Feyerabend,truth, and relativisms: Footnotes to the Italian debate

There is a substantial literature on Feyerabend's relativism—including a few papers in this collection—but fewer specific studies of the ways that his writings and ideas have been taken up among the non-academic public. This is odd, given his obvious interest in the lives and concerns of persons who were not ‘intellectuals’—a term that, for him, had a pejorative ring to it. It is also odd, given the abundance of evidence of how Feyerabend's relativism played a role in a specific national and cultural context—namely, contemporary Italian debates about relativism. This paper offers a study of how Feyerabend's ideas have been deployed by Italian intellectuals and cultural commentators—including the current Pope—and critically assesses them.     

Instrumentalizing Failure: Edison's Invention of the Carbon Microphone

For Thomas Edison, experiencing a failure did not mean that he had failed. Through an examination of the process that led to his invention of the carbon microphone, I argue that his positive approach to failure contributed both to his success as an inventor and to the functional success of his inventions. Edison's laboratory notebooks and legal testimony reveal that his seemingly erratic approach and reliance on trial and error methods in fact had a consistent direction and a rational basis, well suited to the under-determined problems he faced. The outcome of this process, the carbon microphone, contributed significantly to the commercial success of the telephone and remains in use today. Thomas Hughes has observed that nineteenth century inventors made use of the unexpected behaviour of their inventions as sources of novel phenomena to exploit in new inventions. This paper identifies other ways in which Edison made use of failure and proposes that, paradoxically, the success of technological artefacts can be determined by the thoroughness with which failure is pursued in their creation. It also notes a parallel between Edison's instrumentalizing of failure and the way in which recent philosophers of science have proposed that scientists should make use of error.     

The Munsell Color System: A scientific compromise from the world of art

Color systems make accurate color specification and matching possible in science, art, and industry by defining a coordinate system for all possible color perceptions. The Munsell Color System, developed by the artist Albert Henry Munsell in the early twentieth century, has influenced color science to this day. I trace the development of the Munsell Color System from its origins in the art world to its acceptance in the scientific community.Munsell's system was the first to accurately and quantitatively describe the psychological experience of color. By considering the problems that color posed for Munsell's art community and examining his diaries and published material, I conclude that Munsell arrived at his results by remaining agnostic as to the scientific definition of color, while retaining faith that color perceptions could be objectively quantified. I argue that Munsell was able to interest the scientific community in his work because color had become a controversial topic between physicists and psychologists. Parts of Munsell's system appealed to each field, making it a workable compromise. For contrast, I suggest that three contemporary scientists with whom Munsell had contact – Wilhelm Ostwald, Ogden Rood, and Edward Titchener – did not reach the same conclusions in their color systems because they started from scientific assumptions about the nature of color.     

Seepage,objectivity, and climate science

Based on the disproportionate amount of attention paid by climate scientists to the supposed global warming hiatus, it has recently been argued that contrarian discourse has “seeped into” climate science. While I agree that seepage has occurred, its effects remain unclear. This lack of clarity may give the impression that climate science has been compromised in a way that it hasn't—such a conclusion should be defended against. To do this I argue that the effects of seepage should be analyzed in terms of objectivity. I use seven meanings of objectivity to analyze contrarian discourse's impact on climate science. The resulting account supports the important point that climate science has not been compromised in a way that invalidates the conclusions its scientists have drawn, despite the reality of seepage having occurred.     

Orchid: A Cultural History

By now, the story of T. D. Lysenko's phantasmagoric career in the Soviet life sciences is widely familiar. While Lysenko's attempts to identify I. V. Michurin, the horticulturist, as the source of his own inductionist ideas about heredity are recognized as a gambit calculated to enhance his legitimacy, the real roots of those ideas are still shrouded in mystery. This paper suggests those roots may be found in a tradition in Russian biology that stretches back to the 1840s—a tradition inspired by the doctrines of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and Etienne and Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. The enthusiastic reception of those doctrines in Russia and of their practical application—acclimatization of exotic life forms—gave rise to the durable scientific preoccupation with transforming nature which now seems implicated in creating the context for Lysenko's successful bid to become an arbiter of the biological sciences.     

Pure science and the problem of progress

How should we understand scientific progress? Kuhn famously discussed science as its own internally driven venture, structured by paradigms. He also famously had a problem describing progress in science, as problem-solving ability failed to provide a clear rubric across paradigm change—paradigm changes tossed out problems as well as solving them. I argue here that much of Kuhn’s inability to articulate a clear view of scientific progress stems from his focus on pure science and a neglect of applied science. I trace the history of the distinction between pure and applied science, showing how the distinction came about, the rhetorical uses to which the distinction has been put, and how pure science came to be both more valued by scientists and philosophers. I argue that the distinction between pure and applied science does not stand up to philosophical scrutiny, and that once we relinquish it, we can provide Kuhn with a clear sense of scientific progress. It is not one, though, that will ultimately prove acceptable. For that, societal evaluations of scientific work are needed.     

Between relativism and pluralism: Philosophical and political relativism in Feyerabend's late work

Relativism is one of the most problematic terms associated with philosophical discourse, with Feyerabend considered among the most important twentieth century theorists subscribing to it. This paper provides a detailed overview of relativist positions advanced in Feyerabend's mid-to-late work and investigates the associated epistemic and political applications. Emphasis is placed on how Feyerabend supported certain aspects of relativism, and at what stage he rejected others. It is noted that Feyerabend had already imposed limitations on relativism in Farewell to Reason, in which he entertained the possibility of epistemic definition within stable contexts, and advanced the notion that opportunities and equality associated with political and cultural units could only be valid within a democratic system. In Conquest of Abundance, political relativism is largely discarded, while epistemological relativism is increasingly treated as an appeal for diversity in all areas.In this re-reading of his work, it becomes clear that Feyerabend was already advocating a moderate form of epistemic and political relativism in the middle of his career, which he subsequently developed in the direction of “ontological pluralism” in his later work. This paper thus shows that Feyerabend's relativism should not be completely rejected, but rather that it continues to offer interesting food for thought.     

The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication,tacit knowledge,and the dynamics of knowledge generation

This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters' regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins's point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Collins rightly highlights the epistemic uncertainty (and skepticism) surrounding much experimental research. However, I will argue that his analysis of tacit knowledge fails to elucidate the reasons why scientists often are (and should be) skeptical of other researchers' experimental results. I will present an analysis of tacit knowledge in experimental research that not only answers to this desideratum, but also shows how such skepticism can in fact be a vital enabling factor for the dynamic processes of experimental knowledge generation.     

The Scientific Interests of Archibald Campbell, 1st Earl of Ilay and 3rd Duke of Argyll (1682-1761)

Amateur scientists were important in the science of the eighteenth century as patrons, investors in talent and new equipment, as the maintainers of gardens and libraries, and, occasionally, as men who could and did make discoveries or significant innovations. The article shows that the 3rd Duke of Argyll was one of these men. He was also much more. Ilay's interests in science, because of his important political position in Scotland, touched not only his immediate friends but helped to reshape Scottish culture itself. This essay looks at his scientific interests, his political career, and his patronage to argue that the results of his long career in politics were to institutionalize a new set of modern values in most Scottish institutions.     

The Pontifex Minimus: William Willcocks and Engineering British Colonialism

Sir William Willcocks (1852–1933) was a prominent British irrigation engineer who served in various British colonies. Best known as the chief designer of the Old Aswan Dam, Willcocks was born and trained in India, achieved prominence with his contribution to the development of centralized and perennial irrigation in Egypt, and was hired at the end of his career by the Ottomans to restore the ancient irrigation works of Mesopotamia (which was then on the verge of being acquired by the British). In this article, I follow Willcocks' voyages across the British Empire and show how hydraulic science moved from one colonial centre to another, and how this movement contributed to the construction and maintenance of colonialism on the ground. Often sent to newly acquired territories with ambitious projects to redesign the landscapes of property and agriculture, Willcocks and other engineers who gained their expertise in the colonies relied on lessons from their day-to-day struggle with the land and other social actors' competing agendas to develop the daily techniques that helped establish colonial rule. As the reception of Willcocks' work in London illustrates, it was in the metropole that engineers' practices were translated into a colonial symbolism that had large-scale technical systems as the right tools for the job of subordinating unruly waters and Nature writ large.     

Different shades of Newton: Herman Boerhaave on Newton mathematicus,philosophus, and optico-chemicus

In this paper I will probe into Herman Boerhaave's (1668–1738) appropriation of Isaac Newton's natural philosophy. It will be shown that Newton's work served multiple purposes in Boerhaave's oeuvre, for he appropriated Newton's work differently in different contexts and in different episodes in his career. Three important episodes in, and contexts of, Boerhaave's appropriation of Newton's natural philosophical ideas and methods will be considered: 1710–11, the time of his often neglected lectures on the place of physics in medicine; 1715, when he delivered his most famous rectorial address; and, finally, 1731/2, in publishing his Elementa chemiae. Along the way, I will spell out the implications of Boerhaave's case for our understanding of the reception, or use, of Newton's ideas more generally.     

Science,self improvement and the first industrial revolution

This study considers Newton's views on space and time with respect to some important ontologies of substance in his period. Specifically, it deals in a philosophico-historical manner with his conception of substance, attribute, existence, to actuality and necessity. I show how Newton links these “features” of things to his conception of God's existence with respect of infinite space and time. Moreover, I argue that his ontology of space and time cannot be understood without fully appreciating how it relates to the nature of Divine existence. In order to establish this, the ontology embodied in Newton's theory of predication is analysed, and shown to be different from the presuppositions of the ontological argument. From the historical point of view Gassendi's influence is stressed, via the mediation of Walter Charleton. Furthermore, Newton's thought on these matters is contrasted with Descartes's and Spinoza's. In point of fact, in his earliest notebook Newton recorded observations on Descartes's version of the ontological argument. Soon, however, he was to oppose the Cartesian conception of the actuality of Divine existence by means of arguments similar to those of Gassendi. Lastly, I suggest that the nature and extent of Henry More's influence on Newton's conception of how God relates to absolute space and time bears further examination.     

Rome and Theistic Evolutionism: The Hidden Strategies behind the ‘Dorlodot Affair’, 1920–1926

In 1918, Henry de Dorlodot—priest, theologian, and professor of geology at the University of Louvain (Belgium)—published Le Darwinisme au point de vue de l'Orthodoxie Catholique (translated as Darwinism and Catholic Thought) in which he defended a reconciliation between evolutionary theory and Catholicism with his own particular kind of theistic evolutionism. He subsequently announced a second volume in which he would extend his conclusions to the origin of Man. Traditionalist circles in Rome reacted vehemently. Operating through the Pontifical Biblical Commission, they tried to force Dorlodot to withdraw his book and to publicly disown his ideas by threatening him with an official condemnation, a strategy that had been used against Catholic evolutionists since the late nineteenth century. The archival material on the ‘Dorlodot affair’ shows how this policy ‘worked’ in the early stages of the twentieth century but also how it would eventually reach the end of its logic. The growing popularity of theistic evolutionism among Catholic intellectuals, combined with Dorlodot's refusal to pull back amidst threats, made certain that the traditionalists did not get their way completely, and the affair ended in an uncomfortable status quo. Dorlodot did not receive the official condemnation that had been threatened, nor did he withdraw his theories, although he stopped short on publishing on the subject. With the decline of the traditionalists’ power and authority, the policy of denunciation towards evolutionists made way for a growing tolerance. The ‘Dorlodot affair’—which occurred in a pivotal era in the history of the Church—can be seen as exemplary with regards to the changing attitude of the Roman authorities towards evolutionism in the first half of the twentieth century.     

Mechanics without mechanisms

At the time of Heinrich Hertz's premature death in 1894, he was regarded as one of the leading scientists of his generation. However, the posthumous publication of his treatise in the foundations of physics, Principles of Mechanics, presents a curious historical situation. Although Hertz's book was widely praised and admired, it was also met with a general sense of dissatisfaction. Almost all of Hertz's contemporaries criticized Principles for the lack of any plausible way to construct a mechanism from the “hidden masses” that are particularly characteristic of Hertz's framework. This issue seemed especially glaring given the expectation that Hertz's work might lead to a model of the underlying workings of the ether.In this paper I seek an explanation for why Hertz seemed so unperturbed by the difficulties of constructing such a mechanism. In arriving at this explanation, I explore how the development of Hertz's image-theory of representation framed the project of Principles. The image-theory brings with it an austere view of the “essential content” of mechanics, only requiring a kind of structural isomorphism between symbolic representations and target phenomena. I argue that bringing this into view makes clear why Hertz felt no need to work out the kinds of mechanisms that many of his readers looked for. Furthermore, I argue that a crucial role of Hertz's hypothesis of hidden masses has been widely overlooked. Far from acting as a proposal for the underlying structure of the ether, I show that Hertz's hypothesis ruled out knowledge of such underlying structure.     

The rationale behind Pierre Duhem's natural classification

The central concern of this paper is the interpretation of Duhem's attitude towards physical theory. Based on his view that the classification of experimental laws yielded by theory progressively approaches a natural classification—a classification reflecting that of underlying realities—Duhem has been construed as a realist of sorts in recent literature. Here I argue that his positive attitude towards the theoretic classification of laws had rather to do with the pragmatic rationality of the physicist. Duhem's idea of natural classification was an intuitive idea in the mind of the physicist that had to be affirmed in order to justify the physicist's pursuit of theory.     

Was Feyerabend an anarchist? The structure(s) of ‘anything goes’

The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan ‘anything goes’, was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munévar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003; Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specifically, I present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabend's radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be ‘methodological opportunists’, which Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the more influential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of ‘anything goes’ on Feyerabendian grounds.     

Instruments of Music,Instruments of Science: Hermann von Helmholtz's Musical Practices,his Classicism,and his Beethoven Sonata

The young Hermann Helmholtz, in an 1838 letter home, declared that he always appreciated music much more when he played it for himself. Though a frequent concert-goer, and celebrated for his highly influential 1863 work on the physiological basis of music theory, Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen, it is likely that Helmholtz's enduring engagement with music began with his initial, personal experience of playing music for himself. I develop this idea, shifting the discussion of Helmholtz's work on sound sensation back to its origins, and examine the role of his material interaction with musical instruments and music itself. In his sound sensation studies, Helmholtz understood sound as an external, physical object. But Helmholtz also conceived of sound in musical terms. Further, Helmholtz's particular musical tastes as well as his deeply personal interaction with musical instruments allowed him to reconcile his conception of sound as physical object with his conception of sound as music. Helmholtz's physiological theory of sound sensation was both the product of and constitutive of how he heard and created sound. I argue that Helmholtz himself was the embodied reconciliation of his physiological theory of sound sensation and his belief that musical aesthetics were historically and culturally contingent.     

Late Feyerabend on materialism,mysticism, and religion

Feyerabend's interests in religion and mysticism grew through his career. In his later writings, Feyerabend's numerous critiques of scientific materialism are often accompanied by purported advantages of religious orientations and temperaments. These recommendations do not simply follow from his tolerant theoretical pluralism; they are more positive attempts to articulate distinctive aspects of human life satisfied by religion, but not by scientific materialism. Elevating the human need for mystery, reverence, and love, he contrasts these goods with the deliverances of monistic conceptions of science and reason. I bring attention to some of the common themes in these remarks to argue that they were integral with other parts of his philosophical project and that they could serve as helpful rejoinders to contemporary exhortations to science-based secularism from philosophers of science.     

Kuhn on incommensurability and theory choice

The incommensurability of two theories seems to problematize theory comparisons, which allow for the selection of the better of the two theories. If so, it becomes puzzling how the quality of theories can improve with time, i.e. how science can progress across changes in incommensurable theories. I argue that in papers published in the 1990s, Kuhn provided a novel way to resolve this apparent tension between incommensurability and scientific progress. He put forward an account of their compatibility which worked not by downplaying the negative consequences of incommensurability but instead by allowing them to reach their natural end: a process of specialisation. This development in Kuhn’s thought has yet to be properly recorded but it is also interesting in its own right. It shows how a robust version of incommensurability—one which really does have severe negative consequences for scientists’ capacity to perform comparative evaluations of incommensurable theories—need make no puzzle of the progress of science.     

Three unpublished letters to Charles Darwin: the solution to a ‘geometrico-geological’ problem

While Charles Darwin wrote his Observations on South America, he often sought the advice and help of other scientists in solving specific problems. Three letters that the Cambridge geologist and mathematician William Hopkins wrote to Darwin exemplify such aid. In these letters Hopkins was able to show Darwin how he could calculate the position of the sedimentary beds on the Chonos Archipelago, which Darwin had visited. In his first letter Hopkins sent a solution, part of which eluded Darwin. Darwin's letters to Hopkins have not yet been found, but two additional letters gave Darwin the solution he was looking for.