I s

Richard Arthur (2006) and I (Savitt, 2009) proposed that the present in (time-oriented) Minkowski spacetime should be thought of as a small causal diamond. That is, given two timelike separated events p and q, with p earlier than q, we suggested that the present (relative to those two events) is the set I⁺(p)∩I^-(q). Mauro Dorato (2011) presents three criticisms of this proposal. I rebut all three and then examine two more plausible criticisms of the Arthur/Savitt proposal. I argue that these criticisms also fail.     

Why be regular? Part II

We provide a novel perspective on “regularity” as a property of representations of the Weyl algebra. In Part I, we critiqued a proposal by Halvorson [2004, “Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (1), pp. 45–56], who advocates for the use of the non-regular “position” and “momentum” representations of the Weyl algebra. Halvorson argues that the existence of these non-regular representations demonstrates that a quantum mechanical particle can have definite values for position or momentum, contrary to a widespread view. In this sequel, we propose a justification for focusing on regular representations, pace Halvorson, by drawing on algebraic methods.     

Scrutinizing thing knowledge

In his book Thing Knowledge Davis Baird argues that our accustomed understanding of knowledge as justified true beliefs is not enough to understand progress in science and technology. To be more accurate he argues that scientific instruments are to be seen as a form of “objective knowledge” in the sense of Karl Popper.I want to examine if this idea is plausible. In a first step I want to show that this proposal implies that nearly all man-made artifacts are materialized objective knowledge. I argue that this radical change in our concept of knowledge demands strong reasons and that Baird does not give them. I take a look at the strongest strand of arguments of Baird's book—the arguments from cognitive autonomy—and conclude that they do not suffice to make Baird's view of scientific instruments tenable.     

Mechanics without mechanisms

At the time of Heinrich Hertz's premature death in 1894, he was regarded as one of the leading scientists of his generation. However, the posthumous publication of his treatise in the foundations of physics, Principles of Mechanics, presents a curious historical situation. Although Hertz's book was widely praised and admired, it was also met with a general sense of dissatisfaction. Almost all of Hertz's contemporaries criticized Principles for the lack of any plausible way to construct a mechanism from the “hidden masses” that are particularly characteristic of Hertz's framework. This issue seemed especially glaring given the expectation that Hertz's work might lead to a model of the underlying workings of the ether.In this paper I seek an explanation for why Hertz seemed so unperturbed by the difficulties of constructing such a mechanism. In arriving at this explanation, I explore how the development of Hertz's image-theory of representation framed the project of Principles. The image-theory brings with it an austere view of the “essential content” of mechanics, only requiring a kind of structural isomorphism between symbolic representations and target phenomena. I argue that bringing this into view makes clear why Hertz felt no need to work out the kinds of mechanisms that many of his readers looked for. Furthermore, I argue that a crucial role of Hertz's hypothesis of hidden masses has been widely overlooked. Far from acting as a proposal for the underlying structure of the ether, I show that Hertz's hypothesis ruled out knowledge of such underlying structure.     

Computational models: a modest role for content

The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view (hereafter, ‘computationalists’) claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.     

Why Be regular?, part I

We provide a novel perspective on “regularity” as a property of representations of the Weyl algebra. We first critique a proposal by Halvorson [2004, “Complementarity of representations in quantum mechanics”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (1), pp. 45–56], who argues that the non-regular “position” and “momentum” representations of the Weyl algebra demonstrate that a quantum mechanical particle can have definite values for position or momentum, contrary to a widespread view. We show that there are obstacles to such an intepretation of non-regular representations. In Part II, we propose a justification for focusing on regular representations, pace Halvorson, by drawing on algebraic methods.     

Scientific progress without increasing verisimilitude: In response to Niiniluoto

First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science's theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.     

Values in early-stage climate engineering: The ethical implications of “doing the research”

Calls for research on climate engineering have increased in the last two decades, but there remains widespread agreement that many climate engineering technologies (in particular, forms involving global solar radiation management) present significant ethical risks and require careful governance. However, proponents of research argue, ethical restrictions on climate engineering research should not be imposed in early-stage work like in silico modeling studies. Such studies, it is argued, do not pose risks to the public, and the knowledge gained from them is necessary for assessing the risks and benefits of climate engineering technologies. I argue that this position, which I call the “broad research-first” stance, cannot be maintained in light of the entrance of nonepistemic values in climate modeling. I analyze the roles that can be played by nonepistemic political and ethical values in the design, tuning, and interpretation of climate models. Then, I argue that, in the context of early-stage climate engineering research, the embeddedness of values will lead to value judgments that could harm stakeholder groups or impose researcher values on non-consenting populations. I conclude by calling for more robust reflection on the ethics and governance of early-stage climate engineering research.     

Pictures of sounds: Wittgenstein on gramophone records and the logic of depiction

I consider the way Wittgenstein employed some kinds of sound recordings (but not others) in discussing logical form in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus. The year that Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, 1889, nearby developments already underway portended two major changes of the coming century: the advent of controlled heavier than air flight and the mass production of musical sound recordings. Before they brought about major social changes, though, these innovations appeared in Europe in the form of children’s toys. Wittgenstein uses the fact that a symphony performance can be constructed from both a written musical score and the grooves of a gramophone record to explain what logical form is. His characterization of logical form in the Tractatus in terms of intertranslatability rather than in terms of interpretability is highlighted by reflecting on the kinds of examples of sound recordings that he did not use to illustrate the notion of logical form. There were other well known technologies for making visual records of sound at the time, but these did not serve to illustrate logical form.     

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

‘Working in a new world’: Kuhn,constructivism, and mind-dependence

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn famously advanced the claim that scientists work in a different world after a scientific revolution. Kuhn's view has been at the center of a philosophical literature that has tried to make sense of his bold claim, by listing Kuhn's view in good company with other seemingly constructivist proposals. The purpose of this paper is to take some steps towards clarifying what sort of constructivism (if any) is in fact at stake in Kuhn's view. To this end, I distinguish between two main (albeit not exclusive) notions of mind-dependence: a semantic notion and an ontological one. I point out that Kuhn's view should be understood as subscribing to a form of semantic mind-dependence, and conclude that semantic mind-dependence does not land us into any worrisome ontological mind-dependence, pace any constructivist reading of Kuhn.     

The intelligibility of motion and construction: Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics, 1619-1637

I argue for an interpretation of the connection between Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics that centers on the standard of geometrical intelligibility that characterizes Descartes’ mathematical work during the period 1619 to 1637. This approach remains sensitive to the innovations of Descartes’ system of geometry and, I claim, sheds important light on the relationship between his landmark Geometry (1637) and his first metaphysics of nature, which is presented in Le monde (1633). In particular, I argue that the same standard of clear and distinct motions for construction that allows Descartes to distinguish ‘geometric’ from ‘imaginary’ curves in the domain of mathematics is adopted in Le monde as Descartes details God’s construction of nature. I also show how, on this interpretation, the metaphysics of Le monde can fruitfully be brought to bear on Descartes’ attempted solution to the Pappus problem, which he presents in Book I of the Geometry. My general goal is to show that attention to the standard of intelligibility Descartes invokes in these different areas of inquiry grants us a richer view of the connection between his early mathematics and philosophy than an approach that assumes a common method is what binds his work in these domains together.     

Structural realism,mathematics, and ontology

Over the last two decades structural realism has been given progressively more elaborated formulations. Steven French has been at the forefront of the development of the most conceptually sophisticated and historically sensitive version of the view. In his book, The Structure of the World (French (2014)), French shows how structural realism, the view according to which structure is all there is (ontic structural realism), is able to illuminate central issues in the philosophy of science: underdetermination, scientific representation, dispositions, natural modality, and laws of nature. The discussion consistently sheds novel light on the problems under consideration while developing insightful and provocative views. In this paper, I focus on the status of mathematics within French's ontic structural realism, and I raise some concerns about its proper understanding vis-à-vis the realist components of the view.     

The semantic conception and the structuralist view of theories: A critique of Suppe’s criticisms

Different conceptions of scientific theories, such as the state spaces approach of Bas van Fraassen, the phase spaces approach of Frederick Suppe, the set-theoretical approach of Patrick Suppes, and the structuralist view of Joseph Sneed et al. are usually put together into one big family. In addition, the definite article is normally used, and thus we speak of the semantic conception (view or approach) of theories and of its different approaches (variants or versions). However, in The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism (Urban and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), starting from certain remarks already made in “Theory Structure” (in P. Asquith and H. Kyburg (Eds.), Current Research in Philosophy of Science, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 317–338), Frederick Suppe excludes the structuralist view as well as other “European” versions from the semantic conception of theories. In this paper I will critically examine the reasons put forward by Suppe for this decision and, later, I will provide a general characterization of the semantic family and of the structuralist view of theories in such a way as to justify the inclusion of the structuralist view (as well as other “European” versions) as a member of this family.     

Leibniz’s syncategorematic infinitesimals

In contrast with some recent theories of infinitesimals as non-Archimedean entities, Leibniz’s mature interpretation was fully in accord with the Archimedean Axiom: infinitesimals are fictions, whose treatment as entities incomparably smaller than finite quantities is justifiable wholly in terms of variable finite quantities that can be taken as small as desired, i.e. syncategorematically. In this paper I explain this syncategorematic interpretation, and how Leibniz used it to justify the calculus. I then compare it with the approach of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis, as propounded by John Bell. I find some salient differences, especially with regard to higher-order infinitesimals. I illustrate these differences by a consideration of how each approach might be applied to propositions of Newton’s Principia concerning the derivation of force laws for bodies orbiting in a circle and an ellipse. “If the Leibnizian calculus needs a rehabilitation because of too severe treatment by historians in the past half century, as Robinson suggests (1966, 250), I feel that the legitimate grounds for such a rehabilitation are to be found in the Leibnizian theory itself.”—(Bos 1974–1975, 82–83).      

Der Einfluß der Temperatur auf die Giftwirkung des DDT bei Honigbienen (Apis mellifica L.)

Summary The action of DDT on honey-bees depends to a high extent on the temperature (see graph). At 36°C (breeding temperature) DDT has a far weaker insecticidal action than at 20°C (laboratory temperature). This shows that the insecticidal properties of DDT diminish with the raise of temperature.This resistance to DDT at higher temperature is most propitious for bee-keeping and also explains the fact why in agricultural practice there has been no corroborated case of poisoning of bees, though in laboratory tests DDT avered itself to be toxic to bees.     

Energy Conservation in GTR

The topics of gravitational field energy and energy-momentum conservation in General Relativity theory have been unjustly neglected by philosophers. If the gravitational field in space free of ordinary matter, as represented by the metric g_ab itself, can be said to carry genuine energy and momentum, this is a powerful argument for adopting the substantivalist view of spacetime.This paper explores the standard textbook account of gravitational field energy and argues that (a) so-called stress-energy of the gravitational field is well-defined neither locally nor globally; and (b) there is no general principle of energy-momentum conservation to be found in General Relativity. I discuss the nature and justification of the zero-divergence law for ordinary stress-energy, and its possible connection with the failure of General Relativity to realise Mach's principle.     

Generative models: Human embryonic stem cells and multiple modeling relations

Model organisms are at once scientific models and concrete living things. It is widely assumed by philosophers of science that (1) model organisms function much like other kinds of models, and (2) that insofar as their scientific role is distinctive, it is in virtue of representing a wide range of biological species and providing a basis for generalizations about those targets. This paper uses the case of human embryonic stem cells (hESC) to challenge both assumptions. I first argue that hESC can be considered model organisms, analogous to classic examples such as Escherichia coli and Drosophila melanogaster. I then discuss four contrasts between the epistemic role of hESC in practice, and the assumptions about model organisms noted above. These contrasts motivate an alternative view of model organisms as a network of systems related constructively and developmentally to one another. I conclude by relating this result to other accounts of model organisms in recent philosophy of science.     

Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation

The ‘received view’ about computation is that all computations must involve representational content. Egan and Piccinini argue against the received view. In this paper, I focus on Egan’s arguments, claiming that they fall short of establishing that computations do not involve representational content. I provide positive arguments explaining why computation has to involve representational content, and how that representational content may be of any type (distal, broad, etc.). I also argue (contra Egan and Fodor) that there is no need for computational psychology to be individualistic. Finally, I draw out a number of consequences for computational individuation, proposing necessary conditions on computational identity and necessary and sufficient conditions on computational I/O equivalence of physical systems.     

The rhetorical strategy of William Paley’s Natural theology (1802): Part 2, William Paley’s Natural theology and the challenge of atheism

The first part of this two-part article suggested that William Paley’s Natural theology (1802) should be viewed as the culmination of a complex psychological strategy for inculcating religious and moral sentiments. Having focused in Part 1 on Paley’s rhetoric, we now turn our attention to the philosophical part of the programme. This article attempts to settle the vexed question of how far Paley responded to the devastating critique of the teleological argument contained in Hume’s posthumously published Dialogues concerning natural religion (1779). It also identifies tensions that arose in Natural theology between the rhetorical and intellectual sides of the stratagem. In response to Erasmus Darwin’s evolutionary theories, Paley asserted that the divinely designed architecture of nature had remained unchanged since the creation. But the more he emphasized the preordained nature of providence, its effectuation through mechanical dispositions, the less room there appeared to be for particular interventions. Section 2 concentrates on Paley’s efforts to reconcile this model of a law-governed, mechanical universe, with the belief in a personal God who was active in worldly affairs. It therefore challenges the view, long unquestioned in the historical literature, that Paley’s Deity was merely a watchmaker, who had remained idle since the Creation.