技术风险视角下的邻避抗争及其环境正义诉求

当代社会技术理性的膨胀与技术主体的责任疏失,为邻避设施埋下技术风险,成为引起邻避抗争运动的重要原因之一。由于技术风险的存在,民众往往不信任邻避设施所采取的安全措施,认为兴建邻避设施会给驻地居民带来健康隐患和环境负担,滋生环境非正义。因而邻避抗争实质上是居民对邻避设施可能带来的环境非正义的抗争,是对环境权益与负担不公正分配的抗争。政府或企业应该基于环境正义原则预防和消解民众对邻避设施技术风险的担忧,从程序正义、分配正义、承认正义三个维度,去协商、处理、应对邻避抗争。     

集约化养猪环境正义:美国北卡州经验及启示

集约化养猪环境正义属于环境伦理实践哲学的研究范畴。20世纪80年代兴起的环境正义运动使弱势群体在环境受害方面的不公正待遇受到美国社会的普遍关注,学术界和政府随即展开了对环境正义的理论和实践探索。作为美国集约化养猪发展最快且养猪环境问题最早显现的地区,北卡罗莱纳州在承认正义、制度正义和分配正义三个层面的集约化养猪环境正义探索经验,可为中国解决集约化养猪环境非正义问题提供有益的参考。     

环境正义的局限与生态正义的超越及其实现

环境正义与生态正义是本质不同的概念。环境正义关注人类差异性主体对环境权利与义务的分配正义,是局限于传统社会正义的理论范畴。生态正义则强调人类补偿对自然伤害的矫正正义,是表征人类与自然和谐秩序的范式创新。通过对生态与环境、生态正义与环境正义的深入辨析,可以看出环境正义的局限性和生态正义对环境正义的超越性;进而在生态正义的视野内基于对权力、资本、科技和价值等实践中介形式的考察,探索出实现人类与自然和谐的现实路径。     

功利主义、平等待人与理性选择

功利主义与"平等"之间的传统联系主要是平等待人,即在计算整体效用时,每一个体只被视为一个单位而得到考虑。如今分配正义问题的研究扩展了传统平等待人理念的内涵,使其逐渐包含一种平等份额要求。因此,功利主义的分配方式被批评为没有能够实现人与人之间在结果上的平等分配。在本文中,笔者打算放弃功利主义传统上所强调的"(整体)效用"概念,转而从"边际效用"概念入手建立功利主义与"平等"之间两种新的联系:首先,所有人的边际效用相等是整体效用最大化的必要条件,这说明功利主义的分配方式平等对待了每个人对物品的珍视态度;其次,边际效用递减规律与"无知之幕"结合后可借助理性选择理论为传统功利主义提供一种平等份额主张。     

论网络武器对现代战争伦理体系的挑战

伴随人类战争的维度由自然空间向虚拟网络空间拓展,网络武器的攻击对象也由计算机系统与互联网向实体世界延伸。作为一种新兴的战争手段,网络武器的作战应用对现代战争伦理体系构成了一系列挑战与冲击:在"开战正义"上主要体现为对正当理由与合法权威的挑战,在"交战正义"上主要体现为对区别原则与相称原则的挑战,在"战后正义"上主要体现为对责任分配与战后恢复的挑战。     

“五水共治”工程的社会参与理论与实践探索

"五水共治"中的社会参与实践建构了现代工程中社会参与的全新内涵。论文基于具有社会性、公益性的民生类工程,以"五水共治"工程为实例,运用理论分析和实地调研相结合的方法,研究了工程的社会参与问题,并试图探索工程社会参与的理论框架。论文从参与者、模式、理念三个维度来论述"五水共治"工程社会参与的创新实践。"五水共治"的社会参与者广泛多样、言行并举、积极有为,在参与过程中形成了法律、政策、道德三维度协同的治理模式,且参与者通过信息互通、双向互动实现了共治共享。"五水共治"的社会参与突破了行动者网络理论人与物关系的框架,通过治理由人与物的关系所引起的环境问题,进而深入到协调和改善人与人之间关系。     

论环境正义——从罗尔斯《正义论》关于动物和正义的思想说起

环境正义讨论的是人对环境行为的正义问题,其核心在于环境的位格化.有四种环境正义的显现:报复的正义、回馈的正义、同情的正义和反观的正义.从位格契约论出发,可以得出环境正义的两个正义原则:实存、进取权利的原则和不能暴殄天物的原则.贯彻于人类的行为中就是作为德性的正义,它是生之积极、死之达观和节约自制三种原则的平衡.     

公平与健康:罗尔斯正义原则的健康伦理意蕴

在罗尔斯的"原初立场"中,订约人被理想化地假定是人人健康,没有人患有疾病或会提前死亡,但是通过机会的公平平等原则,我们可以扩展罗尔斯的正义理论,使之能够解释避免健康不公平的道德重要性。同时,罗尔斯的"差异原则"又允许一定程度的不平等,因此,需要对可允许的健康不公平做出充分的解释,这样,我们就能说明罗尔斯的正义原则能够在多大程度上有助于实现健康的公平。可见,罗尔斯"作为公平的正义"理论虽然不是为健康问题而设计的,但它却为我们判断何时健康的社会决定因素的分配是正义的提供了一个较为充分的理由,它使我们能以一种更为系统的方式来思考健康伦理问题。     

生命主体、固有价值、平等主义与物种主义——汤姆·雷根的动物权利理论批判

在雷根的动物权利理论中,作为形式化正义原则基础的固有价值假定的内涵实际上就是生命主体标准。雷根对动物生命主体的证成是成功的。但以此为由,基于跨物种的平等原则而主张动物拥有道德地位和道德权利却是不合理的。人类拥有权利不是因为他们具备固有价值,而在于他们是人。物种主义是适宜的。     

环境正义:环境伦理的回归

环境伦理是实践哲学的一部分。进入20世纪90年代,环境伦理由于缺乏对现实的关注而陷入了某种发展困境。与此同时,作为对传统的环境保护运动的补充和社会正义这一永恒主题在环境领域的延伸的环境正义运动及其相关理论的发展,不但在西方发达国家内部,而且在全球范围内得到广泛响应。环境正义实际上是对传统民法原则的讨论和校正,其所代表的从现实的角度看待环境问题的倾向,也是环境伦理谋求自身发展的回归。     

爱因斯坦、毕加索,科学、艺术

That Maxwell' s electrodynamics the way in which it is usually understood leads to asymmetries that do not appear in the phenomena is well known. Albert Einstein The painter' s studio should be a laboratory. There one does not make art in the manner of a monkey, one invents. Painting is a play of the mind.     

Complexity, Networks, and Non-Uniqueness

The aim of the paper is to introduce some of the history and key concepts of network science to a philosophical audience, and to highlight a crucial—and often problematic—presumption that underlies the network approach to complex systems. Network scientists often talk of “the structure” of a given complex system or phenomenon, which encourages the view that there is a unique and privileged structure inherent to the system, and that the aim of a network model is to delineate this structure. I argue that this sort of naïve realism about structure is not a coherent or plausible position, especially given the multiplicity of types of entities and relations that can feature as nodes and links in complex networks.     

Theories,theoretical models,truth

This paper was written with two aims in mind. A large part of it is just an exposition of Tarski's theory of truth. Philosophers do not agree on how Tarski's theory is related to their investigations. Some of them doubt whether that theory has any relevance to philosophical issues and in particular whether it can be applied in dealing with the problems of philosophy (theory) of science.In this paper I argue that Tarski's chief concern was the following question. Suppose a language L belongs to the class of languages for which, in full accordance with some formal conditions set in advance, we are able to define the class of all the semantic interpretations the language may acquire. Every interpretation of L can be viewed as a certain structure to which the expressions of the language may refer. Suppose that a specific interpretation of the language L was singled out as the intended one. Suppose, moreover, that the intended interpretation can be characterized in a metalanguage L ⁺. If the above assumptions are satisfied, can the notion of truth for L be defined in the metalanguage L ⁺ and, if it can, how can this be done?     

Introduction. Meaningfulness,Volunteers, Citizenship

This introductory article starts by describing the genesis of this special issue and the interconnection of its topics. The editors offer a variety of reading entries into the key-note articles and responses. The article reconstructs the research interests underpinning the idea of integrating meaningfulness, volunteers and citizenship. It highlights the explicit interdisciplinary design of the special issue, and shows how the key-note authors, and their respondents, weave connections between meaningfulness, volunteering and citizenship. And, finally, the editors bring the background understandings of the key-note papers to the foreground, and reconstruct a non-intentional meta-level discussion on two fundamental concepts and their interplay: self and world.