The Origins of Time-Asymmetry in Thermodynamics: The Minus First Law

This paper investigates what the source of time asymmetry is in thermodynamics, and comments on the question whether a time-symmetric formulation of the Second Law is possible.     

Taking Thermodynamics Too Seriously

This paper discusses the mistake of understanding the laws and concepts of thermodynamics too literally in the foundations of statistical mechanics. Arguing that this error is still made in subtle ways, the article explores its occurrence in three examples: the Second Law, the concept of equilibrium and the definition of phase transitions.     

EXORCIST XIV: The Wrath of Maxwell’s Demon. Part II. From Szilard to Landauer and Beyond

In this second part of our two-part paper we review and analyse attempts since 1950 to use information theoretic notions to exorcise Maxwell’s Demon. We argue through a simple dilemma that these attempted exorcisms are ineffective, whether they follow Szilard in seeking a compensating entropy cost in information acquisition or Landauer in seeking that cost in memory erasure. In so far as the Demon is a thermodynamic system already governed by the Second Law, no further supposition about information and entropy is needed to save the Second Law. In so far as the Demon fails to be such a system, no supposition about the entropy cost of information acquisition and processing can save the Second Law from the Demon.     

A choice-semantical approach to theoretical truth

A central topic in the logic of science concerns the proper semantic analysis of theoretical sentences, that is sentences containing theoretical terms. In this paper, we present a novel choice-semantical account of theoretical truth based on the epsilon-term definition of theoretical terms. Specifically, we develop two ways of specifying the truth conditions of theoretical statements in a choice functional semantics, each giving rise to a corresponding logic of such statements. In order to investigate the inferential strength of these logical systems, we provide a translation of each truth definition into a modal definition of theoretical truth. Based on this, we show that the stronger notion of choice-semantical truth captures more adequately our informal semantic understanding of scientific statements.     

Probability without certainty: foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach debate

Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C. I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but argue that this ambiguity is only apparent if probability theory is viewed within a modal logic. Although there are empirical situations where Reichenbach is right, and others where Lewis’s reasoning seems to be more appropriate, it will become clear that Reichenbach’s stance is the generic one. We conclude that this constitutes a threat to epistemic foundationalism.     

Boltzmann's H-theorem, its discontents, and the birth of statistical mechanics

A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt (reversibility) and Zermelo (recurrence) objections to Boltzmann's H-theorem, and its simplified variant in the Ehrenfests’ 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited 1896 (measure-theoretic) objection of Zermelo (similar to an 1889 argument due to Poincaré) is also analysed. Significant differences between the objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. We give particular emphasis to the radical nature of Poincaré's and Zermelo's attack, and the importance of the shift in Boltzmann's thinking in response to the objections taken together.     

Quantum state holism: a case for holistic causation

I propose to interpret quantum state holism as a view concerning possibilities: the degree of possibility of a compound's outcome is not determined by the degrees of possibility of the components' outcomes. To analyze this proposal I sketch the modal framework of branching space-times with probabilities understood as weights of possibility. These probabilities serve to define holistic events. A holistic event produces its outcomes subluminally; yet the degree of possibility of its outcome is not determined by the degrees of possibility imposed by the event's components.     

Debunking material induction

In this paper, we present an explanatory objection to Norton's material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.     

Circularity,indispensability, and mathematical explanation in science

In this paper I consider the objection that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) is circular and hence fails to support mathematical platonism. The objection is that the explanandum in any mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon is itself identified using mathematical concepts. Hence the explanandum is only genuine if the truth of some mathematical theory is already presupposed. I argue that this objection deserves to be taken seriously, that it does sometimes undermine support for EIA, but that there is no reason to think that circularity is an unavoidable feature of mathematical explanation in science.     

Can We Explain Thermodynamics By Quantum Decoherence?

Can we explain the laws of thermodynamics, in particular the irreversible increase of entropy, from the underlying quantum mechanical dynamics? Attempts based on classical dynamics have all failed. Albert (1994a,b; 2000) proposed a way to recover thermodynamics on a purely dynamical basis, using the quantum theory of the collapse of the wavefunction of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986). In this paper we propose an alternative way to explain thermodynamics within no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. Our approach relies on the standard quantum mechanical models of environmental decoherence of open systems, e.g. Joos and Zeh (1985) and Zurek and Paz (1994).     

The quantitative content of statistical mechanics

I give a brief account of the way in which thermodynamics and statistical mechanics actually work as contemporary scientific theories, and in particular of what statistical mechanics contributes to thermodynamics over and above any supposed underpinning of the latter׳s general principles. In doing so, I attempt to illustrate that statistical mechanics should not be thought of wholly or even primarily as itself a foundational project for thermodynamics, and that conceiving of it this way potentially distorts the foundational study of statistical mechanics itself.     

Thermoscopes, thermometers, and the foundations of measurement

Psychologists debate whether mental attributes can be quantified or whether they admit only qualitative comparisons of more and less. Their disagreement is not merely terminological, for it bears upon the permissibility of various statistical techniques. This article contributes to the discussion in two stages. First it explains how temperature, which was originally a qualitative concept, came to occupy its position as an unquestionably quantitative concept (§§1–4). Specifically, it lays out the circumstances in which thermometers, which register quantitative (or cardinal) differences, became distinguishable from thermoscopes, which register merely qualitative (or ordinal) differences. I argue that this distinction became possible thanks to the work of Joseph Black, ca. 1760. Second, the article contends that the model implicit in temperature’s quantitative status offers a better way for thinking about the quantitative status of mental attributes than models from measurement theory (§§5–6).     

Oxidation and tyrosine phosphorylation: synergistic or antagonistic cues in protein tyrosine phosphatases

Protein tyrosine phosphatases (PTPs) have been generally recognised as key modulators of cell proliferation, differentiation, adhesion and motility. During signalling, several PTPs undergo two posttranslational modifications that greatly affect their enzymatic activity: tyrosine phosphorylation and cysteine oxidation. Although these modifications share their reversibility depending on the intracellular environment, their effects on enzymatic activity are opposite, tyrosine phosphorylation being correlated to enzyme activation and thiol oxidation to complete inactivation. Several papers have suggested that both these modifications occur in response to the same stimuli i.e. cell proliferation induced by numerous growth factors and cytokines. Conversely, the possibility that these two regulation mechanisms act simultaneously on PTPs has not been established and very few reports investigated this dual regulation of PTPs. To underline the relevance of the question, we discuss several possibilities: (i) that tyrosine phosphorylation and cysteine oxidation of PTPs may share the same target molecules but with different kinetics; (ii) that PTP phosphorylation and oxidation may take place on different subcellular pools of the same protein and (iii) that these two modifications, although having divergent effects on enzyme activity, cooperate in the integrated and coordinated function of PTPs during receptor tyrosine kinase signalling. We believe that our perspective will open new perspectives on an ancient problem – the apparent contradiction of opposing enzymatic regulation of many PTPs – thus clarifying their role as positive or negative transducers (or both) of many extracellular stimuli.Received 11 October 2004; received after revision 26 January 2005; accepted 10 February 2005 Available online 29 March 2005     

The double transfer of thermodynamics: From physics to chemistry and from Europe to America

The aim of this study is twofold: to explore, first, the influence of the intellectual and social conditions on the transfer of thermodynamics to chemistry and thereby the making of chemical thermodynamics, and second, the way that this knowledge was transferred from Europe to America. Consequently, it is of interest to examine the methodological approaches used by physicists and chemists to transfer thermodynamics to chemistry, to evaluate the potential of this science to offer solutions to existing chemical problems, and to discuss the attitude of the scientific community towards these new ideas. The development of chemical thermodynamics in America followed a different route compared to the European experience. Although it was transferred from Europe, it had distinctive characteristics imposed by a different traditional, intellectual and social milieu. This study focuses on the content of the transferred knowledge to America and the direction that this knowledge assumed by the American scientists. As a paradigm, the chemical thermodynamics of Gilbert Newton Lewis will be considered.     

Statistical mechanics and thermodynamics: A Maxwellian view

One finds, in Maxwell's writings on thermodynamics and statistical physics, a conception of the nature of these subjects that differs in interesting ways from the way they are usually conceived. In particular, though—in agreement with the currently accepted view—Maxwell maintains that the second law of thermodynamics, as originally conceived, cannot be strictly true, the replacement he proposes is different from the version accepted by most physicists today. The modification of the second law accepted by most physicists is a probabilistic one: although statistical fluctuations will result in occasional spontaneous differences in temperature or pressure, there is no way to predictably and reliably harness these to produce large violations of the original version of the second law. Maxwell advocates a version of the second law that is strictly weaker; the validity of even this probabilistic version is of limited scope, limited to situations in which we are dealing with large numbers of molecules en masse and have no ability to manipulate individual molecules. Connected with this is his conception of the thermodynamic concepts of heat, work, and entropy; on the Maxwellian view, these are concept that must be relativized to the means we have available for gathering information about and manipulating physical systems. The Maxwellian view is one that deserves serious consideration in discussions of the foundation of statistical mechanics. It has relevance for the project of recovering thermodynamics from statistical mechanics because, in such a project, it matters which version of the second law we are trying to recover.     

Special cases,composition of causes,and the complexity of nature

It is often held by philosophers of science that special, idealized situations are prior to complex cases in several senses: equations for complex cases are derived from those for special cases by “composing” special case equations; behavior in complex cases is explained in terms of behavior in special cases; one learns the true nature of a property in the special case where it is allowed to work in isolation. In this paper, I argue that a strand of non-equilibrium thermodynamics which attempts to go beyond the limitations of classical non-equilibrium thermodynamics adheres to something that is the reverse of this picture. Thus, the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of this picture lies very near to the heart of foundational issues in non-equilibrium thermodynamics.     

Scientific authorship in the age of collaborative research

I examine two challenges that collaborative research raises for science. First, collaborative research threatens the motivation of scientists. As a result, I argue, collaborative research may have adverse effects on what sorts of things scientists can effectively investigate. Second, collaborative research makes it more difficult to hold scientists accountable. I argue that the authors of multi-authored articles are aptly described as plural subjects, corporate bodies that are more than the sum of the individuals involved. Though journal editors do not currently conceive of the authors of multi-authored articles this way, this conception provides us with the conceptual resources to make sense of how collaborating scientists behave.