Covariance/Invariance: A Cognitive Heuristic in Einstein's Relativity Theory Formation

Relativity Theory by Albert Einstein has been so far littleconsidered by cognitive scientists, notwithstanding its undisputedscientific and philosophical moment. Unfortunately, we don't have adiary or notebook as cognitively useful as Faraday's. But physicshistorians and philosophers have done a great job that is relevant bothfor the study of the scientist's reasoning and the philosophy ofscience. I will try here to highlight the fertility of a `triangulation'using cognitive psychology, history of science and philosophy of sciencein starting answering a clearly very complex question:why did Einstein discover Relativity Theory? Here we arenot much concerned with the unending question of precisely whatEinstein discovered, that still remains unanswered, for we have noconsensus over the exact nature of the theory's foundations(Norton 1993). We are mainly interested in starting to answer the`how question', and especially the following sub-question: what(presumably) were his goals and strategies in hissearch? I will base my argument on fundamental publications ofEinstein, aiming at pointing out a theory-specific heuristic, settingboth a goal and a strategy: covariance/invariance.The result has significance in theory formation in science, especiallyin concept and model building. It also raises other questions that gobeyond the aim of this paper: why was he so confident in suchheuristic? Why didn't many other scientists use it? Where did he keep ? such a heuristic? Do we have any other examples ofsimilar heuristic search in other scientific problemsolving?     

Misrepresentation in Context

We can witness the recent surge of interest in the interaction between cognitive science, philosophy of science, and aesthetics on the problem of representation. This naturally leads us to rethinking the achievements of Goodman’s monumental book Languages of Art. For, there is no doubt that no one else contributed more than Goodman to throw a light on the cognitive function of art. Ironically, it could be also Goodman who has been the stumbling block for a unified theory of representation. In this paper, I shall contrast the ways how differently misrepresentation has been treated in cognitive science, aesthetics, and philosophy of science. And I shall show that it is Goodman’s unnecessary separation of resemblance and representation in art that made such a difference. As a conclusion, I will indicate some of the most promising projects toward the unified theory of representation the revolt against Goodman’s rejection of resemblance theories might promise to us.     

The Deluge of Spurious Correlations in Big Data

Very large databases are a major opportunity for science and data analytics is a remarkable new field of investigation in computer science. The effectiveness of these tools is used to support a “philosophy” against the scientific method as developed throughout history. According to this view, computer-discovered correlations should replace understanding and guide prediction and action. Consequently, there will be no need to give scientific meaning to phenomena, by proposing, say, causal relations, since regularities in very large databases are enough: “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves”. The “end of science” is proclaimed. Using classical results from ergodic theory, Ramsey theory and algorithmic information theory, we show that this “philosophy” is wrong. For example, we prove that very large databases have to contain arbitrary correlations. These correlations appear only due to the size, not the nature, of data. They can be found in “randomly” generated, large enough databases, which—as we will prove—implies that most correlations are spurious. Too much information tends to behave like very little information. The scientific method can be enriched by computer mining in immense databases, but not replaced by it.     

论博物学历史中的“断裂”

博物学历史悠久、内容繁杂。学界对博物学在历史发展中是否出现过"断裂"进行了广泛的争论。迈尔、法伯及罗杰等科学史家认为,生物学的基本问题没有变化,因此生物学的历史应该是一部连续的历史。另一方面,福柯、阿什沃斯等人从哲学和认识论的角度出发,认为自文艺复兴以来博物学经历过若干次断裂,形成不同的阶段。博物学的问题旨趣在不同的阶段有很大的差别。本文以连续论者迈尔和断裂论者福柯为主要考察对象,分析和评判其主要观点,力图将断裂问题置于编史学的视角下理解。结论认为,"断裂"不是生物学或生物学史问题,而应该看做一个编史学问题。关于"断裂"的讨论有助于拓展博物学史及科学史研究的多元视角。     

科技与社会研究的分析框架与经验基础

当前提高科技与社会研究的水平，有两个问题需要予以特别注意；（1）分析框架的多元化。分析框架规定着科技与社会研究的范围，制约着研究者的视野，进而影响到研究的质量。长期以来，我们所使用的分析框架单一，而且，该框架也固有许多缺陷。应当尝试各种可能的框架，在比较和综合的过程中，选择和建立新的更佳分析框架。（2）加强科技社会史的研究。对于科技与社会研究。科技社会史具有激发直觉和灵感、提供历史的检验等作用；此外，科技与社会研究和科技社会史研究以科技社会嫡史学为中介，存在一种互相制约、互为因果的关系。因此，加强科技社会史的研究，是提高科技与社会研究水平的一项重要措施。     

Abstraction and Insight: Building Better Conceptual Systems to Support More Effective Social Change

When creating theory to understand or implement change at the social and/or organizational level, it is generally accepted that part of the theory building process includes a process of abstraction. While the process of abstraction is well understood, it is not so well understood how abstractions “fit” together to enable the creation of better theory. Starting with a few simple ideas, this paper explores one way we work with abstractions. This exploration challenges the traditionally held importance of abstracting concepts from experience. That traditional focus has been one-sided—pushing science toward the discovery of data without the balancing process that occurs with the integration of the data. Without such balance, the sciences have been pushed toward fragmentation. Instead, in the present paper, new emphasis is placed on the relationship between abstract concepts. Specifically, this paper suggests that a better theory is one that is constructed of concepts that exist on a similar level of abstraction. Suggestions are made for quantifying this claim and using the insights to enable scholars and practitioners to create more effective theory.     

How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: Philosophical Misconceptions About Methodological Naturalism

In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the supernatural (Intrinsic MN or IMN). Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and empirically grounded attitude of scientists, which is justified in virtue of the consistent success of naturalistic explanations and the lack of success of supernatural explanations in the history of science (Provisory MN or PMN). Science does have a bearing on supernatural hypotheses, and its verdict is uniformly negative. We will discuss five arguments that have been proposed in support of IMN: the argument from the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. We conclude that IMN, because of its philosophical flaws, proves to be an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC. Evolutionary scientists are on firmer ground if they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential grounds, instead of ruling them out by philosophical fiat.     

A Realistic Look at Putnam's Argument Against Realism

Putnam's ``model-theoretic' argument against metaphysical realism presupposes that an ideal scientific theory is expressible in a first order language. The central aim of this paper is to show that Putnam's ``first orderization' of science, although unchallenged by numerous critics, makes his argument unsound even for adequate theories, never mind an ideal one. To this end, I will argue that quantitative theories, which dominate the natural sciences, can be adequately interpreted and evaluated only with the help of so-called theories of measurement whose epistemological and methodological purpose is to justify systematic assignments of quantitative values to objects in the world. And, in order to fulfill this purpose, theories of measurement must have an essentially higher order logical structure. As a result, Putnam's argument fails because much of science turns out to rest on essentially higher order theoretical assumptions about the world.     

颜色理论之争的背后--从"原型"视角看歌德的自然哲学

歌德的颜色学实际上是关于颜色的"形态学",它与亚里士多德以降的传统颜色理论是高度一致的.作为歌德自然哲学的核心概念,"原型"成为指导其科学研究的重要原则,并且是颜色理论之争的关键所在.而争论的背后,实质上是两种自然观的深刻分歧.     

“政策科学”概念溯源

政策科学是当今社会科学中发展迅速的一门学科,并且已经形成了相对独立、具有特色的理论和方法体系,产生了一系列具有政策指导意义和理论价值的研究成果。因此,对“政策科学”的概念进行溯源,以此回溯政策科学的发展史是有意义的。     

历史的逻辑理性--科学哲学理性的未来转向

西方现代科学哲学理性经历了从逻辑理性到历史理性的演进。逻辑理性和历史理性存在一定的合理性的同时,也存在自身无法克服的局限性。科学哲学的进一步发展表明,科学哲学理性的未来转向应是将二者统一的“历史的逻辑理性”。正确把握历史的逻辑理性的关键是如何理解历史。从归根到底的意义上看,历史的本质是实践的。历史的逻辑理性将是科学哲学理论的生长点。     

主流科学史中智识史与社会史传统的分离、纷争与融合

智识史与社会史是主流科学史中两大研究传统，这两大研究传统的历史演变构成了科学史学的历史。本文通过对智识史与社会史传统分离和纷争历史的系统疏理，指出两大传统的互补和融合是世纪之交科学史学发展的新趋势。     

Digestive Enzyme Secretion, Intuition, and the History of Science: Part II

A companion paper explored the role of intuition in the genesis of an alternative theory for the secretion of pancreatic digestive enzymes, looking through the lens of three philosophers/historians of science. Gerald Holton, the last scholar, proposed that scientific imagination is shaped by a number of thematic presuppositions, which function largely below awareness. They come in pairs of opposites that alternately gain cultural preeminence. The current paper examines three thematic presuppositions inherent to both the generally accepted model for digestive enzyme secretion and most consciousness-centered views of higher-level cognition—discreteness, reduction, and simplicity. Since they often build on each other, together they are referred to as the simplicity worldview. Also considered are the three opposite thematic assumptions inherent to both the alternative model for digestive enzyme secretion and intuition-friendly views of higher-level cognition—the continuum, holism, and complexity—together referred to as the complexity worldview. The article highlights the potential importance to scientific knowledge of this currently less favored worldview.     

Identifying Difference,Engaging Dissent: What is at Stake in Democratizing Knowledge?

Several prominent voices have called for a democratization of science through deliberative processes that include a diverse range of perspectives and values. We bring these scholars into conversation with extant research on democratic deliberation in political theory and the social sciences. In doing so, we identify systematic barriers to the effectiveness of inclusive deliberation in both scientific and political settings. We are particularly interested in what we call misidentified dissent, where deliberations are starkly framed at the outset in terms of dissenting positions without properly distinguishing the kinds of difference and disagreement motivating dissent.     

The Perspective of the Instruments: Mediating Collectivity

Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and philosophy of technology have repeatedly stressed that scientific practices are collective practices that crucially depend on the presence of scientific technologies. Postphenomenology is one of the movements that aims to draw philosophical conclusions from these observations through an analysis of human–technology interactions in scientific practice. Two other attempts that try to integrate these insights into philosophy of science are Ronald Giere’s Scientific Perspectivism (2006) and Davis Baird’s Thing Knowledge (2004). In this paper, these two approaches will be critically discussed from the perspective of postphenomenology. We will argue that Giere and Baird problematically assume that scientific instruments (a) have a determined function, and (b) that all human members of a scientific collective have immediate access to this function. However, these assumptions also allow them to offer a clear answer to the question how scientists can collectively relate to scientific phenomena. Such an answer is not yet (explicitly) formulated within the postphenomenological perspective. By adding a postphenomenological touch to the semiotic approach in Actor-Network Theory, we offer an account of how different individual human–technology relations are integrated into larger scientific collectives. We do so by showing that scientific instruments not only help constitute scientific phenomena, but also the intersubjectivity within such collectives.     

Constructivism, Cognition, and Science – An Investigation of Its Links and Possible Shortcomings

This paper addresses the questions concerningthe relationship between scientific andcognitive processes. The fact that both,science and cognition, aim at acquiring somekind of knowledge or representationabout the “world” is the key for establishing alink between these two domains. It turns outthat the constructivist frameworkrepresents an adequate epistemologicalfoundation for this undertaking, as its focusof interest is on the (constructive)relationship between the world and itsrepresentation. More specifically, it will beshown how cognitive processes and their primaryconcern to construct a representation of theenvironment and to generate functionallyfitting behavior can act as the basis forembedding the activities and dynamics of theprocess of science in them by making use ofconstructivist concepts, such as functionalfitness, structure determinedness, etc.Cognitive science and artificiallife provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interactionbetween each other and with the environmentenabling us to establish this link betweencognitive processes and thedevelopment/dynamics of scientific theories.The concepts of activation, synaptic weight,and genetic (representational) spaces arepowerful tools which can be used as“explanatory vehicles”for a cognitivefoundation of science, more specifically forthe “context of discovery” (i.e., thedevelopment, construction, and dynamics ofscientific theories and paradigms).Representational spaces do not only offer us abetter understanding of embedding science incognition, but also show, how theconstructivist framework, both, can act as anadequate epistemological foundation for theseprocesses and can be instantiated by theserepresentational concepts from cognitivescience. The final part of this paper addresses somemore fundamental questions concerning thepositivistic and constructivist understandingof science and human cognition. Among otherthings it is asked, whether a purelyfunctionalist and quantitative view of theworld aiming almost exclusively at itsprediction and control is really satisfying forour intellect (having the goal of achieving aprofound understanding of reality).     

科学史的可能性研究

由对科学史的主体和对象的阐释入手,探究了科学史何以可能的问题,通过分析,文章得出结论:科学史在某方面是不可能的,但在某种意义上又是可能的,其缺点正是其所是的本质特征之一,对科学史进行评级也许不失为一种比较有效的使其得以可能的办法之一。     

对近代科学革命以前的科技关系的考察

近代以前的科学史不能看成单纯的科学思想史,把科学思想史与科技关系史结合起来考察,才能对古代科学、科学思想的特点以及它们的缓慢发展进行较合理的说明.     

十九世纪末对假想火星文明的科学探索及其影响

本文通过发掘天文学历史上未被关注到的大量文献,对19世纪末一些科学人士尝试探索假想火星文明,以及这样的尝试在当时科学界所引发的争论,对科幻作品创作产生的影响,进行了系统的论述和分析。这些考察除了具有科学编史学的意义之外,也是对科幻作品的科学史意义进行探索的有益尝试。