of trend: that the process by which scientific research groups form, grow, and dissolve might be inherently hostile to such science. In particular, I employ a paradigm developed by Smaldino and McElreath (2016) that treats a scientific community as a population undergoing selection. As will become clear, perhaps counter-intuitively this sort of process in some ways promotes high risk, high reward science. But, as I will point out, risky science is, in general, the sort of thing that is hard to repeat. While more conservative scientists will be able to train students capable of continuing their successful projects, and so create thriving lineages, successful risky science may not be the sort of thing one can easily pass on. In such cases, the structure of scientific communities selects against high risk, high rewards projects. More generally, this project makes clear that there are at least two processes to consider in thinking about how incentives shape scientific communities—the process by which individual scientists make choices about their careers and research, and the selective process governing the formation of new research groups.     

A revolution without tooth and claw—Redefining the physical base units

A case study is presented of a recent proposal by the major metrology institutes to redefine four of the physical base units, namely kilogram, ampere, mole, and kelvin. The episode shows a number of features that are unusual for progress in an objective science: for example, the progress is not triggered by experimental discoveries or theoretical innovations; also, the new definitions are eventually implemented by means of a voting process. In the philosophical analysis, I will first argue that the episode provides considerable evidence for confirmation holism, i.e. the claim that central statements in fundamental science cannot be tested in isolation; second, that the episode satisfies many of the criteria which Kuhn requires for scientific revolutions even though one would naturally classify it as normal science. These two observations are interrelated since holism can provide within normal science a possible source of future revolutionary periods.     

Philosophy and history of science: Beyond the Kuhnian paradigm

At issue in this paper is the question of the appropriate relationship between the philosophy and history of science. The discussion starts with a brief sketch of Kuhn's approach, followed by an analysis of the so-called ‘testing-theories-of-scientific-change programme’. This programme is an attempt at a more rigorous approach to the historical philosophy of science. Since my conclusion is that, by and large, this attempt has failed, I proceed to examine some more promising approaches. First, I deal with Hacking's recent views on the issues in question, particularly his notion of a ‘style of reasoning’. Next, Nickles's reconstructionist interpretation of the development of science and his views on Whig history are addressed. Finally, I propose an account of philosophy as a theoretical, an interpretative and explanatory, enterprise. Thus, three alternatives to the Kuhnian paradigm are discussed, alternatives that share a recognition of the relative autonomy of philosophy from history. Hence, they assume a less tight relationship between philosophy and history of science than is the case within the Kuhnian paradigm.     

Pure science and the problem of progress

How should we understand scientific progress? Kuhn famously discussed science as its own internally driven venture, structured by paradigms. He also famously had a problem describing progress in science, as problem-solving ability failed to provide a clear rubric across paradigm change—paradigm changes tossed out problems as well as solving them. I argue here that much of Kuhn’s inability to articulate a clear view of scientific progress stems from his focus on pure science and a neglect of applied science. I trace the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, showing how the distinction came about, the rhetorical uses to which the distinction has been put, and how pure science came to be both more valued by scientists and philosophers. I argue that the distinction between pure and applied science does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny, and that once we relinquish it, we can provide Kuhn with a clear sense of scientific progress. It is not one, though, that will ultimately prove acceptable. For that, societal evaluations of scientific work are needed.     

Socially conditioned mathematical change: the case of the French Revolution

This paper examines a historical case of conceptual change in mathematics that was fundamental to its progress. I argue that in this particular case, the change was conditioned primarily by social processes, and these are reflected in the intellectual development of the discipline. Reorganization of mathematicians and the formation of a new mathematical community were the causes of changes in intellectual content, rather than being mere effects. The paper focuses on the French Revolution, which gave rise to revolutionary developments in mathematics. I examine how changes in the political constellation affected mathematicians both individually and collectively, and how a new professional community—with different views on the objects, problems, aims, and values of the discipline—arose. On the basis of this account, I will discuss such Kuhnian themes as the role of the professional community and normal versus revolutionary development.     

激光与新材料

激光技术的发展在很大程度上得益于相关新材料的问世和应用。本文就激光研究中几个最主要参数指标的进展。综述介绍了材料科学所起的关键作用。从一个方面说明了学科交叉与合作对于科学技术进步所起的重要作用。     

Pluralism and objectivity: Exposing and breaking a circle

The paper argues that Helen Longino’s pluralism implies circularity as it claims a preferably high number of qualified contributions to any scientific discussion that aims for objectivity, but does not regard the question who or what sets and employs the standards that rule the decision who is qualified to contribute and who is not. Therefore, objectivity is premised for a process that is to generate that very objectivity. Philip Kitcher’s ideal of democratization of science seems only to bypass the problem by introducing ideal deliberators tutored by appropriate experts, as for the implementation of this ideal the deliberators and experts, again, would have to be appointed by someone. However, Kitcher’s approach is based on a Rawlsian egalitarism and in this sense calls for political intrusion which could be based on case-by-case decisions. This offers a solution. I will illuminate the problem by some examples from climatology and demonstrate how Kitcher’s approach can help to tackle the problem by a final case study of pluralism in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.     

A second look at the colors of the dinosaurs

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative.     

Evaluating community science

Community science—scientific investigation conducted partly or entirely by non-professional scientists—has many advantages. For example, community science mobilizes large numbers of volunteers who can, at low cost, collect more data than traditional teams of professional scientists. Participation in research can also increase volunteers’ knowledge about and appreciation of science. At the same time, there are worries about the quality of data that community science projects produce. Can the work of non-professionals really deliver trustworthy results? Attempts to answer this question generally compare data collected by volunteers to data collected by professional scientists. When volunteer data is more variable or less accurate than professionally collected data, then the community science project is judged to be inferior to traditional science. I argue that this is not the right standard to use when evaluating community science, because it relies on a false assumption about the aims of science. I show that if we adopt the view that science has diverse aims which are often in tension with one another, then we cannot justify holding community science data to an expert accuracy standard. Instead, we should evaluate the quality of community science data based on its adequacy-for-purpose.     

Models, scientific realism, the intelligibility of nature, and their cultural significance

In this article, I will view realist and non-realist accounts of scientific models within the larger context of the cultural significance of scientific knowledge. I begin by looking at the historical context and origins of the problem of scientific realism, and claim that it is originally of cultural and not only philosophical, significance. The cultural significance of debates on the epistemological status of scientific models is then related to the question of ‘intelligibility’ and how science, through models, can give us knowledge of the world by presenting us with an ‘intelligible account/picture of the world’, thus fulfilling its cultural-epistemic role. Realists typically assert that science can perform this role, while non-realists deny this. The various strategies adopted by realists and non-realists in making good their respective claims, is then traced to their cultural motivations. Finally I discuss the cultural implications of adopting realist or non-realist views of models through a discussion of the views of Rorty, Gellner, Van Fraassen and Clifford Hooker on the cultural significance of scientific knowledge.     

Historicism and the failure of HPS

This paper suggests that the failure to integrate history and philosophy of science properly may be explained by incompatible metaphysics implied by these fields. Historians and sociologists tend to be historicists, who assume that all objects of research are variable in principle, while philosophers look for permanent and essential qualities. I analyse, how the historicists and essentialist approaches differ with regard to the research objects of general history, history of science and science itself. The implied historicism makes some radical pronouncements by Latour on ontological variance understandable. I will also consider, whether there could be something like a historicist philosophy of science. The historicisation of the natural world proves most challenging, but both certain traditional disciplines and some recent advances in physical and life sciences indicate compatibility with historicism. One should note that historicism does not alter how ‘truth’ is understood. Historicism does not question the reality of objects either; only their eternality.     

How to infer explanations from computer simulations

Computer simulations are involved in numerous branches of modern science, and science would not be the same without them. Yet the question of how they can explain real-world processes remains an issue of considerable debate. In this context, a range of authors have highlighted the inferences back to the world that computer simulations allow us to draw. I will first characterize the precise relation between computer and target of a simulation that allows us to draw such inferences. I then argue that in a range of scientifically interesting cases they are particular abductions and defend this claim by appeal to two case studies.     

The eagle and the starlings: Galileo’s argument for the autonomy of science—how pertinent is it today?

After Galileo’s argument for the autonomy of science is analysed and adapted to take into account later developments of scientific practices, we conclude that, in the final analysis, it is not compelling. Nevertheless, Galileo’s argument still provides a useful point of reference, for aspects of it can be interpreted to anticipate central components of the often acclaimed ideal of science as value free, so that appraising it contributes to the larger purpose of exploring how well that ideal stands up today. Finally, we will argue that residue from Galileo’s struggle with the Church remains with us, making it difficult to identify the conditions that would need to be put into place today for any robust sense of the autonomy of science to be defensible.     

Neuformulierung der Kristallographie

Summary A consideration of symmetry in any object or process entails essentially a correlation between parts of a unit or between unit and unit. Enquiry must be made as to what is geometrically distinguishable or indistinguishable and an attempt undertaken to discover the pattern underlying apparent disorder.Crystallography has been the science in which the principles of symmetry have been most extensively applied and received their fullest development. Naturally enough, the system evolved for formulating the symmetry inherent in crystals has been adapted to the specific problems the crystallographer sets out to solve.Such researches, however, go far beyond the bounds of ordinary geometric crystallography and are, in particular, an essential requisite for mastering the problems of stereochemistry. It is, therefore, obviously desirable to find a method of formulation which can be applied to any or all the problems in which the question of symmetry arises, such as the systematic ambiguities or the possible deformations of objects or processes endowed with symmetry. To this end the Element of Symmetry, traditional starting point of investigations into symmetry, must be replaced by the covering operations as such.Symmetry formulæ can be deduced, which beyond merely describing the features involved, permit the detailed numerical calculation of their development and variation. In this respect they must prove of value not only to the chemist in his investigation of isomers etc., but can usefully be adopted also by the crystallographer.A short introduction into this new method of formulation is given in the preceding pages.     

Incommensurabilities in the work of Thomas Kuhn

I distinguish between two ways in which Kuhn employs the concept of incommensurability based on for whom it presents a problem. First, I argue that Kuhn’s early work focuses on the comparison and underdetermination problems scientists encounter during revolutionary periods (actors’ incommensurability) whilst his later work focuses on the translation and interpretation problems analysts face when they engage in the representation of science from earlier periods (analysts’ incommensurability). Secondly, I offer a new interpretation of actors’ incommensurability. I challenge Kuhn’s account of incommensurability which is based on the compartmentalisation of the problems of both underdetermination and non-additivity to revolutionary periods. Through employing a finitist perspective, I demonstrate that in principle these are also problems scientists face during normal science. I argue that the reason why in certain circumstances scientists have little difficulty in concurring over their judgements of scientific findings and claims while in others they disagree needs to be explained sociologically rather than by reference to underdetermination or non-additivity. Thirdly, I claim that disagreements between scientists should not be couched in terms of translation or linguistic problems (aspects of analysts’ incommensurability), but should be understood as arising out of scientists’ differing judgments about how to take scientific inquiry further.     

Why did Kuhn’s Structure of scientific revolutions cause a fuss?

After the publication of The structure of scientific revolutions, Kuhn attempted to fend off accusations of extremism by explaining that his allegedly “relativist” theory is little more than the mundane analytical apparatus common to most historians. The appearance of radicalism is due to the novelty of applying this machinery to the history of science. This defence fails, but it provides an important clue. The claim of this paper is that Kuhn inadvertently allowed features of his procedure and experience as an historian to pass over into his general account of science. Kuhn’s familiar claims, that science is directed in part by extra-scientific influences; that the history of science is divided by revolutionary breaks into periods that cannot be easily compared; that there is no ahistorical standard of rationality by which past episodes may be judged; and that science cannot be shown to be heading towards the Truth—these now appear as methodological commitments rather than historico-philosophical theses.     

Forms of presentism in the history of science. Rethinking the project of historical epistemology

Since the late 1980s, presentism has seen a resurgence among some historians of science. Most of them draw a line between a good form of presentism and typical anachronism, but where the line should be drawn remains an open question. The present article aims at resolving this problem. In the first part I define the four main distinct forms of presentism at work in the history of science and the different purposes they serve. Based on this typology, the second part reconsiders what counts as anachronism, Whiggism and positivist history. This clarification is used as a basis to rethink the research program of historical epistemology in the third section. Throughout this article, I examine the conceptual core of historical epistemology more than its actual history, from Bachelard to Foucault or others. Its project should be defined – as Canguilhem suggested – as an attempt to account for both the contingency and the rationality of science. As such, historical epistemology is based on a complex fifth form of presentism, which I call critical presentism. The critical relation at stake not only works from the present to the past, because of the acknowledged rationality of science, but also from the past to the present because of the contingency and historicity of scientific knowledge.     

Science, truth and history, Part I. Historiography, relativism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

Recently, many historians of science have chosen to present their historical narratives from the ‘actors’-eye view’. Scientific knowledge not available within the actors’ culture is not permitted to do explanatory work. Proponents of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) purport to ground this historiography on epistemological relativism. I argue that they are making an unnecessary mistake: unnecessary because the historiographical genre in question can be defended on aesthetic and didactic grounds; and a mistake because the argument from relativism is in any case incoherent.The argument of the present article is self-contained, but steers clear of metaphysical debates in the philosophy of science. To allay fears of hidden assumptions, the sequel, to be published in the following issue, will consider SSK’s prospects of succour from scientific realism, instrumentalism, and a metaphysical system of Bruno Latour’s own devising.