Visual Models in Analogical Problem Solving

Visual analogy is believed to be important in human problem solving. Yet, there are few computational models of visual analogy. In this paper, we present a preliminary computational model of visual analogy in problem solving. The model is instantiated in a computer program, called Galatea, which uses a language for representing and transferring visual information called Privlan. We describe how the computational model can account for a small slice of a cognitive-historical analysis of Maxwell’s reasoning about electromagnetism.     

Ontological Frameworks for Scientific Theories

A close examination of the literature on ontology may strike one with roughly two distinct senses of this word. According to the first of them, which we shall call traditional ontology, ontology is characterized as the a priori study of various “ontological categories”. In a second sense, which may be called naturalized ontology, ontology relies on our best scientific theories and from them it tries to derive the ultimate furniture of the world. From a methodological point of view these two senses of ontology are very far away. Here, we discuss a possible relationship between these senses and argue that they may be made compatible and complement each other. We also examine how logic, understood as a linguistic device dealing with the conceptual framework of a theory and its basic inference patterns must be taken into account in this kind of study. The idea guiding our proposal may be put as follows: naturalized ontology checks for the applicability of the ontological categories proposed by traditional ontology and give substantial feedback for it. The adequate expression of some of the resulting ontological frameworks may require a different logic. We conclude with a discussion of the case of orthodox quantum mechanics, arguing that this theory exemplifies the kind of relationship between the two senses of ontology. We also argue that the view proposed here may throw some light in ontological questions concerning this theory.     

作为表达的模型

通常认为,模型在科学知识的组织和获得过程中起中心作用,大多数模型以某种方式表达了它们的目标系统。本文试图探讨的问题是关于模型如何表达它的目标系统。首先本文将引入模型的表达理论必须面对的两个基本问题,接下来将试图评述理论的语义观的解决方案所面临的问题及其原因,最后本文将对在何种方向上寻求模型的表达理论提出意见。     

Bridging the Gap Between Argumentation Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematics

We argue that there are mutually beneficial connections to be made between ideas in argumentation theory and the philosophy of mathematics, and that these connections can be suggested via the process of producing computational models of theories in these domains. We discuss Lakatos’s work (Proofs and Refutations, 1976) in which he championed the informal nature of mathematics, and our computational representation of his theory. In particular, we outline our representation of Cauchy’s proof of Euler’s conjecture, in which we use work by Haggith on argumentation structures, and identify connections between these structures and Lakatos’s methods.     

Gödel, Einstein, Mach: Casting Constraints on All-embracing Concepts

Can a theory turn back, as it were, upon itselfand vouch for its own features? That is, canthe derived elements of a theory be the veryprimitive terms that provide thepresuppositions of the theory? This form of anall-embracing feature assumes a totality inwhich there occurs quantification over thattotality, quantification that is defined bythis very totality. I argue that the Machprinciple exhibits such a feature ofall-embracing nature. To clarify the argument,I distinguish between on the one handcompleteness and on the other wholeness andtotality, as different all-embracing features:the former being epistemic while the latter –ontological. I propose an analogy between the Mach principleas a possible selection principle in generalrelativity, and the vicious-circle principle infoundations of mathematics. I finally concludewith a consequence of this analogyvis-à-vis completeness and totality,viz., both should be constrained if they wereto be valid concepts for a physical theory. The paper progresses chronologically. Itfocuses on the physical approach of Mach thatformed the background for Einstein's generaltheory of relativity. The solutions of thefield equations in the form of cosmologicalmodels set the scene for the view ofall-embracing concepts discussed in the paper.Specifically, the ideas encapsulated in whatEinstein called the Mach principle, constitutethe thread of this account. The principle isfound however to falter, in view of the factthat there are several different types ofsolution of the field equations that contradictit. One such important cosmological model withramifying consequences is the rotational masssolution of Gödel. The question arises asto whether there is an analogy betweenincompleteness in foundations of mathematicsand in physics? The analogy between the vicious-circleprinciple and the Mach principle demonstratesan affirmative answer which suggests in turnthat completeness and totality must becurtailed – that is, conditions and limitsshould be imposed on completeness and totalityto render them valid for physical theories.     

Thinking Dynamically About Biological Mechanisms: Networks of Coupled Oscillators

Explaining the complex dynamics exhibited in many biological mechanisms requires extending the recent philosophical treatment of mechanisms that emphasizes sequences of operations. To understand how nonsequentially organized mechanisms will behave, scientists often advance what we call dynamic mechanistic explanations. These begin with a decomposition of the mechanism into component parts and operations, using a variety of laboratory-based strategies. Crucially, the mechanism is then recomposed by means of computational models in which variables or terms in differential equations correspond to properties of its parts and operations. We provide two illustrations drawn from research on circadian rhythms. Once biologists identified some of the components of the molecular mechanism thought to be responsible for circadian rhythms, computational models were used to determine whether the proposed mechanisms could generate sustained oscillations. Modeling has become even more important as researchers have recognized that the oscillations generated in individual neurons are synchronized within networks; we describe models being employed to assess how different possible network architectures could produce the observed synchronized activity.     

科学发展模式的生物进化论类比研究

科学发展的多元进化模式是科学哲学关于科学进步问题的成果之一。与其相对应的生物进化论类比则是近年来国际学术界争议的焦点。我们将从当代生物进化论出发,论证科学发展作为增生式的非目的性过程,其生物进化类比是恰当的。     

On Ultrametricity,Data Coding,and Computation

The triangular inequality is a defining property of a metric space, while the stronger ultrametric inequality is a defining property of an ultrametric space. Ultrametric distance is defined from p-adic valuation. It is known that ultrametricity is a natural property of spaces in the sparse limit. The implications of this are discussed in this article. Experimental results are presented which quantify how ultrametric a given metric space is. We explore the practical meaningfulness of this property of a space being ultrametric. In particular, we examine the computational implications of widely prevalent and perhaps ubiquitous ultrametricity.     

Induction from a Single Instance: Incomplete Frames

In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.     

A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation</Emphasis>

The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application. The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed, how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the nuclear structure.     

Relativity Theory Refounded

We put forward a new view of relativity theory that makes the existence of a flow of time compatible with the four-dimensional block universe. To this end, we apply the creation-discovery view elaborated for quantum mechanics to relativity theory and in such a way that time and space become creations instead of discoveries and an underlying non temporal and non spatial reality comes into existence. We study the nature of this underlying non temporal and non spatial reality and reinterpret many aspects of the theory within this new view. We show that data of relativistic measurements are sufficient to derive the three-dimensionality of physical space. The nature of light and massive entities is reconsidered, and an analogy with human cognition is worked out.     

Quantum Superpositions and the Representation of Physical Reality Beyond Measurement Outcomes and Mathematical Structures

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical (actualist) representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the (metaphysical) presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions.     

信息技术与意义的嬗变

意义问题历来是哲学研究的重大问题.进入信息社会以来,人们对信息技术的社会作用和文化功能讨论较多,但对于信息技术与意义的关系讨论较少.本文以海德格尔的学生,美国哲学家Albert Borgmann提出的"意义退隐"思想为问题指向,通过意义理论的分析和三分法的方法论的分析,提出如下论点:信息技术引起的"意义退引"问题应该精细地分析,意义在信息时代出现了分化和转型,因此发生嬗变.     

On Gene’s Action and Reciprocal Causation

Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by wholly physical properties, e.g., geometrical structures of molecular aggregates (cells). In response, we argue that contrary to his expectations one cannot infer reductionist assumptions even from detailed biological explanations that invoke the molecular level, as interlevel causal reciprocity is essential to these explanations. Recent very detailed explanations that concern the structure and function of chromatin—the intricacies of supposedly basic molecular level—demonstrate this. They show that what seem to be basic physical parameters extend into a more general biological context, thus rendering elusive the concepts of the basic level and causal hierarchy postulated by the reductionists. In fact, relevant phenomena are defined across levels by entangled, extended parameters. Nor can the biological context be explained away by basic physical parameters defining molecular level shaped by evolution as a physical process. Reductionists claim otherwise only because they overlook the evolutionary significance of initial conditions best defined in terms of extended biological parameters. Perhaps the reductionist assumptions (as well as assumptions that postulate any particular levels as causally fundamental) cannot be inferred from biological explanations because biology aims at manipulating organisms rather than producing explanations that meet the coherence requirements of general ontological models. Or possibly the assumptions of an ontology not based on the concept of causal powers stratified across levels can be inferred from biological explanations. The incoherence of downward causation is inevitable, given reductionist assumptions, but an ontological alternative might avoid this. We outline desiderata for the treatment of levels and properties that realize interlevel causation in such an ontology.     

Matter in Z3

In this paper, I will discuss a certain conception of matter that Aristotle introduces in Metaphysics Z3. It is often assumed that Aristotle came to distinguish between matter and form only in his physical writings, and that this lead to a conflict with the doctrine of primary substances in the Categories that he tries to resolve in Z3. I will argue that there is no such conflict. In Z3, Aristotle seems to suggest that matter is what is left over when we strip a thing of all its properties. I take it that he does not want us to strip away these properties by physical means or in our imagination. Rather, we are asked to strip a referring noun phrase of all its predicative parts. We are thus not supposed to be able to refer to something that has no qualities whatsoever, but to construct a phrase that refers to something that has properties without referring to its having them, and without implying which properties it has. The idea that there might be a way of referring to something definite without mentioning any of its qualities is platonic and it still underlies modern predicate logic. In Z3, Aristotle argues against this conception and thus against the basic idea of predicate logic. According to him, matter is at best an inseparable aspect of a primary substance, which substance is best referred to as a compound τóδε τι (“this such”). Matter is what the τóδε refers to as part of this phrase. But it cannot exist in separation from form, and we cannot refer to it by a separated term, without also referring to the substantial form of the substance of which it is an aspect.     

学科交叉与分子生物学的革命和发展 --纪念DNA双螺旋模型建立50周年

20世纪生物学最激动人心的大事就是50年前DNA双螺旋结构的发现。作为纪念，本文从历史的角度阐明这场分子生物学革命的方法论动因：物理化学技术在分子生物学中的运用。化学在生物学中的运用随着有机化学的发展自然而然地进行，然而，物理学方法在生物学中的运用却需要理论的勇气和胆量。玻尔、薛定谔等对物理化学方法的倡导，洛克菲勒基金会对应用物理学方法研究分子生物学问题的资助等促使大批物理学家向生物学转移。同位素示踪方法、X射线衍射分析、超速离心技术等的应用推动着分子生物学的革命性发展。20世纪末和新的世纪，计算技术、应用数学和信息科学方法代替物理学方法成为推动分子生物学发展的新方法。     

研究诚信的体制化——美国研究诚信办公室及其启示

科学研究中的不端行为愈来愈引起各界关注。在此背景下，研究诚信的体制化显得至关重要。作为应对此类问题的专门机构，美国研究诚信办公室的成立背景、早期发展和主要工作对我国相关领域具有极大的启示意义。本文对此进行了探讨，并在此基础上揭示研究诚信和研究伦理的体制化趋势。     

Making Quantum Theory Compatible with Realism

After a brief account of theway quantum theory deals with naturalprocesses, the crucial problem that such atheory meets, the measurement or, better, themacro-objectification problem is discussed.The embarrassing aspects of the occurrence ofentangled states involving macroscopic systemsare analyzed in details. The famous example ofSchroedinger's cat is presented and it ispointed out how the combined interplay of thesuperposition principle and the ensuingentanglement raises some serious difficultiesin working out a satisfactory quantum worldview, agreeing with our definiteperceptions. The orthodox solution to themacro-objectification problem, i.e. thepostulate of wave packet reduction, isanalyzed and is proved to be inconsistent withthe assumption that the theory governes alsothe measurement process. After these premises,the rest of the paper is devoted to discuss arecent proposal of overcoming the difficultiesof the standard formalism by acceptingnonlinear and stochastic modifications of thequantum dynamics. The proposed theory is shownto agree with all known predictions of thestandard theory concerning microscopic systemsand to account, on the basis of a universaldynamics which is assumed to govern allnatural processes, for wave packet reductionin measurement processes and, more important,to eliminate all the difficulties concerningmacroscopic situations. Actually, the proposedtheory allows one to take consistently amacrorealistic position about natural processes and about our definite perceptions.