范·弗拉森的构造经验论

范·弗拉森的构造经验论郭贵春在当代西方科学哲学的发展中，范·弗拉森的构造经验论具有极其广泛的影响。在经验构造论的基础上，范·弗拉森既是对逻辑经验主义的理论框架进行最尖锐批评的科学哲学家之一，同时又是反实在论阵营中的一名代表人物。他正是要通过这种双向的...     

范·弗拉森"语用学"科学说明观的两个问题

范·弗拉森的科学说明理论("语用学"的科学说明)以语境为基础,以经验论的实用主义为背景,综合了以前说明模式的成果,以相对完美的形式取得了学术界比较一致的承认.但事情的另一面是,范·弗拉森"语用学"的科学说明理论存在两个问题:一是他的科学说明理论语用学性质模糊;二是他的相关关系的不相关性.     

论最佳解释推理与贝叶斯推理的相容性——基于对范·弗拉森的批判性分析

范·弗拉森促使关于最佳解释推理(IBE)的争论集中于IBE与贝叶斯推理的相容性,但是他用动态大弃赌定理作为论据来批判IBE是一种误导。通过对IBE作出狭义、中义和广义的区分,可以更为细致地考察和发展范·弗拉森的合理观点,得出结论:IBE不是独立的推理,无论是科学辩护方面还是"助发现"意义上的科学发现方面,IBE都是相容于贝叶斯推理的。     

范·弗拉森关于量子测量的模态解释

范·弗拉森的量子测量的模态解释不仅是他的量子力学哲学理论的核心,也是他的一般科学哲学理论--建构经验论--的主要科学思想基础.本文主要从量子测量的解释问题,测量的模态解释的主要思想内容和模态解释的意义等几个层次较深入浅出地介绍范·弗拉森的量子测量解释理论,并概括地说明它与范·弗拉森的整个量子力学哲学及与他的建构经验论的关系.     

范·弗拉森科学表征观的语用等价策略

抽象结构如何表征具体目标对象,是当今科学表征哲学研究的重要议题.范·弗拉森把该问题表述为理论模型如何与现象相联系,并引入数据模型来协调二者的关系,提出理论模型由于与数据模型结构同构而表征了现象.但范·弗拉森否认结构的实在性,反对现象本身存在结构,从而导致数据模型与现象之间无法同构,产生"实在性丢失"问题.对此范·弗拉森...     

范.弗拉森—一个辩证的反实在论者

范·弗拉森的反实在论是当今科学辩证化发展过程的一个重要组成部分。从总体上看，它是一种处在现象主义和激进反实在论之间的科学哲学；从性质上看，它融汇了建构主义与经验主义；从方法上看，它把语义方法与工具主义统一起来。在认知策略上，范·弗拉森采取了既反左也反右的方针，从而坚持了符合论原则，利用了工具主义的长处。他的思想在当今科学实在论争论中起着中和作用。     

范·弗拉森的量子力学解释理论

范·弗拉森的量子力学解释理论既是他的量子力学哲学的核心，也是他的建构经验论的科学思想基础。本文主要从量子力学的一般解释理论、量子力学测量问题、测量的模态解释的主要思想、模态解释的意义等四个层次较深入浅出地介绍范·弗拉森的量子力学解释理论。     

论范.弗拉森语用学的科学说明观

本文旨在论述范．弗拉森语用学的科学说明观，认为其语用学的科学说明观是在批判历史上种种科学说明观的基础上形成的；与以往科学说明观不同的是：它高度重视说明中的语境因素，把科学说明与科学理论的真理性对立起来。     

范·弗拉森对EPR关联的分析

本文主要介绍范·弗拉森对EPR关联的哲学分析,即EPR关联的神秘性不能用迄今为止所发展的对关联的六种解释(机遇、巧合、同格、前定和谐、逻辑同一、共因)的任何一种解释来获得满意的说明.它只是一种不同于经典统计的统计性关联.然后给以简单评述.     

科学解释的贝叶斯网络模型探析

解释项和被解释项之间的逻辑相关、统计相关以及因果相关等语义学模型都不能揭示科学解释的内在机制。解释必须涉及语境,必须关注解释主体。范·弗拉森和阿欣斯坦等人把解释拓展为理论、事实和语境的三元关系,但因为不是基于解释者的模型,也不能摆脱解释困境。基于贝叶斯网络的解释模型介于解释模型的语义学进路和语用学进路之间,它立足于把解释的因果关系和解释者的信念相结合,把定性解释和定量解释考虑在内从而避免科学解释陷入困境。     

Meaning of Life in Fragile Wit(h)nessing: On Experiencing Radical Uniqueness as Gift and Grace

In this comment-response Mikael Lindfelt makes some suggestions to how one could develop the argument for wit(h)nessing as experiencing meaningfulness in life as put forward by Nicole Note and Emilie Van Deale. While being positive to the main phenomenological approach, and especially the dialectical relational aspect of the phenomenological argument, Lindfelt uses Alain Badiou’s talk of Event in trying both to develop the phenomenological argument and to point out some idealistic tendencies in the line of the argument. Lindfelt suggests that the aspect of uniqueness in the relational experience of the other should be taken to more radically than suggested by Note and Van Deale. By pointing out the dialectical fragility of the Event of wit(h)nessing Lindfelt is arguing for that the concept of respect could be more utilized in arguing for the experience of meaning seen as a gift.     

Thinking Through the Prism of Life

The article provides an overview of the argument in Robert Scharff’s paper “Displacing epistemology: Being in the midst of technoscientific practice” (Scharff 2011), focusing on his central objective, to articulate a hidden ground of the current controversies in the philosophy of science and technology studies, between objectivism and constructivism, through a deeper confrontation with Heidegger’s legacy. The commentary addresses two aspects of Scharffs argument that deserve to be developed further, namely how it both criticizes and cultivates itself an ideal of the meta-knower, and how the idea of thinking from the perspective of life in Dilthey’s sense can be critically reflected through Heidegger’s later criticism. By rehearsing Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia, and also his gradually increased criticism of the very concept of life, the commentary tries to show how Scharff’s intervention can in fact be strengthened against possible criticism.     

推定及其实用主义解释

做出一个推定意味着将被推定的东西暂时接受为真,直到它被证明为假。因此,推定允许我们在缺乏充分认知保障的情况下进行试探性的认知实践。然而,推定的认识论基础并不牢靠,在包含推定的推理中,我们得到的既非传统意义的知识,也非确然的事实,究竟是什么为推定的合理使用提供了依据?我们又如何做出一个合理有效的推定?这是亟待解决的问题。一个成功的解释既要符合推定的三个基本特征,同时又要能够阐明其认识论基础,从这个角度来看,目前流行几种解释理论并不成功。雷谢尔关于推定的论述揭示出一种实用主义解释的可能,本文将表明实用主义解释更具合理性,它包含以下三个方面:通过似真性概念建立推定的基本原则,通过融贯论建立似真性的认识论辩护,通过实用主义的效验原则建立其使用的合理性基础。     

Expanding Mediation Theory

In his article In Between Us, Yoni van den Eede expands existing theories of mediation into the realm of the social and the political, focusing on the notions of opacity and transparency. His approach is rich and promising, but two pitfalls should be avoided. First, his concept of ‘in-between’ runs the risk to conceptualize mediation as a process ‘between’ pre-given entities. On the basis of current work in postphenomenology and actor-network theory, though, mediation should rather be seen as the origin of entities, not as an intermediary between them. Second, Van den Eede’s separate discussion of transparency and opacity in ‘use’ and in ‘context’ runs the risk to make invisible the complementarity of the two dimensions. While transparency of use embodies an experiential form of the distinction between transparency and opacity, transparency of context embodies a more cognitive dimension of the distinction. Only by linking the two it becomes possible to take responsibility for the impact that technological mediations can have. Users and designers need a ‘double vision’ to simultaneously see the transparency of both use and context.     

论个体性状的完全因果解释

尼安德的"传递论证"中有两个不合理之处:第一,把个体性状出现的遗传学原因扩展为个体性状出现的所有原因,从而把完全因果解释理解成了对个体性状的历史解释;第二,要求对个体性状的解释包括对"原因的原因"的无休止上溯,从而把完全因果解释理解成了终极解释。索伯尔在回应尼安德时只是强调了遗传机制与选择机制属于两种不同的因果路径,没有指出尼安德对科学解释的错误理解,这就不能完全排除选择机制对个体性状的解释作用。     

自然主义视野中的逻辑必然性

从自然主义的视角出发,科学知识社会学的早期代表人物布鲁尔把逻辑知识等同于集体共享的推理模式,探求逻辑知识的自然与社会基础。在他看来演绎推理是建立在人类生物性基础上的一种社会惯例,逻辑必然性是一种道德必然性,逻辑的强制力来自于社会。逻辑规则作为社会惯例,是自我指涉、自我创造、自我证立的。     

Leibniz and Newton on Space

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable.     

Algebraic Collisions

Algebraic equations in the tradition of Descartes and Frans Van Schooten accompany Christiaan Huygens’s early work on collision, which later would be reorganized and presented as De motu corporum ex percussione. Huygens produced the equations at the same time as his announcement of his rejection of Descartes’s rules of collision. Never intended for publication, the equations appear to have been used as preliminary scaffolding on which to build his critiques of Descartes’s physics. Additionally, Huygens used algebraic equations of this form to accurately predict the speeds of bodies after collision in experiments carried out at the Royal Society. Despite their deceptive simplicity, Huygens’s algebraic equations pose significant conceptual problems both mathematically and for their physical interpretation especially for negative speeds; they may very well have been the source of a new principle, the conservation of quantity of motion with direction.     

On Gene’s Action and Reciprocal Causation

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology.