Physics Develops Unaffected by Constructivism

The way physics and other parts of science work can be explained in the framework of radical constructivism. However, this constructivist view itself shows that a uniquily accepted epistemology, constructivism or any other, would not be an advantage for the developmentof science. Unlike physics some parts of science successfully use constructivist concepts inside their theories. Because this is the case particularly in learning theory, constructivist ideas can help to improve physics teaching.     

"哲学资本"——布迪厄社会理论的"工具箱"

布迪厄是法国当代著名社会学家,更是法国当代著名哲学家。但由于多种原因,我国学界并没有把他作为法国当代著名哲学家来对待,因此,我国学者对布迪厄的哲学思想了解的不多。布迪厄依靠自己拥有的哲学资本①(哲学博士和哲学教师资格文凭),创造性地运用系统论、普遍联系和认识论等哲学思想,使其社会理论凸现出建构的结构主义或结构的建构主义、关系主义和反思性的哲学特征,布迪厄在创立社会理论的过程中,哲学资本起到了工具箱②的作用。     

The Construction of Chaos Theory

This paper aims at a logico-mathematical analysis of the concept of chaos from the point of view of a constructivist philosophy of physics. The idea of an internal logic of chaos theory is meant as an alternative to a realist conception of chaos. A brief historical overview of the theory of dynamical systems is provided in order to situate the philosophical problem in the context of probability theory. A finitary probabilistic account of chaos amounts to the theory of measurement in the line of a quantum-theoretical foundational perspective and the paper concludes on the non-classical internal logic of chaos theory. Finally, deterministic chaos points to a philosophy which asserts that chaotic systems are no less measurable than other physical systems where predictable and non–predictable phenomena intermingle in a constructive theory of measurement.

Symmetries and Symmetry-Breakings: The Fabric of Physical Interactions and the Flow of Time

This short note develops some ideas along the lines of the stimulating paper by Heylighen (Found Sci 15 4(3):345–356, 2010a). It summarizes a theme in several writings with Francis Bailly, downloadable from this author’s web page. The “geometrization” of time and causality is the common ground of the analysis hinted here and in Heylighen’s paper. Heylighen adds a logical notion, consistency, in order to understand a possible origin of the selective process that may have originated this organization of natural phenomena. We will join our perspectives by hinting to some gnoseological complexes, common to mathematics and physics, which may shed light on the issues raised by Heylighen.     

A Physical Approach to the Construction of Cognition and to Cognitive Evolution

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.(e.g., the law of energy conservation can bederived from the homogeneity of time and bythis depends on our mental time metricgenerator). So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously (for ex.: most scientistssee cognitive evolution converging towards adefinitive world picture, whereas organicevolution obviously has no specific focus (the`pride of creation').     

Systems and Beliefs

Systems thinking provides insights into how ideas interact and change, and constructivism is an example of this type of systemic approach. In the 1970s constructivism emphasised the development of mathematical and scientific ideas in children. Recently constructivist ideas are applied much more generally. Here I use this approach to consider beliefs and their role in conflicts and the conditions needed for reconciliation. If we look at Reality in terms of how we construct it as a human cognitive process, we recognise two things. First, that we cannot go beyond our senses and thoughts to what exists independently of us, and second, if we construct what we know we have to take responsibility for this. This inevitably focuses our thinking on the relation we have with the physical and social world, we are a part of the universe rather than apart from it. This paper argues that accepting and understanding these limits of human knowing together with our interconnectedness provide opportunities to understand conflicting positions. To resolve conflict, people with opposing viewpoints have to be prepared to understand each other. That is a challenge because our own reality plays a vital role in our lives, for everything from personal survival to social support.     

Mathematical Models and Reality: A Constructivist Perspective

To explore the relation between mathematical models and reality, four different domains of reality are distinguished: observer-independent reality (to which there is no direct access), personal reality, social reality and mathematical/formal reality. The concepts of personal and social reality are strongly inspired by constructivist ideas. Mathematical reality is social as well, but constructed as an autonomous system in order to make absolute agreement possible. The essential problem of mathematical modelling is that within mathematics there is agreement about ‘truth’, but the assignment of mathematics to informal reality is not itself formally analysable, and it is dependent on social and personal construction processes. On these levels, absolute agreement cannot be expected. Starting from this point of view, repercussion of mathematical on social and personal reality, the historical development of mathematical modelling, and the role, use and interpretation of mathematical models in scientific practice are discussed.     

Radical Constructivism in Biology and Cognitive Science

This article addresses the issue of “objectivism vs constructivism” in two areas,biology and cognitive science, which areintermediate between the natural sciences suchas physics (where objectivism is dominant) andthe human and social sciences (whereconstructivism is widespread). The issues inbiology and in cognitive science are intimatelyrelated; in each of these twin areas, the “objectivism vs constructivism” issue isinterestingly and rather evenly balanced; as aresult, this issue engenders two contrastingparadigms, each of which has substantialspecific scientific content. The neo-Darwinianparadigm in biology is closely resonant withthe classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitivescience, and both of them are intrinsicallyobjectivist. The organismic paradigm inbiology, based on the concept of autopoiesis,is consonant with the paradigm of “enaction” incognitive science; the latter paradigms are bothprofoundly constructivist.In cognitive science, the objectivism vsconstructivism issue is internal to thescientific field itself and reflexivity isinescapable. At this level, strong ontologicalobjectivism is self-contradictory and thereforeuntenable. Radical constructivism isself-coherent; but it also rehabilitatesa weak form of objectivism as a pragmaticallyviable alternative. In conclusion, there is aneven-handed reciprocity between “objectivist”and “constructivist” perspectives. Finally, thearticle examines the consequences of thisconclusion for fields other than cognitivescience: biology; physics and the naturalsciences; and the human and social sciences.     

A Non-confrontational Art of Living in the Technosphere and Infosphere

Several trends in contemporary philosophy have revived the question of the good life. This article addresses the more elaborate notion of an “art of living” in the specific context of the technosphere on the basis of recent works in philosophy of technology. It also brings ideas from Asian philosophy and from Buddhism in particular into the discussion. The focus is on the notion of non-confrontation, which could lead to a decisive change in the methods and scope of technology assessment within the humanities. The art of living in the technosphere emerges as an existential virtuosity that pertains to practical wisdom.     

Foundations and Methodology for an Evolutionary World View: A Review of the Principia Cybernetica Project

The Principia Cybernetica Project was created to develop an integrated philosophy or world view, based on the theories of evolution, self-organization, systems and cybernetics. Its conceptual network has been implemented as an extensive website. The present paper reviews the assumptions behind the project, focusing on its rationale, its philosophical presuppositions, and its concrete methodology for computer-supported collaborative development. Principia Cybernetica starts from a process ontology, where a sequence of elementary actions produces ever more complex forms of organization through the mechanism of variation and selection, and metasystem transition. Its epistemology is constructivist and evolutionary: models are constructed by subjects for their own purposes, but undergo selection by the environment. Its ethics takes fitness and the continuation of evolution as the basic value, and derives more concrete guidelines from this implicit purpose. Together, these postulates and their implications provide answers to a range of age-old philosophical questions.     

Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis

This paper studies the Lockean thesis from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic. The Lockean thesis states that belief can be defined as ‘sufficiently high degree of belief’. Its main problem is that it gives rise to a notion of belief which is not closed under conjunction. This problem is typical for classical epistemic logic: it is single-agent and static. I argue that from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic, the Lockean thesis fares much better. I briefly mention that it can successfully be extended from single-agent to multi-agent settings. More importantly, I show that accepting the Lockean thesis (and a more sophisticated version for conditional beliefs) leads to a significant and unexpected unification in the dynamic behavior of (conditional) belief and high (conditional) probability with respect to public announcements. This constitutes a methodological argument in favor of the Lockean thesis. Furthermore, if one accepts Baltag’s Erlangen program for epistemology, this technical observation has even stronger philosophical implications: because belief and high probability display the same dynamic behavior, it is plausible that they are indeed one and the same epistemic notion.     

Constructivism, Cognition, and Science – An Investigation of Its Links and Possible Shortcomings

This paper addresses the questions concerningthe relationship between scientific andcognitive processes. The fact that both,science and cognition, aim at acquiring somekind of knowledge or representationabout the “world” is the key for establishing alink between these two domains. It turns outthat the constructivist frameworkrepresents an adequate epistemologicalfoundation for this undertaking, as its focusof interest is on the (constructive)relationship between the world and itsrepresentation. More specifically, it will beshown how cognitive processes and their primaryconcern to construct a representation of theenvironment and to generate functionallyfitting behavior can act as the basis forembedding the activities and dynamics of theprocess of science in them by making use ofconstructivist concepts, such as functionalfitness, structure determinedness, etc.Cognitive science and artificiallife provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interactionbetween each other and with the environmentenabling us to establish this link betweencognitive processes and thedevelopment/dynamics of scientific theories.The concepts of activation, synaptic weight,and genetic (representational) spaces arepowerful tools which can be used as“explanatory vehicles”for a cognitivefoundation of science, more specifically forthe “context of discovery” (i.e., thedevelopment, construction, and dynamics ofscientific theories and paradigms).Representational spaces do not only offer us abetter understanding of embedding science incognition, but also show, how theconstructivist framework, both, can act as anadequate epistemological foundation for theseprocesses and can be instantiated by theserepresentational concepts from cognitivescience. The final part of this paper addresses somemore fundamental questions concerning thepositivistic and constructivist understandingof science and human cognition. Among otherthings it is asked, whether a purelyfunctionalist and quantitative view of theworld aiming almost exclusively at itsprediction and control is really satisfying forour intellect (having the goal of achieving aprofound understanding of reality).     

Virtual Invaders

Since both responses interrogate different aspects of my article “The screen as an in-between” (Vanderbeeken 2011), I will address them separately. Vanhoutte rightly questions the affinities of my theses with Luddism, Orwell and Baudrillard’s theoretical terrorism. My reply discusses why these reactionary positions are currently out of joint. Hoens rightly questions my interpretation of the notion ‘passion for the real’ and whether the examples discussed delineate the specificity of new media. My reply discusses how I take this notion as a starting point for an analysis that complements rather then criticises Badiou and ?i?ek and how the apparent resemblance between old and new media in fact entails significant differences.     

How Deep is the Surface? A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Meaning-Making in Living Systems

Living systems are characterized by unique properties that make them resistant to the ``information-processingperspective' of traditional cognitive science.This paper details those unique properties andoffers a new theoretical framework forunderstanding the behavior of living systems.This framework leans heavily on ideas fromgeneral systems theory (specifically Bateson'sinteractionist perspective), semiotics, andMerleau-Ponty's phenomenology. The benefits ofusing this framework are illustrated withexamples from two different domains: immunologyand verbal interaction.     

Using Wittgenstein’s Family Resemblance Principle to Learn Exemplars

The introduction of the notion of family resemblance represented a major shift in Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the meaning of words, moving away from a belief that words were well defined, to a view that words denoted less well defined categories of meaning. This paper presents the use of the notion of family resemblance in the area of machine learning as an example of the benefits that can accrue from adopting the kind of paradigm shift taken by Wittgenstein. The paper presents a model capable of learning exemplars using the principle of family resemblance and adopting Bayesian networks for a representation of exemplars. An empirical evaluation is presented on three data sets and shows promising results that suggest that previous assumptions about the way we categories need reopening.

Theories,theoretical models,truth

This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski's theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski's theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science.In this paper I argue that Tarski's chief concern was the following question. Suppose a language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L ⁺. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L ⁺ and, if it can, how can this be done?     

On a Transvariation Based Measure of Group Separability

In this paper, the potentialities of transvariation (Gini, 1959) in measuring the separation between two groups of multivariate observations are explored. With this aim, a modified version of Gini’s notion of multidimensional transvariation is proposed. According to Gini (1959), two groups G₁ and G₂ are said to transvary on the k-dimensional variable X = (X₁,...,X_h,...,X_k) if there exists at least one pair of units, belonging to different groups, such that for h = 1,...,k the sign of the difference between their X_h values is opposite to that of m_1h −m_2h, where m_1h and m_2h are the corresponding group mean values of X_h. We introduce a modification that allows us to derive a measure of group separation, which can be profitably used in discriminating between two groups. The performance of the measure is tested through simulation experiments. The results show that the proposed measure is not sensitive to distributional assumptions and highlight its robustness against outliers.     

Emergence,Computation and the Freedom Degree Loss Information Principle in Complex Systems

We consider processes of emergence within the conceptual framework of the Information Loss principle and the concepts of (1) systems conserving information; (2) systems compressing information; and (3) systems amplifying information. We deal with the supposed incompatibility between emergence and computability tout-court. We distinguish between computational emergence, when computation acquires properties, and emergent computation, when computation emerges as a property. The focus is on emergence processes occurring within computational processes. Violations of Turing-computability such as non-explicitness and incompleteness are intended to represent partially the properties of phenomenological emergence, such as logical openness, given by the observer’s cognitive role; structural dynamics where change regards rules rather than only values; and multi-modelling where multiple non-equivalent models are required to model such structural dynamics. In this way, we validate, from an epistemological viewpoint, models and simulations of phenomenological emergence where the sequence of events constitutes the natural, analogical non-Turing computation which a cognitive complex system can reproduce through learning. Reproducibility through learning is different from Turing-like computational iteration. This paper aims to open a new, non-reductionist understanding of the conceptual relationship between emergence and computability.