试论科学知识、技术知识与工程知识

本文首先通过对实证主义知识论的批判来建构立足于生活实践的知识论立场,在科学、技术、工程三元论的架构下,沿着知识论的两个基本追问——何谓知识?知识何以可能?即知识基于什么样的活动得以产生的追问,来分析已往科学知识、技术知识、工程知识的研究在流行的知识论框架下存在的问题与缺失。从立足于生活实践的知识论立场看,科学知识作为描述性知识,其目标与意图就是在于理解世界,描述世界的存在方式;技术知识作为行动的程序性和规范性知识,其目的在于解决实践过程中"做什么"和"怎样做"的问题;而工程知识作为造物行动中的情境化知识,其目的在于人工物在现实中的成功建造。三者有着本质的区别,但存在着十分紧密的联系。     

Gordon Pask's Conversation Theory: A Domain Independent Constructivist Model of Human Knowing

Although it is conceded (as argued by many)that distinct knowledge domains do presentparticular problems of coming to know, in thispaper it is argued that it is possible (anduseful) to construct a domain independent modelof the processes of coming to know, one inwhich observers share understandings and do soin agreed ways. The model in question is partof the conversation theory (CT) of Gordon Pask. CT, as a theory of theory construction andcommunication, has particular relevance forfoundational issues in science and scienceeducation. CT explicitly propounds a ``radicalconstructivist' (RC) epistemology. A briefaccount is given of the main tenets of RC andCT's place in that tradition and the traditionsof cybernetics. The paper presents a briefnon-technical account of the main concepts ofCT including elaborations by Laurillard andHarri-Augstein and Thomas. As part of CT, Pask also elaborated a methodology – knowledgeand task analysis – for analysing the structureof different knowledge domains; thismethodology is sketched in outline.     

On The Impossibility Of Empirical Controls Of Scientific Theories – From The Point Of View Of A Psychologist

Standard considerations of philosophy of science are reformulated in psychological terms and arguments, suggesting a fundamental change in life perspective: subjective experiences or introspective data are subject to motivational biases and therefore not admitted as objective empirical facts in science, However, we never experience objects or events of the external world, i.e., so called objective facts, but exclusively subjective percepts or mental events. They are merely assumed to, but may or may not be accurate or distorted mental representations of objects or events of an external world. Accordingly, the latter are theoretical constructs, i.e., constructs of the fictitious but most successful predictive (implicit) theory, called external world, which seems to be constructed from regularities observed in mental events and serves as a reference fiction for, erroneously called empirical, tests of predictions of scientific theories.Relevant Publication: Micko, H.C.: 2001, Psychologie: Von der Geistes – zur Naturwissenschaft – und weiter wohin? Erkenntnistheoretische Erwägungen vor und nach dem Aufkommen des philosophischen Konstruktivismus. Ztschr. f. Psychologie, 209: 54–68.     

Essential Tension: Mathematics - Physics - Philosophy

The author focuses on the tension "realism - idealism" in the philosophy of mathematics, but he does that from the perspective of a theoretical physicist. It is not only that one's standpoint in the philosophy of mathematics determines our understanding of the effectiveness of mathematics in physics, but also the fact that mathematics is so effective in physical sciences tells us something about the nature of mathematics.     

The Arrow of Time and Meaning

All the attempts to find the justification of the privileged evolution of phenomena exclusively in the external world need to refer to the inescapable fact that we are living in such an asymmetric universe. This leads us to look for the origin of the “arrow of time” in the relationship between the subject and the world. The anthropic argument shows that the arrow of time is the condition of the possibility of emergence and maintenance of life in the universe. Moreover, according to Bohr’s, Poincaré’s and Watanabe’s analysis, this agreement between the earlier-later direction of entropy increase and the past-future direction of life is the very condition of the possibility for meaningful action, representation and creation. Beyond this relationship of logical necessity between the meaning process and the arrow of time the question of their possible physical connection is explored. To answer affirmatively to this question, the meaning process is modelled as an evolving tree-like structure, called “Semantic Time”, where thermodynamic irreversibility can be shown. Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river ; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger ; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire. – (Jorge Luis Borges)     

论译者主体性与中医术语英译的关系

作者以中医术语为例,从语义学的角度探讨译者主体性与术语翻译之间的内在关系,指出译者不仅要把握与权衡中医术语的字面含义与学术含义,而且要掌握足够的语义学、术语学与中医学等跨文化与跨学科知识,才能充分发挥译者主体性,创造出成功的中医术语译名。     

论译者主体性与中医术语英译的关系

作者以中医术语为例,从语义学的角度探讨译者主体性与术语翻译之间的内在关系,指出译者不仅要把握与权衡中医术语的字面含义与学术含义,而且要掌握足够的语义学、术语学与中医学等跨文化与跨学科知识,才能充分发挥译者主体性,创造出成功的中医术语译名。     

对WHO传统医学战略的反思和建议

本文对世界卫生组织（WHO）制定和实施《2002-2005年传统医学战略》的经验教训进行了理论上的总结,认为基础性的“知识缺陷”导致该战略没有发挥关键性作用。建议我国应以“扶持中医药和民族医药事业发展”为契机,在大力消除“知识缺陷”的基础上,促进我国全民健康事业的顺利发展。     

归纳推理合理性的心理学辩护

归纳推理在哲学、科学、心理学以及日常生活中都具有重要作用。我们通过归纳推理将知识组织成有用的结构。休谟首先对归纳推理的合理性提出质疑,后来的学者对归纳推理合理性的逻辑辩护都失败了,其根本原因在于数学逻辑不适于描述归纳推理。归纳推理实质上是心理事件而不是数学事件,它所依赖的生活事件集合与数学集合具有完全不同的结构。从心理归纳的角度讲,归纳推理发生在人、知识、情境的三维空间中,其目的是适应性。从适应性的角度,心理归纳的合理性能够得到充要的证明。     

The Abductive Loop: Tracking Irrational Sets

We argue from the Church-Turing thesis (Kleene Mathematical logic. New York: Wiley 1967) that a program can be considered as equivalent to a formal language similar to predicate calculus where predicates can be taken as functions. We can relate such a calculus to Wittgenstein’s first major work, the Tractatus, and use the Tractatus and its theses as a model of the formal classical definition of a computer program. However, Wittgenstein found flaws in his initial great work and he explored these flaws in a new thesis described in his second great work; the Philosophical Investigations. The question we address is “can computer science make the same leap?” We are proposing, because of the flaws identified by Wittgenstein, that computers will never have the possibility of natural communication with people unless they become active participants of human society. The essential difference between formal models used in computing and human communication is that formal models are based upon rational sets whereas people are not so restricted. We introduce irrational sets as a concept that requires the use of an abductive inference system. However, formal models are still considered central to our means of using hypotheses through deduction to make predictions about the world. These formal models are required to continually be updated in response to peoples’ changes in their way of seeing the world. We propose that one mechanism used to keep track of these changes is the Peircian abductive loop.     

Towards a Radical Constructivist Understanding of Science

Constructivism is the idea thatwe construct our own world rather than it beingdetermined by an outside reality. Its mostconsistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC),claims that we cannot transcend ourexperiences. Thus it doesn't make sense to saythat our constructions gradually approach thestructure of an external reality. The mind isnecessarily an epistemological solipsist, incontrast to being an ontological solipsist whomaintains that this is all there is, namely asingle mind within which the only world exists.RC recognizes the impossibility of the claimthat the world does not exist. Yet, RC has thepotential to go much further. I claim that RCprovides the foundation of a new world-view inwhich we can overcome hard scientific problems.Thus, the paper is urging us to carry RCfurther, not just on philosophical grounds, butalso into the domain of science.     

World Views. Elements of the Apostelian and General Approach

In the work of the late Belgian philosopher, logician and freethinker Leo Apostel (1924–1995) the concept of ‘world view’ is extensively developed. From the diverse research of Apostel, I gather and examine the constituents of a world view and their relationships. I propose to understand it as a pluralist and open, rationalised ontology of the ‘world whole’, comprising knowledge systems, valuative ethical systems and concomitant action guiding systems, to a large extent reflecting insight in the exact sciences. The prolific and scattered opus of Apostel renders my account of encompassing world views approximate and incomplete. It merely outlines the intrinsically unfinished project and presents a recent development. This development mainly involves our approach to the phenomenon of emergence from a quantum theoretical perspective. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

技术传统与技术哲学视界

本文提出了一个理解和描述各种传统技术的基本概念——技术传统。技术传统的最直接含义是一个技术能够存在的最小单位，由一个操作规则系统、一套工艺学知识所构成，同时还要有稳定的可传习性。技术传统构成着我们人类的生存方式。在我们生存方式的构成中技术传统不仅是一个技能共同体，而且还是生存共同体，它所完成的是文明的伦理功能，是支撑德性社会的世俗基础。考察技术传统能够给知识、技术、世界、生存等概念带来富有意义的变化。     

科学证据、类比方法和伦理论证——兼论严重脑损伤患者的他心问题

以类比论证来确认他心认识的可能性与途径的研究方法曾经受到许多哲学家的诟病。继人工语言哲学家的工作之后,日常语言哲学家将他心问题从一种单纯的认识论问题转化为日常生活中的沟通问题,从而使他心问题部分地得到解决。不过,陷入昏迷状态的脑损伤患者是否具有思想、情感以及其他心理属性等仍然是一个悬而未决问题。神经科学对大脑活动与意识状态之间的关联性研究推进了这一领域的进展。在此基础上,有研究者试图运用类比的方法,结合大脑活动与意识状态之间关联性的研究结果,论证他者具备意识能力和心理属性,进而探讨对待他者道德义务的有效性问题。神经科学的研究拓展了我们对于大脑和意识的认识,但是对他者负有道德义务并不必然要求他者具备意识能力,同时论证和论据存在内在缺陷。神经科学对他心问题的解答存在局限性。     

Quantum Nonlocality and the Challenge to Scientific Realism

In this essay I examine various aspects of the nearcentury-long debate concerning the conceptualfoundations of quantum mechanics and the problems ithas posed for physicists and philosophers fromEinstein to the present. Most crucial here is theissue of realism and the question whether quantumtheory is compatible with any kind of realist orcausal-explanatory account which goes beyond theempirical-predictive data. This was Einstein's chiefconcern in the famous series of exchanges with NielsBohr when he refused to accept the truth orcompleteness of a doctrine (orthodox QM) which ruledsuch questions to be strictly inadmissible. I discussthe later history of quantum-theoretical debate withparticular reference to the issue of nonlocality,i.e., the phenomenon of superluminal(faster-than-light) interaction betweenwidely-separated particles. Then I show how thestandard `Copenhagen' interpretation of QM hasinfluenced current anti-realist orontological-relativist approaches to philosophy ofscience. Indeed, there are clear signs that somephilosophers have retreated from a realist positionvery largely in response to just these problems. So itis important to ask exactly why – on what scientificor philosophical grounds – any preferred alternative(causal-realist) construal should have been ruled outas a matter of orthodox QM wisdom. Moreconstructively, my paper presents various arguments infavour of one such alternative, the `hidden-variables'theory developed since the early 1950s by David Bohmand consistently marginalised by proponents of theCopenhagen doctrine.     

对国民休闲文化价值的认识及其权益属性的探讨--兼论日本社会休闲的运作机制

本文对我国社会目前缺少对休闲“文化价值”的认识，欠缺“国民权益论”思想的支持及缺少行政、地域社会支援的现象进行了讨论。在此基础上，结合日本社会休闲的实际运行机制指出，发展我国休闲应首先着手形成国民休闲文化价值的社会意识主流，确立其权益属性，其次为建设权益保障制度，接下来是开展休闲活动的具体“技术”方面建设，从而促使社会休闲系统的运作建立在“权利”的本位基础上，各级政府必须回到“事业”立场上来对待国民的休闲要求，建设公助、共助、自助协力的社会机制，使我国的休闲业在很好地体现社会公平的前提下健康地得以开展。     

怀疑主义难题的语境主义解答--基思·德娄斯的虚拟条件的语境主义评价

语境主义是当代西方知识论中占支配地位的反怀疑主义理论.语境主义者主张,知识的归因依赖于归因者的语境,知识的标准随着语境的不同而不同.在怀疑主义的语境里,知识的标准异常地高,在这种标准下,我们没有知识;在日常语境里,知识的标准相对较低,在这种标准下,我们有知识.因此,怀疑主义对知识的否定与我们对知识的肯定,两者都是正确的.     

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent “softer” accounts of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as “the anti-philosophical stance”. I then demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific practice.