Data Mining the Intellectual Revival of ‘Catastrophic’ Mother Nature

Earth-shaping catastrophic events have long focused the attention of the geographical and geological sciences, and captured the public imagination. During the past 40 years, neocatastrophism has emerged as a key paradigm that reflects widespread changes involving cultural, scientific, political and technological spheres. Nonetheless, the extent, chronology and origin of this trend are equivocal. Here, we use Google Ngram to quantitatively explore the recent development of catastrophism. We elucidate a discernable rise in neocatastrophic thinking during the last quarter of the twenty-first century that can be linked to the environmental awakening of the 1960s. It is suggested that these discourses of ‘shock’ and ‘fear’ partly correspond to a media-driven dramatization of natural hazards, exploited by scientists and journalists to attract wider readership.     

The Construction of ‘Reality’ in the Robot: Constructivist Perspectives on Situated Artificial Intelligence and Adaptive Robotics

This paper discusses different approaches incognitive science and artificial intelligenceresearch from the perspective of radicalconstructivism, addressing especially theirrelation to the biologically based theories ofvon Uexküll, Piaget as well as Maturana andVarela. In particular recent work in ‘New AI’ and adaptive robotics on situated and embodiedintelligence is examined, and we discuss indetail the role of constructive processes asthe basis of situatedness in both robots andliving organisms.     

‘The Economic’ According to Aristotle: Ethical, Political and Epistemological Implications

A renewed concern with Aristotle’s thought about the economic aspects of human life and society can be observed. Aristotle dealt with the economic issues in his practical philosophy. He thus considered ‘the economic’ within an ethical and political frame. This vision is coherent with a specific ontology of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle. In a recent paper, I analysed this ontology and left its consequences, especially for Ethics and Politics, for another paper. In this article, I firstly summarise the reasoning and conclusions of the aforementioned paper. Then, I extract the ethical and political “lessons” of the Aristotelian conception. I finally add a section with epistemological “lessons”, and consequences for the teaching of Economics.     

Revisiting <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tom Tom:</Emphasis> Performative Anamnesis and Autonomous Vision in Ken Jacobs’ Appropriations of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tom Tom the Piper’s Son</Emphasis>

In 1969 the American avant-garde filmmaker Ken Jacobs gained wide recognition with a two-hour long interpretation of a 1905 silent short film. Ever since, the artist has kept on revisiting the same material, each time with a different technological approach. Originally hailed as a prime example of structural filmmaking, Jacobs’ more recent variations on the theme of Tom Tom the Piper’s Son beg for a broader understanding of his methods and the meanings implied. To gain a deeper insight in this on-going mise-en-abyme (and an obsession dominating a large part of his career), this essay expands comments by the artist himself with concepts taken from animation, media-archaeology and Warburg’s Mnemosyne atlas. Rereading a filmic text with minute attention, remediating it from an analogue to an electronic format, and reanimating the original action by adding a variety of intervals: all Jacobs’ strategies are aimed at demonstrating the afterlife of Tom Tom in a contemporary cultural context.     

On Indivisibles and Infinitesimals: A Response to David Sherry, “The Jesuits and the Method of Indivisibles”

In “The Jesuits and the Method of Indivisibles” David Sherry criticizes a central thesis of my book Infinitesimal: that in the seventeenth century the Jesuits sought to suppress the method of indivisibles because it undermined their efforts to establish a perfect rational and hierarchical order in the world, modeled on Euclidean Geometry. Sherry accepts that the Jesuits did indeed suppress the method, but offers two objections. First, that the book does not distinguish between indivisibles and infinitesimals, and that whereas the Jesuits might have reason to object to the first, the second posed no problem for them. Second, seeking an alternative explanation for the Jesuits’ hostility to the method, he proposes that its implicit atomism conflicted with the Catholic doctrine of the sacrament of the Eucharist, and was therefore heretical. In response to Sherry’s first criticism I point out that the Jesuits objected to all forms of the method of indivisibles, and that the distinction between indivisibles and infinitesimals consequently cannot explain the fight over the method in the seventeenth century. With regards to the Eucharist, I agree with Sherry that the Jesuits were indeed concerned about the method’s affinity to atomism and materialism, though for a different reason: these doctrines were antithetical to their efforts to impose divine hierarchy and order on the world. In as much as the technical details of the miracle of the Eucharist mattered, they provided no grounds for objecting to a mathematical (rather than physical) doctrine.