Three principles for canonical quantum gravity

We outline three principles that should guide us in the construction of a theory of canonical quantum gravity: (1) diffeomorphism invariance, (2) implementing the proper dynamics and related constraint algebra, (3) local Lorentz invariance. We illustrate each of them with its role in model calculations in loop quantum gravity.     

Mechanisms, principles, and Lorentz's cautious realism

I show that Albert Einstein's distinction between principle and constructive theories was predated by Hendrik A. Lorentz's equivalent distinction between mechanism- and principle-theories. I further argue that Lorentz's views toward realism similarly prefigure what Arthur Fine identified as Einstein's “motivational realism.”     

On the empirical equivalence between special relativity and Lorentz׳s ether theory

In this paper I argue that the case of Einstein׳s special relativity vs. Hendrik Lorentz׳s ether theory can be decided in terms of empirical evidence, in spite of the predictive equivalence between the theories. In the historical and philosophical literature this case has been typically addressed focusing on non-empirical features (non-empirical virtues in special relativity and/or non-empirical flaws in the ether theory). I claim that non-empirical features are not enough to provide a fully objective and uniquely determined choice in instances of empirical equivalence. However, I argue that if we consider arguments proposed by Richard Boyd, and by Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin, a choice based on non-entailed empirical evidence favoring Einstein׳s theory can be made.     

Principle or constructive relativity

Appealing to Albert Einstein's distinction between principle and constructive theories, Harvey Brown has argued for an interpretation of the theory of relativity as a dynamic and constructive theory. Brown's view has been challenged by Michel Janssen and in this paper I investigate their dispute. I argue that their disagreement appears larger than it actually is due to the two frameworks used by Brown and Janssen to express their respective views: Brown's appeal to Einstein's principle–constructive distinction and Janssen's framing of the disagreement as one over the question whether relativity provides a kinematic or a dynamic constraint. I appeal to a distinction between types of theories drawn by H. A. Lorentz two decades before Einstein's distinction to argue that Einstein's distinction represents a false dichotomy. I argue further that the disagreement concerning the kinematics–dynamics distinction is a disagreement about labels but not about substance. There remains a genuine disagreement over the explanatory role of spacetime geometry and here I agree with Brown arguing that Janssen sees a pressing need for an explanation of Lorentz invariance where no further explanation is needed.     

Minkowski spacetime and Lorentz invariance: The cart and the horse or two sides of a single coin?

Michel Janssen and Harvey Brown have driven a prominent recent debate concerning the direction of an alleged arrow of explanation between Minkowski spacetime and Lorentz invariance of dynamical laws in special relativity. In this article, I critically assess this controversy with the aim of clarifying the explanatory foundations of the theory. First, I show that two assumptions shared by the parties—that the dispute is independent of issues concerning spacetime ontology, and that there is an urgent need for a constructive interpretation of special relativity—are problematic and negatively affect the debate. Second, I argue that the whole discussion relies on a misleading conception of the link between Minkowski spacetime structure and Lorentz invariance, a misconception that in turn sheds more shadows than light on our understanding of the explanatory nature and power of Einstein׳s theory. I state that the arrow connecting Lorentz invariance and Minkowski spacetime is not explanatory and unidirectional, but analytic and bidirectional, and that this analytic arrow grounds the chronogeometric explanations of physical phenomena that special relativity offers.     

Time isotropy,Lorentz transformation and inertial frames

Homogeneity of Euclidean space and time, spatial isotropy, principle of relativity and the existence of a finite speed limit (or its variants) are commonly believed to be the only axioms required for developing the special theory of relativity (Lorentz transformations). In this paper, however, it is pointed out that the Lorentz transformation for a boost cannot actually be derived without the explicit assumption of time isotropy (viz. time-reversal symmetry) which is logically independent of the other postulates of relativity. Postulating time isotropy also restores the symmetry between space and time in the postulates of relativity (i.e. time and space share the same symmetries then). Time isotropy also helps explain naturally one key general feature of the fundamental physical laws, viz. their time-reversal symmetry. But inertial frames are defined in influential texts as frames having space-time homogeneity and spatial isotropy only. Inclusion of time isotropy in that definition is thus suggested.     

Squaring the circle: Gleb Wataghin and the prehistory of quantum gravity

The early history of the attempts to unify quantum theory with the general theory of relativity is depicted through the work of the Italian physicist Gleb Wataghin, who, in the context of quantum electrodynamics, has anticipated some of the ideas that the quantum gravity community is entertaining today.     

The landing zone – Ground for model transfer in chemistry

This essay proposes a new notion - the landing zone - in order to identify conceptual features that allow modelers to transfer mathematical tools across disciplinary borders. This discussion refers to the transferable models as ‘templates’. Templates are functions, equations, or computational methods that are capable of being generalized from a particular subject matter. There are formal and conceptual prerequisites for the transfer of a template to a new domain. A landing zone is an ontology that contributes to the satisfaction of these conditions for successful transfer. This paper presents a case study on a model in chemistry - the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules (QTAIM) - that makes use of transferred templates from physics - the virial theorem and the wave function. The landing zone in this case is a new ontological notion, that of the topological atom, which prepares ground for the use of the virial theorem and the wave function in chemistry. The virial theorem requires that there exists in-principle stability to the system that it represents, and the wave function requires transformation in its representation that is justified. The ontology of QTAIM - the landing zone for these templates - grounds the scientific use of these templates in the context of chemistry.     

Local reduction in physics

A conventional wisdom about the progress of physics holds that successive theories wholly encompass the domains of their predecessors through a process that is often called “reduction.” While certain influential accounts of inter-theory reduction in physics take reduction to require a single “global” derivation of one theory׳s laws from those of another, I show that global reductions are not available in all cases where the conventional wisdom requires reduction to hold. However, I argue that a weaker “local” form of reduction, which defines reduction between theories in terms of a more fundamental notion of reduction between models of a single fixed system, is available in such cases and moreover suffices to uphold the conventional wisdom. To illustrate the sort of fixed-system, inter-model reduction that grounds inter-theoretic reduction on this picture, I specialize to a particular class of cases in which both models are dynamical systems. I show that reduction in these cases is underwritten by a mathematical relationship that follows a certain liberalized construal of Nagel/Schaffner reduction, and support this claim with several examples. Moreover, I show that this broadly Nagelian analysis of inter-model reduction encompasses several cases that are sometimes cited as instances of the “physicist׳s” limit-based notion of reduction.     

Accountability and values in radically collaborative research

This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a “model of the experiment,” must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in a massively distributed collaboration must therefore involve models of such interests and values and their methodological and epistemic effects.     

On the origins and foundations of Laplacian determinism

In this paper I examine the foundations of Laplace’s famous statement of determinism in 1814, and argue that rather than derived from his mechanics, this statement is based on general philosophical principles, namely the principle of sufficient reason and the law of continuity. It is usually supposed that Laplace’s statement is based on the fact that each system in classical mechanics has an equation of motion which has a unique solution. But Laplace never proved this result, and in fact he could not have proven it, since it depends on a theorem about uniqueness of solutions to differential equations that was only developed later on. I show that the idea that is at the basis of Laplace’s determinism was in fact widespread in enlightenment France, and is ultimately based on a re-interpretation of Leibnizian metaphysics, specifically the principle of sufficient reason and the law of continuity. Since the law of continuity also lies at the basis of the application of differential calculus in physics, one can say that Laplace’s determinism and the idea that systems in physics can be described by differential equations with unique solutions have a common foundation.     

Quantum mechanics,time and ontology

Against what is commonly accepted in many contexts, it has been recently suggested that both deterministic and indeterministic quantum theories are not time-reversal invariant, and thus time is handed in a quantum world. In this paper, I analyze these arguments and evaluate possible reactions to them. In the context of deterministic theories, first I show that this conclusion depends on the controversial assumption that the wave-function is a physically real scalar field in configuration space. Then I argue that answers which restore invariance by assuming the wave-function is a ray in Hilbert space fall short. Instead, I propose that one should deny that the wave-function represents physical systems, along the lines proposed by the so-called primitive ontology approach. Moreover, in the context of indeterministic theories, I argue that time-reversal invariance can be restored suitably redefining its meaning.     

On Popper’s strong inductivism (or strongly inconsistent anti-inductivism)

It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In section 2, first, I begin by briefly characterizing the relevant notion of inductivism that is at stake here; second, I present and discuss the main Popperian argument against it and show that in the only reading in which the argument is formally it is restricted to cases of predicted evidence, and that even if restricted in this way the argument is formally valid it is nevertheless materially unsound. In section 3, I analyze the desiderata that, according to Popper, any acceptable measure for evidential support must satisfy, I clean away its ad-hoc components and show that all the remaining desiderata are satisfied by inductuvist-in-strict-sense measures. In section 4 I demonstrate that two of these desiderata, accepted by Popper, imply that in cases of predicted evidence any measure that satisfies them is qualitatively indistinguishable from conditional probability. Finally I defend that this amounts to a kind of strong inductivism that enters into conflict with Popper’s anti-inductivist argument and declarations, and that this conflict does not depend on the incremental versus non-incremental distinction for evidential-support measures, making Popper’s position inconsistent in any reading.     

Kant and Newton on the a priori necessity of geometry

In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant explicitly rejects Newton’s absolutist position that space is an actually existing thing; however, Kant also concedes that the absolutist successfully preserves the a priori necessity that characterizes our geometrical knowledge of space. My goal in this paper is to explore why the absolutist can explain the a priori necessity of geometry by turning to Newton’s De Gravitatione, an unpublished text in which Newton addresses the essential features associated with our representation of space and the relationship between our geometrical investigation of space and our knowledge of the form of space that is a part of the natural order. Attention to Newton’s account of space in De Gravitatione offers insight into the sense in which absolutist space is a priori and reveals why, in the Aesthetic, Kant could concede a priori geometrical knowledge to his absolutist opponent. What I highlight in particular is that, by Kant’s standards, Newton employs the very constructive method of mathematics that secures the a priori necessity of geometry, even though, as an absolutist, and as emphasized in the arguments of the Aesthetic, Newton fails to provide a metaphysics of space that explains the success of his mathematical method.     

The twins and the bucket: How Einstein made gravity rather than motion relative in general relativity

In publications in 1914 and 1918, Einstein claimed that his new theory of gravity in some sense relativizes the rotation of a body with respect to the distant stars (a stripped-down version of Newton's rotating bucket experiment) and the acceleration of the traveler with respect to the stay-at-home in the twin paradox. What he showed was that phenomena seen as inertial effects in a space-time coordinate system in which the non-accelerating body is at rest can be seen as a combination of inertial and gravitational effects in a (suitably chosen) space-time coordinate system in which the accelerating body is at rest. Two different relativity principles play a role in these accounts: (a) the relativity of non-uniform motion, in the weak sense that the laws of physics are the same in the two space-time coordinate systems involved; (b) what Einstein in 1920 called the relativity of the gravitational field, the notion that there is a unified inertio-gravitational field that splits differently into inertial and gravitational components in different coordinate systems. I provide a detailed reconstruction of Einstein's rather sketchy accounts of the twins and the bucket and examine the role of these two relativity principles. I argue that we can hold on to (b) but that (a) is either false or trivial.     

Protein folds: molecular systematics in three dimensions

Advances in methods of structure determination have led to the accumulation of large amounts of protein structural data. Some 500 distinct protein folds have now been characterized, representing one-third of all globular folds that exist. The range of known structural types and the relatively large fraction of the protein universe that has already been sampled have greatly facilitated the discovery of some unifying principles governing protein structure and evolutionary relationships. These include a highly skewed distribution of topological arrangements of secondary-structure elements that favors a few very common connectivities and a highly skewed distribution in the capacity of folds to accommodate unrelated sequences. These and other observations suggest that the number of folds is far fewer than the number of genes, and that the fold universe is dominated by a small number of giant attractors that accommodate large numbers of unrelated sequences. Thus all basic protein folds will likely be determined in the near future, laying the foundation for a comprehensive understanding of the biochemical and cellular functions of whole organisms.     

Evidence for the intracellular accumulation of anandamide in adiposomes

Anandamide is a lipid messenger that carries out a wide variety of biological functions. It has been suggested that anandamide accumulation involves binding to a saturable cellular component. To identify the structure(s) involved in this process, we analyzed the intracellular distribution of both biotinylated and radiolabeled anandamide, providing direct evidence that lipid droplets, also known as adiposomes, constitute a dynamic reservoir for the sequestration of anandamide. In addition, confocal microscopy and biochemical studies revealed that the anandamide-hydrolase is also spatially associated with lipid droplets, and that cells with a larger adiposome compartment have an enhanced catabolism of anandamide. Overall, these findings suggest that adiposomes may have a critical role in accumulating anandamide, possibly by connecting plasma membrane to internal organelles along the metabolic route of this endocannabinoid. S. Oddi, F. Fezza: These authors contributed equally to the study.     

Extracting information shocks from the Bank of England inflation density forecasts

This paper shows how to extract the density of information shocks from revisions of the Bank of England's inflation density forecasts. An information shock is defined in this paper as a random variable that contains the set of information made available between two consecutive forecasting exercises and that has been incorporated into a revised forecast for a fixed point event. Studying the moments of these information shocks can be useful in understanding how the Bank has changed its assessment of risks surrounding inflation in the light of new information, and how it has modified its forecasts accordingly. The variance of the information shock is interpreted in this paper as a new measure of ex ante inflation uncertainty that measures the uncertainty that the Bank anticipates information perceived in a particular quarter will pose on inflation. A measure of information absorption that indicates the approximate proportion of the information content in a revised forecast that is attributable to information made available since the last forecast release is also proposed.