Causation,information, and physics

This work outlines the novel application of the empirical analysis of causation, presented by Kutach, to the study of information theory and its role in physics. The central thesis of this paper is that causation and information are identical functional tools for distinguishing controllable correlations, and that this leads to a consistent view, not only of information theory, but also of statistical physics and quantum information. This approach comes without the metaphysical baggage of declaring information a fundamental ingredient in physical reality and exorcises many of the otherwise puzzling problems that arise from this view-point, particularly obviating the problem of ‘excess baggage’ in quantum mechanics. This solution is achieved via a separation between information carrying causal correlations of a single qubit and the bulk of its state space.     

String theory,Einstein, and the identity of physics: Theory assessment in absence of the empirical

String theorists are certain that they are practicing physicists. Yet, some of their recent critics deny this. This paper argues that this conflict is really about who holds authority in making rational judgment in theoretical physics. At bottom, the conflict centers on the question: who is a proper physicist? To illustrate and understand the differing opinions about proper practice and identity, we discuss different appreciations of epistemic virtues and explanation among string theorists and their critics, and how these have been sourced in accounts of Einstein's biography. Just as Einstein is claimed by both sides, historiography offers examples of both successful and unsuccessful non-empirical science. History of science also teaches that times of conflict are often times of innovation, in which novel scholarly identities may come into being. At the same time, since the contributions of Thomas Kuhn historians have developed a critical attitude towards formal attempts and methodological recipes for epistemic demarcation and justification of scientific practice. These are now, however, being considered in the debate on non-empirical physics.     

Number and measure: Hermann von Helmholtz at the crossroads of mathematics, physics, and psychology

In 1887 Helmholtz discussed the foundations of measurement in science as a last contribution to his philosophy of knowledge. This essay borrowed from earlier debates on the foundations of mathematics (Grassmann / Du Bois), on the possibility of quantitative psychology (Fechner / Kries, Wundt / Zeller), and on the meaning of temperature measurement (Maxwell, Mach). Late nineteenth-century scrutinisers of the foundations of mathematics (Dedekind, Cantor, Frege, Russell) made little of Helmholtz’s essay. Yet it inspired two mathematicians with an eye on physics (Poincaré and Hölder), and a few philosopher-physicists (Mach, Duhem, Campbell). The aim of the present paper is to situate Helmholtz’s contribution in this complex array of nineteenth-century philosophies of number, quantity, and measurement.     

Setting up a discipline, II: British history of science and “the end of ideology”, 1931-1948

For the history of science the 1940s were a transformative decade, when salient scholars like Herbert Butterfield or Alexandre Koyré set out to shape postwar culture by promoting new standards for understanding science. Some years ago I placed these developments in a tradition of enduring arts-science tensions and the contemporary notion that previous, “scientistic”, historical practices needed to be confronted with disinterested codes of historical craft (Mayer, 2000). Here, I want to further explore the ideological dimensions of the processes through which the academic study of science became institutionalized. Butterfield’s generation of science historians moulded perception of science in highly specific ways. Whereas the scientist-historians of the 1930s put scientific innovation into its socio-economic contexts, postwar accounts portrayed the birth of modern science as an intellectual revolution. Anti-Marxism formed a defining feature of the process by which the image of scientific work as a disinterested journey of the mind came to be institutionalized. Rather than spelling the end of ideology, appointments processes in the early Cold War years reveal disagreement about what science was to be invariably coextensive with dissent about social and political order. Rather than testifying to irreconcilable conflicts between interestedness and historical craft, the work of both the 1930s and 40s speaks of surprisingly productive relations between the two.