Principle or constructive relativity

Appealing to Albert Einstein's distinction between principle and constructive theories, Harvey Brown has argued for an interpretation of the theory of relativity as a dynamic and constructive theory. Brown's view has been challenged by Michel Janssen and in this paper I investigate their dispute. I argue that their disagreement appears larger than it actually is due to the two frameworks used by Brown and Janssen to express their respective views: Brown's appeal to Einstein's principle–constructive distinction and Janssen's framing of the disagreement as one over the question whether relativity provides a kinematic or a dynamic constraint. I appeal to a distinction between types of theories drawn by H. A. Lorentz two decades before Einstein's distinction to argue that Einstein's distinction represents a false dichotomy. I argue further that the disagreement concerning the kinematics–dynamics distinction is a disagreement about labels but not about substance. There remains a genuine disagreement over the explanatory role of spacetime geometry and here I agree with Brown arguing that Janssen sees a pressing need for an explanation of Lorentz invariance where no further explanation is needed.     

Understanding,explanation, and unification

In this article I argue that there are two different types of understanding: the understanding we get from explanations, and the understanding we get from unification. This claim is defended by first showing that explanation and unification are not as closely related as has sometimes been thought. A critical appraisal of recent proposals for understanding without explanation leads us to discuss the example of a purely classificatory biology: it turns out that such a science can give us understanding of the world through unification of the phenomena, even though it does not give us any explanations. The two types of understanding identified in this paper, while strictly separate, do have in common that both consist in seeing how the individual phenomena of the universe hang together. Explanations give us connections between the phenomena through the asymmetric, ‘vertical’ relation of determination; unifications give us connections through the symmetric, ‘horizontal’ relation of kinship. We then arrive at a general definition of understanding as knowledge of connections between the phenomena, and indicate that there might be more than two types of understanding.     

Holism, physical theories and quantum mechanics

Motivated by the question what it is that makes quantum mechanics a holistic theory (if so), I try to define for general physical theories what we mean by `holism'. For this purpose I propose an epistemological criterion to decide whether or not a physical theory is holistic, namely: a physical theory is holistic if and only if it is impossible in principle to infer the global properties, as assigned in the theory, by local resources available to an agent. I propose that these resources include at least all local operations and classical communication. This approach is contrasted with the well-known approaches to holism in terms of supervenience. The criterion for holism proposed here involves a shift in emphasis from ontology to epistemology. I apply this epistemological criterion to classical physics and Bohmian mechanics as represented on a phase and configuration space respectively, and for quantum mechanics (in the orthodox interpretation) using the formalism of general quantum operations as completely positive trace non-increasing maps. Furthermore, I provide an interesting example from which one can conclude that quantum mechanics is holistic in the above mentioned sense, although, perhaps surprisingly, no entanglement is needed.     

Collaborative explanation,explanatory roles,and scientific explaining in practice

Scientific explanation is a perennial topic in philosophy of science, but the literature has fragmented into specialized discussions in different scientific disciplines. An increasing attention to scientific practice by philosophers is (in part) responsible for this fragmentation and has put pressure on criteria of adequacy for philosophical accounts of explanation, usually demanding some form of pluralism. This commentary examines the arguments offered by Fagan and Woody with respect to explanation and understanding in scientific practice. I begin by scrutinizing Fagan's concept of collaborative explanation, highlighting its distinctive advantages and expressing concern about several of its assumptions. Then I analyze Woody's attempt to reorient discussions of scientific explanation around functional considerations, elaborating on the wider implications of this methodological recommendation. I conclude with reflections on synergies and tensions that emerge when the two papers are juxtaposed and how these draw attention to critical issues that confront ongoing philosophical analyses of scientific explanation.     

Existence of macroscopic spatial superpositions in collapse theories

It is shown that the collapse dynamics in the CSL model will entangle two independent systems under certain conditions, and their state after collapse may be an entangled superposition of spatially separated states. However, since the conditions can hardly be satisfied in reality, the occurrence of such superpositions is very improbable, and thus collapse theories still provide a promising solution to the measurement problem.     

States of ignorance and ignorance of states: Examining the Quantum Principal Principle

Earman (2018) has recently argued that the Principal Principle, a principle of rationality connecting objective chance and credence, is a theorem of quantum probability theory. This paper critiques Earman's argument, while also offering a positive proposal for how to understand the status of the Principal Principle in quantum probability theory.     

Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency

In this paper, I explore Rosen’s (1994) ‘transcendental’ objection to constructive empiricism—the argument that in order to be a constructive empiricist, one must be ontologically committed to just the sort of abstract, mathematical objects constructive empiricism seems committed to denying. In particular, I assess Bueno’s (1999) ‘partial structures’ response to Rosen, and argue that such a strategy cannot succeed, on the grounds that it cannot provide an adequate metalogic for our scientific discourse. I conclude by arguing that this result provides some interesting consequences in general for anti-realist programmes in the philosophy of science.     

Mechanisms, principles, and Lorentz's cautious realism

I show that Albert Einstein's distinction between principle and constructive theories was predated by Hendrik A. Lorentz's equivalent distinction between mechanism- and principle-theories. I further argue that Lorentz's views toward realism similarly prefigure what Arthur Fine identified as Einstein's “motivational realism.”     

Ordinary language philosophy,explanation, and the historical turn in philosophy of science

Taking a cue from remarks Thomas Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within parts of the British philosophical context in the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time, ordinary language philosophy's influence was at its peak. I argue that the ordinary language philosophers' methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms relate to the historical turn in philosophy of science. To show these connections, I primarily examine the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle and R.B. Braithwaite in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse's appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models and analogies in scientific reasoning, and W.H. Watson's Wittgensteinian philosophy of science, an early influence on Toulmin. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception. Looking at the philosophical background during which so-called linguistic philosophers also had a hand in bringing these questions to prominence helps us understand why.     

The autonomy of models and explanation: anomalous molecular rearrangements in early twentieth-century physical organic chemistry

During the 1930s and 1940s, American physical organic chemists employed electronic theories of reaction mechanisms to construct models offering explanations of organic reactions. But two molecular rearrangements presented enormous challenges to model construction. The Claisen and Cope rearrangements were predominantly inaccessible to experimental investigation and they confounded explanation in theoretical terms. Drawing on the idea that models can be autonomous agents in the production of scientific knowledge, I argue that one group of models in particular were functionally autonomous from the Hughes–Ingold theory. Cope and Hardy’s models of the Claisen and Cope rearrangements were resources for the exploration of the Hughes–Ingold theory that otherwise lacked explanatory power. By generating ‘how-possibly’ explanations, these models explained how these rearrangements could happen rather than why they did happen. Furthermore, although these models were apparently closely connected to theory in terms of their construction, I argue that partial autonomy issued in extra-logical factors concerning the attitudes of American chemists to the Hughes–Ingold theory. And in the absence of a complete theoretical hegemony, a degree of consensus was reached concerning modelling the Claisen rearrangement mechanism.     

The operational framework for quantum theories is both epistemologically and ontologically neutral

Operational frameworks are very useful to study the foundations of quantum mechanics, and are sometimes used to promote antirealist attitudes towards the theory. The aim of this paper is to review three arguments aiming at defending an antirealist reading of quantum physics based on various developments of standard quantum mechanics appealing to notions such as quantum information, non-causal correlations and indefinite causal orders. Those arguments will be discussed in order to show that they are not convincing. Instead, it is argued that there is conceptually no argument that could favour realist or antirealist attitudes towards quantum mechanics based solely on some features of some formalism. In particular, both realist and antirealist views are well accomodable within operational formulations of the theory. The reason for this is that the realist/antirealist debate is located at a purely epistemic level, which is not engaged by formal aspects of theories. As such, operational formulations of quantum mechanics are epistmologically and ontologically neutral. This discussion aims at clarifying the limits of the historical and methodological affinities between scientific antirealism and operational physics while engaging with recent discoveries in quantum foundations. It also aims at presenting various realist strategies to account for those developments.     

Reduction and emergence in the fractional quantum Hall state

We present the fractional quantum Hall (FQH) effect as a candidate emergent phenomenon. Unlike some other putative cases of condensed matter emergence (such as thermal phase transitions), the FQH effect is not based on symmetry breaking. Instead FQH states are part of a distinct class of ordered matter that is defined topologically. Topologically ordered states result from complex long-ranged correlations between their constituent parts, such that the system displays strongly irreducible, qualitatively novel properties.     

Circularity,indispensability, and mathematical explanation in science

In this paper I consider the objection that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) is circular and hence fails to support mathematical platonism. The objection is that the explanandum in any mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon is itself identified using mathematical concepts. Hence the explanandum is only genuine if the truth of some mathematical theory is already presupposed. I argue that this objection deserves to be taken seriously, that it does sometimes undermine support for EIA, but that there is no reason to think that circularity is an unavoidable feature of mathematical explanation in science.     

Localization and the interface between quantum mechanics, quantum field theory and quantum gravity II: The search of the interface between QFT and QG

The main topics of this second part of a two-part essay are some consequences of the phenomenon of vacuum polarization as the most important physical manifestation of modular localization. Besides philosophically unexpected consequences, it has led to a new constructive “outside-inwards approach” in which the pointlike fields and the compactly localized operator algebras which they generate only appear from intersecting much simpler algebras localized in noncompact wedge regions whose generators have extremely mild almost free field behavior.Another consequence of vacuum polarization presented in this essay is the localization entropy near a causal horizon which follows a logarithmically modified area law in which a dimensionless area (the area divided by the square of dR where dR is the thickness of a light-sheet) appears. There are arguments that this logarithmically modified area law corresponds to the volume law of the standard heat bath thermal behavior. We also explain the symmetry enhancing effect of holographic projections onto the causal horizon of a region and show that the resulting infinite dimensional symmetry groups contain the Bondi–Metzner–Sachs group. This essay is the second part of a partitioned longer paper.     

Genesis of Karl Popper's EPR-like experiment and its resonance amongst the physics community in the 1980s

I present the reconstruction of the involvement of Karl Popper in the community of physicists concerned with foundations of quantum mechanics, in the 1980s. At that time Popper gave active contribution to the research in physics, of which the most significant is a new version of the EPR thought experiment, alleged to test different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The genesis of such an experiment is reconstructed in detail, and an unpublished letter by Popper is reproduced in the present paper to show that he formulated his thought experiment already two years before its first publication in 1982. The debate stimulated by the proposed experiment as well as Popper's role in the physics community throughout 1980s is here analysed in detail by means of personal correspondence and publications.     

String theory,Einstein, and the identity of physics: Theory assessment in absence of the empirical

String theorists are certain that they are practicing physicists. Yet, some of their recent critics deny this. This paper argues that this conflict is really about who holds authority in making rational judgment in theoretical physics. At bottom, the conflict centers on the question: who is a proper physicist? To illustrate and understand the differing opinions about proper practice and identity, we discuss different appreciations of epistemic virtues and explanation among string theorists and their critics, and how these have been sourced in accounts of Einstein's biography. Just as Einstein is claimed by both sides, historiography offers examples of both successful and unsuccessful non-empirical science. History of science also teaches that times of conflict are often times of innovation, in which novel scholarly identities may come into being. At the same time, since the contributions of Thomas Kuhn historians have developed a critical attitude towards formal attempts and methodological recipes for epistemic demarcation and justification of scientific practice. These are now, however, being considered in the debate on non-empirical physics.     

Genetic models in brain and behavior research,part IV

Four reviews on the the role of developmental factors in hypertension are introduced and set in historical context. Recent research in the laboratory rat has shown that the preweaning environment makes an important contribution to the level of blod-pressure reached in adult life in genetic models of hypertension. Both of the most commonly used models of hypertension, the SHR and SS/Jr rat strains, exhibit lower BP in adult life, if they are fostered shortly after birth to mothers from their normotensive control strains. It has been suggested that it is the idiosyncratic maternal behavior of the hypertensive mothers which contributes to the elevated BP of their offspring, and it has been amply demonstrated that there is an association between a constellation of behaviors emitted by rat mothers and the adult BP of their offspring in a wide variety of genetic groups (inbred hypertensive animals, F1's and F2's). In addition to the above, maternal environment has been demonstrated to have a significant impact on the pathophysiological response of hypertensive animals to a high salt diet. Being raised by an SHR mother, versus an SS/Jr mother, increases the magnitude of BP increases to a high salt diet, susceptibility to hemorrhagic stroke, body weight loss and the risk of mortality. A variety of physiological systems are undergoing rapid change during the preweaning period and may mediate the effects of differences in the maternal environment. These include the renin-angiotensin system and the peripheral sympathetic nervous system. Nutritional factors may be involved in all of the phenomena referred to above. Thus, any physiological mechanisms that are proposed to link maternal behavior to its effects on the physiology of adult animals should recognize the involvement of nutritional factors. Research on the role of developmental factors such as maternal behavior in genetic models of hypertension is at the interface of two growing disciplines: behavior genetics and developmental psychobiology. The methodological and conceptual contributions of these fields to advancing our understanding of these phenomena is emphasized.     

Pancreastatin,a chromogranin A-derived peptide,inhibits leptin and enhances UCP-2 expression in isolated rat adipocytes

Leptin, the ob gene product, is an adipocyte-secreted hormone that centrally regulates weight by decreasing caloric intake and increasing energy expenditure. Expression of leptin is regulated by dietary status, insulin, glucocorticoids and catecholamines. Pancreastatin (PST), a chromogranin A-derived peptide, correlates with catecholamine levels, and may play a role in the physiology of stress, modulating endocrine secretion and metabolism. Thus, PST has been found to exert a lipolytic and anti-insulin effect in white adipocytes. The aim of the present work was to investigate a possible role of PST modulating the expression of key genes involved in lipid storage and metabolism: leptin, PPAR-2, UCP-1 and UCP-2. We incubated isolated rat epididymal adipocytes with 100 nM PST for 16 and 24 h. Leptin, UCP-2 and UCP-1 mRNA levels were assessed by RT-PCR, followed by Southern blot. Leptin secretion was also measured by ELISA. PST inhibited leptin expression and secretion at 16-h incubation, but this effect was no longer observed after 24 h. On the other hand, PST stimulated the expression of UCP-2 after 16 h. However, the effect was still significant after 24 h. The inhibitory effect of PST on leptin expression and secretion and the stimulation of UCP-2 expression were prevented by blocking PKC. UCP-1 and PPR-2 expression did not change after PST stimulation. Leptin differentially regulates the expression of key genes in the rat adipocyte, upregulating the expression of UCP-2 and inhibiting the expression and secretion of leptin by a mechanism that involves PKC activity. These effects may contribute to the metabolic action of catecholamines in physiological and pathophysiological conditions with increased sympathetic activity.Received 5 September 2003; received after revision 6 October 2003; accepted 14 October 2003     

The Na/K pump,resting potential and selective permeability in canine Purkinje fibres at physiologic and room temperatures

All mammalian cells maintain a resting potential generated by ions moving down concentration gradients. In excitable cells, the inside potential is negative relative to outside. In order to maintain this electrochemical gradient, the sodium potassium (Na/K) pump actively transports out three sodium ions for every two potassium ions it brings in. This process generates a net outward current and thus hyperpolaizes the resting potential. I employed dihydroouabain (DHO) to inhibit the Na/K pump and thus measure its contribution to the resting potential. It contributed 9.0 mV at 34°C and 3.8 mV at 25°C. The P_K/P_Na ratios were calculated at both temperatures before and after subtracting the Na/K pump contribution. These ratios also suggested a decreased contribution of the Na/K pump under hypothermia. Taken together, these results suggest that the pump contribution to the resting potential is more significant at physiologic temperatures (34°C) than at room temperature (25°C), and that estimates of selective permeability can only be accurately obtained after assessing and eliminating the Na/K pump contribution to the resting potential.