Antibiotic-mediated antagonism leads to a bacterial game of rock-paper-scissors in vivo

Colicins are narrow-spectrum antibiotics produced by and active against Escherichia coli and its close relatives. Colicin-producing strains cannot coexist with sensitive or resistant strains in a well-mixed culture, yet all three phenotypes are recovered in natural populations. Recent in vitro results conclude that strain diversity can be promoted by colicin production in a spatially structured, non-transitive interaction, as in the classic non-transitive model rock-paper-scissors (RPS). In the colicin version of the RPS model, strains that produce colicins (C) kill sensitive (S) strains, which outcompete resistant (R) strains, which outcompete C strains. Pairwise in vitro competitions between these three strains are resolved in a predictable order (C beats S, S beats R, and R beats C), but the complete system of three strains presents the opportunity for dynamic equilibrium. Here we provide conclusive evidence of an in vivo antagonistic role for colicins and show that colicins (and potentially other bacteriocins) may promote, rather than eliminate, microbial diversity in the environment.     

集体风险投资公共品博弈的种群演化动力学的研究

集体目标的完成需要多个个体的参与贡献。然而每个个体都想最大化自己的利益,因此,研究贡献行为在自私个体中产生并广泛传播成了公共品博弈动力学的核心问题。通过建立一个具有集体风险的公共品博弈的理论模型,加入了增长因子这个因素,更加贴近真实,动力学的演化特征更加丰富,并借助复制动力学的演化分析,结果显示较高风险,较高增长回报下有利于合作的涌现。同时,个体的初始财富、集体目标、合作代价、参与博弈的个体数目等因素也会对种群产生影响。     

Local dispersal promotes biodiversity in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors

One of the central aims of ecology is to identify mechanisms that maintain biodiversity. Numerous theoretical models have shown that competing species can coexist if ecological processes such as dispersal, movement, and interaction occur over small spatial scales. In particular, this may be the case for non-transitive communities, that is, those without strict competitive hierarchies. The classic non-transitive system involves a community of three competing species satisfying a relationship similar to the children's game rock-paper-scissors, where rock crushes scissors, scissors cuts paper, and paper covers rock. Such relationships have been demonstrated in several natural systems. Some models predict that local interaction and dispersal are sufficient to ensure coexistence of all three species in such a community, whereas diversity is lost when ecological processes occur over larger scales. Here, we test these predictions empirically using a non-transitive model community containing three populations of Escherichia coli. We find that diversity is rapidly lost in our experimental community when dispersal and interaction occur over relatively large spatial scales, whereas all populations coexist when ecological processes are localized.     

Emergence of group cooperation in public goods game on regular small-world network

The regular small-world network, which contains the properties of small-world network and regular network, has recently received substantial attention and has been applied in researches on 2-person games. However, it is a common phenomenon that cooperation always appears as a group behavior. In order to investigate the mechanism of group cooperation, we propose an evolutionary multi-person game model on a regular small-world network based on public goods game theory. Then, to make a comparison of frequency of cooperation among different networks, we carry out simulations on three kinds of networks with the same configuration of average degree: the square lattice, regular small-world network and random regular network. The results of simulation show that the group cooperation will emerge among these three networks when the enhancement factor r exceeds a threshold. Furthermore, time required for full cooperation on regular small-world network is slightly longer than the other networks, which indicates that the compact interactions and random interactions will promote cooperation, while the longer-range links are the obstacles in the emergence of cooperation. In addition, the cooperation would be promoted further by enhancing the random interactions on regular small-world network.     

Maintenance of cooperation in a public goods game: A new decision-making criterion with incomplete information

Hardin’s "The Tragedy of the Commons" prophesies the inescapable collapse of many human enterprises.The emergence and abundance of cooperation in animal and human societies is a challenging puzzle to evolutionary theory.In this work,we introduce a new decision-making criterion into a voluntary public goods game with incomplete information and choose successful strategies according to previous payoffs for a certain strategy as well as the risk-averse benefit.We find that the interest rate of the common pool and the magnitude of memory have crucial effects on the average welfare of the population.The appropriate sense of individuals’ innovation also substantially influences the equilibrium strategies distribution in the long run.     

年龄分布下周期种群系统动态博弈的Nash均衡

研究具有年龄结构的周期种群在资源开发中的动态博弈问题.利用Kakutani多值映射不动点定理证明了Nash均衡的存在性.借助法锥和共轭系统,描述了均衡策略.     

Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games

Humans often cooperate in public goods games and situations ranging from family issues to global warming. However, evolutionary game theory predicts that the temptation to forgo the public good mostly wins over collective cooperative action, and this is often also seen in economic experiments. Here we show how social diversity provides an escape from this apparent paradox. Up to now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in all respects, in sharp contrast with real-life situations, where diversity is ubiquitous. We introduce social diversity by means of heterogeneous graphs and show that cooperation is promoted by the diversity associated with the number and size of the public goods game in which each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each such game. When social ties follow a scale-free distribution, cooperation is enhanced whenever all individuals are expected to contribute a fixed amount irrespective of the plethora of public goods games in which they engage. Our results may help to explain the emergence of cooperation in the absence of mechanisms based on individual reputation and punishment. Combining social diversity with reputation and punishment will provide instrumental clues on the self-organization of social communities and their economical implications.     

全球公共物品、经济安全和对外经贸政策

面对全球化快速发展的挑战。民族国家不得不应对随之而来的经济安全和各种危机．这在涉及国际贸易流动和国际竞争时更为严重。而我们观察到,目前所谓“全球化”趋势,在不同国家间造成收益分配上的不平衡,尤其是考虑到跨国资本和贸易以及相伴随的国际经济制度安排的情况下更是如此。本引入全球公共物品概念．分析全球化背景下的经济安全和国家外经贸政策的相关性,并且通过新加坡的案例分析来说明,结论说明经济政策制定和经济安全维护中应以弥补提供和利用全球公共物品为政策制定基准。     

基于“绿箱”政策的农村公共产品供给研究

公共产品供给不足严重制约了农业经济的可持续发展。目前我国农村公共产品供给的制约因素主要是：公共财政投入不足;尚未建立多元的供给机制;公共政策的困境等。在“绿箱”政策框架内扩大公共产品供给,应加大公共财政对农村基础设施建设的支持力度;按WTO规则界定政府职能;制定有效的公共政策,刺激公共产品的私人供给。     

How a membrane agent buys goods in a membrane store

In this paper we consider a specific model of membrane systems, i. e. membrane systems with attributes. In these systems, the information is placed at the membranes in form of attributes, no objects are considered inside the membranes except for other membranes. The membrane system with attributes evolves according to rules that compute new values for the attributes from the attributes assigned to the membranes involved in the rule. The model of membrane systems with attributes allows us to specify business transactions in a precise way and to simulate different models for such transactions with a suitable tool for membrane systems with attributes.     

How a membrane agent buys goods in a membrane store

In this paper we consider a specific model of membrane systems, i. e. membrane systems with attributes. In these systems, the information is placed at the membranes in form of attributes, no objects are considered inside the membranes except for other membranes. The membrane system with attributes evolves according to rules that compute new values for the attributes from the attributes assigned to the membranes involved in the rule. The model of membrane systems with attributes allows us to specify business transactions in a precise way and to simulate different models for such transactions with a suitable tool for membrane systems with attributes.     

与铁磁导体耦合的量子点中非线性热自旋效应

研究与两个铁磁导体耦合的单个量子点中热梯度产生的纯自旋流。发现热梯度和电子库的铁磁性会在量子点能级离开电子-空穴对称点时产生较强的自旋压。自旋压的大小和方向可以通过改变热梯度的方向来调整。当两个铁磁引线的磁化方向为相互平行时,自旋压的绝对值最小,而当两个引线中的磁矩为反平行时,自旋压的强度会显著增大。     

Quantum phase transition in a resonant level coupled to interacting leads

A Luttinger liquid is an interacting one-dimensional electronic system, quite distinct from the 'conventional' Fermi liquids formed by interacting electrons in two and three dimensions. Some of the most striking properties of Luttinger liquids are revealed in the process of electron tunnelling. For example, as a function of the applied bias voltage or temperature, the tunnelling current exhibits a non-trivial power-law suppression. (There is no such suppression in a conventional Fermi liquid.) Here, using a carbon nanotube connected to resistive leads, we create a system that emulates tunnelling in a Luttinger liquid, by controlling the interaction of the tunnelling electron with its environment. We further replace a single tunnelling barrier with a double-barrier, resonant-level structure and investigate resonant tunnelling between Luttinger liquids. At low temperatures, we observe perfect transparency of the resonant level embedded in the interacting environment, and the width of the resonance tends to zero. We argue that this behaviour results from many-body physics of interacting electrons, and signals the presence of a quantum phase transition. Given that many parameters, including the interaction strength, can be precisely controlled in our samples, this is an attractive model system for studying quantum critical phenomena in general, with wide-reaching implications for understanding quantum phase transitions in more complex systems, such as cold atoms and strongly correlated bulk materials.     

有限理性博弈论分析在政府决策与民意测验关系中的应用

先引入博弈论的两个经典案例,说明追求个体利益会与整体利益相抵触;接着介绍了有限理性中的复制动态分析方法;最后用复制动态分析方法分析在完全理性情况下,追求个体最优结果与社会整体利益的矛盾,以及政府在决策时如何看待民意测验.     

与非共线铁磁引线耦合的双量子点环中电子的输运

用非平衡格林函数理论研究与两个铁磁引线连接的平行连耦合双量子点系统中电子输运性质。两个铁磁引线的磁矩相互成任意角度,即磁矩是非共线性的。通过调节磁矩间的角度,可以控制不同自旋方向电子的输运性质,从而能充分操作通过整个系统的电流和隧穿磁阻。两个铁磁弓I线磁矩间的相对角度对量子点中不同自旋电子的占据数有显著的影响,是决定电流和隧穿磁阻性质的内在机制。量子点间的耦合强度、量子点与引线的耦合强度等也会对系统的电流有明显的作用,从而提供了丰富的电流操控手段。本文研究的系统可以用作自旋阀,在自旋电子学器件中有实际的应用价值。     

Targeted misexpression of a Drosophila opsin gene leads to altered visual function

Drosophila mutants transformed with a chimaeric gene that expresses the ocellar visual pigment in the major class of photoreceptor cells of the retina were used to investigate the properties of this minor pigment. The photoreceptor cells in which this opsin was misexpressed showed new spectral characteristics and physiology.     

Genome shuffling leads to rapid phenotypic improvement in bacteria

For millennia, selective breeding, on the basis of biparental mating, has led to the successful improvement of plants and animals to meet societal needs. At a molecular level, DNA shuffling mimics, yet accelerates, evolutionary processes, and allows the breeding and improvement of individual genes and subgenomic DNA fragments. We describe here whole-genome shuffling; a process that combines the advantage of multi-parental crossing allowed by DNA shuffling with the recombination of entire genomes normally associated with conventional breeding. We show that recursive genomic recombination within a population of bacteria can efficiently generate combinatorial libraries of new strains. When applied to a population of phenotypically selected bacteria, many of these new strains show marked improvements in the selected phenotype. We demonstrate the use of this approach through the rapid improvement of tylosin production from Streptomyces fradiae. This approach has the potential to facilitate cell and metabolic engineering and provide a non-recombinant alternative to the rapid production of improved organisms.     

不对称信息下两阶段供应链的库存博弈

文章在随机需求以及考虑缺货成本的前提下,针对由供货商和零售商组成的两阶段供应链,分析了独立决策与联合决策的库存成本,以及在对称信息与不对称信息下协调的有效性条件;采用转移支付的协调策略,提出了使得双方成本最小化,并使得供应链达最优的方法;最后,举例说明了该方法的有效性.     

审计服务市场中监督博弈分析

针对审计工作中博弈方1-注册会计师与博弈方2-被审计单位之间监督审计问题，建立了监督博弈模型，应用该模型对双方在审计过程中出现的四种情况作了分析，由模型给出了规范我国注册会计师行业和会计信息披露的几点建议．