A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction

I began this study with Laudan's argument from the pessimistic induction and I promised to show that the caloric theory of heat cannot be used to support the premisses of the meta-induction on past scientific theories. I tried to show that the laws of experimental calorimetry, adiabatic change and Carnot's theory of the motive power of heat were (i) independent of the assumption that heat is a material substance, (ii) approximately true, (iii) deducible and accounted for within thermodynamics.I stressed that results (i) and (ii) were known to most theorists of the caloric theory and that result (iii) was put forward by the founders of the new thermodynamics. In other words, the truth-content of the caloric theory was located, selected carefully, and preserved by the founders of thermodynamics.However, the reader might think that even if I have succeeded in showing that laudan is wrong about the caloric theory, I have not shown how the strategy followed in this paper can be generalised against the pessimistic meta-induction. I think that the general strategy against Laudan's argument suggested in this paper is this: the empirical success of a mature scientific theory suggests that there are respects and degrees in which this theory is true. The difficulty for — and and real challenge to — philosophers of science is to suggest ways in which this truth-content can be located and shown to be preserved — if at all — to subsequent theories. In particular, the empirical success of a theory does not, automatically, suggest that all theoretical terms of the theory refer. On the contrary, judgments of referential success depend on which theoretical claims are well-supported by the evidence. This is a matter of specific investigation. Generally, one would expect that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence or turn out to be independent of the evidence at hand, are not compelling. For simply, if the evidence does not make it likely that our beliefs about putative theoretical entities are approximately correct, a belief in those entities would be ill-founded and unjustified. Theoretical extrapolations in science are indespensable , but they are not arbitrary. If the evidence does not warrant them I do not see why someone should commit herself to them. In a sense, the problem with empricist philisophers is not that they demand that theoretical beliefs must be warranted by evidence. Rather, it is that they claim that no evidence can warrant theorretical beliefs. A realist philosopher of science would not disagree on the first, but she has good grounds to deny the second.I argued that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence must not be taken as belief-worthy. But can one sustaon the more ambitious view that loosely supported parts of a theory tend to be just those that include non-referring terms? There is an obvious excess risk in such a generalisation. For there are well-known cases in which a theoretical claim was initially weakly supported by the evidence     

Species concepts,process analysis,and the hierarchy of nature

Species figure prominently in all biological studies, but what a species actually is and how we recognize it in practice is still a much-debated issue. Present discussion revolves around five major species concepts: the biological, the evolutionary, the cladistic, the recognition and the phylogenetic concepts. Each of these species notions has its theoretical and practical problems. One important point that has emerged from recent discussions on the ontological status of species is that there is a tension between species concepts based on interbreeding and those based on genealogy, and that practical application of these two kinds of concept may give rise to incompatible results. Species recognized by one species concept appear to be essentially different entities compared with species demarcated by another. However, these different species may all represent real and objective entities in nature. What we perceive as a species depends on the evolutionary processes that we have made objects of our research. Some of these processes are between entities of the genealogical hierarchy of nature, while other processes relate to nature's ecological hierarchy. It is essential that our species concept should be adjusted to the focal level of our research program, thereby taking into full account the two process hierarchies of nature.     

Unification, explanation, and the composition of causes in Newtonian mechanics

William Whewell's philosophy of scientific discovery is applied to the problem of understanding the nature of unification and explanation by the composition of causes in Newtonian mechanics. The essay attempts to demonstrate: (1) the sense in which ‘approximate’ laws (e.g. Kepler's laws of planetary motion) successfully refer to real physical systems rather than to (fictitious) idealizations of them; (2) why good theoretical constructs are not badly underdetermined by observation; and why, in particular, Newtonian forces are not conventional and (3) how empiricist arguments against the existence of component causes, and against the veracity of the fundamental laws, are flawed.     

Objectivity, abstraction, and the individual: the influence of Søren Kierkegaard on Paul Feyerabend

This paper explores the influence of Søren Kierkegaard upon Paul Feyerabend by examining their common criticisms of totalising accounts of human nature. Both complained that philosophical and scientific theories of human nature which were methodologically committed to objectivity and abstraction failed to capture the richness of human experience. Kierkegaard and Feyerabend argued that philosophy and the science were threatening to become obstacles to human development by imposing abstract theories of human nature and reality which denied the complexities of both. In both cases, this took the form of asserting an ‘existential’ criterion for the assessment of philosophical and scientific theories. Kierkegaard also made remarks upon the inappropriateness of applying natural scientific methods to human beings which Feyerabend later expanded and developed in his criticisms of the inability of the ‘scientific worldview’ to accommodate the values necessary to a flourishing human life. I conclude by noting some differences between Kierkegaard and Feyerabend’s positions and by affirming the value of existential criticisms of scientific knowledge.     

Nature in the laboratory — nature as a laboratory. Considerations about the ethics of release experiments

Field tests with genetically modified organisms go beyond the boundaries of the politically and morally neutralized space that normally surrounds scientific experiments. They enter public areas. As a social process of shaping nature they are political in a fundamental sense. Consequences of this observation concern the legitimacy of decisions and the legitimacy of deciding procedures. The political rights of citizens and their human rights can only be respected if these procedures are democratic. Without a more serious exploration of the specific circumstances of release tests — for example, the precise ecological context, the consequences for the future development of the affected ecosystem, the social consequences, and the possible institutional ways of establishing gene technology in agriculture — we do not really know what we are doing when we release transgenic organisms. Moral judgements today can therefore only be prima facie, not free from shortcomings. As responsible judges we must confess that we are still morally blind.     

Forecast Combination and Bayesian Model Averaging: A Prior Sensitivity Analysis

In this study we evaluate the forecast performance of model‐averaged forecasts based on the predictive likelihood carrying out a prior sensitivity analysis regarding Zellner's g prior. The main results are fourfold. First, the predictive likelihood does always better than the traditionally employed ‘marginal’ likelihood in settings where the true model is not part of the model space. Secondly, forecast accuracy as measured by the root mean square error (RMSE) is maximized for the median probability model. On the other hand, model averaging excels in predicting direction of changes. Lastly, g should be set according to Laud and Ibrahim (1995: Predictive model selection. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 57 : 247–262) with a hold‐out sample size of 25% to minimize the RMSE (median model) and 75% to optimize direction of change forecasts (model averaging). We finally apply the aforementioned recommendations to forecast the monthly industrial production output of six countries, beating for almost all countries the AR(1) benchmark model. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The love of truth

It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, I argue that this view is untenable. The truth norm clashes with plausible evidential norms in a wide range of cases, such as when we have excellent but misleading evidence for a falsehood or no evidence for a truth. I will consider various ways to resolve this conflict and argue that none of them work. However, I will ultimately attempt to vindicate the love of truth, by arguing that knowledge is the proper epistemic goal. The upshot is that we should not aim merely to believe the truth; we should aim to know it.     

Changes in dopamineβ-hydroxylase activity of monkey plasma with age

Summary Plasma dopamine -hydroxylase activity of Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata fuscata) increased with age, and the developmental changes were similar to those of human beings. However, the adult level plasma DBH activity of various monkey species was much lower than that of human beings.We thank Dr.K. Nozawa, Dr.O. Takenaka and Mr.T. Shotake (Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University) for their help in collecting monkey blood samples.     

The Role of Geometrical Construction in Theodosius’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Spherics</Emphasis>

This paper is a contribution to our understanding of the constructive nature of Greek geometry. By studying the role of constructive processes in Theodoius’s Spherics, we uncover a difference in the function of constructions and problems in the deductive framework of Greek mathematics. In particular, we show that geometric problems originated in the practical issues involved in actually making diagrams, whereas constructions are abstractions of these processes that are used to introduce objects not given at the outset, so that their properties can be used in the argument. We conclude by discussing, more generally, ancient Greek interests in the practical methods of producing diagrams.     

A note on the predictive power of survey data in nowcasting euro area GDP

This paper investigates the trade‐off between timeliness and quality in nowcasting practices. This trade‐off arises when the frequency of the variable to be nowcast, such as gross domestic product (GDP), is quarterly, while that of the underlying panel data is monthly; and the latter contains both survey and macroeconomic data. These two categories of data have different properties regarding timeliness and quality: the survey data are timely available (but might possess less predictive power), while the macroeconomic data possess more predictive power (but are not timely available because of their publication lags). In our empirical analysis, we use a modified dynamic factor model which takes three refinements for the standard dynamic factor model of Stock and Watson (Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 2002, 20, 147–162) into account, namely mixed frequency, preselections and cointegration among the economic variables. Our main finding from a historical nowcasting simulation based on euro area GDP is that the predictive power of the survey data depends on the economic circumstances; namely, that survey data are more useful in tranquil times, and less so in times of turmoil.     

Structure and evolution of the genetic code viewed from the perspective of the experimentally expanded amino acid repertoire in vivo

Much effort has been devoted recently to expanding the amino acid repertoire in protein biosynthesis in vivo. From such experimental work it has emerged that some of the non-canonical amino acids are accepted by the cellular translational machinery while others are not, i.e. we have learned that some determinants must exist and that they can even be anticipated. Here, we propose a conceptual framework by which it should be possible to assess deeper levels of the structure of the genetic code, and based on this experiment to understand its evolution and establishment. First, we propose a standardised repertoire of 20 amino acids as a basic set of conserved building blocks in protein biosynthesis in living cells to be the main criteria for genetic code structure and evolutionary considerations. Second, based on such argumentation, we postulate the structure and evolution of the genetic code in the form of three general statements: (i) the nature of the genetic code is deterministic; (ii) the genetic code is conserved and universal; (iii) the genetic code is the oldest known level of complexity in the evolution of living organisms that is accessible to our direct observation and experimental manipulations. Such statements are discussed as our working hypotheses that are experimentally tested by recent findings in the field of expanded amino acid repertoire in vivo. Received 30 June 1999; accepted 9 July 1999     

Actants and enframing: Heidegger and Latour on technology

A central issue in the philosophy of technology concerns the relationship between technology and the conditions under which technology develops. Traditionally, two main accounts are given of this relationship. The social constructivist approach considers technology to be largely determined by “social” factors (e.g. military interests, economic policy). By contrast, technological determinism describes technology as self-determinative, and as following its own independent aim of greater efficiency. This paper discusses two alternatives to these conceptions of technology, namely, the accounts offered by Bruno Latour and Martin Heidegger. It examines their common theses that our present misunderstanding of technology is due to a continued commitment to the subject–object distinction. The paper further compares their accounts, which attempt to overcome this distinction, and argues that ultimately both authors fail to find a role for human beings that is consistent with their contention that we need to develop a less anthropocentric understanding of the world.     

Urban bioclimatology

This article deals with the part of urban climatology which is of particular relevance to human beings. Presented first is a summary of all human biometeorologically effective complexes, as well as other factors which are relevant to urban planning and which depend on atmospheric conditions in urban structures in a direct or indirect manner. Later, methods for human biometeorologically significant assessment of thermal and air pollution components of the urban climate are discussed in detail, because these components can be strongly influenced by urban planning. The application of these methods is illustrated by some results of appropriate investigations in urban areas.     

Analogical reflection as a source for the science of life: Kant and the possibility of the biological sciences

In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kant's work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kant's interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kant's claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kant's claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kant's statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kant's methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to his conception of living beings and to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kant's explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.     

Der Modellversuch am Tier in seiner Bedeutung für das Verständnis menschlicher Erbleiden

Summary The mutation of homologous genes can produce the same changes in phenotype in different mammals, animals as well as human beings. In this way the same hereditary disease can arise in man and animal. This fact permits the study of human hereditary diseases in model experiments in animals under conditions impossible to be realized in man. How far the parallelism between human beings and animals can be taken and where the limits of this parallelism are, which are the problems of the comparative heredo-pathology in detail, and how these problems may be attacked, is demonstrated here in numerous examples.

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Nach einem Vortrag in der Nederlandse Anthropogenetische Vereniging in Utrecht am 28. November 1953.     

Standards of evidence and causality in regulatory science: Risk and benefit assessment

In this paper we analyze the Russo-Williamson Thesis (RWT) as a standard of evidence in regulatory science, in risk as well as benefit assessment. In our analysis we take account of the recent controversies that have taken place in regulation with respect to the evidentiary requirements necessary for regulatory decision making. RWT's main point is that not only probabilistic but also mechanistic evidence is necessary for being able to infer the existence of causal links. We ask in which way RWT could have an impact upon current decision making about subjecting to regulation (or, to the contrary, leaving them unregulated) certain chemical substances, food stuffs, health claims, and other typical objects of regulation. We show that the application of RWT resolves some of the problems posed by current standards of evidence. RWT makes it possible to determine with higher accuracy if a particular substance should be subjected to regulation or not, even though under certain circumstances RWT itself may turn into a source of regulatory error. The adequacy of RWT as a standard of evidence depends on the precise manner of its application to regulation (particularly the consideration of mechanistic evidence as a complementary or necessary requirement), as well as the assessment of its non-epistemic consequences.     

On the ORigin of smell: odorant receptors in insects

Olfaction, the sense of smell, depends on large, divergent families of odorant receptors that detect odour stimuli in the nose and transform them into patterns of neuronal activity that are recognised in the brain. The olfactory circuits in mammals and insects display striking similarities in their sensory physiology and neuroanatomy, which has suggested that odours are perceived by a conserved mechanism. Here I review recent revelations of significant structural and functional differences between the Drosophila and mammalian odorant receptor proteins and discuss the implications for our understanding of the evolutionary and molecular biology of the insect odorant receptors. Received 23 March 2006; accepted 28 April 2006     

John Hunter and his approach to pathology

Given the old conception of the relation greater than, the proposition that the whole is greater than the part is an immediate consequence. But being greater in this sense is not incompatible with being equal in the sense of one-one correspondence. Some who failed to recognize this formulated invalid arguments against the possibility of infinite quantities. Others who did realize that the relations of equal and greater when so defined are compatible, concluded that such relations are not appropriately taken as quantitative relations, at least, not in general. If suitable quantitative relations were to be defined, there was a possibility of retaining either the traditional definition of greater and finding another concept of equality, or of retaining the concept of equality as one-one correspondence and defining greater than so that it is incompatible with equality in this sense. The former alternative was implicitly taken by Bolzano, who never succeeded in defining suitable quantitative relations. The latter alternative was taken by Cantor, and is the basis of his great success in constructing a mathematical theory of the transfinite.     

The accuracy of IMF and OECD forecasts for G7 countries

This paper analyses the size and nature of the errors in GDP forecasts in the G7 countries from 1971 to 1995. These GDP short‐term forecasts are produced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and by the International Monetary Fund, and published twice a year in the Economic Outlook and in the World Economic Outlook, respectively. The evaluation of the accuracy of the forecasts is based on the properties of the difference between the realization and the forecast. A forecast is considered to be accurate if it is unbiased and efficient. A forecast is unbiased if its average deviation from the outcome is zero, and it is efficient if it reflects all the information that is available at the time the forecast is made. Finally, we also examine tests of directional accuracy and offer a non‐parametric method of assessment. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mechanisms,the interventionist theory,and the ability to use causal relationships

In the area of social science, in particular, although we have developed methods for reliably discovering the existence of causal relationships, we are not very good at using these to design effective social policy. Cartwright argues that in order to improve our ability to use causal relationships, it is essential to develop a theory of causation that makes explicit the connections between the nature of causation, our best methods for discovering causal relationships, and the uses to which these are put. I argue that Woodward's interventionist theory of causation is uniquely suited to meet Cartwright's challenge. More specifically, interventionist mechanisms can provide the bridge from ‘hunting causes’ to ‘using them’, if interventionists (i) tell us more about the nature of these mechanisms, and (ii) endorse the claim that it is these mechanisms—or whatever constitutes them—that make causal claims true. I illustrate how having an understanding of interventionist mechanisms can allow us to put causal knowledge to use via a detailed example from organic chemistry.