Heidegger on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Verfallenheit</Emphasis>

The question of Heidegger’s reflections on technology is explored in terms of ‘living with’ technology and including the socio-theoretical (Edinburgh) notion of ‘entanglement’ towards a review of Heidegger’s understanding of technology and media, including the entertainment industry and modern digital life. I explore Heidegger’s reflections on Gelassenheit by way of the Japanese aesthetic conception of life and of art as wabi-sabi understood with respect to Heidegger’s Gelassenheit as the art of Verfallenheit.     

Thinking Through the Prism of Life

The article provides an overview of the argument in Robert Scharff’s paper “Displacing epistemology: Being in the midst of technoscientific practice” (Scharff 2011), focusing on his central objective, to articulate a hidden ground of the current controversies in the philosophy of science and technology studies, between objectivism and constructivism, through a deeper confrontation with Heidegger’s legacy. The commentary addresses two aspects of Scharffs argument that deserve to be developed further, namely how it both criticizes and cultivates itself an ideal of the meta-knower, and how the idea of thinking from the perspective of life in Dilthey’s sense can be critically reflected through Heidegger’s later criticism. By rehearsing Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia, and also his gradually increased criticism of the very concept of life, the commentary tries to show how Scharff’s intervention can in fact be strengthened against possible criticism.     

当代技术哲学的海德格尔式马克思主义展开——以阿克塞洛斯为例

希腊裔法国哲学家科斯塔斯·阿克塞洛斯虽未进入当代主流技术哲学家谱系,但其思想却彰显了一条从马克思到海德格尔的当代技术哲学潜在进路.他从技术概念切入对马克思的诠释、随后在对马克思和海德格尔之间创造性对话的建构中阐发一种以技术现象及其经验为主要内容的"未来之思",这种思想以"行星性"概念为核心,最终迈向一种技术形而上学或技...     

海德格尔关于科学两种不同表述的内涵与统一性

海德格尔关于科学"本质"的两个命题虽然在表述上大相径庭,但在理论内核和论证方法上具有内在统一性。从内容上看,1938年"科学的本质是研究"和1953年"科学是现实之物的理论"这两个具有代表性的命题蕴含了科学"对现实之物的干预性加工"、"方法对科学的胜利"以及科学"专业化"的必然性与积极方面,体现了海德格尔科学思想的深邃和丰富性的一面。从逻辑结构上看,这两个命题通过"对置性"(Gegenstndlichkeit)这一概念贯通起来,体现了其思想与方法论上"一致性"的一面。只有把这两个具有内在统一性的命题结合起来才能更加深入地把握"科学的本质"及其局限性。这两种论述基本上包含了海德格尔关于"科学"的其他命题。海德格尔认为,只有不迷恋确定性、严格性与客观性,立足于"存在的历史"和活生生的"此在的生存",才能更好地把握科学。     

论技术对生活世界的规定性

技术全面地影响了我们的生活世界,不仅构造了我们的生活方式,而且模仿了我们真实有效的经验存在。技术所呈现的物质实在性在一定程度上使经验失去了有效性,影响了人类对生活世界的有效判断;技术标准规定了人的技术性存在,量化的指标变成了海德格尔的技术"座架"。     

论海德格尔的“四重体”观念与亚里士多德的四因说

晚期海德格尔经常使用作为世界的"天、地、神、人"四重整体来言说存在问题。这种四重整体观念乃是对亚里士多德四因说的一种典型重演:一方面援用了四因说的基本框架,另一方面把专注于自然物的四因说扩展到技术制作物领域,并引入了特殊意义上的"人"这一重要因素。这种处理方式表明海德格尔既再次切近了古代形而上学,但也立足于自身的技术性时代做出了重要更新。     

On Heidegger’s Actuality

In my reply to the commentaries by Babette Babich and Robert C. Scharff I make a distinction between critical remarks and additions that are relevant for my view on philosophy for substantive reasons and others that relate to a style or way of philosophizing. My reply to Scharff concerns the latter. I continue to defend an updated version of Heidegger’s thinking about technology, which I bring together with elements from the work of Don Ihde and Andrew Feenberg. I read all this from the perspective of a neo-pragmatist way of philosophizing, explicitly inspired by Richard Rorty.     

海德格尔论意向性及其生命意蕴

意向性是海德格尔现象学思想的中心主题,也是通达存在问题的重要路径。海德格尔重点探究了意向性的三个方面,并诠释了其内含的生命意蕴。第一,意向性在本性上是实践,表现为此在操劳着的生命活动。第二,意向性的根基是超越性,是从此在的在世引申出来的,呈示出生命之投身于世界的原初状态。第三,意向性的渊源是时间性,时间性的绽出境域为意向性之何所指提供了源泉,也决定了生命的绽出境域。这一思想迸射出生命的灵性之光,是对僵固的科学理论和学院哲学的批判,对人们关注实际的生命经验、认识生命的价值和意义具有重要作用。     

权力视域内的技术

现代哲学家对于技术的经典分析越来越彰显出对于技术理解的一种权力的视域。这肇始于海德格尔,马尔库塞、哈贝马斯、芬伯格和约瑟夫.劳斯继之。海德格尔认为现代技术作为座架拥有摆置的权力;马尔库塞和哈贝马斯认为现代技术作为一种不自觉的意识形态而宰制着人;芬伯格主张技术体现出一种知识与权力的双面特征,在技术的定形中体现的是一种类似于游戏的权力的运作;约瑟夫.劳斯则在科学技术的实践形相的背景下细致阐述实验室内外知识、技术与权力的互渗关系。对于技术权力化趋势可能产生的更复杂的后果,我们还没有足够的时间距离来进行审视。     

反思的现代性与技术理性的解构--海德格尔和福柯论现代技术问题

海德格尔和福柯对于现代技术问题的思考属于某种反思的现代性立场：无论前者对机械技术的本质的追问，还是后者对自我技术的谱系学分析，都没有简单地否定现代技术，而是揭示了现代技术的解蔽和遮蔽双重性。这样的立场告诉我们：面对现代技术的极度张扬，哲学应该坚持一种保守主义姿态，应该在更新的意义上恢复经验的地位。     

On Living with Technology through Renunciation and Releasement

Marc Van den Bosche suggests that Heidegger’s conceptions of Gestell and Gelassenheit, taken together with his analysis of Nietzschean Nihilism (interpreted especially by Wolfgang Schirmacher), depicts our era in a way that “supplements” Andrew Feenberg and Don Ihde’s work. Weaving these sources together, he sees the possibility of our becoming (quoting Schirmacher) “technicians” that “live, in a released way, within the groundless.” Here, I raise some questions about whether the author has really fitted all these sources together and argue that his idea of becoming post-modern “technicians” appears to require that we first practice a very un-Heideggerian kind of “renunciation.”     

The Uses of Reason in Times of Technical Mediation

The art of living idiom suits well a practice-oriented approach in ethics of technology. But what remains or becomes of the functioning and use of reason in ethics? In reaction to the comments by Huijer this reply elaborates in more detail how Foucault’s art of living can be adapted for a critical contemporary ethics of technology. And the aesthetic-political rationality in Foucault’s ethics is compared with Wellner’s suggestions of holding on to the notion of code but with a new meaning. Foucault’s fourfold scheme of subjectivation and a distinction of “below and above reason” structure the argument.     

The God Concept: Aristotle and the Philosophical Tradition

Before beginning a paper on metaphysics, it is wise to acknowledge the paper’s own “metaphysical” assumptions. In what follows, we must bear in mind that the history of philosophy is as interpretively diverse as it is long. We will begin with the premise that Metaphysics is indeed a foundational science. We will posit that Aristotle’s corpus is unified; that is, that Aristotle can be read as a “systematic” philosopher. Moreover, we will assume that the history of philosophy is itself a unity. If we posit such, “philosophy” can be read as a comprehensible continuity: a certainly contestable position. We must bear in mind that similitude is decidedly not identity; however, similitude does imply a certain conceptual correlation, one which, when pressed, may yield interesting, if not unexpected, results. Thus, we will travel at lightning speed through what took a snail’s pace to develop, “mapping,” so to speak, the structure of the unmoved mover of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1941) onto the traditional historical divisions of the history of philosophy. We will begin with Aristotle himself in the Ancient period, move to Averroes (the Ibn-Rushd of this paper) in the Medieval period, focus on Descartes and Spinoza as Modern thinkers and, finally, end in Heidegger and Sartre in Contemporary philosophy. This is philosophy with a capital “P,” which may or may not be the reader’s preferred position, let alone the writer’s. But, for our purposes here, it is, nonetheless, inevitable.     

STS视角的符号消费本质探析

符号消费是现代技术发展引发的新的消费方式,这种消费方式深刻地影响了人们的思维方式、价值观和审美意识。从STS视角揭示和剖析符号消费的本质及其社会后果,可以为建构现代技术发展与大众消费活动的合理关系提供一种可能性路径。     

自然科学时代的道德判断力——赫费对科学技术批判理论的批判

面对科学技术的强权,科学技术批判理论执着于机会与威胁的不同批判立场,在科学的道德评价上陷入二难抉择的困境;海德格尔拒绝道德理性,企图通过技术的形而上学批判而消解科学的强权,此做法也行不通。现代科技并不能回避道德的审视,但是,现代科技问题的悬而未决性质,决定了科学伦理学必须做出方法论上的转向。赫费认为,恢复判断力的德性地位,实现对科学问题的准确诊断,能够克服现代科技强权的二难困境,这在方法论上构成了对科学技术批判理论的批判。     

Who is Afraid of the Political? A Response to Robert Scharff and Michel Puech

In their respective commentaries to my article “Postphenomenology and the Politics of Sustainable Technology” both Robert Scharff and Michel Puech take issue with my postphenomenological inroad into the politics of technology. In a first step I try to accommodate the suggestions and objections raised by Scharff by making my account of the political more explicit. Consequently, I argue how an antagonistic relational conceptualisation of the political allows me to address head on Puech’s plea to leave politics behind and move towards an ethically informed, post-political approach to sustainability. “But perhaps the question philosophy is confronted with—through the question of the political—might be whether not all reasoning, including a purely theoretical reasoning, can truly only be a political reasoning, resulting in an inevitable, indeed necessary circular structure” (Boehm 2002; author’s translation). In a footnote to my original article ‘Postphenomenology and the Politics of Sustainable Technology’, I wrote that “for the purpose of this paper, it suffices to say that I use the adjective ‘political’ to indicate all aspects of human and non-human agency that are related to ‘shaping the good life’ (Goeminne 2011a).” With hindsight, brought about by the commentaries of Scharff (2011) and Puech (2011), I now see that I could not have been more optimistic. Or should I say naïve? Indeed, although coming from different angles and resulting in very different suggestions, both commentaries precisely target my postphenomenological inroad into the ‘politics’ of technology. In challenging my grounding of the politics of technology in a postphenomenological perspective, Scharff in particular invites me to make my notion of the political more explicit. In what follows, I will therefore first elaborate my take on the political dimension of technology in dialogue with Scharff’s comments and suggestions. Armed with this deepened concept of the political, I will then address Puech’s plea to leave politics behind and move towards an ethically informed, post-political approach to sustainability. Evidently, within the limits of this piece, I can only indicate the broader direction my conceptualisation of the political takes. It suffices perhaps to say that, partly induced by the commentaries of Scharff and Puech, the question of the political has meanwhile taken a much more prominent place in my research as can be seen from a few recent publications [e.g. Goeminne (2012) and Goeminne (forthcoming)]. In saying this, I am also expressing my indebtedness to the commentators for nudging me in this political direction.     

科技发明权与屠呦呦青蒿素发现争端的化解

科技发明权之争是科学史上司空见惯的现象,也是当今世界科技舞台上屡见不鲜的事情。因此,亟待从理论上为科技发明权的评判提供一个公正合理而切实可行的评判标准。本文尝试提出符合系统论整体性原则的科技评判标准,能在现实的科技发明权评判中发挥其积极作用,尤其能为解决纷繁复杂的科技发明权争端提供有益的启示。根据科技发明权总体性的评判标准,屠呦呦无可争议地享有青蒿素的发明权。因此,本文希望为当前青蒿素发明权之争画上一个句号。     

论海德格尔对"数学因素"的形而上分析

本文以海德格尔对"数学因素"的形而上分析为基点,力图通过海德格尔对"数学因素"的形而上与诠释学解释,以说明海德格尔在"数学因素"的本已规定上是如何界辨现代科学与现代形而上学的本质关联的观点.在海德格尔看来,"数学因素"在本源上就蕴含着现代科学与现代形而上学的一体性思考方式,据此得出形而上学完成于现代科学技术之中的基本结论.     

现象学视野中的技术创新

本文从现象学的视角考察技术创新。没有将意向性结构运用到对技术创新的追问中去：考察了意向性概念的变化，提出它在技术创新的现象学研究中的地位和作用；指出考察技术创新是揭示技术本质的方式之一。技术创新是现代技术得以显现其自身的前提和地平线（horizon）；技术具有清晰的意向性或存在论的结构，即技术“在——技术创新中——存在”。