Coal to Diamonds

In this commentary to Napoletani et al. (Foundations of Science 16:1–20, 2011), we put agnostic science in a wider historical context of philosophy of mathematics. Secondly, the parallel to Tukey’s “exploratory data analysis” will be discussed. Thirdly, it will be argued that what is new is the mutually interdependent dynamics of data (on which Napoletani et al. focus) and of computational modeling—which puts science closer to engineering and vice versa.     

Science Is Not Always “Self-Correcting”

Some prominent scientists and philosophers have stated openly that moral and political considerations should influence whether we accept or promulgate scientific theories. This widespread view has significantly influenced the development, and public perception, of intelligence research. Theories related to group differences in intelligence are often rejected a priori on explicitly moral grounds. Thus the idea, frequently expressed by commentators on science, that science is “self-correcting”—that hypotheses are simply abandoned when they are undermined by empirical evidence—may not be correct in all contexts. In this paper, documentation spanning from the early 1970s to the present is collected, which reveals the influence of scientists’ moral and political commitments on the study of intelligence. It is suggested that misrepresenting findings in science to achieve desirable social goals will ultimately harm both science and society.     

哲学已死?——霍金的哲学思想

霍金在《大设计》中声称"哲学已死"。他的"哲学已死"究竟是指什么?本文考察霍金的哲学思想,指出霍金以自然定律统治自然的"科学决定论"为基本原则,试图在科学的框架内对本体论、因果律以及宇宙本质等问题做出"科学"的解答。霍金的"解题"并不成功,哲学当然也没死亡。霍金结合最新的物理科学进展为哲学的基础性问题提供一种可能的答案,却是有意义富有启发性的尝试。     

试论术语学的建构是一种“科学研究纲领”的思想——兼评“交流(交际)术语学”在术语学发展中的作用

20世纪90年代至今,虽然传统术语学思想受到多方质疑,但当今全球化的术语学理论和实践并没有到消极的“十字路口”。与之相反,术语学建设变得更加稳健和朝气蓬勃。文章从科学哲学的角度,论述西方学者提出的“术语学是一种科学研究纲领”的思想,并对交流(交际)术语学在术语学发展中的作用做粗浅评价。     

Complexity and Context-Dependency

It is argued that given the “anti-anthropomorphic” principle—that the universe is not structured for our benefit—modelling trade-offs will necessarily mean that many of our models will be context-specific. It is argued that context-specificity is not the same as relativism. The “context heuristic”—that of dividing processing into rich, fuzzy context-recognition and crisp, conscious reasoning and learning—is outlined. The consequences of accepting the impact of this human heuristic in the light of the necessity of accepting context-specificity in our modelling of complex systems is examined. In particular the development of “islands” or related model clusters rather than over-arching laws and theories. It is suggested that by accepting and dealing with context (rather than ignoring it) we can push the boundaries of science a little further.     

What Second Order Science Reveals About Scientific Claims: Incommensurability,Doubt, and a Lack of Explication

The traditional sciences often bracket away ambiguity through the imposition of “enabling constraints”—making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science reveals hidden issues, problems and assumptions which all too often escape the attention of the practicing scientist. These hidden values—precisely because they are hidden and not made explicit—can get in the way of the public’s acceptance of a scientific claim. A conflict in understood meaning—between the scientist’s restricted claims and the public’s broader understanding of those same claims can result in cognitive dissonance or the equivalent of the Mori Uncanny Valley. Scientists often react to these differences by claiming “incommensurability” between their restricted claim and the public’s understanding. Second order science, by explicating the effects of variations in values assumed for these uceps and associated impacts on related scientific claims, can often moot these assertions of incommensurability and thereby promote greater scientific understanding. This article explores how second order science can address issues of public doubt regarding the scientific enterprise using examples from medicine, diet and climate science.     

Second Order Science: Examining Hidden Presuppositions in the Practice of Science

The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. To overcome this barrier, ‘science’ has imposed “enabling constraints”—hidden assumptions which are given the status of ceteris paribus. Such assumptions allow ambiguity to be bracketed away at the expense of transparency. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions, which we refer to throughout the article as “uceps.” The meanings of the various uceps are shown via their applicability to the science of climate change. Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. Second order science reveals hidden issues, problems and assumptions which all too often escape the attention of the practicing scientist (but which can also get in the way of the acceptance of a scientific claim). This article lays out initial foundations for second order science, its ontology, methodology, and implications.     

Being Post-Positivist . . . or Just Talking About it?

Hans Ruin and Patrick Heelan join me in celebrating the rise of post-positivist and phenomenological approaches to scientific and technological practice. Yet as they both know, I am also concerned that the very presence of all the new accounts which give voice to this trend may tempt us into concluding prematurely that the traditional understanding of science and technology has already been displaced. With especially Ruin’s encouragement, I expand my original discussion of this concern by explaining why I agree with him about the ontologically mistaken suppositions that one might become post-positivistic by doing philosophy “meta-philosophically,” or become phenomenological by making “life” more basic that “nature.”     

What if We were Already in the In-Between? Further Ventures into the Ontologies of Science and Politics

What follows from the suggestion to pay attention to what is in-between science and politics? Karen François’s paper “In-between science and politics” follows Latour in arguing for the need for political theory to get out of the Platonic cave that it still inhabits. Political theory needs to be brought into the wild through empirical studies of how science and politics in fact intermix. And the Latourian proposition needs to be strengthened by focusing on the embodied knowledges that enable situated objectivities to emerge. Though worthwhile, these arguments are weakened by a superficial treatment of political theory and by a lack of attention to the difficulties involved in combining Latourian actor-network theory with the “strong objectivity” of standpoint theory. Most problematically the paper purports to define as an agenda (exploring the in-between of science and politics) what whole fields of inquiry have already been in full swing exploring for quite a while. The ‘turn to ontology’ in STS and social anthropology and the development of ‘empirical philosophy’ suggests what might be at stake in such explorations.     

The God Concept: Aristotle and the Philosophical Tradition

Before beginning a paper on metaphysics, it is wise to acknowledge the paper’s own “metaphysical” assumptions. In what follows, we must bear in mind that the history of philosophy is as interpretively diverse as it is long. We will begin with the premise that Metaphysics is indeed a foundational science. We will posit that Aristotle’s corpus is unified; that is, that Aristotle can be read as a “systematic” philosopher. Moreover, we will assume that the history of philosophy is itself a unity. If we posit such, “philosophy” can be read as a comprehensible continuity: a certainly contestable position. We must bear in mind that similitude is decidedly not identity; however, similitude does imply a certain conceptual correlation, one which, when pressed, may yield interesting, if not unexpected, results. Thus, we will travel at lightning speed through what took a snail’s pace to develop, “mapping,” so to speak, the structure of the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1941) onto the traditional historical divisions of the history of philosophy. We will begin with Aristotle himself in the Ancient period, move to Averroes (the Ibn-Rushd of this paper) in the Medieval period, focus on Descartes and Spinoza as Modern thinkers and, finally, end in Heidegger and Sartre in Contemporary philosophy. This is philosophy with a capital “P,” which may or may not be the reader’s preferred position, let alone the writer’s. But, for our purposes here, it is, nonetheless, inevitable.     

马克思主义作为科学哲学在国外的历史与现状

与马克思主义人文主义解读相比,马克思传统的科学性解读在国内的处境及研究与它的应有的地位极不相称。那么作为一种科学哲学的马克思主义在国外的研究处境如何呢?笔者所在的研究团队在国外访学期间,通过对大量文献的收集与整理,发现对马克思主义科学哲学的研究在国外已经形成了如下共识:将实践范畴作为严整的(社会)科学探索;马克思传统中的科学研究与哲学升华的相互依赖;辩证唯物主义本体论及辩证法对于唯物史观的逻辑优先性;严整的(社会)科学探索作为哲学理解的基础性地位等。在此基础上,国外形成了几种代表性的研究领域:对马克思恩格斯经典著作中的科学哲学思想的深入挖掘;马克思主义作为科学哲学在前苏联的传播与发展;马克思主义在社会主义国际和共产国际之间的理论与实践;马克思主义在当代科学哲学中的延续;西方马克思主义科学哲学的初步探索等。     

Discovering the Principle of Finality in Computational Machines

In this essay we argue that the notion of machine necessarily includes its being designed for a purpose. Therefore, being a mechanical system is not enough for being a machine. Since the experimental scientific method excludes any consideration of finality on methodological grounds, it is then also insufficient to fully understand what machines are. Instead in order to understand a machine it is first required to understand its purpose, along with its structure, in clear parallel with Aristotle’s final and formal causes. Obviously, purpose and structure are not machine components that can physically interact with other components; nonetheless they are essential to understanding their operation. This casts an interesting light on the relationship between mind and body: for just as an artifact’s finality and structure explain its operation, so also consciousness is the explanation—not the efficient cause—of specifically human behavior. What machines and human beings have in common is that, in order to understand them, it is necessary to appeal to the principle of finality. Yet while finality is given and extrinsic in the case of machines, we human beings are characterized by the ability to self-propose our own ends. Since the principle of finality is essential to understanding the production of machines, the traditional view in modern Western philosophy that finality lies beyond the scope of objective/scientific knowledge should be rectified to allow for a genuine science of the artificial. We think a correct understanding of final causality will overcome current resistance to this principle.     

道家哲学与现代物理哲学的契合性考察

与儒家"向内觅理"有别,道家重视外向的"天之道",对自然之源和万物之本多有探讨,形成了独特而深刻的自然哲学思想,诸如"道""朴""无""有""阴阳"等自然哲学概念,在此基础上形成了"道生万物"的宇宙创生观,"负阴抱阳"的自然运行观,"道通为一"的世界统一观等自然哲学思想.这些概念和思想被现代物理科学,特别是量子物理学所...     

科学知识变化的三种解释模式及其评价

科学知识的发展变化问题是20世纪科学哲学所关注的核心论题之一。纵观20世纪科学哲学的发展，主要地形成了三种解释模式：逻辑一理性论模式、认知论模式和社会学模式。虽然在20世纪的最后30年认知主义者和科学知识社会学家都对逻辑一理性论进行了猛烈的批判，但它们也未能对科学知识的变化问题给出令人满意的说明。对科学知识发展变化的完全说明应是这三种模式的有机统一。     

Representation and Truthlikeness

Woosuk Park’s paper “Misrepresentation in Context” is a useful plea for a theory of representation with promising interaction between cognitive science, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. In this paper, I argue that such a unified account is provided by Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics. This theory puts Park’s criticism of Nelson Goodman and Jerry Fodor in context. Some of Park’s pertinent remarks on the problem of misrepresentation can be illuminated by the account of truthlikeness and idealization developed by philosophers of science.     

Understanding Natural Science Based on Abductive Inference: Continental Drift

This study aims to understand scientific inference for the evolutionary procedure of Continental Drift based on abductive inference, which is important for creative inference and scientific discovery during problem solving. We present the following two research problems: (1) we suggest a scientific inference procedure as well as various strategies and a criterion for choosing hypotheses over other competing or previous hypotheses; aspects of this procedure include puzzling observation, abduction, retroduction, updating, deduction, induction, and recycle; and (2) we analyze the “theory of continental drift” discovery, called the Earth science revolution, using our multistage inference procedure. Wegener’s Continental Drift hypothesis had an impact comparable to the revolution caused by Darwin’s theory of evolution in biology. Finally, the suggested inquiry inference model can provide us with a more consistent view of science and promote a deeper understanding of scientific concepts.     

Quantum Superpositions and the Representation of Physical Reality Beyond Measurement Outcomes and Mathematical Structures

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical (actualist) representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the (metaphysical) presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions.     

关于弦论的哲学分析

弦论属于当前粒子物理学的研究前沿。在理论建构上,它内含了许多非传统的特性,这些特性使它切入到科学哲学形而上的核心争论之中。本文将系统考究弦论所牵涉的经验可证实性、理论唯一性、亚决定性原理、科学实在论、科学隐喻和科学统一等哲学问题,并给出相应的哲学分析。     

Beyond Physics? On the Prospects of Finding a Meaningful Oracle

Certain enterprises at the fringes of science, such as intelligent design creationism, claim to identify phenomena that go beyond not just our present physics but any possible physical explanation. Asking what it would take for such a claim to succeed, we introduce a version of physicalism that formulates the proposition that all available data sets are best explained by combinations of “chance and necessity”—algorithmic rules and randomness. Physicalism would then be violated by the existence of oracles that produce certain kinds of noncomputable functions. Examining how a candidate for such an oracle would be evaluated leads to questions that do not admit an easy resolution. Since we lack any plausible candidate for any such oracle, however, chance-and-necessity physicalism appears very likely to be correct.     

试论新中国“规划科学”模式的延续和发展——以“自然辩证法研究规划草案”为中心的考察

新中国成立后,哲学社会科学走上由国家主导的"规划科学"模式的道路。但受政治运动冲击、制度缺失等因素的影响,制定的各项哲学社会科学规划大都形同虚设,只有1956年制定的《自然辩证法(数学和自然科学中的哲学问题)十二年(1956-1967)研究规划草案》幸运地成为集中体现并延续上述"规划科学"模式的一个成功特例。虽然草案本身还只是一个不完善的学术性工作计划,但它依然充分发挥了"规划科学"模式的积极作用,推动了具有中国特色的自然辩证法事业的发展,在中国自然辩证法发展史上具有极其重要的地位和作用。