Collaborative explanation,explanatory roles,and scientific explaining in practice

Scientific explanation is a perennial topic in philosophy of science, but the literature has fragmented into specialized discussions in different scientific disciplines. An increasing attention to scientific practice by philosophers is (in part) responsible for this fragmentation and has put pressure on criteria of adequacy for philosophical accounts of explanation, usually demanding some form of pluralism. This commentary examines the arguments offered by Fagan and Woody with respect to explanation and understanding in scientific practice. I begin by scrutinizing Fagan's concept of collaborative explanation, highlighting its distinctive advantages and expressing concern about several of its assumptions. Then I analyze Woody's attempt to reorient discussions of scientific explanation around functional considerations, elaborating on the wider implications of this methodological recommendation. I conclude with reflections on synergies and tensions that emerge when the two papers are juxtaposed and how these draw attention to critical issues that confront ongoing philosophical analyses of scientific explanation.     

The transcendental meditation technique, adrenocortical activity, and implications for stress.

The practice of the transcendental meditation technique in subjects eliciting this state regularly for 3--5 years is correlated with acute decline of adrenocortical activity not associated with sleep during the practice.     

The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication,tacit knowledge,and the dynamics of knowledge generation

This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters' regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins's point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Collins rightly highlights the epistemic uncertainty (and skepticism) surrounding much experimental research. However, I will argue that his analysis of tacit knowledge fails to elucidate the reasons why scientists often are (and should be) skeptical of other researchers' experimental results. I will present an analysis of tacit knowledge in experimental research that not only answers to this desideratum, but also shows how such skepticism can in fact be a vital enabling factor for the dynamic processes of experimental knowledge generation.     

String theory,Einstein, and the identity of physics: Theory assessment in absence of the empirical

String theorists are certain that they are practicing physicists. Yet, some of their recent critics deny this. This paper argues that this conflict is really about who holds authority in making rational judgment in theoretical physics. At bottom, the conflict centers on the question: who is a proper physicist? To illustrate and understand the differing opinions about proper practice and identity, we discuss different appreciations of epistemic virtues and explanation among string theorists and their critics, and how these have been sourced in accounts of Einstein's biography. Just as Einstein is claimed by both sides, historiography offers examples of both successful and unsuccessful non-empirical science. History of science also teaches that times of conflict are often times of innovation, in which novel scholarly identities may come into being. At the same time, since the contributions of Thomas Kuhn historians have developed a critical attitude towards formal attempts and methodological recipes for epistemic demarcation and justification of scientific practice. These are now, however, being considered in the debate on non-empirical physics.     

Multiple discoveries,inevitability, and scientific realism

When two or more (groups of) researchers independently investigating the same domain arrive at the same result, a multiple discovery occurs. The pervasiveness of multiple discoveries in science suggests the intuition that they are in some sense inevitable—that one should view them as results that force themselves upon us, so to speak. We argue that, despite the intuitive force of such an “inevitabilist insight,” one should reject it. More specifically, we distinguish two facets of the insight and argue that: (a) the profusion of multiple discoveries in scientific practice does not support the inevitabilist side of the inevitability/contingency of science controversy; and (b) the crucial role of background knowledge in scientific inquiry complicates the attempt to interpret the pervasiveness of multiple discoveries in realist terms.     

Mathematical reasoning: induction, deduction and beyond

Mathematics used to be portrayed as a deductive science. Stemming from Polya (1954), however, is a philosophical movement which broadens the concept of mathematical reasoning to include inductive or quasi-empirical methods. Interest in inductive methods is a welcome turn from foundationalism toward a philosophy grounded in mathematical practice. Regrettably, though, the conception of mathematical reasoning embraced by quasi-empiricists is still too narrow to include the sort of thought-experiment which Mueller describes as traditional mathematical proof (Mueller, 1969, p. 295) and which Lakatos examines in Proofs and refutations (Lakatos, 1976). This paper extends the concept of mathematical reasoning along two further dimensions to accommodate thought-experiment.     

Embodied Odysseys: Relics of stories about journeys through past,present, and future

This paper argues that the heritage represented by a museum should be seen not just in its individual objects but also in the relationships between them. The Conservatoire Nationale des Arts et Métiers and the Science Museum in London, the earliest great European science museums, were deeply concerned with the relationship between science and practice. The foundation speeches of the Deutsches Museum emphasised the concern with both past and future. Such ancestry provided hard-to-escape templates within which collections were built up over the subsequent century and more. Thus the Science Museum’s biotechnology collection developed at the very end of the twentieth century and albeit based on detailed historical research reflects the same concerns with science–technology relations as could be seen in the 1876 Loan Exhibition which started off the Science Museum. The physical presence of such carefully-structured accumulations of objects could embody and reinforce the reality of such categories as pure and applied science.     

Microbes,mathematics, and models

Microbial model systems have a long history of fruitful use in fields that include evolution and ecology. In order to develop further insight into modelling practice, we examine how the competitive exclusion and coexistence of competing species have been modelled mathematically and materially over the course of a long research history. In particular, we investigate how microbial models of these dynamics interact with mathematical or computational models of the same phenomena. Our cases illuminate the ways in which microbial systems and equations work as models, and what happens when they generate inconsistent findings about shared targets. We reveal an iterative strategy of comparative modelling in different media, and suggest reasons why microbial models have a special degree of epistemic tractability in multimodel inquiry.     

Putting a spin on circulating reference,or how to rediscover the scientific subject

Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless practices of science are thus re-united.     

Reichenbach on causality in 1923: Scientific inference,coordination, and confirmation

In The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920b), Reichenbach developed an original account of cognition as coordination of formal structures to empirical ones. One of the most salient features of this account is that it is explicitly not a top-down type of coordination, and in fact it is crucially “directed” by the empirical side. Reichenbach called this feature “the mutuality of coordination” but, in that work, did not elaborate sufficiently on how this is supposed to work. In a paper that he wrote less than two years afterwards (but that he published only in 1932), “The Principle of Causality and the Possibility of its Empirical Confirmation” (1923/1932), he described what seems to be a model for this idea, now within an analysis of causality that results in an account of scientific inference. Recent reassessments of his early proposal do not seem to capture the extent of Reichenbach's original worries. The present paper analyses Reichenbach's early account and suggests a new way to look at his early work. According to it, we perform measurements, individuate parameters, collect and analyse data, by using a “constructive” approach, such as the one with which we formulate and test hypotheses, which paradigmatically requires some simplicity assumptions. Reichenbach's attempt to account for all these aspects in 1923 was obviously limited and naive in many ways, but it shows that, in his view, there were multiple ways in which the idea of “constitution” is embodied in scientific practice.     

Deflationary representation,inference, and practice

This paper defends the deflationary character of two recent views regarding scientific representation, namely RIG Hughes' DDI model and the inferential conception. It is first argued that these views' deflationism is akin to the homonymous position in discussions regarding the nature of truth. There, we are invited to consider the platitudes that the predicate “true” obeys at the level of practice, disregarding any deeper, or more substantive, account of its nature. More generally, for any concept X, a deflationary approach is then defined in opposition to a substantive approach, where a substantive approach to X is an analysis of X in terms of some property P, or relation R, accounting for and explaining the standard use of X. It then becomes possible to characterize a deflationary view of scientific representation in three distinct senses, namely: a “no-theory” view, a “minimalist” view, and a “use-based” view—in line with three standard deflationary responses in the philosophical literature on truth. It is then argued that both the DDI model and the inferential conception may be suitably understood in any of these three different senses. The application of these deflationary ‘hermeneutics’ moreover yields significant improvements on the DDI model, which bring it closer to the inferential conception. It is finally argued that what these approaches have in common—the key to any deflationary account of scientific representation—is the denial that scientific representation may be ultimately reduced to any substantive explanatory property of sources, or targets, or their relations.     

Newton’s notion and practice of unification

In this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newton’s Principia. I will clarify Newton’s notion (as can be found in Newton’s utterances on unification) and practice of unification (its actual occurrence in his scientific work). In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis (Kitcher, Salmon and Schurz). I will argue, after showing that neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’s account aptly capture Newton’s notion and practice of unification, that Salmon’s later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmon’s account in order to answer the question at stake.     

Species concepts,process analysis,and the hierarchy of nature

Species figure prominently in all biological studies, but what a species actually is and how we recognize it in practice is still a much-debated issue. Present discussion revolves around five major species concepts: the biological, the evolutionary, the cladistic, the recognition and the phylogenetic concepts. Each of these species notions has its theoretical and practical problems. One important point that has emerged from recent discussions on the ontological status of species is that there is a tension between species concepts based on interbreeding and those based on genealogy, and that practical application of these two kinds of concept may give rise to incompatible results. Species recognized by one species concept appear to be essentially different entities compared with species demarcated by another. However, these different species may all represent real and objective entities in nature. What we perceive as a species depends on the evolutionary processes that we have made objects of our research. Some of these processes are between entities of the genealogical hierarchy of nature, while other processes relate to nature's ecological hierarchy. It is essential that our species concept should be adjusted to the focal level of our research program, thereby taking into full account the two process hierarchies of nature.     

Making sense of absolute measurement: James Clerk Maxwell,William Thomson,Fleeming Jenkin,and the invention of the dimensional formula

During the 1860s, the Committee on Electrical Standards convened by the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) attempted to articulate, refine, and realize a system of absolute electrical measurement. I describe how this context led to the invention of the dimensional formula by James Clerk Maxwell and subsequently shaped its interpretation, in particular through the attempts of William Thomson and Fleeming Jenkin to make absolute electrical measurement intelligible to telegraph engineers. I identify unit conversion as the canonical purpose for dimensional formulae during the remainder of the nineteenth century and go on to explain how an operational interpretation was developed by the French physicist Gabriel Lippmann. The focus on the dimensional formula reveals how various conceptual, theoretical, and material aspects of absolute electrical measurement were taken up or resisted in experimental physics, telegraphic engineering, and electrical practice more broadly, which leads to the conclusion that the integration of electrical theory and telegraphic practice was far harder to achieve and maintain than historians have previously thought. This ultimately left a confusing legacy of dimensional concepts and practices in physics.     

Inevitability,contingency, and epistemic humility

This paper offers an epistemological framework for the debate about whether the results of scientific enquiry are inevitable or contingent. I argue in Sections 2 and 3 that inevitabilist stances are doubly guilty of epistemic hubris—a lack of epistemic humility—and that the real question concerns the scope and strength of our contingentism. The latter stages of the paper—Sections 4 and 5—address some epistemological and historiographical worries and sketch some examples of deep contingencies to guide further debate. I conclude by affirming that the concept of epistemic humility can usefully inform critical reflection on the contingency of the sciences and the practice of history of science.     

The unfolding of the historical style in modern cosmology: Emergence,evolution, entrenchment

This paper traces the emergence, evolution and subsequent entrenchment of the historical style in the shifting scene of modern cosmological inquiry. It argues that the historical style in cosmology was forged in the early decades of the 20^th century and continued to evolve in the century that followed. Over time, the scene of cosmological inquiry has gradually become dominated and entirely constituted by historicist explanations. Practices such as forwards and backwards temporal extrapolation (thinking about the past evolutionary history of the universe with different initial conditions and other parameters) are now commonplace. The non-static geometrization of the cosmos in the early 20th century led to inquires thinking about the cosmos in evolutionary terms. Drawing on the historical approach of Gamow (and contrasting this with the ahistorical approach of Bondi), the paper then argues that the historical style became a major force as inquirers began scouring the universe for fossils and other relics as a new form of scientific practice—cosmic palaeontology. By the 1970s the historical style became the bedrock of the discipline and the presupposition of new lines of inquiry. By the end of the 20th century, the historical style was pushed to its very limits as temporal reasoning began to occur beyond a linear historical narrative. With the atemporal ‘ensemble’ type multiverse proposals, a certain type of ahistorical reasoning has been reintroduced to cosmological discourse, which, in a sense, represents a radical de-historicization of the historical style in cosmology. Some are now even attempting to explain the laws of physics in terms of their historicity.     

Chemical reductionism revisited: Lewis, Pauling and the physico-chemical nature of the chemical bond

The wave-mechanical treatment of the valence bond, by Walter Heitler and Fritz London, and its ensuing foundational importance in quantum chemistry has been traditionally regarded as the basis for the argument that chemistry may be theoretically reduced to physics. Modern analyses of the reductionist claim focuses on the limitations to achieving full reduction in practice because of the approximations used in modern quantum chemical methods, but neglect the historical importance of the chemical bond as a chemical entity. This paper re-examines these arguments with a study of the development of the valence bond by chemist Gilbert Lewis within a chemically autonomous framework, and its extension by Linus Pauling using Heitler and London’s methods. Here, we see that the chemical bond is best described as a theoretical synthesis or physico-chemical entity, to represent its full interdisciplinary importance from the philosophical and historical perspectives.     

The Science of Sympathy: Morality,Evolution, and Victorian Civilization

The large grain measures used until at least the end of the nineteenth century for controlling the sale of dry goods have precise legal definitions in terms of smaller units of weight or capacity. They are related by experimental procedures which in the modern period have involved water determinations, but it has been appreciated that for medieval measures the medium was grain. A study of the way grain packs in such vessels has enabled the sizes of early Scottish standards to be recovered for the first time and deductions made about their evolution and use, against a background of early English practice.     

Measurement in French Experimental Physics from Regnault to Lippmann. Rhetoric and Theoretical Practice

This paper explores the legacy of the great French experimental physicist Victor Regnault through the example of Gabriel Lippmann, whose engagement with electrical standardization during the early 1880s was guided by Regnault's methodological precept to measure ‘directly’. Lippmann's education reveals that the theoretical practice of ‘direct’ measurement entailed eliminating extraneous physical effects through the experimental design, rather than, like physicists in Britain and Germany, making numerical ‘corrections’ to measured values. It also provides, paradoxically, exemplars of the qualitative theoretical practices that sustained Regnault's misguided ambition to avoid theory. By considering the largely negative reactions to Lippmann's proposals for selecting suitable electrical units and methods of measuring the ohm, this paper associates these theoretical practices with the ineffectual rhetorical strategies employed by Lippmann to promote his work, and thereby indicates that the practice of direct measurement was limited to French experimental physics. Whilst this result aligns readily with the existence of divergent nineteenth century British and German cultures of precision, it emerges from a very different disciplinary context in which the practice of precision electrical measurement developed independently of submarine telegraphy. This is because, as this paper illustrates, telegraphic engineering and experimental physics remained separate professions in France.     

Is it a short‐memory,long‐memory,or permanently Granger‐causation influence?

Exploring the Granger‐causation relationship is an important and interesting topic in the field of econometrics. In the traditional model we usually apply the short‐memory style to exhibit the relationship, but in practice there could be other different influence patterns. Besides the short‐memory relationship, Chen (2006) demonstrates a long‐memory relationship, in which a useful approach is provided for estimation where the time series are not necessarily fractionally co‐integrated. In that paper two different relationships (short‐memory and long‐memory relationship) are regarded whereby the influence flow is decayed by geometric, or cutting off, or harmonic sequences. However, it limits the model to the stationary relationship. This paper extends the influence flow to a non‐stationary relationship where the limitation is on ?0.5 ≤ d ≤ 1.0 and it can be used to detect whether the influence decays off (?0.5 ≤ d < 0.5) or is permanent (0.5 ≤ d ≤ 1.0). Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.