Model-Based and Manipulative Abduction in Science

What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based)certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanation occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action provides otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. Many external things, usually inert from the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into what I callepistemic mediators, which are illustrated in the last part of the paper, together with an analysis of the related notions of ``perceptual and inceptual rehearsal' and of ``external representation'.     

Towards a Theory of Mathematical Argument

In this paper, I assume, perhaps controversially, that translation into a language of formal logic is not the method by which mathematicians assess mathematical reasoning. Instead, I argue that the actual practice of analyzing, evaluating and critiquing mathematical reasoning resembles, and perhaps equates with, the practice of informal logic or argumentation theory. It doesn’t matter whether the reasoning is a full-fledged mathematical proof or merely some non-deductive mathematical justification: in either case, the methodology of assessment overlaps to a large extent with argument assessment in non-mathematical contexts. I demonstrate this claim by considering the assessment of axiomatic or deductive proofs, probabilistic evidence, computer-aided proofs, and the acceptance of axioms. I also consider Jody Azzouni’s ‘derivation indicator’ view of proofs because it places derivations—which may be thought to invoke formal logic—at the center of mathematical justificatory practice. However, when the notion of ‘derivation’ at work in Azzouni’s view is clarified, it is seen to accord with, rather than to count against, the informal logical view I support. Finally, I pose several open questions for the development of a theory of mathematical argument.     

Parmenides Reloaded

I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.     

Reasoning to Hypotheses: Where Do Questions Come?

Detectives and scientists are in the business of reasoning from observations to explanations. This they often do by raising cunning questionsduring their inquiries. But to substantiate this claim we need to know how questions arise and how they are nurtured into more specific hypotheses. I shall discuss what the problem is, and then introduce the so-called interrogative model of inquiry which makes use of an explicit logic of questions. On this view, a discovery processes can be represented as a model-based game in which an inquirer subjects a source of information to a series of strategically organized questions. Strategic principles and why-questions are especially important in heuristical reasoning. Why-questions have their own peculiar nature among questions. They indicate that the inquirer's expectations are somehow disappointed, and that is cognitively challenging. In a finished argument why-questions can be omitted, but in the search for more specific questions they are highly important. As a detetective example I shall analyze Sherlock Holmes reasoning in Silver Blace, the scientific one is A.R. Wallace's discovery of the principle of natural selection. In both of these examples the meaning of questions, especially of well-chosen why-questions, of strategic principles, and of highly structured background knowledge come to the fore. Good questions frequent those who have orderly expectations, based on experience and expertise (detectives!) or highly structured background theories (scientists!).     

Misrepresentation in “Misrepresentation in Context” in Context

I argue that in aiming to integrate the notions of representation and resemblance in the arts, philosophy of sciences and cognitive sciences one needs to focus on those processes of reasoning and creative inquiry that (i) exploit our faculties of imagination and mental imagery, (ii) create novel and useful metaphors based on iconic types of meaning, and (iii) may result in discovery through the interactive practices of artists and scientists. To address these matters within the confines of Goodmanian conventionalist and symbolic theories of logic, thought and language is unlikely to deliver these points. A comprehensive philosophy of signs, however, might do the job.     

因果性的反事实条件分析:大卫·刘易斯及其批评者

刘易斯的因果性反事实条件分析是新休谟主义进路的典型代表,它试图通过引入"反事实条件"的模态范畴来弥补传统律则性理论的不足。然而,这一分析进路又产生了诸如可能世界的相似性、反事实条件依赖的时间箭头等新问题;本奈特、豪斯曼和霍维奇等人揭示了刘易斯的理论在这些问题上的根本困难。而这些困难的最终解决依赖于彻底抛弃休谟主义的因果性研究进路,转向因果实在论和实验的、操作的因果观念。     

Models in Biology and Physics: What’s the Difference?

In Making Sense of Life, Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion.     

Withdrawing Unfalsifiable Hypotheses

There has been little research into the weak kindsof negating hypotheses. Hypotheses may be unfalsifiable. In this case it is impossible tofind a contradiction in some area of the conceptualsystems in which they are incorporated.Notwithstanding this fact, it is sometimes necessaryto construct ways of rejecting the unfalsifiablehypothesis at hand by resorting to some external forms of negation, external because wewant to avoid any arbitrary and subjectiveelimination, which would be rationally orepistemologically unjustified. I will consider akind of ``weak' (unfalsifiable) hypotheses that arehard to negate and the ways for making it easy. Inthese cases the subject can ``rationally' decide towithdraw his hypotheses even in contexts where it is``impossible' to find ``explicit' contradictions: theuse of negation as failure (an interestingtechnique for negating hypotheses and accessing newones suggested by artificial intelligence) isilluminating. I plan to explore whether this kind ofnegation can be employed to model hypothesiswithdrawal in Poincaré's conventionalism of theprinciples of physics and in Freudian analyticreasoning.     

Absence of Contingency in the Newtonian Universe

I argue that, contrary to thestandard view, the Newtonian universe containsno contingency. I do this by arguing (i) thatno contingency is introduced into the Newtonianuniverse by the initial conditions of physicalsystems in the universe, and (ii) that theclaim that the Newtonian universe as a wholehas contingent properties leads to incoherence.This result suggests that Newtonian physics iseither inconsistent or incomplete, since thelaws of Newtonian physics are too weak todetermine all the properties of the Newtonianuniverse uniquely.     

Gödel, Einstein, Mach: Casting Constraints on All-embracing Concepts

Can a theory turn back, as it were, upon itselfand vouch for its own features? That is, canthe derived elements of a theory be the veryprimitive terms that provide thepresuppositions of the theory? This form of anall-embracing feature assumes a totality inwhich there occurs quantification over thattotality, quantification that is defined bythis very totality. I argue that the Machprinciple exhibits such a feature ofall-embracing nature. To clarify the argument,I distinguish between on the one handcompleteness and on the other wholeness andtotality, as different all-embracing features:the former being epistemic while the latter –ontological. I propose an analogy between the Mach principleas a possible selection principle in generalrelativity, and the vicious-circle principle infoundations of mathematics. I finally concludewith a consequence of this analogyvis-à-vis completeness and totality,viz., both should be constrained if they wereto be valid concepts for a physical theory. The paper progresses chronologically. Itfocuses on the physical approach of Mach thatformed the background for Einstein's generaltheory of relativity. The solutions of thefield equations in the form of cosmologicalmodels set the scene for the view ofall-embracing concepts discussed in the paper.Specifically, the ideas encapsulated in whatEinstein called the Mach principle, constitutethe thread of this account. The principle isfound however to falter, in view of the factthat there are several different types ofsolution of the field equations that contradictit. One such important cosmological model withramifying consequences is the rotational masssolution of Gödel. The question arises asto whether there is an analogy betweenincompleteness in foundations of mathematicsand in physics? The analogy between the vicious-circleprinciple and the Mach principle demonstratesan affirmative answer which suggests in turnthat completeness and totality must becurtailed – that is, conditions and limitsshould be imposed on completeness and totalityto render them valid for physical theories.     

Understanding Scientific Inquiries of Galileo’s Formulation for the Law of Free Falling Motion

The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum.     

科学普适性信念批判的SLK进路研究及其意义

西方学术传统所坚持的科学普适性信念,多年来受到来自数学哲学、物理哲学等多条进路的批判。布鲁尔的SSK思想也是对这种信念的一种批判,作为其SSK组成部分的SLK思想,是这种批判的集中体现。他以逻辑学这门硬科学为例,从逻辑基础和逻辑规则社会性两个方面,提供了对于科学普适性信念更为深入的批判路径,从而导致了科学形象的极大变革。     

随附性/排除论证的限度

金在权基于随附性/排除论证排除了自主的心理性质。对随附性/排除论证的3种批评意见——该论证存在不自洽性、否定心理性质的因果效力是不合理的、该论证的普遍化将导致一切宏观性质失去因果效力——或者曲解了金在权的本意,或者超出了物理主义的框架,从而超出了论证的前提。随附性/排除论证能够在物理主义内部形成对自主心理性质的消解,但不能形成对突现论的反驳。     

Quantum Mechanics and Realism

Quantum mechanics is usually presented as a challenge to scientific realism, but I will argue that the details of quantum mechanics actually support realism. I will first present some basic quantum mechanical concepts and results, including the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment and Bell's theorem, and do it in a way that everyone can understand. I will then use the physics to inform the philosophy, showing that quantum mechanics provides evidence to support epistemological realism.     

思想实验、论证及形式整编

当代哲学对思想实验提出一系列重要且困难的问题,比如认识力问题和规范力问题.另一方面,通过揭示思想实验的论证结构,从逻辑上给出对思想实验的证成,消除相关的神秘主义和怀疑主义倾向,往往被看作理性主义广泛目标的一部分.以此为背景,论文就以下三个相关问题展开讨论:第一,思想实验与论证之间有怎样的关联;第二,怎样借助这种关联对思...     

The Commercialization of Research and the Quest for the Objectivity of Science

In this paper, I discuss the objectivity of science in the context of commercialized research. Objectivity has traditionally been associated with the behavior of individual scientists and their willingness and ability to base their reasoning on data and logic. By introducing some examples of problematic practices in current research, I show that this view is insufficient. A view that I call the Social View on objectivity succeeds better in accommodating the way in which commercialization affects research.     

Multiple Roles for Analogies in the Genesis of Fluid Mechanics: How Analogies Can Cooperate with Other Heuristic Strategies

When Johann and Daniel Bernoulli founded fluid dynamics they encountered several problems. To go beyond the vision of Newtonian particles, a new set of images was needed in order to deal with the spatial extensibility and lack of form of fluids. I point to evidence that analogy was an essential abductive strategy in the creation of this imagery. But its heuristic behavior is complex: analogy can provide an initial model or proto-model that establishes the starting point of a theoretical process, but it can play other roles as well. The historical genesis analyzed here shows that the participation of analogy in physicists’ creativity is not so restricted and that its richness opens up the field for very different roles and strategies in model-based discovery processes. Analogies can crop up intermittently in the evolution of a theory; and they can cooperate with images, extreme case reasoning and thought experiments, and even activate these processes at origin. Although it may seem that the contributions of analogy are generative in the sense of helping to discover new aspects of reality, we must stress the evaluative function that sometimes is performed by analogical reasoning in order to gain confidence. The study of the Bernoulli’s genesis of the foundations of fluid dynamics generates interesting hypotheses about the multiple roles that analogy can play in scientific model-based reasoning.     

我们能够获得那些可能性或必然性的知识吗?--以威廉姆森的观点为契机

模态知识论的核心问题是:"我们如何证成或知道那些仅仅属于可能性(mere possibility)的宣称,与那些既非逻辑亦非数学的必然性宣称?"对于这个问题,威廉姆森论证并主张:由于每一类的模态宣称都逻辑上等价于某一类的反事实条件句宣称,因而日常透过"想象模拟"去评估反事实条件句的认知能力也就给了我们认知形而上学模态性的能力。威廉姆森并且认为,有些这样得来的反事实条件句知识和模态知识,既非先验,亦非后验,应被归属为第三类的"椅验知识"(armchair thinking)。作者们认为威廉姆森的理论虽大体上可信,但仍至少有九个问题需要进一步探讨。     

论心智逻辑理论与心智模型理论融合的可能途径

文献表明，到目前为止，还没有一个全面的、精确的和统一的研究人类推理心理学理论，而心智逻辑理论和心智模型理论是近20年来发展最快的两个主流理论。心智逻辑理论认为人类运用推理图式进行推理；心智模型理论则认为人类通过构造心智模型实现推理。本文讨论了两个理论各自的适用范围和局限性，并提出未来两理论融合的可能方向。     

道家哲学与现代物理哲学的契合性考察

与儒家"向内觅理"有别,道家重视外向的"天之道",对自然之源和万物之本多有探讨,形成了独特而深刻的自然哲学思想,诸如"道""朴""无""有""阴阳"等自然哲学概念,在此基础上形成了"道生万物"的宇宙创生观,"负阴抱阳"的自然运行观,"道通为一"的世界统一观等自然哲学思想.这些概念和思想被现代物理科学,特别是量子物理学所...