科学知识变化的三种解释模式及其评价

科学知识的发展变化问题是20世纪科学哲学所关注的核心论题之一。纵观20世纪科学哲学的发展，主要地形成了三种解释模式：逻辑一理性论模式、认知论模式和社会学模式。虽然在20世纪的最后30年认知主义者和科学知识社会学家都对逻辑一理性论进行了猛烈的批判，但它们也未能对科学知识的变化问题给出令人满意的说明。对科学知识发展变化的完全说明应是这三种模式的有机统一。     

论以技术为中介的科学认识的变化

现代科学研究的技术中介日益加重,作者以康德的认识论为参照论述了技术介入后的科学认识的三种变化:一是人对观察的认知体验与对观察的信念巨大的分离;二是科学知识的判断过程完全走向工具的外化阅读之上;三是康德那里自然的合目的性先天调节原则因科学的技术基础的复杂化而转化为技术进化本身的目的性,造成科学变革受技术基础的牵制.     

Embodied Anomaly Resolution in Molecular Genetics: A Case Study of RNAi

Scientific anomalies are observations and facts that contradict current scientific theories and they are instrumental in scientific theory change. Philosophers of science have approached scientific theory change from different perspectives as Darden (Theory change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics, 1991) observes: Lakatos (In: Lakatos, Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 1970) approaches it as a progressive “research programmes” consisting of incremental improvements (“monster barring” in Lakatos, Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery, 1976), Kuhn (The structure of scientific revolutions, 1996) observes that changes in “paradigms” are instigated by a crisis from some anomaly, and Hanson (In: Feigl, Maxwell (eds) Current issues in the philosophy of science, 1961) proposes that discovery does not begin with hypothesis but with some “problematic phenomena requiring explanation”. Even though anomalies are important in all of these approaches to scientific theory change, there have been only few investigations into the specific role anomalies play in scientific theory change. Furthermore, much of these approaches focus on the theories themselves and not on how the scientists and their experiments bring about scientific change (Gooding, Experiment and the making of meaning: Human agency in scientific observation and experiment, 1990). To address these issues, this paper approaches scientific anomaly resolution from a meaning construction point of view. Conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier and Turner, Cogn Sci 22:133–187, 1996; The way we think: Conceptual blending and mind’s hidden complexities, 2002) from cognitive linguistics describes how one constructs meaning from various stimuli, such as text and diagrams, through conceptual integration or blending. The conceptual integration networks that describe the conceptual integration process characterize cognition that occurs unconsciously during meaning construction. These same networks are used to describe some of the cognition while resolving an anomaly in molecular genetics called RNA interference (RNAi) in a case study. The RNAi case study is a cognitive-historical reconstruction (Nersessian, In: Giere (ed) Cognitive models of science, 1992) that reconstructs how the RNAi anomaly was resolved. This reconstruction traces four relevant molecular genetics publications in describing the cognition necessary in accounting for how RNAi was resolved through strategies (Darden 1991), abductive reasoning (Peirce, In: Hartshorne, Weiss (eds) Collected papers, 1958), and experimental reasoning (Gooding 1990). The results of the case study show that experiments play a crucial role in formulating an explanation of the RNAi anomaly and the integration networks describe the experiments’ role. Furthermore, these results suggest that RNAi anomaly resolution is embodied. It is embodied in a sense that cognition described in the cognitive-historical reconstruction is experientially based.

Emergence,Computation and the Freedom Degree Loss Information Principle in Complex Systems

We consider processes of emergence within the conceptual framework of the Information Loss principle and the concepts of (1) systems conserving information; (2) systems compressing information; and (3) systems amplifying information. We deal with the supposed incompatibility between emergence and computability tout-court. We distinguish between computational emergence, when computation acquires properties, and emergent computation, when computation emerges as a property. The focus is on emergence processes occurring within computational processes. Violations of Turing-computability such as non-explicitness and incompleteness are intended to represent partially the properties of phenomenological emergence, such as logical openness, given by the observer’s cognitive role; structural dynamics where change regards rules rather than only values; and multi-modelling where multiple non-equivalent models are required to model such structural dynamics. In this way, we validate, from an epistemological viewpoint, models and simulations of phenomenological emergence where the sequence of events constitutes the natural, analogical non-Turing computation which a cognitive complex system can reproduce through learning. Reproducibility through learning is different from Turing-like computational iteration. This paper aims to open a new, non-reductionist understanding of the conceptual relationship between emergence and computability.     

研究型大学与政府科研机构的关系--国际比较研究

研究型大学与政府科研机构在国家科研体制中的定位与分工是影响一个国家科技资源配置的重要因素。本文概括了世界主要国家研究型大学与政府科研机构的关系模式，并着重探讨了美英模式和德法模式国家两者合作的经验，从而结合我国的国情，对如何实现我国研究型大学与政府科研机构的关系重建提出了若干建设性的对策建议。     

A Theory of Scientific Model Construction: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Conceptual Process of Abstraction and Concretisation</Emphasis>

The process of abstraction and concretisation is a label used for an explicative theory of scientific model-construction. In scientific theorising this process enters at various levels. We could identify two principal levels of abstraction that are useful to our understanding of theory-application. The first level is that of selecting a small number of variables and parameters abstracted from the universe of discourse and used to characterise the general laws of a theory. In classical mechanics, for example, we select position and momentum and establish a relation amongst the two variables, which we call Newton’s 2nd law. The specification of the unspecified elements of scientific laws, e.g. the force function in Newton’s 2nd law, is what would establish the link between the assertions of the theory and physical systems. In order to unravel how and with what conceptual resources scientific models are constructed, how they function and how they relate to theory, we need a view of theory-application that can accommodate our constructions of representation models. For this we need to expand our understanding of the process of abstraction to also explicate the process of specifying force functions etc. This is the second principal level at which abstraction enters in our theorising and in which I focus. In this paper, I attempt to elaborate a general analysis of the process of abstraction and concretisation involved in scientific- model construction, and argue why it provides an explication of the construction of models of the nuclear structure.     

Belief Systems and the Modeling Relation

The paper presents the most general aspects of scientific modeling and shows that social systems naturally include different belief systems (i.e. different models). Belief systems differ in a variety of respects, most notably in the selection of suitable qualities to encode and the internal structure of the observables. The following results emerge from the analysis: (1) conflict is explained by showing that different models encode different qualities, which implies that they model different realities; (2) explicitly connecting models to the realities that they encode makes it possible to clarify the relations among models; (3) by understanding that social systems are complex one knows that there is no chance of developing a maximal model of the system; (4) the distinction among different levels of depth implicitly includes a strategy for inducing change; (5) identity-preserving models are among the most difficult to modify; (6) since models do not customarily generate internal signals of error, strategies with which to determine when models are out of synch with their situations are especially valuable; (7) changing the form of power from a zero sum game to a positive sum game helps transform the nature of conflicts.     

知识经济条件下的企业组织范式研究

知识经济的迅速发展及新技术在企业中的推广和应用,从根本上改变着企业赖以存在的内外部环境、发展要素及运行机制,促使企业组织范式逐渐从传统经济的科学管理向知识经济时代的知识管理转变。本文从组织范式变革与环境变化二者耦舍的视角出发,深入剖析了“范式悖论”的成因,并对组织范式进行了基本分类,分析了不同类型组织范式演进的路径和动力来源,结合知识经济条件下组织结构的发展趋势构建了基于二重空间的企业组织网链结构模型。     

Error, Error-Statistics and Self-Directed Anticipative Learning

Error is protean, ubiquitous and crucial in scientific process. In this paper it is argued that understanding scientific process requires what is currently absent: an adaptable, context-sensitive functional role for error in science that naturally harnesses error identification and avoidance to positive, success-driven, science. This paper develops a new account of scientific process of this sort, error and success driving Self-Directed Anticipative Learning (SDAL) cycling, using a recent re-analysis of ape-language research as test example. The example shows the limitations of other accounts of error, in particular Mayo’s (Error and the growth of experimental knowledge, 1996) error-statistical approach, and SDAL cycling shows how they can be fruitfully contextualised.     

重复元件介导的重组是新嵌合基因形成的一个重要机制

先前的研究提示重复元件在产生新的嵌合基因中具有机制性的作用,这与经典的外显子洗牌模型是一致的,它依赖于非同源重组。而近期一些关于染色体异常的研究结果显示,异位的同源重组可能对于产生新基因也非常重要。本项研究通过对8种果蝇的年轻基因进行筛选和分析,从中识别出了17个重复片段,它们是在最近1200万年中通过异位重组形成的。它们中的大多数已具有功能,并进化出多样的表达类型和嵌合结构。这些结果证实,重复元件介导的非等位同源重组在产生新嵌合基因中起到重要作用。     

国内科学文化研究与欧美后SSK“科学的文化研究”之比较

国内的科学文化研究是在不改变科学的客观性、真理性和表象论的前提下,把科学作为一种文化现象和文化过程来研究,可划归为大众理解科学的科学传播视域。欧美后SSK的科学的文化研究是SSK从科学的社会研究扩展到科学实践的文化研究,是从科学知识的社会建构论转向科学实践的文化建构论,是对科学客观性和表象论的进一步背离和消解,强化和放大了各种异质性文化因素对制造科学的作用;背离了科学家的真实立场和科学的核心问题,成了反科学的帮凶,不会结出真正的果实。二者在研究内容、方法、理念和科学观上是根本不同的,他们都有自己亟需解决的问题。     

Steps from Erratic Projects towards Structured Programs in Research

Currently, research is mostly organized in research projects intended to provide results within a limited period of time. Here, small teams of scientists erratically define single scientific studies, write a proposal, and send it to the refereeing board. In case of a funding, the study is carried out and the results are published. To optimize the research and reduce the respective costs and/or raise the outcome, multiple research projects should be organized within a comprehensive research program. A meta-model (paradigm) can help comprise (a) the representation of the state-of-the-art decision knowledge, (b) the adding of new research questions, (c) the performing of trials to answer these questions, and (d) the revision of the current model. It will be discussed how to structure studies within research programs and these within one super-program.

论因果性

因果联系之所以存在,是因为世间存在着有可能经历变化的持久事物,而且人们拥有关于持久事物本性的知识。如果一个持久事物经历了一种变化,人们就能够借助他们关于该事物本性的知识确认它经历了这一变化,从而能够为该事物为什么经历这一变化提供因果解释。因果联系可以分为自然与理性两类,二者间的一个重要区别在于,前者可以为合理预测提供根据,但后者不能。     

Incorporating Student Covariates in Cognitive Diagnosis Models

In educational measurement, cognitive diagnosis models have been developed to allow assessment of specific skills that are needed to perform tasks. Skill knowledge is characterized as present or absent and represented by a vector of binary indicators, or the skill set profile. After determining which skills are needed for each assessment item, a model is specified for the relationship between item responses and skill set profiles. Cognitive diagnosis models are often used for diagnosis, that is, for classifying students into the different skill set profiles. Generally, cognitive diagnosis models do not exploit student covariate information. However, investigating the effects of student covariates, such as gender, SES, or educational interventions, on skill knowledge mastery is important in education research, and covariate information may improve classification of students to skill set profiles. We extend a common cognitive diagnosis model, the DINA model, by modeling the relationship between the latent skill knowledge indicators and covariates. The probability of skill mastery is modeled as a logistic regression model, possibly with a student-level random intercept, giving a higher-order DINA model with a latent regression. Simulations show that parameter recovery is good for these models and that inclusion of covariates can improve skill diagnosis. When applying our methods to data from an online tutor, we obtain reasonable and interpretable parameter estimates that allow more detailed characterization of groups of students who differ in their predicted skill set profiles.     

生态环境哲学:哲学当代创新之域

生态环境哲学缘起于人类对自身当代生存状况与未来命运的忧虑和关注，人类生命中自然意识的觉醒以及人类文明范式的当代转型的科学基础与文化背景中。对于人与自然生态系统及人与自然生态系统中生物、非生物的关系思考和研究，生态环境哲学可在吸收与转换现代生态科学与环境科学的知识与原理的基础上而进行哲学当代创新。这种创新意味着哲学范式的一种根本性转变。     

Evaluating Scientific Research Projects: The Units of Science in the Making

Original research is of course what scientists are expected to do. Therefore the research project is in many ways the unit of science in the making: it is the center of the professional life of the individual scientist and his coworkers. It is also the means towards the culmination of their specific activities: the original publication they hope to contribute to the scientific literature. The scientific project should therefore be of central interest to all the students of science, particularly the philosophers and sociologists of science. We shall focus on the preliminary evaluation of research projects—the specific task of referees—and will emphasize the problem of their scientificity—the chief concern of scientific gatekeepers. In the past such an examination aimed only at protecting the taxpayer from swindlers and incompetent amateurs, such as the inventors of continuous motion artifacts. In recent times a similar issue has resurfaced with regard to some of the most prestigious and most handsomely funded projects, namely work on string theory and many-worlds cosmology. Indeed, some of their faithful have claimed that these theories are so elegant, and so full of high-grade mathematics, that they should be exempted from empirical tests. This claim provoked the spirited rebuttal of the well-known cosmologists Ellis and Silk (Nature 516:321–323, 2014), which the present paper is intended to reinforce. Indeed, we shall try to show why empirical testability is necessary though insufficient for a piece of work to qualify as scientific. Finally, the present paper may also be regarded as an indirect contribution to the current debate over the reliability of quantitative indicators of scientific worth, such as the h-index of scientific productivity (e.g., Wilsdon in Nature 523:129, 2015). But we shall touch only tangentially on the sociological, political, and economics of research teams: our focus will be the acquisition of new scientific knowledge.     

Lines of Descent: Kuhn and Beyond

Thomas S. Kuhn is famous both for his work on the Copernican Revolution and his ‘paradigm’ view of scientific revolutions. But Kuhn later abandoned the notion of paradigm (and related notions) in favour of a more ‘evolutionary’ view of the history of science. Kuhn’s position therefore moved closer to ‘continuity’ models of scientific progress, for instance ‘chain-of-reasoning’ models, originally championed by D. Shapere. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate around Kuhn’s new ‘developmental’ view and to evaluate these competing models with reference to some major innovations in the history of cosmology, from Copernicanism to modern cosmology. This evaluation is made possible through some unexpected overlap between Kuhn’s earlier discontinuity model and various versions of the later continuity models. It is the thesis of this paper that the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model accounts better for the cosmological evidence than both Kuhn’s early paradigm model and his later developmental view of the history of science.     

Poincaré on Generalizations and Facts: Construction or Translation?

Much of the focus on Poincaré’s philosophy of science has been on the notion of convention, a crucial concept that has become distinctive of his position. However, other notions have received much less attention. That is the case of verifiable hypotheses. This kind of hypotheses seems to be constituted from the generalization of several observable facts. So, in order to understand what these hypotheses are, we need to know what a fact to Poincaré is. He divides facts into brute and scientific facts. The characterization of this duality is not trivial at all, and leads us to the following questions that we will discuss in this paper: (1) which the part of construction that exists in a scientific fact and which the part of translation, that is, what remains from the brute fact in the scientific one?; and (2) when we conceive a generalized hypothesis, are we supposed to do it from scientific or from brute facts? The clarification of these questions could lead to distinguish the part of construction and the part of translation in the first steps of science, which is essential to get a better understanding of Poincaré’s conception of science.