最佳说明推理与溯因推理

最佳说明推理源于溯因推理,在一种推理过程中同时对科学假说的产生和评价作出了说明。文章考察了最佳说明推理的基本概念;从新假说产生即科学发现的视角,重构了皮尔士的溯因模型;在此基础上,比较了最佳说明推理与溯因推理的异同,比较性地评价了两者作为科学探究模式的优劣;最后,尝试性地得出几条结论。     

推理的广义概念——推理理论的基本问题

拉尔夫·约翰逊指出推理理论的研究是哲学领域亟待填补的空白,并指出对推理概念本身的探讨是推理理论研究中至关重要的基本问题。文章讨论了目前学者对这个概念的各种用法并试图解释推理与论证之间的概念混淆。为了澄清推理的概念,文章试图从形式逻辑研究抽象推理形式的角度和非形式逻辑研究真实推理的具体特征进行论述,提出了一个相对广义的推理之概念,以涵盖更多推理理论研究试图探讨的理论内涵。最后,文章再次指出了推理理论研究的学术意义。     

科学发现的本质及其逻辑机制的再发现

不管对科学发现进行语义分析，还是对科学发现活动本身进行历史探究，我们都会发现，科学发现除了具有社会、历史和心理上的属性外，它在本质上乃是新假说的产生、选择、修正、接受和解释的逻辑过程，其逻辑机制正是皮尔士与汉森等所倡导的溯因推理。而且，现代认知科学的新成果促进了溯因推理形式的不断完善，人们意识到在新假说产生与选择中背景理论与背景知识的重要作用，创新了溯因推理的推理形式，令人满意地回答了溯因推理何以能够以及如何能够成为科学发现的逻辑的问题。     

原因、假说选择与最佳解释推理

科学哲学领域的方法论研究者提出了各种对“最佳解释”,“融贯性”或者“统合性”的概率测度.这些测度如果有用,至少在某些情况下依赖它们作解释性推理应该比因果推理中通常用的统计方法更准确.格拉斯(2012)发现,大多数此类测度在小样本的情况下都不优于通常统计方法中用的似然度(likelihood)或后验概率.此后,格拉斯(2013)比较了他定义的测度和后验概率对解决一类假说选择问题的优劣.在该类问题中,需要从一组互不相容且非此即彼的假说中择一,但假说的概率未知.他的结果显示,在似然度已知而主观的先验概率和真实的概率分布不同的情况下,如果样本很小,极大化他的测度选择假说可以比极大化后验概率更准确.本文在格拉斯的框架下探究一些一致的模型选择方法在有限样本下的准确性.笔者发现不同方法在准确性上的优劣依赖于真实假说的分布以及所采用的主观先验概率.虽然很多方法可能在所有设置下都不是最优,但也没有方法在所有设置下都是最优.笔者认为,如果对真实假说的分布和主观先验概率没有限定,讨论哪种方法在样本量不大的情况下能更准确的选出真假说意义不大.     

论解释主义对彻底怀疑论的解答

当代怀疑论论证的一个主要形式是基于非充分决定原则,而解释主义则旨在反驳该怀疑论论证。解释主义者认为,根据我们的知觉证据以及最佳解释推理标准,日常情境假说比怀疑论假说更优,因此我们相信日常情境假说是有充分理由的。以沃格尔的方案为例,解释主义反驳彻底怀疑论进路的主要想法获得了清晰展示。但是,解释主义面临着来自三个方面的批评。首先,最佳解释推理本身需要辩护;其次,解释主义作为一种反怀疑论方案需要注意其有效性问题;最后,解释主义相比于其他反怀疑论策略,如知识论析取主义,并没有优势。结论指出,解释主义并不是较好的反对怀疑论途径。     

里普顿的最佳说明推理及其问题

里普顿的最佳说明推理建立在区分实际说明和潜力说明的基础上,这使得推理结果不是一个在前提的支持下更可能为真的说明,而是一个与推理的可靠性无关的最可爱的潜力说明.这个理论产生一系列困难.本文讨论这些困难的起因,并提出将可靠性作为缺省理由的方式有助于克服这些困难.     

贝叶斯推理谬误分析——基于因果联结与信念形成的解释进路

贝叶斯推理是概率推理的一种重要形式,但是在推理过程中会出现“先验概率忽视”和“证据质量忽视”的谬误,以往认为前者是由于人们在推理过程中采用了代表性启发式策略而产生的,而后者是由于缺乏相关的专业知识所造成的,但是前一解释在理论基础、前提假设和解释范围三个方面都存在问题,而后一解释又与实证研究结果不相符合.基于休谟的“因果...     

推理能力与逻辑规则--"沃森选择任务"论争的辨析

一直以来逻辑规则被认为是人们进行正确推理的依据.但是,1966年"沃森选择任务"(Wason selection task)实验的结果似乎表明人们的实际推理可能不遵守逻辑规则.这一问题已成为认知科学最重要的问题之一,逻辑学家和心理学家也一直争论到现在.本文通过分析各种理论对"沃森选择任务"的解释,表明人类的推理能力与逻辑规则并不冲突.     

认知神经科学中神经层次的反向推理述介

近些年来,随着功能神经成像技术的广泛应用,认知神经科学家越来越多地运用反向推理策略来建立和评价各种认知假说。科学哲学家们在讨论反向推理的性质时多把反向推理当作演绎或归纳,企图从有效性和可靠性角度来分析反向推理的合理性。分析表明,这个做法是失败的。反向推理中演绎和归纳交织在一起,同时还要参照其他认识论价值标准,应当被理解成一种溯因推理。反向推理作为溯因推理不仅对形成新假说有启发作用,也能够以最佳解释推理的形式对竞争假说做出筛选。     

回归自然的认知策略——中医诊断的模型化推理及其方法论启示

众所周知,中国传统医学和现代医学在诊断的方法论上存在极大的差别。但长久以来,人们对中医诊断的认识一直比较模糊。“基于模型推理”的概念使我们对中医诊断的推理过程具有了新的和比较清楚的认识。事实上,一个有效的中医诊断相当于一组复杂的假说推论。利用可直观转换的模型系统;基于模型选择模型、锁定假说;颠倒地使用三段论第一式（AAA）,是本文从中医诊断的考察中获得的关于解决假说推论中溯因难题的重要启示。对中医诊断的研究将有助于了解直观模型在人类认识过程中的作用,并推进回归自然的认知研究新策略。     

Modelling Abduction in Science by means of a Modal Adaptive Logic

Scientists confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses as a result of their abductive inferences, generally want to reason further on the different hypotheses one by one. This paper presents a modal adaptive logic MLA ^s that enables us to model abduction in such a way that the different explanatory hypotheses can be derived individually. This modelling is illustrated with a case study on the different hypotheses on the origin of the Moon.     

Problems with Peirce's Concept of Abduction

Abductive reasoning takes place in forming``hypotheses' in order to explain ``facts.' Thus, theconcept of abduction promises an understanding ofcreativity in science and learning. It raises,however, also a lot of problems. Some of them will bediscussed in this paper. After analyzing thedifference between induction and abduction (1), Ishall discuss Peirce's claim that there is a ``logic'of abduction (2). The thesis is that this claim can beunderstood, if we make a clear distinction betweeninferential elements and perceptive elements ofabductive reasoning. For Peirce, the creative act offorming explanatory hypotheses and the emergence of``new ideas' belongs exclusively to the perceptive sideof abduction. Thus, it is necessary to study the roleof perception in abductive reasoning (3). A furtherproblem is the question whether there is arelationship between abduction and Peirce's concept of``theorematic reasoning' in mathematics (4). Both formsof reasoning could be connected, because both arebased on perception. The last problem concerns therole of instincts in explaining the success ofabductive reasoning in science, and the questionwhether the concept of instinct might be replaced bymethods of inquiry (5).     

Abduction as a Logic and Methodology of Discovery: the Importance of Strategies

There are various ``classical' argumentsagainst abduction as a logic of discovery,especially that (1) abduction is too weak amode of inference to be of any use, and (2) inbasic formulation of abduction the hypothesisis already presupposed to be known, so it isnot the way hypotheses are discovered in thefirst place. In this paper I argue, bybringing forth the idea of strategies,that these counter-arguments are weaker thanmay appear. The concept of strategiessuggests, inter alia, that many inferentialmoves are taken into account at the same time.This is especially important in abductivereasoning, which is basically a very weak modeof inference. The importance of strategicthinking can already be seen in Charles S.Peirce's early treatments of the topic, and N.R.Hanson's later writings on abductionalthough they did not use the concept of``strategies.' On the whole, I am arguing thatthe focus should be more on methodologicalprocesses, and not only on validityconsiderations, which have dominated thediscussion about abduction.     

Understanding Natural Science Based on Abductive Inference: Continental Drift

This study aims to understand scientific inference for the evolutionary procedure of Continental Drift based on abductive inference, which is important for creative inference and scientific discovery during problem solving. We present the following two research problems: (1) we suggest a scientific inference procedure as well as various strategies and a criterion for choosing hypotheses over other competing or previous hypotheses; aspects of this procedure include puzzling observation, abduction, retroduction, updating, deduction, induction, and recycle; and (2) we analyze the “theory of continental drift” discovery, called the Earth science revolution, using our multistage inference procedure. Wegener’s Continental Drift hypothesis had an impact comparable to the revolution caused by Darwin’s theory of evolution in biology. Finally, the suggested inquiry inference model can provide us with a more consistent view of science and promote a deeper understanding of scientific concepts.     

Abduction and Estimation in Animals

One of the most pressing issues in understanding abduction is whether it is an instinct or an inference. For many commentators find it paradoxical that new ideas are products of an instinct and products of an inference at the same time. Fortunately, Lorenzo Magnani’s recent discussion of animal abduction sheds light on both instinctual and inferential character of Peircean abduction. But, exactly for what reasons are Peirce and Magnani so convinced that animal abduction can provide us with a novel perspective? Inspired by Peirce’s and Magnani’s discussions of animal abduction, I propose to compare Peirce’s and Magnani’s views of animal abduction with the estimative power of non-human animals and humans, which was one of the internal senses in medieval psychology.     

The ‘Galilean Style in Science’ and the Inconsistency of Linguistic Theorising

Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available.