The career of continental drift theory: An application of Imre Lakatos' analysis of scientific growth to the rise of drift theory

The continental drift research programme reigns supreme within the geological community. The programme achieved its regal status only within the last decade. Its ascension to the summit took over fifty years, and required numerous switchbacks. Although its climb may seem haphazard, I argue that there is an overall rationale to its development which is partially elucidated by the account of scientific growth and change as put forth by Imre Lakatos. However, at least two alterations must be made in Lakatos' analysis. One concerns his analysis of ‘novel fact’, and the other is concerned with his thesis that the hard core of a research programme remains the same throughout the programme's lifetime. I consider and reject Elie Zahar's notion of ‘novel fact’, introduce an alternative notion of ‘novel fact’, and argue that Lakatos and his followers must abandon the thesis that a research programme's hard core is immune from change, but that they can do so without endangering Lakatos' overall account of scientific growth and change.     

Thought styles and paradigms—a comparative study of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn

At first glance there seem to be many similarities between Thomas S. Kuhn’s and Ludwik Fleck’s accounts of the development of scientific knowledge. Notably, both pay attention to the role played by the scientific community in the development of scientific knowledge. But putting first impressions aside, one can criticise some philosophers for being too hasty in their attempt to find supposed similarities in the works of the two men. Having acknowledged that Fleck anticipated some of Kuhn’s later theses, there seems to be a temptation in more recent research to equate both theories in important respects. Because of this approach, one has to deal with the problem of comparing the most notable technical terms of both philosophers, namely “thought style” and “paradigm”.This paper aims at a more thorough comparison between Ludwik Fleck’s concept of thought style and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. Although some philosophers suggest that these two concepts are essentially equal in content, a closer examination reveals that this is not the case. This thesis of inequality will be defended in detail, also taking into account some of the alleged similarities which may be responsible for losing sight of the differences between these theories.     

Thought styles and paradigms: A comparative study of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn

At first glance there seem to be many similarities between Thomas S. Kuhn’s and Ludwik Fleck’s accounts of the development of scientific knowledge. Notably, both pay attention to the role played by the scientific community in the development of scientific knowledge. But putting first impressions aside, one can criticise some philosophers for being too hasty in their attempt to find supposed similarities in the works of the two men. Having acknowledged that Fleck anticipated some of Kuhn’s later theses, there seems to be a temptation in more recent research to equate both theories in important respects. Because of this approach, one has to deal with the problem of comparing the most notable technical terms of both philosophers, namely “thought style” and “paradigm”.This paper aims at a more thorough comparison between Ludwik Fleck’s concept of thought style and Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. Although some philosophers suggest that these two concepts are essentially equal in content, a closer examination reveals that this is not the case. This thesis of inequality will be defended in detail, also taking into account some of the alleged similarities which may be responsible for losing sight of the differences between these theories.     

Sharing Knowledge,Shaping Europe: US Technological Collaboration and Nonproliferation

While many aspects of Shapin's historical thesis (see preceding article) are accepted, this paper raises objections to specific parts of his historical account, and also to the historiographical assumptions underlying his sociological programme. In particular, Shapin's claim to have explained the Edinburgh phrenology debate in social terms is analysed and rejected.     

Three challenges to the complementarity of the logic and the pragmatics of science

The bipartite metatheory thesis attributes to Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank and Otto Neurath a conception of the nature of post-metaphysical philosophy of science that sees the purely formal-logical analyses of the logic of science as complemented by empirical inquiries into the psychology, sociology and history of science. Three challenges to this thesis are considered in this paper: that Carnap did not share this conception of the nature of philosophy of science even on a programmatic level, that Carnap's detailed analysis of the language of science is incompatible with one developed by Neurath for the pursuit of empirical studies of science, and, finally, that Neurath himself was confused about the programme of which the bipartite metatheory thesis makes him a representative. I argue that all three challenges can be met and refuted.     

The ‘Popperian Programme’ and mathematics: Part II: From quasi-empiricism to mathematical research Programmes

In the first part of this article I investigated the Popperian roots of Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations, which was an attempt to apply, and thereby to test, Popper's theory of knowledge in a field—mathematics—to which it had not primarily been intended to apply. While Popper's theory of knowledge stood up gloriously to this test, the new application gave rise to new insights into the heuristic of mathematical development, which necessitated further clarification and improvement of some Popperian methodological maxims. In the present part I analyze this second phase in the development of Lakatos's Popperian programme in mathematics, and its connection to the methodology of scientific research programmes.     

Review

In this paper we study some methodological problems associated with the development of one of the major theories in low temperature physics, that of superconductivity. The first experimental results of 1911 were interpreted within a framework that hindered the paradoxical aspects of the new phenomenon. Various research programmes degenerated until new experimental results forced a reappraisal of the existing theoretical framework making possible a different formulation of the problem that had to be solved. This led to a progressive research programme, whose positive heuristic we also study.     

The roots of predictivism

In The Paradox of Predictivism (2008, Cambridge University Press) I tried to demonstrate that there is an intimate relationship between predictivism (the thesis that novel predictions sometimes carry more weight than accommodations) and epistemic pluralism (the thesis that one important form of evidence in science is the judgments of other scientists). Here I respond to various published criticisms of some of the key points from Paradox from David Harker, Jarret Leplin, and Clark Glymour. Foci include my account of predictive novelty (endorsement novelty), the claim that predictivism has two roots, the prediction per se and predictive success, and my account of why Mendeleev’s predictions carried special weight in confirming the Periodic Law of the Elements.     

Radicals and types: A critical comparison of the methodologies of Popper and Lakatos and their use in the reconstruction of some 19th century chemistry

Research programmes associated with two nineteenth-century chemical theories, Radical Theory and the Theory of Types are discussed. The purpose is to examine in a very general way how well the methodologies of Popper and Lakatos can account for the development of these programmes. The chemical discussion is prefaced by a critical comparison of certain aspects of the two above-mentioned philosophies.     

Rethinking the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge

It is widely believed that the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects—one modest, and the other less so. The programme’s modest aspect—best represented by the “symmetry thesis”—does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological “externalism”. The immodest aspect, however—in the form of “finitism”—pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism about truth. Accepting these points will allow us to put an end to much unnecessary debate surrounding the strong programme, and allow a more fruitful discussion to begin.     

Ideals and monisms: recent criticisms of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge

I offer a reply to criticisms of the Strong Programme presented by Stephen Kemp who develops some new lines of argument that focus on the ‘monism’ of the programme. He says the programme should be rejected for three reasons. First, because it embodies ‘weak idealism’, that is, its supporters effectively sever the link between language and the world. Second, it challenges the reasons that scientists offer in explanation of their own beliefs. Third, it destroys the distinction between successful and unsuccessful instrumental action. Kemp is careful to produce quotations from the supporters of the programme as evidence to support his case. All three points deserve and are given a detailed response and the interpretation of the quoted material plays a significant role in the discussion. My hope is that careful exegesis will offset the numerous misinterpretations that are current in the philosophical literature. Particular attention is paid to what is said about the normative standards involved in the application of empirical concepts. The operation of these standards in the face of the negotiability of all concepts is explored and misapprehensions on the topic are corrected. The work of Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn and Hesse is used to illustrate these themes.     

The ontology of artefacts: the hard problem

We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ (UD) and ‘Realizability Constraints’ (RC), which address aspects of the dual nature thesis. Assessing supervenience accounts, we find them either wanting with respect to these criteria or insufficiently informative. Next, we argue that a recent application of Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view to artefacts cannot (yet) meet our criteria, although the broader view leaves room for improvement. Based on our evaluation of the most promising candidates, we conclude that so far general metaphysical views fail to address the most salient features of artefacts. Although they can account for the fact that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, they do not offer the conceptual resources needed to describe the relation between these natures; this relation raises a hard problem in metaphysics.     

Writing tea’s empire

The Almagest of Ptolemy (mid-second century ad) contains eleven dated reports of observations of the positions of planets made during the third century bc in Babylon and Hellenistic Egypt. The present paper investigates the character, purpose, and conventions of the observational programmes from which these reports derive, the channels of their transmission to Ptolemy's time, and the fidelity of Ptolemy's presentation of them. Like the Babylonian observational programme, about which we have considerable knowledge through cuneiform documents, the Greco-Egyptian ones were not directed towards the deduction of mathematical models of celestial motion but appear to have investigated patterns, correlations, and periodicities of phenomena. Ptolemy's immediate sources most likely were not the original series of observational records, but treatises by various astronomers of the intervening four centuries, including Hipparchus. While Ptolemy does not appear to have tampered with the wording of the reports, he faced difficulties and uncertainties in interpreting them; critically, he lacked sufficiently detailed information about the ancient calendars to be able to convert the reported dates accurately into his own chronological framework based on the Egyptian calendar.     

For or against structural realism? A verdict from high energy physics

When it comes to supporting the main ontic structural realist thesis, that we are better off with a metaphysics purged of objects, its proponents have to meet several challenges, three of which are to ensure that objects can be recast in terms of structure alone at both the level of theory and the level of ontology, to justify on physical grounds that structure exists in the world in a way that affects the goings-on in it, and to show that the relation between objects and structure is non-reciprocal, so that structure is ontologically prior to objects but not the converse. Assuming—tacitly or explicitly—that the objects of physics can be thus recast using symmetry group structure, supporters of the thesis have, therefore, to meet the remaining challenges. The present paper discusses and contests two such attempts, which typify arguments in favor of ontic structural realism from high-energy physics.     

How thin rational choice theory explains choices

The critics of rational choice theory (RCT) frequently build on the contrast between so-called thick and thin applications of RCT to argue that thin RCT lacks the potential to explain the choices of real-world agents. In this paper, I draw on often-cited RCT applications in several decision sciences to demonstrate that despite this prominent critique there are at least two different senses in which thin RCT can explain real-world agents’ choices. I then defend this thesis against the most influential objections put forward by the critics of RCT. In doing so, I explicate the implications of my thesis for the ongoing philosophical debate concerning the explanatory potential of RCT and the comparative merits of widely endorsed accounts of explanation.     

Quantification, Mandated Science and Judgment

In his Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, Ted Porter asks how to account for the prestige and power of quantitative methods in the modern world. His answer involves two theses. One reverses a standard claim by asserting that quantification in basic sciences can often be driven by quantification in more applied areas such as government and business. The second thesis, which I call judgment replacement, asserts that quantification overcomes lack of trust in humans by replacing human judgment in scientific communities and public life. Some aspects of the latter thesis are insightful and convincing. However, as a general claim, the judgment replacement thesis says that quantification and objectivity imply shallowness, superficiality and lack of subtlety. I examine one of Porter's key examples and show that as a general proposition the judgment replacement thesis gives a warped account of governmental decisions that involve a great deal of scientific input, an activity that colleagues and I have called mandated science. I show that Porter obfuscates the very features of mandated science that need the most clarification. The quantitative mentality can be superficial but it can also be complex and profound, and quantification can actually increase human judgment. The virtues of quantitative methods help account for their prestige and power.     

On the viability of the No Alternatives Argument

If we cannot directly empirically test the claims of a particular scientific theory directly, then it would be nice to have some other criteria with which to assess its viability. In his 2013 book, String Theory and the Scientific Method, Richard Dawid aims to develop such criteria, with an eye to vindicating research programmess in disciplines where direct empirical data is scant or non-existent. In an accompanying paper, Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger formalise Dawid's so-called ‘No Alternatives Argument’ (NAA) using a generalised Bayesian framework, as a first step towards formalising Dawid's entire research programme (which itself relies on two further arguments). In this paper, I argue that the formalisation of the NAA cannot play the central role in Dawid's programme as intended. This is based on the observation that not all confirmation is non-negligible confirmation. For Dawid's programme to be useful, it must demonstrate the viability not just of non-empirical theory confirmation, but of non-negligible non-empirical theory confirmation. I argue that Dawid et al.‘s appeal to Bayesian confirmation theory to formalise his NAA cannot guarantee non-negligible confirmation. As a result, I conclude that if Dawid's overall project is to succeed, it must do so without the NAA formalised in this way.     

The experimenter's regress as philosophical sociology

I will divide my discussion into two. In the first part I will discuss Godin and Gingras's delicious claim (this volume) that the experimenter's regress is anticipated by Sextus Empiricus's formulation of scepticism. In the second part, I will try to deal with Godin and Gingras's ‘critical argument’, that the experimenter's regress would be redundant if we were less concerned with ‘frightening philosophers’.     

The variability of patterns of sexual dimorphism in the hominoid skull

Summary Univariate and multivariate statistical analyses are applied to a number of cranial dimensions and angles from living hominoids in order to investigate the patterns of sexual dimorphism in these groups. Clear differences in patterns of cranial sexual dimorphisms are demonstrated not only between genera but also within a single species (Homo). These differences overlay the common finding of a sexual size difference in all groups. The results imply that caution is required in using the sexual dimorphisms of living hominoids as models for those anticipated in fossils.