The normativity of artefacts

Part of the distinction between artefacts, objects made by humans for particular purposes, and natural objects is that artefacts are subject to normative judgements. A drill, say, can be a good drill or a poor drill, it can function well or correctly or it can malfunction. In this paper I investigate how such judgements fit into the domain of the normative in general and what the grounds for their normativity are. Taking as a starting point a general characterization of normativity proposed by Dancy, I argue how statements such as ‘this is a good drill’ or ‘this drill is malfunctioning’ can be seen to express normative facts, or the content of normative statements. What they say is that a user who has a desire to achieve a particular relevant outcome has a reason to use, or not to use, the artefact in question. Next this analysis is extended to show that not just statements that say that an artefact performs its function well or poorly, but all statements that ascribe a function to an artefact can be seen as expressing a normative fact. On this approach the normativity of artefacts is analyzed in terms of reasons on grounds of practical, and to a lesser extent theoretical, rationality. I close by investigating briefly to what extent reasons on moral grounds are, in the analysis adopted here, involved in the normativity of artefacts.     

Dual-Nature and collectivist frameworks for technical artefacts: a constructive comparison

This paper systematically compares two frameworks for analysing technical artefacts: the Dual-Nature approach, exemplified by the contributions to Kroes and Meijers (2006), and the collectivist approach advocated by Schyfter (2009), following Kusch (1999). After describing the main tenets of both approaches, we show that there is significant overlap between them: both frameworks analyse the most typical cases of artefact use, albeit in different terms, but to largely the same extent. Then, we describe several kinds of cases for which the frameworks yield different analyses. For these cases, which include one-of-a-kind artefacts and defect types, the Dual-Nature framework leads to a more attractive analysis. Our comparison also gives us the opportunity to respond to Vaesen’s (2010, this issue) critical paper. We do so by distinguishing two readings of the Dual-Nature framework and pointing out that on the sustainable, weaker reading, Vaesen’s considerations supplement the framework rather than offering an alternative to it.     

Function and use of technical artefacts: social conditions of function ascription

It is argued that we cannot understand the notion of proper functions of artefacts independently of social notions. Functions of artefacts are related to social facts via the use of artefacts. The arguments in this article can be used to improve existing function theories that look to the causal history of artefacts to determine the function. A view that takes the intentions of designers into account to determine the proper function is both natural and often correct, but it is shown that there are exceptions to this. Taking a social constitutive element into account may amend these backwards looking theories. An improved theory may either have a disjunctive form—either the history or collective intentions determine the proper function—or, as is suggested in the article, be in the form of an encompassing account that views the designers’ intentions as social, in so far as they are accepted by the users. Designers have authority, which is a social fact. The views argued for here are applied to two existing theories of artefact functions, a causal historic approach and an action theoretic approach.     

The bootstrapped artefact: a collectivist account of technological ontology, functions, and normativity

In 2006, this journal addressed the problem of technological artefacts, and through a series of articles aimed at tackling the ‘dual nature of technical artefacts’, posited an understanding of these as constituted by both a structural (physical) and a functional (intentional) component. This attempt to conceptualise artefacts established a series of important questions, concerning such aspects of material technologies as mechanisms, functions, human intentionality, and normativity. However, I believe that in establishing the ‘dual nature’ thesis, the authors within this issue focused too strongly on technological function. By positing function as the analytic axis of the ‘dual nature’ framework, the theorists did not sufficiently problematise what is ultimately a social phenomenon. Here I posit a complementary analytic approach to this problem; namely, I argue that by using the Strong Programme’s performative theory of social institutions, we can better understand the nature of material technologies. Drawing particularly from Martin Kusch’s work, I here argue that by conceptualising artefacts as artificial kinds, we can better examine technological ontology, functions, and normativity. Ultimately, a Strong Programme approach, constructivist and collectivist in nature, offers a useful elaboration upon the important question raised by the ‘dual nature’ theorists.     

The ontology of artefacts: the hard problem

We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ (UD) and ‘Realizability Constraints’ (RC), which address aspects of the dual nature thesis. Assessing supervenience accounts, we find them either wanting with respect to these criteria or insufficiently informative. Next, we argue that a recent application of Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view to artefacts cannot (yet) meet our criteria, although the broader view leaves room for improvement. Based on our evaluation of the most promising candidates, we conclude that so far general metaphysical views fail to address the most salient features of artefacts. Although they can account for the fact that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, they do not offer the conceptual resources needed to describe the relation between these natures; this relation raises a hard problem in metaphysics.     

Klein-Weyl's program and the ontology of gauge and quantum systems

We distinguish two orientations in Weyl's analysis of the fundamental role played by the notion of symmetry in physics, namely an orientation inspired by Klein's Erlangen program and a phenomenological-transcendental orientation. By privileging the former to the detriment of the latter, we sketch a group(oid)-theoretical program—that we call the Klein-Weyl program—for the interpretation of both gauge theories and quantum mechanics in a single conceptual framework. This program is based on Weyl's notion of a “structure-endowed entity” equipped with a “group of automorphisms”. First, we analyze what Weyl calls the “problem of relativity” in the frameworks provided by special relativity, general relativity, and Yang-Mills theories. We argue that both general relativity and Yang-Mills theories can be understood in terms of a localization of Klein's Erlangen program: while the latter describes the group-theoretical automorphisms of a single structure (such as homogenous geometries), local gauge symmetries and the corresponding gauge fields (Ehresmann connections) can be naturally understood in terms of the groupoid-theoretical isomorphisms in a family of identical structures. Second, we argue that quantum mechanics can be understood in terms of a linearization of Klein's Erlangen program. This stance leads us to an interpretation of the fact that quantum numbers are “indices characterizing representations of groups” ((Weyl, 1931a), p.xxi) in terms of a correspondence between the ontological categories of identity and determinateness.     

The nature of posterior hypothalamic projections to cardiorespiratory centers in the brainstem

Summary Focal electrical stimulation of the midlateral posterior hypothalamus in the rat produces rapid shallow respiration accompanied by a rise in arterial blood pressure. Stimulation of presumably intrinsic neurons only by glutamate induces slower deeper respiration associated with a fall in blood pressure.     

The x-phi(les): unusual insights into the nature of inquiry

Experimental philosophy is often regarded as a category mistake. Even those who reject that view typically see it as irrelevant to standard philosophical projects. We argue that neither of these claims can be sustained and illustrate our view with a sketch of the rich interconnections with philosophy of science.     

英国国家科技创新政策的战略规划

在世界新科技革命迅猛发展,经济全球化趋势日益增强的背景下,一个国家的科技政策愈来愈明显地表达出国家竞争战略的意志,可以说科技实力的竞争已演变成为国际竞争的焦点。时代主题的变换与新科技的冲击同样为英国的发展提供了机遇与挑战。英国科技创新战略应运而生,并在实践中取得显著效果,为英国构建国家创新体系奠定了坚实的基础。本文试图通过解读英国科技创新政策的战略规划,为我国制定科技政策提供借鉴与参考。     

The starvation-survival state of microorganisms in nature and its relationship to the bioavailable energy

Summary Although one can measure the organic matter in various ecosystems in terms of organic carbon, this measurement does not indicate what portion of the organic carbon is bioavailable to the microorganisms. Most organic matter is recalcitrant and, therefore, most microorganisms do not have sufficient energy to carry on their metabolism for growth and reproduction. As a result, many species of bacteria will form ultramicrocells and enter a physiological state known as starvation-survival. This physiological state results in metabolic arrest which permits the organisms to survive for long periods of time without sufficient energy for growth and reproduction.Technical paper No. 8920, Oregon Agricultural Experiment Station.