The American Philosophical Society and the rise of astronomy in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century

Early geological investigations in the St David's area (Pembrokeshire) are described, particularly the work of Murchison. In a reconnaissance survey in 1835, he regarded a ridge of rocks at St David's as intrusive in unfossiliferous Cambrian; and the early Survey mapping (chiefly the work of Aveline and Ramsay) was conducted on that assumption, leading to the publication of maps in 1845 and 1857. The latter represented the margins of the St David's ridge as ‘Altered Cambrian’. So the supposedly intrusive ‘syenite’ was regarded as younger, and there was no Precambrian. These views were challenged by a local doctor, Henry Hicks, who developed an idea of the ex-Survey palaeontologist John Salter that the rocks of the ridge were stratified and had formed a Precambrian island, round which Cambrian sediments (now confirmed by fossil discoveries) had been deposited. Hicks subsequently proposed subdivision of his Precambrian into ‘Dimetian’, ‘Pebidian’, and (later) ‘Arvonian’, and he attempted correlations with rocks in Shropshire, North Wales, and even North America, seeking to develop the neo-Neptunist ideas of Sterry Hunt. The challenge to the Survey's work was countered in the 1880s by the Director General, Geikie, who showed that Hicks's idea of stratification in the Dimetian was mistaken. A heated controversy developed, several amateur geologists, supported by a group of Cambridge Sedgwickians, forming a coalition of ‘Archaeans’ against the Survey. Geikie was supported by Lloyd Morgan. Attention focused particularly on Ogof Lle-sugn Cave and St Non's Arch, with theory/controversy-ladenness of observations evident on both sides. Evidence from an eyewitness student record of a Geological Society meeting reveals the ‘sanit`ized’ nature of the official summary of the debate in QJGS. Field mapping early in the twentieth century by J. F. N. Green allowed a compromise consensus to be achieved, but Green's evidence for unconformity between the Cambrian and the Dimetian, obtained by excavation, can no longer be verified, and his consensual history of the area may need revision. Unconformity between the Cambrian and the Pebidian tuffs is not in doubt, however, and Precambrian at St David's is accepted. The study exhibits features of geological controversy and the British geological community in the nineteenth century. It also furnishes a further instance of the great influence of Murchison in nineteenth-century British geology and the side-effects of his controversy with Sedgwick.     

Paul Natorp and the emergence of anti-psychologism in the nineteenth century

This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. This interpretation of Natorp suggests that attention paid to late nineteenth century theories of subjectivity and philosophy of psychology could improve our understanding of the emergence of anti-psychologism in that period.     

The rise of alternative bread leavening technologies in the nineteenth century

This article reveals how nineteenth-century chemists and health reformers tried to eradicate the use of yeast in bread, claiming they had devised healthier and more sanitary ways to raise bread. It describes the alternative technological solutions to baking bread, investigating factors that influenced their development and adaptation in the marketplace. A lack of scientific and cultural consensus surrounding yeast, what it was and what it did, fermented during this period. The conflict over yeast helped create a heterogeneous industrialization of the baking industry, changing processes and ingredients and creating new forms of bakery products. By examining the claims of promoters of rival scientific beliefs and technologies, as well as those of users and social commentators, we can see that technology’s eventual adaptation and impact on society is not predictable at its outset. Exploring the relationship between differing scientific beliefs, cultural understandings and alternative technologies also shows how science and industry cannot be isolated from their social and cultural context. The examination of the nineteenth-century technological development of commonplace commodities such as bread, baking powder and yeast, also reveals and explores a story that has not been told before in the history of science and technology. Why it has not been told is as enlightening as the story itself, revealing as it does our own privileging of what is important in science and history.     

Terrestrial magnetism and the development of international collaboration in the early nineteenth century

The establishment of Gauss's and Weber's Magnetische Verein in 1834, and the British Government's support of Edward Sabine's ‘Magnetic Crusade’ in 1838, marked the opening of a new era in international geomagnetic research. However, the British and German efforts, although initiating an increase in the scale of investigations of the earth's field, were also the culmination of over half a century of activity by individuals and institutions in several countries. This article traces the growth of international cooperation in terrestrial magnetism from the late eighteenth century until the 1830s, and examines the change in leadership in the field from France to Britain and Germany. The transition from individual to government-backed collaboration is described, and also the role of Alexander von Humboldt as an organiser of geomagnetic research and author of a cosmical approach to earth magnetism as one of a number of related ‘telluric’ forces.     

Polar motion measurement at the Observatoire de Lyon in the late nineteenth century

The motion of geographic poles, predicted by Euler, was discovered at the end of the 1880s, mainly by German and American astronomers. However, French astronomers were strongly reluctant to accept the reality of this phenomenon. Indeed, all observations at the Observatoire de Paris converged toward non-detection of the polar motion. Science, as most fields of public life, was extremely centralized in France, and the Observatoire de Paris was still living on past glory gained in the field of classical astronomy. However, the directors who succeeded Urbain Le Verrier were doubtful about the accuracy of the observation in such an urban observatory, and were pushing for the construction of an observatory outside the city. At the same time, just after the French defeat of 1871, a wide decentralization of the universities started, and a few big regional cities were selected to host new observatories. In this paper we show how it is in one of these new observatories, in Lyon, that the polar motion was first observed in France, and how this was immediately recognized internationally. Although the weight of French Jacobinism kept the new observatories at an embryonic stage for many decades, this contribution to an internationally discussed problem shows how enthusiastically and efficiently work was carried out in the early years of French provincial observatories.     

William Whewell,natural theology and the philosophy of science in mid nineteenth century Britain

This article aims to reveal the moral and theological dimensions of William Whewell's philosophy of science. It suggests that, in addition to an internalist account of Whewell's method and epistemology, there is a need to view his philosophy of science (and knowledge) within the intellectual context constituted by the assumptions of natural theology. It argues that writers of natural theology saw man's ability to know the world as an indication of his special place in nature, and that epistemological theories were therefore invested with moral and theological significance. Whewell's work is interpreted as an attempt to dissociate natural science from Utilitarianism and empiricist philosophy: he sought to promote a philosophy of science which guaranteed the principles of natural theology and the values of Christianity. But the idealist epistemology which he proposed was criticized by both scientists and theologians. In 1853 (in his book Of the plurality of worlds), again within the framework of natural theology, Whewell attempted to justify this epistemology by affirming the metaphysics of a Christian Platonism. From this position, Whewell defended natural theology against the metaphysical scepticism of both Henry Mansel and the positivists.     

Between chemistry,medicine and leisure: Antonio Casares and the study of mineral waters and Spanish spas in the nineteenth century

This article considers how chemical analyses were employed not only to study and describe mineral waters, but also to promote new spas, and to reinforce the scientific authority of experts. Scientists, jointly with bath owners, visitors and local authorities, created a significant spa market by transforming rural spaces into social and economic sites. The paper analyses the role developed by the chemist Antonio Casares in the commodification of mineral water in mid-19^th century Spain. His scientific publications and water analyses put a new economic value on some Spanish mineral waters and rural springs. First the paper explores the relationship between geographic factors, regulation, and spa development in 19^th century Spain, and considers how scientific work improved the economy of some rural areas. Then the transformation of numerous country springs into spas, and the commodification of baths as places between science and leisure is examined. Finally the location of spas across the borders of medicine and chemistry is shown, together with the complex field operations required to study mineral waters. This paper reveals an intense circulation of knowledge between the field, laboratories and scientific publications, as well as the essential role developed by experts like Casares, who not only contributed to the study of rural springs but also to their economic transformation.     

Feyerabend on politics,education, and scientific culture

The purpose of this paper is to offer a sympathetic reconstruction of the political thought of Paul Feyerabend. Using a critical discussion of the idea of the ‘free society’ it is suggested that his political thought is best understood in terms of three thematic concerns—liberation, hegemony, and the authority of science—and that the political significance of those claims become clear when they are considered in the context of his educational views. It emerges that Feyerabend is best understood as calling for the grounding of cognitive and cultural authorities—like the sciences—in informed deliberation, rather than the uncritical embrace of prevailing convictions. It therefore emerges that a free society is best understood as one of epistemically responsible citizenship rather than epistemically anarchistic relativism of the ‘anything goes’ sort—a striking anticipation of current debates about philosophy of science in society.     

The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of science

The widespread impression that recent philosophy of science has pioneered exploration of the “social dimensions of scientific knowledge” is shown to be in error, partly due to a lack of appreciation of historical precedent, and partly due to a misunderstanding of how the social sciences and philosophy have been intertwined over the last century. This paper argues that the referents of “democracy” are an important key in the American context, and that orthodoxies in the philosophy of science tend to be molded by the actual regimes of science organization within which they are embedded. These theses are illustrated by consideration of three representative philosophers of science: John Dewey, Hans Reichenbach, and Philip Kitcher.