科学家的幽默

我不是牛顿 有一次,所有的在天堂的科学家准备玩一次躲猫猫的游戏.很不幸轮到爱因斯坦找人.他打算数到100然后开始找.所有人都开始藏起来,除了牛顿.牛顿只是在爱因斯坦前面的地上画了一个1米边长的正方形,然后站在中间.爱因斯坦数到97、98、99、100,然后睁开了眼睛,看见牛顿站在前面,就叫到:"牛顿出局,牛顿出局."     

女人六个不结婚理由

<正>不少美国人看来,已故影星伊丽莎白·泰勒与美国脱口秀天后欧普拉都是事业成功与富有的女性,而两人最大的差异在于泰勒对婚姻乐此不疲,她一共结过八次婚;而欧普拉则一直与婚姻保持距离。而现在,不少美国女性都有向欧普拉"学习"的趋势——不婚比例已经攀至历史新高,华盛顿大学社会学教授皮特·史瓦兹分     

推陈出新——评介《剑桥牛顿指南》第二版

<正>《剑桥牛顿指南》第二版近期由剑桥大学出版社出版,其主编为牛津大学科学史教授、"牛顿项目"负责人Rob Iliffe和塔夫茨大学哲学教授、第一版的第二主编George Smith。与十四年前出版的第一版相比,第二版内容变化颇大,因此有必要作一简要介绍。《剑桥牛顿指南》的编写计划始于20世纪90年代早期,最初的任务落在著名牛顿研究者及传记作者Richard Westfall身上。Westfall于1996年去世后,I.Bernard Cohen和     

牛顿“判决性实验”判决了什么?

判决性实验是理解实验在理论构建和检验过程中作用的关键,本文通过重新检视牛顿三棱镜实验,指出:1)牛顿最初是在培根意义上提出其"判决性实验"的,重在说明其在牛顿个人内心的多种理解进路之间的一种"内部判决"作用;2)该实验在牛顿和胡克等人的光色理论之间同样做出了有效的判决:确立了牛顿的日光异质理论,否决了各种版本的修正理论;3)该实验并不直接判决光的微粒说与波动说,以实验"判决"形而上学假说是不当的,这只能导致对判决性实验这一概念的否定。     

牛顿科学的"推理规则"与科学发现的逻辑

牛顿在<自然哲学的数学原理>中提出的"哲学中的推理规则",不仅浓缩了牛顿时代有关科学方法论的许多内容,而且还蕴涵着在此之后有关"科学发现的逻辑"问题的历史变化的思想根源,甚至这一规则也可以作为今天"复活发现逻辑"的一个典型的科学史范例.     

"赫森论点"文本研究

"赫森论点"是用马克思主义研究科学的第一次系统尝试,意图通过对牛顿科学工作的现实性溯源,寻找<原理>在问题选择和具体内容方面的决定性力量,从而颠覆人们对科学家创造性工作的唯心理解和精英人物推动历史前进的英雄史观.但赫森论证效力不足,既无法证明社会经济-技术需求对科学家的问题选择存在"决定性"影响,也没有触及牛顿体系的科学内核.因此,"赫森论点"的价值仍然是"提出问题"意义上的,而不是"解决问题"意义上的.     

黑格尔论自然哲学

本文考察了黑格尔在《自然哲学》中的自然科学观,特别关注的是他对牛顿的见解.我论证的是,黑格尔的科学观是康德建构主义的一种后期形式.我进一步论证的是,黑格尔的建构主义对意识经验的内容采纳了一种实验进路的形式,其中理论得到阐述,并在必要的情况下通过一种熟悉的试错法而得到重新阐述.我最后论证的是,黑格尔对牛顿的批判开始于他的博士论文并贯穿于包括《自然哲学》在内的后期作品,黑格尔批评了牛顿从数学演绎出物理定律的努力尝试,从而正确地拒斥了牛顿不做形而上学的主张.尽管黑格尔式的自然哲学通常被认为是无根据的与不重要的,但是,经过仔细审视,它就显得是有根据的与重要的.对科学家在哲学上的不成熟见解而言,这种自然哲学在当今与在黑格尔活跃之时一样有用.     

走进人类母系社会的最后一个部落

云南西北高原川滇交界处的泸沽湖畔,生活着一个神秘的氏族——摩棱人。他们至今还延续着母系社会的母系大家庭生活方式,保留着走婚的阿夏婚姻形式,男人不娶、女人不嫁。这里被称为"人类最后的母系部落"、"世界母系文化的最后一片领地"、"人类母系社会文化的活化石"、"神奇女     

中国历史记载中的仙女座流星雨及其相关研究

对中国历史上关于仙女座流星雨的记载进行收集、整理和校勘,并在此基础上进行研究,得出5项结果:(1)比拉彗星在分裂之前曾有5次大量抛射物质,而这种抛射有四个回归周期一次的规律,证明引力效应对比拉彗星是周期性的.(2)抛射方向都是向前,所以火箭效应非常明显;周期不断缩短,但不均匀,平均每回归一次缩短9天;轨道偏心率不变小.(3)彗星碎解后,流星尘云分布的轨道宽度1798年为1千万公里、1885年为580万公里;向轨道两侧的扩散速度为每秒0.69米,为彗星分裂后二彗星体的分离速度每秒7米的1/10倍.(4)以H.A.牛顿对1885年出现的流星雨密度的统计值为基础,对中国记载的几次最大的流星雨的密度和总量进行估算,包括对古代和民间记载的流星雨数的几种模糊概念,如星陨如雨、不可称数、无数、众多等,做出最低下限的估算;对伴随流星雨出现的一些特殊现象,如天空亮度足以掩星盖月、出现极光式的发光现象、大气发声和观测者的心理恐惧等所包容的流星密度和总数,也做出估算.(5)解释中国历史上惟一一次记载的"月如坠地"现象.     

微粒论视野中的牛顿环与光的“阵发”理论

牛顿环实验以其前所未有的技巧和精度为实验科学树立了光辉典范,然而,牛顿基于该实验而创立的光的阵发理论却历来为人所诟病,这一反差迄今未得到有效解释。本文剖析了牛顿环实验以及牛顿对该实验现象的观察、描述与理论分析过程,揭示了光的微粒论思想在此过程中的关键作用:牛顿在观察牛顿环图像并对其作定性描述时即掉入了一种"微粒论陷阱",并通过后续的一系列逻辑传导过程,最终导致了光的阵发理论的失败。     

Newton’s Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space

This paper investigates Newton’s ontology of space in order to determine its commitment, if any, to both Cambridge neo-Platonism, which posits an incorporeal basis for space, and substantivalism, which regards space as a form of substance or entity. A non-substantivalist interpretation of Newton’s theory has been famously championed by Howard Stein and Robert DiSalle, among others, while both Stein and the early work of J. E. McGuire have downplayed the influence of Cambridge neo-Platonism on various aspects of Newton’s own spatial hypotheses. Both of these assertions will be shown to be problematic on various grounds, with special emphasis placed on Stein’s influential case for a non-substantivalist reading. Our analysis will strive, nonetheless, to reveal the unique or forward-looking aspects of Newton’s approach, most notably, his critical assessment of substance ontologies, that help to distinguish his theory of space from his neo-Platonic contemporaries and predecessors.     

Leibniz and Newton on Space

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable.     

Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature

The first two sections of this paper investigate what Newton could have meant in a now famous passage from “De Graviatione” (hereafter “DeGrav”) that “space is as it were an emanative effect of God.” First it offers a careful examination of the four key passages within DeGrav that bear on this. The paper shows that the internal logic of Newton’s argument permits several interpretations. In doing so, the paper calls attention to a Spinozistic strain in Newton’s thought. Second it sketches four interpretive options: (i) one approach is generic neo-Platonic; (ii) another approach is associated with the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More; a variant on this (ii*) emphasizes that Newton mixes Platonist and Epicurean themes; (iii) a necessitarian approach; (iv) an approach connected with Bacon’s efforts to reformulate a useful notion of form and laws of nature. Hitherto only the second and third options have received scholarly attention in scholarship on DeGrav. The paper offers new arguments to treat Newtonian emanation as a species of Baconian formal causation as articulated, especially, in the first few aphorisms of part two of Bacon’s New Organon. If we treat Newtonian emanation as a species of formal causation then the necessitarian reading can be combined with most of the Platonist elements that others have discerned in DeGrav, especially Newton’s commitment to doctrines of different degrees of reality as well as the manner in which the first existing being ‘transfers’ its qualities to space (as a kind of causa-sui). This can clarify the conceptual relationship between space and its formal cause in Newton as well as Newton’s commitment to the spatial extended-ness of all existing beings. While the first two sections of this paper engage with existing scholarly controversies, in the final section the paper argues that the recent focus on emanation has obscured the importance of Newton’s very interesting claims about existence and measurement in “DeGrav”. The paper argues that according to Newton God and other entities have the same kind of quantities of existence; Newton is concerned with how measurement clarifies the way of being of entities. Newton is not claiming that measurement reveals all aspects of an entity. But if we measure something then it exists as a magnitude in space and as a magnitude in time. This is why in DeGrav Newton’s conception of existence really helps to “lay truer foundations of the mechanical sciences.”     

牛顿引力平方反比定律的发现

本文回溯了牛顿早期动力学思想发展的主要线索及其研究的具体过程，深入探究牛顿有关引力平方反比定律发现的认识论根源，指出：牛顿“跨越”离心力定律，应用自己的“（１／２）Ｒ公式”和推广的伽利ｔ２定律，并结合开普勒周期定律，在１６６９年前得到圆轨道上的意向力平方反比关系；牛顿在１６７９年才认识到开普勒面积定律的物理意义，在成文于１６８０年的《论椭圆轨道》原始手稿中解决开普勒命题，即证明椭圆轨道上的引力平方反比定律。     

Thinking Through the Prism of Life

The article provides an overview of the argument in Robert Scharff’s paper “Displacing epistemology: Being in the midst of technoscientific practice” (Scharff 2011), focusing on his central objective, to articulate a hidden ground of the current controversies in the philosophy of science and technology studies, between objectivism and constructivism, through a deeper confrontation with Heidegger’s legacy. The commentary addresses two aspects of Scharffs argument that deserve to be developed further, namely how it both criticizes and cultivates itself an ideal of the meta-knower, and how the idea of thinking from the perspective of life in Dilthey’s sense can be critically reflected through Heidegger’s later criticism. By rehearsing Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia, and also his gradually increased criticism of the very concept of life, the commentary tries to show how Scharff’s intervention can in fact be strengthened against possible criticism.     

论互换身体的可能：试驳伯纳德·威廉斯

自洛克以来,对个人同一性（Personal identity）的心理说明一直是种重要理论,依照这种理论,我们可以设想不同个体“互换身体”的情况,并且这种情况对心理说明提供了支持。当代学者伯纳德·威廉斯（Bernard Willianrs）对这种理论提出质疑,认为在说明个人同一性问题时,身体要素必不可少。威廉斯的质疑通过反驳互换身体的例子展开,本文将对威廉斯的反驳作出回应,指出该反驳存在的问题,以及为什么在说明我们的存在时,身体的必要性可能并不像威廉斯认为的那样确定。     

The Unseen Déjà-Vu: From Erkki Huhtamo’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Topoi</Emphasis> to Ken Jacobs’ Remakes

This commentary on Edwin Carels’ essay “Revisiting Tom Tom: Performative anamnesis and autonomous vision in Ken Jacobs’ appropriations of Tom Tom the Piper’s Son” broadens up the media-archaeological framework in which Carels places his text. Notions such as Huhtamo’s topos and Zielinski’s “deep time” are brought into the discussion in order to point out the difficulty to see what there is to see and to question the position of the viewer in front of experimental films like Tom Tom the Piper’s Son and its remakes.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tom Tom:</Emphasis> Performative Anamnesis and Autonomous Vision in Ken Jacobs’ Appropriations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tom Tom the Piper’s Son</Emphasis>

In 1969 the American avant-garde filmmaker Ken Jacobs gained wide recognition with a two-hour long interpretation of a 1905 silent short film. Ever since, the artist has kept on revisiting the same material, each time with a different technological approach. Originally hailed as a prime example of structural filmmaking, Jacobs’ more recent variations on the theme of Tom Tom the Piper’s Son beg for a broader understanding of his methods and the meanings implied. To gain a deeper insight in this on-going mise-en-abyme (and an obsession dominating a large part of his career), this essay expands comments by the artist himself with concepts taken from animation, media-archaeology and Warburg’s Mnemosyne atlas. Rereading a filmic text with minute attention, remediating it from an analogue to an electronic format, and reanimating the original action by adding a variety of intervals: all Jacobs’ strategies are aimed at demonstrating the afterlife of Tom Tom in a contemporary cultural context.     

Tools, Objects, and Chimeras: Connes on the Role of Hyperreals in Mathematics

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model ${\mathcal{S}}$ as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In ${\mathcal{S}}$ , all definable sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace ${-\hskip-9pt\int}$ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy.     

Gould, Hull, and the Individuation of Scientific Theories

When is conceptual change so significant that we should talk about a new theory, not a new version of the same theory? We address this problem here, starting from Gould’s discussion of the individuation of the Darwinian theory. He locates his position between two extremes: ‘minimalist’—a theory should be individuated merely by its insertion in a historical lineage—and ‘maximalist’—exhaustive lists of necessary and sufficient conditions are required for individuation. He imputes the minimalist position to Hull and attempts a reductio: this position leads us to give the same ‘name’ to contradictory theories. Gould’s ‘structuralist’ position requires both ‘conceptual continuity’ and descent for individuation. Hull’s attempt to assimilate into his general selectionist framework Kuhn’s notion of ‘exemplar’ and the ‘semantic’ view of the structure of scientific theories can be used to counter Gould’s reductio, and also to integrate structuralist and population thinking about conceptual change.