From successful measurement to the birth of a law: Disentangling coordination in Ohm's scientific practice

In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm's work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means of abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm's measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm's experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm's assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm's law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination.     

And to end on a poetic note: Galen's authorial strategies in the pharmacological books

This paper examines the authorial strategies deployed by Galen in his two main pharmacological treatises devoted to compound remedies: Composition of Medicines according to Types and Composition of Medicines according to Places. Some of Galen's methods of self assertion (use of the first person; writing of prefaces) are conventional. Others have not received much attention from scholars. Thus, here, I examine Galen's borrowing of his sources' 'I'; his use of the phrase 'in these words'; and his recourse to Damocrates' verse to conclude pharmacological books. I argue that Galen's authorial persona is very different from that of the modern author as defined by Roland Barthes. Galen imitates and impersonates his pharmacological sources. This re-enactment becomes a way to gain experience (peira) of remedies and guarantees their efficacy.     

Mathematical formalisms in scientific practice: From denotation to model-based representation

The present paper argues that ‘mature mathematical formalisms’ play a central role in achieving representation via scientific models. A close discussion of two contemporary accounts of how mathematical models apply—the DDI account (according to which representation depends on the successful interplay of denotation, demonstration and interpretation) and the ‘matching model’ account—reveals shortcomings of each, which, it is argued, suggests that scientific representation may be ineliminably heterogeneous in character. In order to achieve a degree of unification that is compatible with successful representation, scientists often rely on the existence of a ‘mature mathematical formalism’, where the latter refers to a—mathematically formulated and physically interpreted—notational system of locally applicable rules that derive from (but need not be reducible to) fundamental theory. As mathematical formalisms undergo a process of elaboration, enrichment, and entrenchment, they come to embody theoretical, ontological, and methodological commitments and assumptions. Since these are enshrined in the formalism itself, they are no longer readily obvious to either the novice or the proficient user. At the same time as formalisms constrain what may be represented, they also function as inferential and interpretative resources.     

William Thomson's dynamical theory: An insight into a scientist's thinking

William Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, played a major role in the nineteenth century in changing scientific theory from the statical view, associated with imponderables, to the dynamical view which conceived of energy as a separate and convertible entity. Thomson's conversion from the statical to the dynamical view of nature was due to the influence of experimentalists, Michael Faraday and James Prescott Joule. It was Thomson's use of mathematical metaphor that enabled him to interpret on a theoretical level the physical explanation given by Faraday and Joule.     

From aether impulse to QED: Sommerfeld and the Bremsstrahlen theory

The radiation that is due to the braking of charged particles has been in the focus of theoretical physics since the discovery of X-rays by the end of the 19th century. The impact of cathode rays in the anti-cathode of an X-ray tube that resulted in the production of X-rays led to the view that X-rays are aether impulses spreading from the site of the impact. In 1909, Arnold Sommerfeld calculated from Maxwell׳s equations the angular distribution of electromagnetic radiation due to the braking of electrons. He thereby coined the notion of “Bremsstrahlen.” In 1923, Hendrik A. Kramers provided a quantum theoretical explanation of this process by means of Bohr׳s correspondence principle. With the advent of quantum mechanics the theory of bremsstrahlung became a target of opportunity for theorists like Yoshikatsu Sugiura, Robert Oppenheimer, and–again–Sommerfeld, who presented in 1931 a comprehensive treatise on this subject. Throughout the 1930s, Sommerfeld׳s disciples in Munich and elsewhere extended and improved the bremsstrahlen theory. Hans Bethe and Walter Heitler, in particular, in 1934 presented a theory that was later regarded as “the most important achievement of QED in the 1930s” (Freeman Dyson). From a historical perspective the bremsstrahlen problem may be regarded as a probe for the evolution of theories in response to revolutionary changes in the underlying principles.     

Neurath’s protocol statements revisited: sketch of a theory of scientific testimony

This paper puts forward a significant revision of the interpretation of Neurath’s proposal for the form and content of so-called protocol sentences that was given by the author some years ago. Importantly, it eschews the ambition to give necessary and sufficient conditions for Neurath’s explicandum and instead aims merely to provide a characterisation of central cases. Even more importantly, it refocusses the explicandum from observation statements generally to observation reports and casts Neurath’s proposal in the form of an incipient theory of scientific testimony, in particular, testimony about observational evidence. In light of this analysis the paper then links Neurath’s proposal to current debates about the viability of Sellars’s anti-foundationalism and explores the nature of testimony and the justification of perceptual knowledge in science and everyday life.     

Scientific patronage in the age of Darwin: The curious case of William Boyd Dawkins

This essay examines the curious relationship between Charles Darwin and the palaeontologist William Boyd Dawkins (1837–1929). Dawkins was a beneficiary of Darwin's patronage and styled himself as a Darwinian to Darwin and the public, yet viciously attacked Darwin and his theory in anonymous reviews. This has confused historians who have misunderstood the exact nature of Dawkins's attitude towards evolution and his relationship to Darwin. The present study explains both the reasons for Dawkins's contradictory statements and his relationship with Darwin. I introduce Batesian mimicry as a conceptual framework to make sense of Dawkins's actions, suggesting that Dawkins mimicked a Darwinian persona in order to secure advancement in the world of Victorian science. Dawkins's pro-Darwinian stance, therefore, was a façade, an act of mimicry. I argue that Dawkins exploited Darwin for his patronage – which took the form of advice, support from Darwin's well-placed friends, and monetary assistance – while safely expressing his dissent from Darwinian orthodoxy in the form of anonymous reviews. This is, therefore, a case study in how scientific authority and power could be gained and maintained in Victorian science by professing allegiance to Darwin and Darwinism.     

The career of continental drift theory: An application of Imre Lakatos' analysis of scientific growth to the rise of drift theory

The continental drift research programme reigns supreme within the geological community. The programme achieved its regal status only within the last decade. Its ascension to the summit took over fifty years, and required numerous switchbacks. Although its climb may seem haphazard, I argue that there is an overall rationale to its development which is partially elucidated by the account of scientific growth and change as put forth by Imre Lakatos. However, at least two alterations must be made in Lakatos' analysis. One concerns his analysis of ‘novel fact’, and the other is concerned with his thesis that the hard core of a research programme remains the same throughout the programme's lifetime. I consider and reject Elie Zahar's notion of ‘novel fact’, introduce an alternative notion of ‘novel fact’, and argue that Lakatos and his followers must abandon the thesis that a research programme's hard core is immune from change, but that they can do so without endangering Lakatos' overall account of scientific growth and change.     

Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations: The case for waiving expertise

The fragmentation of academic disciplines forces individuals to specialise. In doing so, they become experts over their narrow area of research. However, ambitious scientific projects, such as the search for gravitational waves, require them to come together and collaborate across disciplinary borders. How should scientists with expertise in different disciplines treat each others’ expert claims? An intuitive answer is that the collaboration should defer to the opinions of experts. In this paper we show that under certain seemingly innocuous assumptions, this intuitive answer gives rise to an impossibility result when it comes to aggregating the beliefs of experts to deliver the beliefs of a collaboration as a whole. We then argue that when experts’ beliefs come into conflict, they should waive their expert status.     

Socially conditioned mathematical change: the case of the French Revolution

This paper examines a historical case of conceptual change in mathematics that was fundamental to its progress. I argue that in this particular case, the change was conditioned primarily by social processes, and these are reflected in the intellectual development of the discipline. Reorganization of mathematicians and the formation of a new mathematical community were the causes of changes in intellectual content, rather than being mere effects. The paper focuses on the French Revolution, which gave rise to revolutionary developments in mathematics. I examine how changes in the political constellation affected mathematicians both individually and collectively, and how a new professional community—with different views on the objects, problems, aims, and values of the discipline—arose. On the basis of this account, I will discuss such Kuhnian themes as the role of the professional community and normal versus revolutionary development.